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SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS
IN NORTH CAROLINA AND
THE FOURTH CIRCUIT, 1993
Making the Government Pay: The Application of the Equal
Access to Justice Act in EEOC v. Clay PrintingCompany
In May 1990, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, charging Clay Printing Company, a familyowned business in Hickory, North Carolina, with twenty-three counts of
age discrimination.' The EEOC alleged that Clay Printing officials had discharged five employees, and constructively discharged at least eighteen
others, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA). 2 In March 1993, the district court ordered that payment of3
$208,000 be made-not by Clay Printing, however, but to Clay Printing.
The district court found, and the appellate court later agreed, that the EEOC
had not been "substantially justified"* in bringing the action against Clay
Printing Company, and that under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA)5
the EEOC was therefore liable for Clay Printing's attorneys' fees and
costs.

6

This Note examines the basic terms and purposes of the EAJA;7 how
the EAJA had been construed by the United States Supreme Court and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit prior to Clay Printing;8 and whether the court of appeals in Clay Printingproperly applied the
EAJA in the context of the ADEA.9 The Note concludes that the court
correctly held that the EEOC is liable for attorneys' fees and costs under the
EAJA when it brings ADEA actions that are not substantially justified. 10
In July 1987, faced with a growing inventory and what they perceived
to be an increasing number of listless employees, Clay Printing Company
1. EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 937 (4th Cir. 1992).
2. Id. The ADEA is codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
3. EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 13 F.3d 813, 814 (4th Cir. 1994). The opinion of the district
court has not been published.
4. For a discussion of the requirement that the government be substantially justified in
bringing or defending an action, see infra notes 57-74 and accompanying text.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
6. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 814.
7. See infra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 50-79 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 87-159 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 160-64 and accompanying text.

1576

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 72

officials sought the advice of a management consultant, Ray L. Scott.11
Scott proposed a number of changes, including reductions in personnel, the

implementation of a compensation system based on commissions rather
than salary, and a requirement that salespeople be made responsible for
their own business expenses.1 2 Many of Scott's recommendations were
adopted by the company's directors; Scott himself soon became "an integral
part of the management hierarchy at Clay."13 During the course of subse-

quent management meetings, Scott remarked that "too many people have
been here too long and make too much money," that there was not enough
"young blood" in the company, and that "if employees had been there 10
years or more, they needed to move on." 14
The five discharged claimants, on whose behalf the EEOC sought re-

lief, ranged in age from forty to sixty years, and had a combined total of
more than 100 years of working experience at Clay Printing.1 5 In affidavits
submitted to the district court, the five former employees testified that they
believed they had been discharged because of their ages, though none
claimed to have evidence to support that allegation. 6 Although none of the
five had ever been reprimanded for poor performance, Clay Printing's directors alleged that the claimants had been discharged because they had
made more money than the rest of the sales team, spent too much time in
the break room, took too long to perform their assigned tasks, disclosed
confidential information, lacked the necessary training, or had been caught
sleeping on the job.17
11. EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 937 (4th Cir. 1992).
12. Id. at 937-38.
13. Id. at 938.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 938-39. The five discharged employees were replaced by persons ranging in age
from 35 to 53 years old. Id. Three of the five replacements were 35 years old. Id. Clay Printing
produced evidence suggesting that, during the time in question, "the number of employees under
age 40 and over age 40 who left the employment of Clay was about equal." Id. at 939-40. For a
discussion of the elements of a wrongful discharge claim under the ADEA, see infra notes 81-86
and accompanying text.
16. Clay Printing,955 F.2d at 939. Each claimant stated that he or she had neither heard any
statement nor seen any document suggesting age was a basis for his or her discharge. Id. The
court of appeals found that the claimants' "beliefs were based upon their own personal feelings
without evidentiary support." Id.
17. Id. at 938-39. The EEOC further alleged that at least 18 persons had been constructively
discharged because of their ages. Id. at 937; for a discussion of the elements of a constructive
discharge claim see note 86. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, however, the EEOC reduced that
number to four. Clay Printing, 955 F.2d at 937. Three of the four, who had been salespersons,
claimed they felt compelled to resign after Clay Printing announced that they would be paid solely
by commission, that they would be responsible for paying their own expenses, and that their
company cars would be taken away. Id. at 940. The fourth employee claimed he resigned after a
dispute with management over his employment contract. Id.
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In an unpublished opinion, the district court granted Clay Printing's
motion for summary judgment on all of the EEOC's claims.'" The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that "the EEOC has failed
...to marshall enough evidence evincing age discrimination,"' 19 that a
"fair-minded jury simply could not return a verdict for the EEOC on the
evidence presented,"2 and that "[a]fter a long, litigious process, what is
really before this court, is a vain attempt by the EEOC to create a triable
issue of age discrimination out of little more than thin air."'"
Soon thereafter, Clay Printing filed a claim for attorneys' fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act.2 2 In an unpublished opinion,
the district court ruled that, under the EAJA, the government was required
to prove its litigating position was "substantially justified," and that the
EEOC had failed to carry that burden.23 The court therefore awarded Clay
Printing $192,792.50 in attorneys' fees and $15,348.92 in expenses.2 4
A unanimous panel of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 5
Reviewing the lower court's decision under an "abuse of discretion" standard,2 6 the court held that "objective indicia provide ample support for our
ruling that the fee award did not constitute an abuse of the district court's
discretion."'27 To support its holding, the court stated that, despite a thirtymonth investigation and ten months of discovery, the EEOC had failed to
make even a prima facie case in three of the five discharge claims, and that
"[a]ll in all, EEOC's case failed quickly and completely."2 The court held
that a single judge's dissent in the Fourth Circuit's affirmance of summary
judgment in the merits action "is not enough to convince us that the district
court's assessment of the case constituted an abuse of its discretion." 29 Finally, the court observed that the ADEA does not expressly preclude an
18. Clay Printing,955 F.2d at 937.

19. Id. at 941.
20. Id. at 942-43.
21. Id. at 944. Judge Restani of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting on the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals by designation, dissented, finding the EEOC "has produced sufficient direct evidence of age discrimination to defeat summary judgment" Id. at 946 (Restani, J.,
dissenting).
22. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 814. The EAJA is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988 & Supp.
IV 1992).
23. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 814.

24. Id.; see also infra note 45 and accompanying text. The sum awarded to Clay Printing
was much larger than other EAJA awards. For a discussion of the frequency and average size of
EAJA awards, see infra note 46.
25. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 815.

26. For a discussion of the appropriate standard of review, see infra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
27. Clay Printing,13 F.3d at 815. For a discussion of the significance of "objective indicia,"
see infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
28. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 815-16; see also infra notes 93-108 and accompanying text.

29. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 816; see also infra notes 109-14 and accompanying text.
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award of fees and costs under the EAJA, and that the EAJA's "plain lan-

guage" suggests the statute is fully applicable to "civil actions involving
anti-discrimination statutes. 30
The EAJA was enacted as a partial response 31 to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness
Society.32 In Alyeska, the Court observed that, under the "American Rule"
governing attorneys' fees, a "prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to

collect a reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser. '33 Well-established common-law exceptions to the American Rule aside, 34 the Court held that Con-

gress's occasional employment of the "private attorney general" concept35
cannot "be construed as a grant of authority to the Judiciary to jettison the
traditional rule against nonstatutory allowances to the prevailing party and
to award attorneys' fees whenever the courts deem the public policy furthered by a particular statute important enough to warrant the award."3 6
Rather, only Congress should be allowed to select those federal statutes for
37
which fee-shifting is appropriate.
Rising to the challenge, the 94th, 95th, and 96th Congresses conducted
public hearings on broad fee-shifting measures.38 Congress particularly

feared that "certain individuals, partnerships, corporations and labor and
30. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 816-18; see also infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
31. See H.R. RaP. No. 1418, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984, 4984-86; H.R. REP. No. 120, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. I, at 5 (1985), reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. 132, 133.
32. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
33. Id. at 247.
34. The Court noted that courts may order a litigant to pay an opponent's reasonable attorneys' fees for "'willful disobedience of a court order,"' or "when the losing party has 'acted in
bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."' Id. at 258-59 (quoting Toledo Scale
Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923) and F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber
Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974), respectively).
35. The notion of the "private attorney general" refers to instances in which "Congress has
opted to rely heavily on private enforcement to implement public policy and to allow counsel fees
so as to encourage private litigation." Id. at 263. The Court cited provisions of the antitrust laws
and Title H of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as examples. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 263-64. It should also be noted that, prior to the enactment of the EAJA, "the
United States' sovereign and general statutory immunity to fee awards" generally barred courts
from awarding attorneys' fees to private parties who prevailed in litigation against the government. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 575 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
38. H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 31, at Pt. I 5, reprintedin 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 133. As
a result of those hearings, the 94th Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act,
Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (1976) (codified at42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)),
which "expanded the liability of losing parties for attorneys' fees in certain civil rights cases, and
in some tax proceedings ... as well." H.R. REp. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 6, reprintedin 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4984-85. For more detailed descriptions of the Congressional response to Alyeska, see Dwayne R. McClure & Mark T. Steele, Note, Liability for Attorneys' Fees Under the
EqualAccess to Justice Act-Raton Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 11 ENERGY L.J. 297, 301-02
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other organizations may be deterred from seeking review of, or defending
against unreasonable governmental action because of the expense involved

in securing the vindication of their rights." 39 To address that perceived
problem, the 96th Congress enacted the EAJA. 4 The primary purpose of

the Act is
to reduce the deterrents and disparity [between the resources of
the government and those of individuals and organizations] by
entitling certain prevailing parties to recover an award of attorney
fees, expert witness fees and other expenses against the United
States... [and to ensure] that the United States will be subject to
the common law and statutory exceptions to the American rule
41

The heart of the Act, and the portion at issue in Clay Printing,
provides:
Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall
award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and
other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to [an(1990); John P. Stem, Note, Applying the Equal Access to Justice Act to Asylum Hearings, 97
YALE LJ. 1459, 1461-62 (1988).
39. H.R. REP.No. 1418, supra note 31, at 5, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4984. The
courts have acknowledged this fear as one of the principal reasons Congress passed the EAJA.
See, e.g., United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161, 1164 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that the EAJA
provides for fee-shifting in order "to avoid the deterring effect which liability for attorney fees
might have on parties' willingness and ability to litigate meritorious civil claims or defenses
against the Government"), cert. denied sub nom. Crandon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 73 (1992).
The courts have sometimes stated the matter even more forcefully. See, e.g., Pullen v. Bowen,
820 F.2d 105, 107 (4th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the EAJA was enacted in order to "penalize
unreasonable behavior on the part of the government without impairing the vigor and flexibility of
its litigating position") (emphasis added).
The House Judiciary Committee cited two additional concerns motivating the enactment of
the EAJA: the growing resources and power of the federal bureaucracy, and the suspicion that
federal agencies were targeting small businesses that agency officials knew lacked the resources
fully to litigate the issues in order more easily to establish lines of cases for future precedential
value. H.R. REp. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 9-10, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4988.
40. H.R. REp. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 6-8, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4985-86.
The EAJA was initially adopted as a three-year experiment. See Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub.
L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325, 2329 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504; 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982)) (repealed 1984). The Act was permanently adopted by the 99th Congress in 1985. See Equal Access
to Justice Act, Extension and Amendment, Pub. L. No. 99-80, 99 Stat. 183 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). For a brief history of the EAJA's enactment, see James B.
Nobile, Note, DeterminingFeesfor Fees Under the EqualAccess to Justice Act: Accomplishing
the Act's Goals, 9 CARnozo L. REv. 1091, 1091-92 n.2, 1098-103 (1988).
41. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 6, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4984. For a
more detailed discussion of the EAJA's goals, see Nobile, supra note 40, at 1103-06; Stem, supra
note 38, at 1462.
One student author has argued that "the government has vexatiously and unreasonably contested fee issues to discourage litigation in a manner that is contrary to the purpose and scope of
the Act." Stephen E. Blackman, Comment, Bad Faith and the EAJA: A Proposalfor Strict Scrutiny of Government Fee Litigation Under the EAJA, 20 ENvmL. L. 975, 975 (1990).
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other portion of the Act], incurred by that party in any civil action
(other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for ju-

dicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United
States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the
court finds that the position of the United States was substantially
42
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust.
The statutory term "position" refers both to an "agency's prelitigation conduct" and to the government's "subsequent litigation positions. '43 The
phrase "fees and other expenses" encompasses "the reasonable expenses of
expert witnesses, the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering
report, test, or project which is found by the court to be necessary for the
preparation of the party's case, and reasonable attorney fees."'44 Attorneys'

fees are limited to $75 per hour, "unless the court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher
fee."'4 5 In recognizing a "special circumstances" exception, Congress intended to give courts "discretion to deny awards where equitable considera'46
tions dictate an award should not be made."
42. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988). The Act also waives the traditional governmental
immunity from awards of attorneys' fees and costs:
Unless expressly prohibited by statute .... [t]he United States shall be liable for [reasonable attorneys'] fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be
liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(b) (1988); see also supra note 37.
43. INS v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 159 (1990). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that administrative agencies must follow the law of the circuit in which they are litigating; nonacquiescence may be grounds for a later EAJA award. Crawford v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 655, 658 (4th
Cir. 1991).
44. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
45. Id. In Clay Printing,the district court increased the hourly fee from $75 to $150. Clay
Printing, 13 F.3d at 814 n.2. Because the EEOC did not specifically appeal the lower court's
decision to exceed the statutory cap, the court did not address the issue. Id.
46. H.R. REP, No. 1418, supra note 31, at 11, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4990. See
generally Ralph V. Seep, Annotation, What Constitutes "Special Circumstances" Precluding
Award of Attorneys' Fees Under EqualAccess to JusticeAct, 106 A.L.R. FED. 191 (1992) (providing a general discussion and case annotations concerning the "special circumstances"
exception).
The House Judiciary Committee expressed particular concern that any fee-shifting legislation
Congress passed not unduly chill government enforcement of federal laws. In a 1985 report on
the EAJA, the Committee wrote:
Concerns have been expressed before the Committee that the provision for awards of
attorneys [sic] fees could chill public officials charged with enforcing the law from
vigorously discharging their responsibilities. That is not the Committee's intent. The
Committee recognizes [and] reaffirms the importance of federal enforcement of federal
law, especially where a federal statute creates rights which cannot be privately enforced
so that those to whom the rights have been extended are entirely dependent upon the
enforcement agency to assure that their rights are protected.
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As reflected in the language of the statute itself,47 Congress intended
to make both plaintiffs and defendants eligible for an EAJA award. 48 However, only those individuals with net worth not exceeding $2 million, and
only those companies, partnerships, and organizations with fewer than 500
employees and net worth not exceeding $7 million, are eligible for an award
under the Act. 49
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the application of the
EAJA in Pierce v. Underwood. ° In Pierce, tenants of government-subsidized apartment buildings filed a class-action suit against the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development.5" The tenants claimed the Secretary had
wrongfully decided not to implement a congressional program through
which the tenants were to receive federal payments to offset rising property
taxes and utility costs.52 Although the agency quickly settled most tenants'

H.R. REP. No. 120, supra note 31, at pt. I, 10, reprinted in 1985 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 139. When
Congress initially proposed the EAJA, the Departments of Justice and the Treasury strongly opposed the legislation, fearing it would chill the government's attempt to prosecute violations of
federal law and would be prohibitively expensive. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 7,
reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4986.
Since the Act was passed, it has become apparent that EAJA litigation, far from rising to a
frequency likely to have a chilling effect, is considerably more rare than many expected it would
be. When the legislation was enacted in 1980, both the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) had forecast daunting costs: The CBO had predicted that EAJA costs to the federal government would total $69 million in the Act's inaugural
year, $115 million in its second year, and $126 million in its third year. H.R. REP. No. 1418,
supra note 31, at 21, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5000. The OMB estimated annual costs
of $205 million. Id. at 23, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5003. The OMB's forecasts exceeded those of the CBO due in part to a belief that the government would be forced to hire
additional attorneys to litigate EAJA claims. Id. The Department of Justice had predicted costs of
$125 million per year. Id.at 20, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4999.
Those predictions proved to be vastly overstated. During the first three years of the Actbetween October 1, 1981, and October 1, 1984-a cumulative total of only $3.9 million was
awarded under the EAJA. H.R. ReP. No. 120, supra note 31, at pt. I, 8, reprinted in 1985
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 137. In 1993, EAJA awards totaled a mere $1,001,181, less than in any previous
reporting year. 1993 DEPr. OF JUSTICE EQUAL Access To JusTIcE Acr AN. REP. at Table 1. In
that same year, there were 263 applications for attorneys' fees and other expenses; 88 percent
(232) of those applications were granted, for an average award of $4,315. Id. The vast majority
of EAJA awards (227, totaling $781,555) were made against the Department of Health and
Human Services. Id. at Table 2.
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
48. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 10, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4989.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Net worth is determined at the time
a party files its EAJA claim. The Act makes an exception to those net-worth requirements for
organizations qualifying for treatment under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Id.
50. 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
51. Id.at 555.
52. Id.
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claims, 3 the tenants filed a claim for attorneys' fees and costs under the
EAJA:5 4
The Court in Pierce reached two conclusions that have continuing significance for all EAJA litigation. First, the Court held that lower courts'
decisions to award fees under the EAJA must be reviewed under an "abuse
of discretion" standard.5 5 While the statute itself does not expressly iden-

tify the appropriate standard of review, a majority of the Court found that
"the text of the statute permits, and sound judicial administration counsels,
deferential review of a district court's decision regarding attorney's fees
under the EAJA." s
Second, the Pierce Court addressed the meaning of the statutory
phrase "substantially justified."5" The legislative history makes clear that,
by requiring the government to assume only substantially justified litigating
53. Id. at 556.
54. Id. at 557. The District Court granted the motion. Id. The Supreme Court agreed an
EAJA award was proper, id. at 570-71, but remanded for a recalculation of the appropriate
amount, id. at 574. For a general discussion of the Court's holding in Pierce, see Sharon G.
Cheney & Cecilia S. Howard, Note, Pierce v. Underwood: Equal Access to Justice Act-Standards Defined by the High Court, 40 MERCER L. REv. 1001 (1989).
55. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 559. Justice Scalia expressed concern about requiring that deference
be given to lower courts' decisions to award potentially enormous sums of money, but took some
comfort in the fact that the median EAJA award at that time was only $3,000. Id. at 563. For a
discussion of the frequency and average size of EAJA awards, see supra note 46.
Until the Supreme Court's decision in Pierce, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit had
reviewed questions of law arising with respect to EAJA awards under a de novo standard of
review. See Hicks v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 1022, 1024 (4th Cir. 1985) ("When the component of the
[government's] legal position is assayed on appeal, the scope and standard of review are a de
novo determination.... [ When the reasonableness of the [government's] factual position is at
issue, the authorities are in disarray.") (emphasis added). The Hicks court's findings followed a
period during which the Fourth Circuit simply avoided the issue. See Smith v. Heckler, 739 F.2d
144, 147 n.7 (4th Cir. 1984) ("We reach this conclusion without deciding the question of which
appellate standard of review is appropriate in [EAJA] cases."). The Court of Appeals has acknowledged that Pierce requires an "abuse of discretion" standard. See Lively v. Bowen, 858
F.2d 177, 180 n.1 (4th Cir. 1988) ("Pierce alters our standard of review of EAJA fee decisions.
We have in the past reviewed such decisions de novo.").
56. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 563. Justice White had urged the Court to adopt a de novo standard
of review. Id. at 583-86 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He noted that the
text of the EAJA does not require a deferential standard of review, id. at 583-84 (White, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part), then argued that the issue of whether government action was
substantially justified is a question of law and so should be reviewed de novo, id. at 584 (White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White further contended that a de novo
standard would promote "consistency and predictability in EAJA litigation." Id. at 585 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 563-68. The pertinent text of the statute appears at 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)
(1988); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text. See generally Kevin W. Brown, Annotation, What Constitutes Substantial Justification of Government's Position so as to Prohibit
Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against Government Under Equal Access to Justice Act, 69 A.L.R.
FED. 130 (1984) (providing a general discussion and case annotations concerning the issue of
substantial justification).
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positions, Congress intended to balance delicately "the constitutional obligation of the executive branch to see that the laws are faithfully executed
against the public interest in encouraging parties to vindicate their rights."5 8
In light of that intent, the Court considered two alternative meanings of the
phrase "substantially justified"-"justified to a high degree" and "justified
in substance or in the main"59 -and settled upon the latter.6" The Court
stated that its reading of the statute was "no different from the 'reasonable
basis both in law and fact' formulation adopted by... the vast majority of
...Courts of Appeals that have addressed this issue," including that of the
Fourth Circuit.6 ' To be "substantially justified," the Court held, the government's position must be "more than merely undeserving of sanctions for
frivolousness;"'62 rather, it must be "justified to a degree that could satisfy a
reasonable person. '"63
58. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 10, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4989; see
also infra note 62. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has declared itself bound to
consider this balance when determining whether the government's position was substantially justified in a given case. See United States v. B & M Used Cars, 860 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1988);
Pullen v. Bowen, 820 F.2d 105, 107 (4th Cir. 1987).
59. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 565.
60. Id.
61. Id. The Court cited Anderson v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 1011, 1013 (4th Cir. 1985), as a
Fourth Circuit decision reaching the same conclusion. Pierce,487 U.S, at 565; see also Smith v.
Heckler, 739 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir. 1984) (stating the same proposition).
62. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 566. The Department of Justice had proposed in 1980 that fees be
awarded "only where the government action was 'arbitrary, frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless."' H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 14, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4993. The
Senate, on the other hand, had proposed that fees be awarded automatically to the prevailing party.
H.R. REP. No. 1418, supranote 31, at 13, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4992. By adopting a
standard that requires substantial justification, Congress sought to strike a compromise between
the two proposals. H.R. REP.No. 1418, supra note 31, at 14, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4993. Congress intended thereby "to caution agencies to carefully evaluate their case and not to
pursue those which are weak or tenuous," while also ensuring that the government is protected
from an award of fees "when its case, though not prevailing, has a reasonable basis in law and
fact." H.R. RP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 14, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4993.
Long before Pierce, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit proved cognizant of Congress's intent to strike a careful balance. See Tyler Business Services, Inc. v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73,
75 (4th Cir. 1982) ("The legislative history discloses that this standard is intended to be between
an automatic award of fees to a successful party and an award of fees only when the government's
position is arbitrary or frivolous."). The court remains sensitive to the issue. See Evans v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 109, 111 (4th Cir. 1991) ("Although by no means automatic, the 'substantially
justified' standard... requires that the government must do more than merely avoid frivolity for it
to escape liability for fees under the Act.").
63. Pierce,487 U.S. at 565. The Court rejected language from a 1985 House Judiciary Committee report which suggested that the standard requires "'more than mere reasonableness."' Id.
at 566-68 (quoting H.R. Rm. No. 120, supra note 31, at 9, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
138). The Court rejected the House's 1985 interpretation for three reasons: (1) the House in 1985
played no role in drafting the statute (the statute was originally adopted in 1980 as a three-year
experiment; Congress in 1985 merely made its provisions permanent, see supra note 40), id. at
566-67; (2) in a 1980 report, the House advocated a "reasonableness in law and fact" standard, id.
at 567 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 14, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4993);
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In United States v. Paisley,' the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit described how appellate review for substantial justification is to be conducted. The Paisleycourt held that an appellate court must first look "at the
available 'objective indicia' of the strength of the Government's position."6 5 The terms of any settlement agreement, the stage of the litigation at
which the merits were decided, and "the views of other courts on the
strength, hence reasonableness, of the Government's position" are examples
of the kinds of "objective indicia" that the reviewing court should consider.6 6 If an analysis of such factors is not sufficient to determine whether
the district court abused its discretion, the court must then conduct "an independent assessment of the merits of the Government's position." 67
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has also discussed the impact that
the decision on the merits both should and should not have on subsequent
EAJA litigation. In Tyler Business Services v. NLRB,6 8 the court held that a
government loss on the merits in no way gives rise to a presumption that the
government's position was not substantially justified.69 Conversely, a
and (3) "[o]nly the District of Columbia Circuit had adopted the position that the Government
had to show something 'slightly more' than reasonableness," id. at 567 (quoting Spencer v.
NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984)).
For a discussion of Justice Scalia's use of legislative history in resolving the issue, see the
recent article by Stephen Breyer (who since has been appointed to the United States Supreme
Court), On the Uses of Legislative History in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S.CAL. L. REv. 845, 85253 (1992).
Justice Brennan argued that more than mere reasonableness should be required if the government is to avoid an award of fees, and that "[flar from occupying the middle ground, 'the test of
reasonableness' is firmly encamped near the position espoused by the Justice Department." Id. at
577-78 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also supra note 62.
For an argument that the Court's interpretation of the phrase "substantially justified" has limited
the EAJA's effectiveness, see Stem, supra note 38, at 1463 n.32.
64. 957 F.2d 1161 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. deniedsub nom. Crandon v. United States, 113 S.Ct.
73 (1992).
65. Id. at 1166 (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 568).
66. Id.
67. Id. The Paisley court also suggested that this analysis is essentially a determination of
whether the government's attorneys had made "a reasonable legal decision" that a violation of
federal law had occurred. Id. at 1165.
68. 695 F.2d 73 (4th Cir. 1982).
69. Id. at 75 (citing H.R. RP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 11, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4990; accord Paisley, 957 F.2d at 1167 ("Although the impulse to equate ultimate judicial rejection of the Government's merits position-at whatever level-with its lack of
substantial justification is understandable, the courts perforce have rejected it as inappropriate
....");Evans v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 109, 110 (4th Cir. 1991) ("It would be a war with life's
realities to reason that the position of every loser in a lawsuit upon final conclusion was unjustified."); United States v. B & M Used Cars, 860 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1988) ('The fact that the
government failed to [prevail on the merits] raises no presumption that its position was not substantially justified."); Smith v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 144, 147 (4th Cir. 1984) ("Our holding [against
the Secretary of Health and Human Services] of course does not mean that the Secretary is automatically liable for attorney's fees every time she loses a case."); Guthrie v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d
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judge's approval of the government's litigating position at some stage of the
merits decision does not conclusively establish that the government's position was substantially justified.7" In short, "the substantial justification issue cannot be transformed into an up-or-down judgment on the relative
reasoning powers of Article III judges who may have disagreed on the merits of a Government litigation position."'"
Although a court's holding on the merits is not itself dispositive of any
subsequent EAJA claim, the merits decision does carry significant weight.
Congress itself suggested that a decisive government loss on the merits may
indicate that the government had taken a substantially unjustified position.7 2
In addition, the Supreme Court has observed that a "string of losses" or a
"string of successes" on a given issue might be indicative of the reasonableness of the government's position on that issue.7 3 The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit has stated the matter even more forcefully:
[Mierits decisions in a litigation, whether intermediate or final,
cannot, standing alone, determine the substantial justification issue. But of course they-and more critically their rationalesare the most powerful available indicatorsof the strength, hence
reasonableness, of the ultimately rejected position. As such, they
obviously must be taken into account both by a district court in
deciding whether the Government's position, though ultimately
rejected on the merits, was substantially justified, and by a court
of appeals in later reviewing that decision for abuse of
discretion.7 4

104, 108 (4th Cir. 1983) ("[E]ntry of summary judgment for the [private party] raises no presumption that the government's position was not substantially justified.").
The Tyler court stated what the Supreme Court would later confirm. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 568-69 (1988) (holding that neither the government's willingness to settle on
unfavorable terms nor a government loss at the pleadings stage commands the conclusion that the
government's position was substantially unjustified).
70. Paisley, 957 F.2d at 1167 (arguing that it is "unacceptable ...to find in an intermediate
judicial determination of merit in the Government's position proof that the position was at least
one that 'could satisfy a reasonable person"').
71. Id.
72. H.R. RP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 11, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4989-90.
The report states that
[e]ertain types of case dispositions may indicate that the Government action was not
substantially justified. A court should look closely at cases, for example, where there
has been a judgment on the pleadings or where there is a directed verdict or where a
prior suit on the same claim has been dismissed. Such cases clearly raise the possibility
that the Government was unreasonable in pursuing the litigation.
Id.
73. Pierce, 487 U.S. at 569.
74. Paisley, 957 F.2d at 1167 (emphasis added).
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When the government fails to demonstrate that its position was
substantially justified,' an award of fees under the EAJA is mandatory. 76 Moreover, attorneys' fees incurred to prepare the EAJA claim may
themselves be recovered. 77 The Supreme Court confirmed that reading of
the law in INS v. Jean,78 and further held that the government's decision to
contest the EAJA award need not itself be substantially unjustified for those
fees to be awarded.7 9
Courts can never apply the EAJA, of course, without reference to the

statutory or common-law causes of action that were at issue in the merits
litigation."0 In order to appreciate the court's holding in Clay Printing,it is
necessary to understand the basic elements of an ADEA claim. The ADEA

makes it illegal for an employer, inter alia,
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his

compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age; [or]
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify [one's] employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-

ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an

employee, because of such individual's age .... 81
To state a claim of discharge in violation of the ADEA, a person has
two alternatives. First, she may show that she is protected by the Act, and

that but for her employer's desire to discriminate against her on the basis of
her age, she would not have been discharged."

Alternatively, she may pro-

75. The burden of proof does rest on the government to demonstrate that its position was
substantially justified. Lively v. Bowen, 858 F.2d 177, 180 (4th Cir. 1988). In part, the Lively
court reached this conclusion by reviewing the pertinent legislative history. Id.; see also H.R.
REP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 11, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4989 (stating that the
burden of proof rests with the government, because "it is far easier for the Government, which has
control of the evidence, to prove the reasonableness of its action than it is for a private party to
marshal the facts to prove that the Government was unreasonable").
76. Tyler Business Services v. NLRB, 695 F.2d 73, 74-75 (4th Cir. 1982) (observing that the
statute "requires an award of attorney's fees" when the government's position was substantially
unjustified and no special circumstances make such an award of fees unjust) (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 77 ("The amount of recovery may include the time spent preparing and prosecuting
the motion for attorney's fees.").
78. 496 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1990).
79. Id. at 162-66.
80. As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted, "[w]hether the government's decision
to initiate and to pursue [an action against a party] was reasonable must be examined in light of
its burden under the appropriate statute." United States v. B & M Used Cars, 860 F.2d 121, 124
(4th Cir. 1988). It is nevertheless beyond the scope of this Note to conduct a full analysis of the
law governing employment discrimination.
81. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (1988). To find protection under the ADEA, one must be at least 40
years of age. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
82. Spagnuolo v. Whirlpool Corp., 641 F.2d 1109, 1111-12 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
860 (1981).

19941

CIVIL PROCEDURE

1587

ceed under the standards of proof laid out by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 3 Briefly stated, the McDonnell Douglas
Court held that a plaintiff may state a prima facie claim of employment
discrimination by showing that she belongs to a protected minority class,
and that she suffered adverse employment treatment despite her qualifications. 84 The burden then shifts to the employer "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's [treatment]."8 5 The
plaintiff must then be given an opportunity to show that the employer's
explanation is a mere pretext for discrimination. 6
In EEOC v. Clay Printing Company, 7 the EEOC asked the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to review a district court's decision to award
more than $208,000 in attorneys' fees and costs to Clay Printing Company
under the EAJA.88 Having observed that it must review the district court's
actions under an "abuse of discretion" standard, 9 the court turned to the
issue of whether the EEOC had been substantially justified9" in bringing the
age discrimination actions against Clay Printing.9 ' The court found it unnecessary to engage in a thorough reevaluation of the evidence; instead,
following UnitedStates v. Paisley,9" the court found it sufficient to examine

83. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adapted the McDonnell Douglas test to ADEA claims in Lovelace v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 681 F.2d 230, 239-40
(4th Cir. 1982).
84. McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 804; see also Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56
(1981) (restating the McDonnell Douglas test, and clarifying the allocation of burdens under that
analysis).
Several Clay Printing employees alleged that they had been constructively discharged.
EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 937 (4th Cir. 1992); see also supra note 17. The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals outlined the essential elements of a constructive discharge claim
in Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986):
"A constructive discharge occurs when 'an employer deliberately makes an employee's working
conditions intolerable and thereby forces him to quit his job."' Id. at 1255 (quoting Holsey v.
Armour & Co., 743 F.2d 199, 209 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1028 (1985)). An
employer is said to have acted deliberately only when he intended to force the employee to quit.
Bristow, 770 F.2d at 1255. Difficult working conditions cannot be taken as circumstantial evidence of such intent when all employees were treated identically. Id. Whether the plaintiff's
working conditions were intolerable is determined "by the objective standard of whether a 'reasonable person' in the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign." Id.
87. 13 F.3d 813 (4th Cir. 1994).
88. Id. at 814; see also supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
89. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 815; see also supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
90. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
91. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 815-16.
92. 957 F.2d 1161, 1166 (4th Cir. 1992); see also supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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"'objective indicia' of the weakness of the government's case,"'93 including
the outcome of the merits litigation.9 4
The court first noted the lower court's grant of summary judgment in
the merits action.95 Although a grant of summary judgment based on questions of law may not be particularly pertinent in subsequent EAJA litigation, 96 a grant of summary judgment based on an "inadequate factual
showing" is highly relevant to the substantial justification question. 7 In
Clay Printing, the EEOC had conducted a lengthy investigation and engaged in ten months of discovery; even then, the court observed, the EEOC
had proved unable to make the minimal factual showing required to overcome a motion for summary judgment. 98
The court also reiterated its reasoning in Paisley: Decisions on the
merits and the rationales underlying them "are the most powerful available
indicators of the strength, hence reasonableness, of the ultimately rejected
position." 99 The court noted that the district court had found that the
EEOC's claims were, "to say the least, simply implausible" and had "no
tenable basis whatsoever."' 10 "All in all," the court of appeals summarized,
"the unmistakable tenor of the [district court's] opinion is that EEOC
wasted everybody's time and was grasping at evidentiary straws."'' 1
The court then observed that, when the district court's grant of summary judgment was appealed, the court of appeals reached conclusions similar to those of the trial judge.'0 In the merits action, the court of appeals
had stated that "[a]fter a long, litigious process, what is really before this
court, is a vain attempt by the EEOC to create a triable issue of age discrimination out of little more than thin air."' 03 In the subsequent EAJA litigation, the appellate court noted its earlier "thin air" comment," and further
observed that the EEOC had failed to make a prima facie case in three of
93. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 815 (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 568 (1988)).

94. For a discussion of the significance of the merits outcome in subsequent EAJA litigation,
see supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
95. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 815.
96. Id. (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 569 (1988)). The Pierce majority be-

lieved that "Where... the dispute centers upon questions of law rather than fact, summary disposition proves only that the district judge was efficient." Pierce, 487 U.S. at 569.
97. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 815.
98. Id.
99. United States v. Paisley, 957 F.2d 1161, 1167 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub non.
Crandon v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 73 (1992); accord Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 815; see also
supra note 74 and accompanying text.

100. Clay Printing,13 F.3d at 816 (quoting the unreported opinion of the district court) (internal quotations omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 944 (4th Cir. 1992).
104. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 816; see also supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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the five discharge claims," °5 had made no showing that Clay Printing's explanations of the discharges were pretextual,10 6 and had fallen "'woefully
short"' of producing the evidence necessary to sustain its constructive discharge claims." 7 In short, the court said, "EEOC's case failed quickly and
08
completely."'
The court next considered the significance of Judge Restani's dissent
in the merits action. 10 9 In its appeal of the district court's EAJA decision,
the EEOC had acknowledged that the dissent was "not legally controlling
on the fees issue." 110 The EEOC nevertheless thought the dissent was
significant:
[Judge Restani's] dissent drives a stake through the heart of
Clay's argument. If this were truly a case where the Commission
proceeded "in the absence of any probative evidence supporting
an inference of age discrimination," where the Commission based
its case on an "empty" record, or where the Commission relied
solely on the "naked assertions of discrimination in the complaint," as Clay contends, then how did this case elicit such a
strongly worded dissent on the very issue of the evidentiary sufficiency of the Commission's case? Unless this court is willing to
say that Judge Restani's view of the evidence was not a permissible one, her opinion provides strong support for the view that the
Commission's case, at its core, was substantially justified."'
The court of appeals responded by balancing the strength of the dissent
against the fact that the district court's decision to award costs and attorneys' fees had to be reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" standard." 2
"We agree [with the EEOC] that the dissenting judge's views should be
considered," the court reasoned, "but this factor alone (and it is alone) is not
enough to convince us that the district court's assessment of the case constituted an abuse of its discretion.""' 3 Moreover, the court observed, a major105. Id.
106. Id.; see also supra note 86 and accompanying text.
107. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 816 (quoting Clay Printing,955 F.2d at 945). More specifically, the court observed that the EEOC had failed to show that Clay Printing officials had deliberately made the complainants' working conditions intolerable. Id.; see also supra note 86.
108. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 816.
109. Id.; see Clay Printing, 955 F.2d at 946-50 (Restani, J., dissenting); see also supra note
21.
110. Reply Brief of Appellant at 18, EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 13 F.3d 813 (4th Cir. 1994)
(No. 93-1605).
111. Id. at 18-19 (citations to Clay Printing Company's brief omitted).
112. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 816. For a discussion of the "abuse of discretion" standard, see
supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
113. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 816. Though the court gave absolutely no indication that its
treatment of Judge Restani's dissent was colored by this fact, perhaps it should be noted that Judge
Restani is not a permanent member of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, but was sitting on the
Fourth Circuit by designation. Clay Printing,955 F.2d at 937.
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ity of the Fourth Circuit panel deciding the merits had indeed concluded
that "of the twenty-three 'cases' involved in EEOC's action . . . not one
'1 14
approached what might be considered a close case."
The EEOC also argued on appeal that, even if its position were not
substantially justified, "the Commission's enforcement actions [under the
ADEA] should not be subject to the 'substantially justified' standard [of
the EAJA]."' 15 In support of this contention, the EEOC advanced two arguments. First, the agency pointed to the law governing the award of attorneys' fees to parties engaged in Title VII litigation. 1 6 The language of
Title VII, the EEOC observed, states that the "prevailing party"-whether
the plaintiff or the defendant-may be awarded attorneys' fees.117 Despite
that clear language, however, the Supreme Court, in its 1978 decision in
ChristiansburgGarment Co. v. EEOC,11 held that "equitable considerations" required that there be a dual standard for awarding attorneys' fees to
plaintiffs and defendants in Title VII actions.1 9 While a plaintiff must simply prevail in order to become eligible for an award of attorneys' fees, a
defendant must not only prevail, but must also demonstrate that the plaintiff's action was "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless." 2 ' The primary
"equitable consideration" that the Court believed dictated this result was the
fact that Title VII plaintiffs were the instruments by which Congress had
" '
elected to enforce important civil rights laws.12
The EEOC argued that because the fee-shifting language of the ADEA
is more stringent than that of Title VII, allowing only plaintiffs to be
awarded fees, 2 2 Congress's drafting of the ADEA "reflects an even
stronger policy choice against the award of fees to prevailing defendants
than that reflected in Title VII." 12 3 If "equitable considerations" militated
114. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 816.
115. Brief of Appellant at 47, EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 13 F.3d 813 (4th Cir. 1994) (No.
93-1605). Instead, the EEOC argued that it should only be subject to the "bad-faith" exception to
the American Rule governing attorneys' fees, which applies to the government under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(b) (1988). Id. at 48 n.19.
116. Id. at 44-48 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988)). Title VII, under which Congress
created the EEOC and delegated the agency its fundamental powers, broadly prohibits employment discrimination. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
117. Brief of Appellant at 44 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988)).
118. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
119. Id. at 418, 422.
120. Id. at 422.
121. Id. at 418. In this respect, the Court appears to have employed its own "private attorney
general" notion; see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
122. Brief of Appellant at 45, EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 13 F.3d 813 (4th Cir. 1994) (No.
93-1605) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1988), as incorporated by reference in 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
(1988), which provides that a court may "allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the
defendant"; the statute is silent with respect to attorneys' fees to be paid by the plaintiff).
123. Id. at 47-48.
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in favor of a heightened standard for defendants' receipt of fees under Title
VII, the EEOC argued, then surely "equitable considerations" should
prompt the court to bar Clay Printing, a prevailing defendant, from being
awarded fees in an action brought under a statute in which Congress elected
to exclude defendants from the benefits of a fee-shifting provision
altogether.' 2 4
As examples of the "equitable considerations" it hoped the court
would consider, the EEOC cited the public importance of allowing the
EEOC to take aggressive measures toward eliminating discrimination and
the difficulty of proving intentional discrimination." The EEOC argued
that Congress had left the door open for courts to contemplate such matters

when it provided in the EAJA that fees were not to be awarded to a prevail126

ing party if "'special circumstances' militate against the award of fees."'
The EEOC made a second, related argument in support of its contention that it "should not be subject to the EAJA's 'substantially justified'
standard."'127 The EAJA provides that the federal government is liable for
attorneys' fees and costs when its position was not substantially justified,
"[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by statute."' 28 The EEOC
pointed out that, in its 1980 report on the EAJA,' 2 9 the House Judiciary
Committee emphasized that the Act was "not intended to replace or supersede any existing fee-shifting statutes ... in which Congress has indicated
a specific intent to encourage vigorous enforcement."' 30 By making only
defendants liable for attorneys' fees under the ADEA, the EEOC argued,
124. Id. at 48. Because Christiansburgwas decided two years before the EAJA was enacted,
the Court did not then have occasion to discuss the Act's impact on such issues.
125. Brief of Appellant at 48. "The Commission must be given some leeway," the EEOC
argued, "in seeking to push for aggressive enforcement of the anti-discrimination statutes under its
administrative charge." Id. at 48-49. In its Reply Brief, the EEOC reiterated its point, arguing
that "[tihere is no logical reason for subjecting the Commission's ADEA actions to a more onerous fee-shifting standard [than that which applies to Title VII plaintiffs], particularly since the
ADEA, on its face, reflects an even stronger policy against the award of fees to prevailing defendants." Reply Brief of Appellant at 24-25, EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 13 F.3d 813 (4th Cir. 1994)
(No. 93-1605).
126. Brief of Appellant at 49 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988)). The Commission
also noted that the House Judiciary Committee had characterized the cited provision as giving
courts "discretion to deny awards where 'equitable considerations dictate an award should not be
made."' Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
4990).
127. Id. at 47.
128. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
129. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 31, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4984.
130. Brief of Appellant at 46 (citing H.R. Rm. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 18, reprintedin
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4997). The cited passage of legislative history also reiterates that the given
subsection of the EAJA was not intended to apply to those civil actions "already covered by
existing fee-shifting statutes." H.R. Rm'. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 18, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4997.
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Congress demonstrated a desire to "encourage vigorous enforcement"; con-

sequently, the agency should not be held liable for attorneys' fees in the
ADEA actions it brings.131
The court of appeals responded to the EEOC's arguments 132 by stating
that the EEOC had "ma[de] too much" of the ADEA's failure expressly to
allow defendants to recover attorneys' fees. 133 The court resolved the issue
by relying on the plain language of the EAJA and on the fact that the
ADEA does not expressly prohibit defendants from receiving an award of

attorneys' fees:
The [EAJA] seems clear enough-in any civil action, if the
United States is a party and loses, the other party gets attorney's
fees unless some other statute specifically says otherwise ...

EAJA makes no distinction between civil actions involving antidiscrimination statutes and those involving other areas of the law

....

Until another statute "specifically provide[s]" that ADEA

defendants cannot get such fees from the United
States, the plain
1 34
language of EAJA will continue to control.
Consequently, the court held, the EEOC was fully liable for attorneys' fees
under the substantially justified standard of the EAJA. 35
The court's rejection of the EEOC's second argument for exclusion
from the EAJA's substantially justified standard 13 6 -the argument based on
the EAJA's conditional phrase, "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided by statute"' 37 -appears well founded. The House Judiciary Committee made it clear that by employing that phrase, Congress intended to spare

from the EAJA's reach only those statutes that already allowed awards of
131. Brief of Appellant at 46, 49. Clay Printing Company opposed the EEOC's request for
exclusion from the EAJA's substantially justified provision by trying to focus the court's attention, not on the language of the ADEA, but on that of the EAJA. Clay Printing argued that
Congress enacted the EAJA with knowledge of the dual standard established in Christiansburg
Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412,422 (1978); see also supra notes 119-21 and accompanying
text, and chose instead to place plaintiffs and defendants on equal footing, Brief of Appellee at 4142, EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 13 F.3d 813 (4th Cir. 1994) (No. 93-1605). Clay Printing also
argued that
all of the Commission's policy notions overlook the principle that Congress is the ultimate policy-maker and that the policies manifested in the EAJA must be given full
meaning and context. Accordingly, this Court need not search through off-point
Supreme Court decisions to discern applicable policy when Congressional intent is clear
and codified.
Id. at 41. This case, Clay Printing contended, presented a prime example of the kind of "egregious" government behavior that "propelled the passage of the EAJA." Id. at 42.
132. See supra notes 115-31 and accompanying text.
133. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 817.
134. Id. at 817-18 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (d)(1)(A) (1988)).
135. Id. at 818.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988).
137. Id.; see also supra notes 127-31 and accompanying text.
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fees against the government, under standards that Congress or the courts
had already carefully tailored to the policy objectives of the specific statute.
The Committee made this point in two ways. First, the Committee listed
three statutes as examples of the kind of legislation that the EAJA was not
intended to supersede; all three authorize awards of attorneys' fees against
the government, under standards at considerable variance with the EAJA's
substantially justified standard.13 8 Second, the Committee explained that
the EAJA's conditional phrase was intended to make clear that the Act "is
intended to apply only to cases (other than tort cases) where fee awards
against the government are not already authorized."1 39 It therefore appears
clear that, by making an exception for statutes that "otherwise specifically
provide," Congress did not intend to place the government's litigating positions under statutes like the ADEA-statutes that make no mention of fee
awards against the government-beyond the reach of the EAJA's substantially justified standard.
The court's decision finds additional support in Congress's articulation
of one of the reasons for enacting the broad fee-shifting measures of the
EAJA: "to caution agencies to carefully evaluate their case and not to pursue those which are weak or tenuous."'140 If the district and appellate
courts' evaluations of the merits of the EEOC's case in Clay Printing141 are
indeed fair assessments, then there can be no doubt that the EEOC is in as
much need of "caution" against prosecuting "weak or tenuous" cases' 4 2 as
any other governmental unit. In the face of what the court appeared to
138. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supranote 31, at 18, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4997 (citing
the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2)(B), (3)(B) (1988) ('The court may assess
against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in
any case under this paragraph in which the complainant has substantially prevailed."); the Civil
Rights Acts, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1988) ("In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a
reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs the
same as a private person."); id. § 1988 (1988) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce" select
statutory provisions, "the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."); and the Voting Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1971(c) (1988) ("In any proceeding hereunder the United States shall be liable for costs
the same as a private person.")).
139. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4997.
Several courts have expressly adopted the cited proposition in their holdings. See Huey v. Sullivan, 971 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (8th Cir. 1992); Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 787 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (9th
Cir. 1986), reh'g denied, 813 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1987); Gavette v. Office of Personnel Management, 808 F.2d 1456, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1986); EEOC v. Kimbrough Inv. Co., 703 F.2d 98, 103 (5th
Cir. 1983), reh'g denied, 715 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1983); Howard v. Heckler, 581 F. Supp. 1231,
1232-33 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
140. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4993; see
also supra note 62.
141. See supra notes 19-21, 28, 100-08 and accompanying text.
142. H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 14, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4993; see
also supra note 62.
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regard as a flagrant abuse of prosecutorial power, 143 it is perhaps not surprising that the court would be unpersuaded by an argument founded on a
mere statutory omission, and would instead require a firm expression of
congressional will in order to reach the conclusion urged by the EEOC. 144
The court's rejection of the EEOC's first argument for exclusion from
the substantially justified standard of the EAJA is somewhat more problematic. The EEOC had argued that "equitable considerations" weighed
against holding the EEOC subject to that standard in actions it brings under
the ADEA. 14 5 Congress did indeed suggest that courts had "discretion to
deny awards where equitable considerations dictate an award146should not be
made," under the "special exceptions" clause of the EAJA.
The court of appeals stated that the tension between equitable concerns
and the EAJA's language posed no real difficulty: '"The question of which
policy was foremost in the collective mind of Congress is irrelevant...
when the words [of the EAJA] point in only one direction." 14 7 Even
though the EEOC had urged the court to follow the example set by the
Supreme Court in ChristiansburgGannent Co. v. EEOC14 8 and add a judicial gloss to the fee-shifting standards set out by Congress,1 49 the court of
appeals apparently regarded equitable concerns as matters entirely for the
legislature's consideration. The court wrote, "EEOC does not disclose another statute that might keep us from turning to EAJA when EEOC loses an
age discrimination suit .... Until another statute 'specifically provide[s]'
that ADEA defendants cannot get such fees from the United States, the
plain language of EAJA will continue to control." 150
If the court's handling of the Clay Printing case is to be faulted, it is
for laying a broader foundation for its holding on this issue than was required. Rather than holding that "equitable considerations" were not sufficiently weighty to justify exempting the EEOC from the EAJA's
substantially justified standard in the case at bar-a holding clearly warranted by the relevant legislative history 1 5 -the court held that another
statute must specifically state that ADEA defendants are barred from col143. See supra notes 19-21, 28, 100-08 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
146. H.R. REP.No. 1418, supra note 31, at 11, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4990; see
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
147. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 817.
148. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
149. See supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
150. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 817-18 (emphasis added) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A)
(1988)).
151. H.R. RP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 11, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4990; see
also supra note 126 and accompanying text.
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lecting attorneys' fees from the government before the EEOC will be able
152
to make a valid claim for exemption.
At least two points, however, may be made in defense of the court's
resolution of this issue. First, it seems clear that, if the court of appeals
were ever to regard "equitable considerations" as relevant to its analysis of
the EAJA's application in ADEA suits brought by the EEOC, 153 this was
not the case that would inspire it to so hold. It is apparent that the court did
not believe Clay Printing had been granted summary judgment due to the
inherent difficulty of proving intentional discrimination, one of the primary
equitable concerns cited by the EEOC.' 5 4 Rather, the court was persuaded
that the EEOC's case was entirely devoid of merit-the agency had not
prevailed because it had tried to build a case out of "thin air."' 155 It therefore remains possible that, if presented with a more compelling set of facts,
the court will find it useful to pursue an analysis of "equitable considerations" in ADEA litigation, as it is permitted to do under the "special cir56
cumstances" clause of the EAJA.1
Second, by declaring "equitable considerations" irrelevant to its analysis, the court appears not to have foreclosed entirely a line of analysis useful
in cases such as Clay Printing. Suppose, for example, that the EEOC were
correct in arguing that one of the primary equitable concerns that should be
considered is the difficulty of proving intentional discrimination. 157 The
statutory term "substantially justified," as construed by the Supreme Court
in Pierce to mean "justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person,"' 1 8 might well be sufficiently inclusive to allow consideration of such
difficulties: the issue would simply be whether, given the difficulty of
proof, the EEOC had reasonable grounds for proceeding with the litigation.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested just such an analysis:
"Whether the government's decision to initiate and to pursue [an action
against a party] was reasonable must be examined in light of its burden
under the appropriate statute."' 5 9 Consequently, even if matters such as
difficulties of proof are not considered by a court as "equitable considerations," per se, they might still influence a court's analysis insofar as they
appear relevant to the question of substantial justification.
152. Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 817-18; see also supra note 150 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
154. Brief of Appellant at 48, EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 13 F.3d 813 (4th Cir. 1994) (No.
93-1605); see also supra note 125 and accompanying text.
155. EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 944 (4th Cir. 1992).
156. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988); see also supra notes 42, 126 and accompanying
text.
157. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
158. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988); see also supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
159. United States v. B & M Used Cars, 860 F.2d 121, 124 (4th Cir. 1988).
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The court of appeals correctly construed precedent and the pertinent
statutory language when it held that the EEOC is liable for costs and attor-

neys' fees under the EAJA when it is not substantially justified in prosecuting an ADEA claim, yet prosecutes that claim nonetheless. 160 The only
fault that might be found with the court's application of the EAJA in Clay
Printingis its refusal to weigh "equitable considerations"; in so holding, the
court deprived itself of one of the tools of analysis that Congress intended

to place at its disposal. 161 That particular quibble aside, the court's holding
comports with the straightforward language of the EAJA, 162 with much of
the pertinent legislative history,1 63 and with Congress's overriding desire to
reduce the financial disincentives individuals and organizations often face

when deciding whether to contest unwarranted government action against
1
them.
TODD EDWARD PETrYS

160. See Clay Printing, 13 F.3d at 818; see also supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
161. See supra notes 122-26, 145-50 and accompanying text.
162. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1988); see also supra note 42 and accompanying text.
163. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 31, at 18, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4997;
see also supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
164. See H.R. REP. No. 1418, supra note 3 1, at 6, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4984; see
also supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.

Civil Procedure-Choice of Law-Collins & Aikman Corp. v.
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 335 N.C. 91,
436 S.E.2d 243 (1993)
In Collins & Aikman Corp. v. HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co.,' the
North Carolina Supreme Court considered choice of law rules with respect
to an insurance contract made in California. Departing from the state's
long-standing rule of lex loci contractus,2 the court held that section 58-3-1
of the North Carolina General Statutes3 mandated the application of North
Carolina law to the insurance contract. Because it promotes North Carolina's interest in the dispute, the decision approximates a modem choice of
law result.4 The court, however, did not use modem analysis, but chose

instead to rely wholly on the insurance choice of law statute, thereby limiting the effect of the decision to insurance contracts.
Collins & Aikman involved the interpretation of a liability insurance
policy issued by Hartford Accident & Indemnity (Hartford) to Collins &
Aikrnan Corporation (C&A),5 a Delaware corporation headquartered in

New York City.6 After unsuccessfully attempting to negotiate a policy
through Marsh & McLennan, an independent broker in North Carolina,

C&A's parent corporation suggested that C&A use Marsh & McLennan's
California office.7 After Marsh & McLennan successfully negotiated the

policy with Hartford in California, Hartford sent the policy to Marsh &
McLennan's California office where it remained during the entire coverage
period.' The policy provided $5,000,000 of coverage for any liability
1. 335 N.C. 91, 436 S.E.2d 243 (1993).
2. The rule of lex loci contractus provides that "the substantive law of the state where the
last act to make a binding contract takes place controls all aspects of the interpretation" of the
contract. Id. at 99, 436 S.E.2d at 248 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (citing Tanglewood Land Co. v.
Byrd, 299 N.C. 260,262,261 S.E.2d 655,656 (1980); Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N.C.
511, 516, 157 S.E. 860, 863 (1931)).
3. For the full text of N.C. GaN. STAT. § 58-3-1 (1991), see infra note 21.
4. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
5. 335 N.C. at 92, 436 S.E.2d at 244.
6. Id. at 98, 436 S.E.2d at 247 (Meyer, J., dissenting). C&A has sixteen subsidiaries and
operates thirty-four manufacturing plants located in seven states and two Canadian provinces. Id.
The sixteen subsidiaries do business in twenty-eight states and several foreign countries. ld.
Moreover, C&A has administrative offices, warehouses, and sales offices throughout the nation.
Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
7. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). C&A is a fully owned subsidiary of Wickes Company, a
Delaware corporation operating primarily in California. Id. at 92, 436 S.E.2d at 244.
8. Id. at 93, 436 S.E.2d at 244. The policy covered C&A from March 1, 1987 through
February 29, 1988. Il However, the policy was not sent to C&A's North Carolina office until
March 8, 1988. Id.
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above the $2,000,000 limit of C&A's primary policy issued by Aetna Casualty and Surety.9
The incident triggering application of the liability policy occurred in
North Carolina. 0 In a wrongful death action brought against C&A in North
Carolina, a jury awarded $2,500,000 in compensatory damages and
$4,000,000 in punitive damages." Hartford denied liability for the punitive
damages. 12 Consequently, C&A sued on the policy in North Carolina.13
The superior court held that Hartford was not liable for the recovery of
punitive damages. 14 In a unanimous decision, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals reversed, holding Hartford liable. 5 The North Carolina Supreme
16
Court granted discretionary review.
The court addressed two issues. First, it considered which state's law
should govern the interpretation of the insurance contract. Hartford contended that North Carolina's long-standing rule of lex loci contractus governed the case.17 Under that rule, "the substantive law of the state where
the last act to make a binding contract takes place controls all aspects of the
interpretation" of the contract.1 " Because the last act to form the contractthe delivery-took place in California, Hartford argued that California law
should be applied. 9 The majority rejected this argument and relied instead
on section 58-3-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes,20 which directs
application of North Carolina law to certain insurance contract cases.2 1
Concluding that North Carolina law governed the dispute,2 2 the court
then examined whether the insurance policy covered punitive dam9. Id.
10. Id. The accident, which occurred on February 29, 1988, involved one of C&A's trucks
from its transportation division in Albemarle, North Carolina. Id. Ninety-seven of the company's
102 trucks, including the one involved in the accident, were titled in North Carolina. Id. The
accident killed two people and prompted a wrongful death action against C&A. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Collins & Aikman Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 106 N.C. App. 357, 364,
416 S.E.2d 591, 595 (1992), aff'd, 335 N.C. 91, 436 S.E.2d 243 (1993).
16. Collins & Aikman, 335 N.C. at 93, 436 S.E.2d at 244.
17. Id. at 94, 436 S.E.2d at 245.
18. Id. at 99, 436 S.E.2d at 248 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 94, 436 S.E.2d at 245.
20. Id.
21. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-1 (1991). The statute provides:
All contracts of insurance on property, lives, or interests in this State shall be deemed to
be made therein, and all contracts of insurance the applications for which are taken
within the State shall be deemed to have been made within this State and are subject to
the laws thereof.
22. Collins & Aiknan, 335 N.C. at 94, 436 S.E.2d at 245,
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ages." Although the policy expressly excluded coverage for "fines and
penalties," the court found those terms ambiguous. 4 Construing the policy
against the drafter, the court held that the policy covered punitive damages. Three justices dissented on this issue; they argued that the provision
excluding fines and penalties was not ambiguous and required the exclusion
of punitive damages.2 6
When states devise choice of law rules, they are limited only by the
Constitution of the United States.2 7 From 1866 to 1935, the United States
Supreme Court often invalidated choice of law rules that exceeded constitutional limits.2" During this time, the Supreme Court employed a very rigid
and structured analysis.2 9 In the contracts area, the Court followed the rule
23. Id. at 97, 436 S.E.2d at 246. If California law had applied, the punitive damages would
not have been covered by the insurance contract because punitive damages are uninsurable as a
matter of policy in California. Id. at 100, 436 S.E.2d at 248-49 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (citing
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Superior Court, 236 Cal. Rptr. 216, 219 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)).
In North Carolina, however, public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage of punitive damages. Id. at 102, 436 S.E.2d at 249-50 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (citing Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins.
Co., 311 N.C. 621, 623, 319 S.E.2d 217, 219 (1984)).
24. Id. at 97, 436 S.E.2d at 246-47.
25. Id. at 96, 436 S.E.2d at 246.
26. Id. at 103-04, 436 S.E.2d at 250-51 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
27. See W. Milller-Freienfels, Conflicts of Law and ConstitutionalLaw, 45 U. Cm. L. REv.
598, 598 (1978).
28. James R. Pielemeier, Why We Should Worry About Full Faith and CreditTo Laws, 60 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1299, 1303 (1987). Courts have differed on which provisions of the Constitution
govern state choice of law limits-the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Due Process Clause.
Article IV of the Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
The Fourteenth Amendment, on the other hand, prohibits a state from "depriv[ing] any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
Choice of law has usually been addressed through the Due Process Clause. See Lea
Brilmayer, Credit Due Judgments and Credit Due Laws: The Respective Roles of Due Process
and Full Faith and Credit in the Interstate Context, 70 IowA L. REv. 95, 95 (1984). Many
commentators, however, have argued that due process analysis as a basis for conflict of laws
analysis is inadequate and should be replaced by Full Faith and Credit Clause analysis. See, e.g.,
James A. Martin, ConstitutionalLimitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 185, 229
(1976) (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause provides a better "theoretical basis for limiting a state's choice of law"). The Due Process Clause prevents a state from "overreaching"
through application of its laws to the exclusion of another state's laws. Brilmayer, supra, at 96.
Professor Brilmayer points out that the Supreme Court's decision in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410
(1979), "stands for the proposition that if there are sufficient contacts to justify application of local
law under the due process clause, then application of local law also satisfies full faith and credit."
Brilmayer, supra, at 108. For conflict of law purposes, therefore, there may be no difference
between due process and full faith and credit treatment.
29. Pielemeier, supra note 28, at 1304. Adhering to a very formal view of state boundaries
and choice of law rules, the United States Supreme Court, in Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934), invalidated the application of a Mississippi choice of
law statute that was virtually identical to section 58-3-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes. A
Connecticut insurance company insured a Mississippi corporation against loss from the dishonesty
of any of its employees. Delta & Pine, 292 U.S. at 144-45. Because the loss occurred in Missis-
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of lex loci contractus, under which it strictly applied the law of the state in
which a contract was formed. 30
When interstate business and travel increased in the mid-twentieth cen-

tury, an increasing number of cases arose in which more than one state had
legitimate interests. 3 ' In response, the Supreme Court shifted its position.3 2

At present, the Court employs a "significant contacts" approach: As long as
a state has significant contacts with a dispute, application of its own law
33

will not violate the Constitution.

The Court recently discussed the significant contacts approach in
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague3 4 and Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
sippi, the Mississippi Supreme Court applied Mississippi law even though the contract was
formed in Tennessee. Id. at 147-48. The United States Supreme Court found this action contravened the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Id. at 149-50. Although the Court
spoke strongly against application of the Mississippi statute, it stated that the statute may not be
unconstitutional under all circumstances. Id. at 149. Under some circumstances, Mississippi
could have a strong enough connection with a contract to justify application of its own law. Id.
Under the circumstances in Delta & Pine, however, Mississippi had only a slight connection to the
contract; thus, the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 149. The decision in Delta & Pine was
clearly a product of early formalistic thinking and there is evidence that the United States Supreme
Court may no longer consider it good law. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 18182 (1964); Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 71 (1955); see also Frederic
L. Kirgis, Jr., The Roles ofDue Processand Full Faith and Credit in Choice ofLaw, 62 CORNELL
L. REv. 94, 110 n.59 (1976) (suggesting that the statute in Delta & Pine would satisfy present due
process standards).
30. Pielemeier, supra note 28, at 1304.
31. Id.
32. Mtiller-Freienfels, supra note 27, at 599. In 1981, the Supreme Court reviewed a state
choice of law decision for the first time in eighteen years. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302 (1981); see also Gene R. Shreve, In Search of a Choice-of-Law Reviewing Standard-Reflections on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66 MN. L. REv. 327, 327 (1982) (noting that Hague
was the first case in eighteen years in which the Supreme Court had reviewed a state choice of law
decision). In 1985, the Court invalidated a state's choice of law rules for the first time in thirtyeight years. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985); see also Pielemeier,
supra note 28, at 1299 ("[Shutts] ended the longstanding Supreme Court acquiescence to a growing trend among state courts to apply forum law in cases involving people and events in other
states."). For a discussion of the Court's recent choice of law decisions, see infra notes 34-39 and
accompanying text.
33. Pielemeier, supra note 28, at 1307.
34. 449 U.S. 302 (1981). The dispute in Hague stemmed from an automobile accident that
occurred in Wisconsin between two Wisconsin residents. Id. at 305. The dispute involved insurance policies that were issued in Wisconsin and covered Wisconsin vehicles. Id. at 305. Each of
the three automobile policies provided a maximum of $15,000 in uninsured motorist coverage. Id.
"Stacking" the policies would allow a recovery of $45,000. Id. The choice of law issue arose in
determining whether to apply Minnesota law, which allowed "stacking," or Wisconsin law, which
did not. Id. at 306. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's choice of Minnesota "stacking" law, finding no constitutional problems. Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W,2d
43, 49 (Minn. 1979).
In a plurality opinion, the United States Supreme Court affirmed Minnesota's choice of law
decision. Hague, 449 U.S. at 320; see also Shreve, supra note 32, at 328-31 (explaining the
Court's decision in Hague). Justice Brennan wrote the opinion and was joined by Justices White,
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Shutts" The Court refused to impose national choice of law standards and
instead left the states relatively free to fashion their own choice of law
rules.36 The full Court could agree only that there must be a legitimate state
interest in the controversy if the state is to apply its own laws.37 That the
Court declined to bring greater uniformity to the area of choice of law disappointed some commentators.3 8 Legal analysts have since called upon the
Court to define more specifically the standards for determining the constitutionality of particular choice of law applications;3 9 thus far the Court has
not done so.
Marshall, and Blackmun. Hague, 449 U.S. at 302. Because Justice Stevens concurred on the
constitutionality of the decision, five justices agreed that the choice of law decision did not violate
the full faith and credit or due process clauses of the Constitution. Id. at 331-32 (Stevens, I.,
concurring). The Court considered three notable contacts with Minnesota: the deceased had
worked in Minnesota and had commuted there daily; Allstate Insurance did business within Minnesota; and Mrs. Hague had become a resident of Minnesota, administering her husband's estate
from there. Id. at 313-19. By aggregating these contacts, the Court held that Minnesota's interest
in applying its stacking rule was sufficient. Id. at 320.
35. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). Shutts involved a class action by 28,000 royalty owners with rights
to certain leases Phillips Petroleum used to produce gas. Id. at 799. The royalty owners filed suit
in Kansas to recover interest on royalty payments owed by Phillips. Id. Although the class action
involved plaintiffs from many different states, id., the Kansas Supreme Court upheld application
of Kansas law to the dispute, id. at 803. It stated that, in a class action, "generally the law of the
forum controlled all claims unless 'compelling reasons' existed to apply a different law." Id.
Actually, ninety-seven percent of the plaintiffs and ninety-nine percent of the gas leases had no
connection to Kansas. Id. at 815.
The United States Supreme Court noted the differences in Kansas law and other potentially
applicable laws, stating that no harm could be asserted unless the substantive laws of the states
were different. Id. at 816. In its discussion of the applicable test of constitutionality, the Court
reiterated that a state must have "'a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts,
creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.'"
Id. at 818 (quoting Hague, 449 U.S. at 312-13). Applying this test, the Court found that application of Kansas law to all of the claims was "sufficiently arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits." Id. at 822.
36. Hague, 449 U.S. at 307. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, expressly stated that
it was not within the Court's function to pursue a federal body of choice of law rules. Id. at 332
(Stevens, J., concurring). Shreve argues, however, that such a national system could promote
uniformity and free federal courts from the difficulties of applying local choice of law rules when
they hear cases in diversity jurisdiction. Shreve, supra note 32, at 339. Although Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 489 (1941), stated that federal choice of law rules
would fall under the impermissible exercise of general federal common law prohibited by Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), commentators criticized the result as unnecessary. See
William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and FederalSystem, 16 STAN . L. REv. 1, 41 (1963); Russell J.
Weintraub, The ErieDoctrine andState Conflict ofLaws Rules, 39 IND. L.J. 228, 241 (1964). The
Supreme Court, however, subsequently expressed approval of the Klaxon decision. See Day &
Zimmerman v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3, 4 (1975).
37. See supra notes 34-35.
38. E.g., Shreve, supra note 32, at 331.
39. Id. at 345-50. Shreve proposed that courts consider the need to prevent unfair surprise to
litigants and to require demonstrable state interests. Id.
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Free to fashion their own choice of law rules limited only by the Constitution,40 states have primarily followed one of two types of contractual
choice of law rules. One group of states follows the Restatement (First) of

Conflict of Laws. 41 Under the Restatement (First), the validity and construction of a contract are governed by the law of the place where the contract was made.42 Performance of a contract, however, is governed by the
law of the place where performance is to occur. 43 A second group of states

follows the rules reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws.
The Restatement (Second) adopted the "most significant relationship"
test,' under which a court applies the law of the state with the closest relationship to the parties and issues involved in the dispute.4 5 While other
choice of law rules are used in the United States,4 6 the two Restatement
tests remain the most prevalent.47
40. As the discussion supra notes 27-39 and accompanying text described, determinations of
whether a particular choice of law violates the Constitution are unclear. Since the Supreme Court
has chosen to offer only minimal guidance on constitutionality, only the most egregious violations
are likely to be overturned. Unless the Court takes a firmer stand in the future, states will remain
relatively free from constitutional second-guessing of their decisions.
41. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 311-47 (1934).

42. Id.§ 311.
43. Id.§§ 355-72.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(1) (1971).

45. Id. § 188. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) § 6 provides seven relevant factors to be considered
in choice of law decisions:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(e) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those
states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e)the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
Id. § 6. RESTATEmENT (SECOND) § 188 provides that courts should apply the law of the state with
"the most significant relationshipto the transaction and the parties under the principles stated in
§ 6." Id. § 188 (emphasis added). The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) allows consideration of the place

of contracting, negotiation, and performance, the location of the subject matter of the contract, id.
§ 188(3), and "the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties." Id. § 188(2)(e).
46. These other tests are not relevant to the focus of this Note but include the following: the
center of gravity test, the government interest analysis, Leflar's rule (or the better rule of law test),
Cavers rule, Fuld's rule, and lexfori. Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law inthe United States, 38
HASTINGS L.. 1041, 1046-50 (1987). For a full discussion of the states using any of these approaches, see generally id. (surveying the choice of law rules in the fifty states and the District of
Columbia).
47. According to a 1987 compilation of state choice of law rules by Gregory Smith, the
following twenty-three states use the RESTATEMENT (FIRST) rules for contract disputes: Alabama,
Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Smith, supra note 46, at 10501171.
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North Carolina long has endorsed the Restatement (First)'s "place of
making" or lex loci contractus test.48 The North Carolina Supreme Court
has stated that "[i]n interpreting a contract made outside of this State our
courts long ago established the principle that the law of the country where
the contract is made is the rule by which the validity of it, its exposition,
and consequences are to be determined."'4 9 Applying that test to the Collins
& Aikman case would lead to a result different from that reached by the
The following fifteen states follow the RFSTATEMENT (SEcoND)'S most significant relationship rule for contract disputes: Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, and Washington.
Id.
More recent articles suggest that only a dozen states still adhere to the RESTATEMENT (FIRsT).
See Michael E. Solimine, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1991, 40 AM. J. CoMP. L. 951,
951 (1992); see also Larry Kramer, Choice of Law In The American Courts In 1990: Trends And
Developments, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 486 (1991) (stating that the most widely used choice of
law approach is that of the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND)).
California and New York, at least in the torts area, have abandoned the "most significant
relationship" test for the "government interest analysis" test. See Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727,
730 (Cal. 1967); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 480 N.E.2d 679, 686-87 (N.Y. 1985); see
also Smith, supra note 46, at 1055-58, 1105-16 (discussing Reich and Schultz).
48. See Smith, supra note 46, at 1116-18; Seymour W. Wurfel, Choice of Law Rules in
North Carolina,48 N.C. L. REv. 243, 275 (1970). But see infra note 63. In Tanglewood Land
Co. v. Byrd, 299 N.C. 260, 261 S.E.2d 655 (1980), the North Carolina Supreme Court reaffirmed
the rule that the law of the place where a contract is made governs its interpretation. Id. at 262,
261 S.E.2d at 656. Byrd involved a contract for the sale of land, but in the past the court also has
applied the rule of lex loci contractus to insurance contracts. See Connor v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 265 N.C. 188, 190, 143 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1965) (applying the rule of lex loci
contractus to an insurance policy issued in Virginia to a Virginia resident covering a vehicle titled
in Virginia); Roomy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 318, 323, 123 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1962) (applying
the rule of lex loci contractus to interpret an automobile insurance policy issued in New York
even though the accident occurred in North Carolina); Keasler v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
177 N.C. 394, 99 S.E. 97 (1919) (applying the rule of lex loci contractus to an insurance policy
issued in Georgia to a Georgia resident).
One notable insurance case involved the applicability of the predecessor statute to § 58-3-1
of the North Carolina General Statutes. In Turner v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 F. Supp. 723
(E.D.N.C. 1952), a federal district court considered the appropriate choice of law with respect to
an automotive policy issued in New Jersey to a resident of New Jersey covering a New Jersey
vehicle that was involved in an accident in North Carolina while leased to a North Carolina resident. Id. at 724. The federal district court refused to apply the predecessor statute to § 58-3-1
based on the United States Supreme Court decision in Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta &
Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934). Turner, 105 F. Supp. at 726. For a discussion of the Delta
& Pine case, see supra note 29.
49. Fast v. Gulley, 271 N.C. 208, 211, 155 S.E.2d 507, 509 (1967) (citing Hall v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 139 N.C. 369, 373, 52 S.E. 50, 51 (1905); Williams, Black & Co. v. Carr, 80 N.C.
294,299 (1879); Anderson v. Doak, 32 N.C. (10 Ired.) 295, 297 (1849); Watson v. Orr, 14 N.C. (3
Dev.) 161, 163 (1831)); see also Bundy v. Commercial Credit Co., 200 N.C. 511, 515, 157 S.E.
860, 863 (1931) ("The general principle recognized in all jurisdictions is that ordinarily the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract is [sic] to be determined by the law of the State or
country in which it is made."); Cannaday v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 143 N.C. 439, 442, 55 S.E.
836, 837 (1906) ('Matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are
determined by the law of the place where it was made.").
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North Carolina Supreme Court. There was no disagreement among the justices that the last act to make the contract (the delivery) occurred in California.5 0 Under the traditional test, California law would have governed, so
the dissenters argued vigorously for the application of California law.5 '
The majority, however, applied section 58-3-1 of the North Carolina
General Statutes, which states that insurance contracts covering property in
North Carolina are governed by North Carolina law.5 2 Though the North
Carolina Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the statute,53 a similar Mississippi statute was found unconstitutional by the United States
Supreme Court in HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land
Co.54 The Collins & Aikman majority found a greater connection between
North Carolina and the insurance contract than was present in Delta &
Pine; therefore, they held that application of the statute would not violate
55
the United States Constitution.
Because the facts of Collins & Aikman were unusual, comparing the

North Carolina Supreme Court's opinion with past North Carolina contract
choice of law cases does not produce clear results. Without questioning the
validity of past cases espousing the lex loci contractus rule, the court distinguished many of them because they did not involve insurance contracts or
the application of section 58-3-1.56 Previous insurance contract cases that
50. See Collins &Aikman, 335 N.C. at 93,436 S.E.2d at 245; id. at 98-99, 436 S.E.2d at 247
(Meyer, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 97-100, 436 S.E.2d at 247-49 (1993) (Meyer, J., dissenting).
52. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3-1 (1993). For the full text of the statute, see supra note 21.
53. Collins & Aikman, 335 N.C. at 95, 436 S.E.2d at 246; see Williams v. Mutual Reserve
Fund Life Ass'n, 145 N.C. 92, 94-95, 58 S.E. 802, 803 (1907). See generally D.W. Markham,
Note, Conflict of Laws-Insurance-Validityof Statutes Localizing Insurance Contracts, 13 N.C.
L. REv. 213 (1935) (discussing the effect of the United States Supreme Court decision in Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co. on the predecessor statute to N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 58-3-1).
54. 292 U.S. 143 (1934). For a discussion of Delta & Pine, see supra note 29.
55. Collins & Aikman, 335 N.C. at 95, 436 S.E.2d at 246. North Carolina also had sufficient
contacts with the controversy and the parties to satisfy the significant contacts test, under which
the United States Supreme Court has reviewed choice of law decisions at least since Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981). See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. Application
of North Carolina law was neither arbitrary nor unfair to the litigants. The policy covered liability
arising from property titled in North Carolina, the insured's transportation division resides in
North Carolina, and both the accident and the wrongful death suit which prompted the liability at
issue in the case occurred in North Carolina. Collins & Aikman, 335 N.C. at 93, 436 S.E.2d at
244.
56. Id. at 94, 436 S.E.2d at 245 (distinguishing Keasler v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 177
N.C. 394, 99 S.E. 97 (1919) and Roomy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 318, 123 S.E.2d 817
(1962)). The only case remotely similar to Collins & Aikman was Turner v. Liberty Mutual
Insurance Co., 105 F. Supp. 723 (E.D.N.C. 1952), the case in which a federal district court refused
to apply the predecessor to N.C. GEM. STAT. § 58-3-1 to a New Jersey insurance contract. See
supra note 48. The majority in Collins & Aikman distinguished the cases by the respective degree
of connection with North Carolina. Collins & Aikman, 335 N.C. at 95, 436 S.E.2d at 245. The
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applied the law of other states did not involve property, lives, or interests in
North Carolina.5 7
The dissenting justices, although agreeing that North Carolina had
more contacts with C&A's policy than with the policies at issue in prior
cases,"8 took a broader view of the situation.59 Considering that the policy
had nationwide coverage, the dissenters argued that these contacts were insufficient to apply North Carolina law.6" The dissenters also noted that the
North Carolina Supreme Court had never before held that the number of
contacts with the state was determinative for choice of law purposes. 6 '
Section 58-3-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes establishes that
certain contacts in connection with insurance contracts will always justify
applying North Carolina law. Although the application of this statute is
constitutional, the court could have reached the same result through modem

contractual choice of law analysis, such as the Restatement (Second)'s most
significant relationship test.62 Instead, the court merely carved out an insur63
ance contract exception to the lex loci contractus rule.
There is some justification for evaluating insurance contracts differently. 64 Mechanical application of the lex loci contractusrule may thwart a
state's legitimate interest in a dispute that involves sufficient contacts. For
example, state interests may be magnified in the area of insurance; the origcourt found the connection with North Carolina more significant in Collins & Aikman because the
vehicles were actually titled in the state, whereas in Turner the vehicle was registered in New
Jersey and only leased to a North Carolina resident. Id.
57. Turner v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 105 F. Supp. 723, 724-26 (E.D.N.C. 1952); Connor v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 265 N.C. 188, 190, 143 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1965); Roomy v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 318, 323, 123 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1962); Keasler v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co., 177 N.C. 394, 99 S.E. 97 (1919).
58. Collins & Aikman, 335 N.C. at 100, 436 S.E.2d at 248.
59. Id. at 99-100, 436 S.E.2d at 248 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 100, 436 S.E.2d at 248 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
61. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). The court may have applied, sub silentio, a modified version
of the REsTATEmENT (SECOND) "significant relationship" rule. For a discussion of the "significant
relationship" test used by a majority of states for choice of law purposes, see supra notes 44-45
and accompanying text.
62. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
63. Commentators have noted that states that purport to follow traditional choice of law rules
do not always adhere to those standards. E.g., Solimine, supra note 47, at 966. Instead, these
states seem willing to apply modem theories "in discrete contexts." Id. North Carolina has done
this in one other context: the Uniform Commercial Code. See Burnick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435,
442-43, 293 S.E.2d 405, 410-11 (1982) (holding that the traditional lex loci contractus rule is
inapplicable when an action is brought under North Carolina's version of the Uniform Commercial Code); see also P. John Kozyris & Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American
Courts in 1989: An Overview, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. 601, 603 (1990) (noting that Burnick creates an
exception to North Carolina's general adherence to the lex loci contractusrule); Smith, supranote
46, at 1118 (same).
64. See Michael W. Mengis, Note, Conflict of Laws: Insurance, 47 LA. L. Rnv. 1213, 1214
(1987).
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inal dispute often involves tortious conduct, such as an automobile accident,
which may involve residents or property within the state. Insurance, a combination of tort and contract, thus requires special rules.
The realities of insurance suggest that choice of law decisions such as
Collins & Aikman do not work any hardship on insurance companies.
Choice of law questions often arise with insurance contracts, because the
state in which liability arises is often different from the state in which the
contract was formed.6 5 If an insurance company insures property or interests in a state, it is foreseeable that the law of that state might later govern a
dispute. Given the sophistication of the modem insurance community, insurance companies should not be surprised when a state chooses to apply its
own law to a dispute arising within its borders.6 6
Indeed, Professor Kirgis noted that insurers who issue national insurance coverage obtain a benefit from each state where a loss might occur.6 7
According to Professor Kirgis, "[s]ince the increased geographic scope of
coverage raise[s] the value of the policy to the insured, the insurer could
charge a higher premium or secure a more competitive position against
other insurers." 68 Through the costs of insurance, therefore, the economics
of the marketplace account for increased risk to insurers caused by uncertainty in choice of law rules.6 9 Insurers are further protected by their freedom to insert choice of law provisions into their contracts; many states
honor these provisions.7 °
Choice of law decisions like Collins & Aikman may also prompt insurance companies to be more explicit in their coverage provisions instead of
relying on local law to fill in contract details. Express provisions would
benefit the insured, who may be unaware of state law at the place of contracting. Moreover, explicit language would benefit unsophisticated buyers
who may be less likely to recognize ambiguities in the policy.7
65. See id. at 1213.
66. See id. at 1232-33.
67. Kirgis, supra note 29, at 110.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. In Collins & Aikman, the insurance contract contained an exception for fines and penalties. 335 N.C. at 97, 436 S.E.2d at 246. The majority found this provision ambiguous with respect
to punitive damages. Id. at 97, 436 S.E.2d at 247. While there is no suggestion that C&A was

unsophisticated, such a provision could be read to be directed primarily at government-imposed
fines on the business. The potential imposition of punitive damages would be apparent to Hartford in issuing a national liability insurance policy. Such an important exception should be stated
expressly and clearly. Hartford Accident & Indemnity possibly preferred to rely on California law
which as a matter of policy prohibited the insuring of punitive damages. In this case, construing
such a provision against the drafter may promote more explicit provisions in future policies. With
such disclosure, the then informed potential buyers could knowingly accept or decline the policy.
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In Collins & Aikman, the North Carolina Supreme Court reached a
sensible conclusion with respect to insurance contracts. By relying on a
statute that affects only insurance contracts, it avoided the need to reevaluate its choice of law rules. The court may be forced to consider broader
change, though, when next confronted with a case where application of the
lex loci contractus rule would disserve strong state interests.
MARY EVELYN THORNTON

Civil Procedure-Forum Selection-N.C. Gen. Stat. § 22B-3
(1994)
A forum selection clause is a provision by which contracting parties
preselect a particular place in which to resolve controversies.' By agreeing
to a forum selection clause, parties consent to the personal jurisdiction of a
forum 2 and agree not to sue in any other forum. Should a party to a forum
selection clause ignore the clause and sue in a forum other than the one
preselected, a court is bound either to dismiss the lawsuit or to transfer it to
the preselected forum.'
In recent years, courts and commentators have recognized the utility of
forum selection clauses.' By preselecting a forum, parties reduce the uncertainty of where plaintiffs will file lawsuits and of how various jurisdictions
will decide the lawsuits. Parties also can better control litigation costs and
1. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PEER HAY, CoNLmicr OF LAWS 360-61 (2d ed. 1992).
2. Id. at 361. Personal jurisdiction is a court's power to render a binding judgment on a
person and to compel compliance with that judgment. FL.EMINo JAMEs, JR. Er AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 53 (4th ed. 1992).
3. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 1, at 361.
4. Id. Federal courts enjoy the power to transfer actions from one federal district or division
to another federal district or division. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (1988 and Supp. XX 1993). State courts
do not enjoy transfer powers. They must, instead, dismiss actions should they decide to enforce
forum selection clauses. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-1, Rule 12(b) (1990). Federal courts cannot
transfer actions to state courts or to foreign courts. Therefore, under these circumstances, they too
must dismiss actions.
5. See, e.g., GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTnN, INTERNATONAL CIvIL LrIOATION IN UsrrEo
STATES COURTS 172 (1989) (pointing out that enforcement of forum selection clauses reduces the

possibility of parallel lawsuits in different forums); James T. Gilbert, Choice of Forum Clauses in
International and Interstate Contracts, 65 KY. L.J. 1, 2-3 (1976) (noting that enforcement of
forum selection clauses promotes certainty in contractual relations and encourages trade by negating the fear of the vagaries of unfamiliar and fortuitous foreign forums); Michael E. Solimine,
Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 51, 51-52
(1992) (stating that enforcement of forum selection clauses allows contracting parties to choose a
neutral forum, advances predictability in contractual relations, and reduces the possibility of parallel lawsuits in different forums); Leandra Lederman, Note, Viva Zapata!: Toward a Rational
System of Forum-Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L. Ray. 422, 42223 (1991) (writing that enforcement of forum selection clauses promotes certainty in contractual
relations, helps control litigation costs, minimizes tactical advantages gained through forum shopping, respects freedom of contract, encourages trade, and conserves judicial resources). But see,
e.g., RussELL J. WEauNRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CoNFLicr OF LAWS 156-57 (3d ed. 1986)
(arguing that enforcement of forum selection clauses often works unfairness because many of
these clauses appear in adhesion contracts); Lee Goldman, My Way and the Highway: The Law
and Economics of Choice of Forum Clauses in Consumer Form Contracts,86 Nw. U. L. REV.
700, 716-30 (1992) (pointing out that enforcement of forum selection clauses often shifts contractual risk to those persons least able to bear these risks); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of
Forum,Another Choice of Law: ConsensualAdjudicatory Procedurein Federal Court, 57 FORDHAm L. REv. 291, 296-97, 362 (1988) (noting that enforcement of forum selection clauses sacrifices due process of law to freedom of contract).
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minimize the tactical advantages forum shopping affords plaintiffs.6 Forum
selection clauses also further numerous public interests. As one commenta-

tor has noted, "[tihe enforcement of reasonable forum-selection clauses...
respects freedom of contract, encourages trade, and conserves judicial re' 7
sources by limiting pretrial struggles over where to litigate.

With recent passage of a statute declaring forum selection clauses unenforceable,' North Carolina's policy on forum selection clauses now
stands in contrast to the policies of the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that enforce these clauses. 9 This forum selection statute provides,
with one exception, that forum selection provisions in contracts entered into
in North Carolina are void as against public policy.
This Note describes North Carolina's forum selection statute.' 0 The
Note next traces the background law leading up to passage of the statute
and the General Assembly's reason for enacting it." The Note then analyzes how the statute affects the enforceability of forum selection clauses
under North Carolina law. 2 Finally, the Note concludes that passage of the
statute created more problems than it solved and that the General Assembly
3
should act to remedy these problems.'
6. Lederman, supra note 5, at 422-23. An example of the advantages plaintiffs gain by
forum shopping is that the plaintiff may select a forum that he knows will pose a great inconvenience to the defendant.
7. Id. at 424 (citations omitted).
8. 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 436 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-3 (1994)).
9. See Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Klippan, GmbH, 611 P.2d 498, 503-04 (Alaska), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 974 (1980); Societe Jean Nicolas v. Mousseux, 597 P.2d 541, 542-43 (Axiz.
1979); Nelms v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 808 S.W.2d 314, 316-18 (Ark. 1991); Smith,
Valentino & Smith v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 551 P.2d 1206, 1208-09 (Cal.
1976); Vessels Oil & Gas Co. v. Coastal Ref. & Marketing, 764 P.2d 391,393 (Colo. App. 1988);
United States Trust Co. v. Bohart, 495 A.2d 1034, 1040 (Conn. 1985); Elia Corp. v. Paul N.
Howard Co., 391 A.2d 214, 216 (Del. Super. 1978); Manrique v. Fabbri, 493 So. 2d 437, 438-40
(Fla. 1986); Calanca v. D&S Mfg. Co., 510 N.E.2d 21, 23-24 (Ill. App. 1987); Davenport Mach.
& Foundry Co. v. Adolph Coors Co., 314 N.W.2d 432, 436-37 (Iowa 1982); Prudential Resources
Corp. v. Plunkett, 583 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Ky. App. 1979); Calzavara v. Biehl & Co., 181 So. 2d 809,
810 (La. App. 1966); Mech v. General Casualty Co., 410 N.W.2d 317, 321 (Minn. 1987); State ex
rel. Marlo v. Hess, 669 S.W.2d 291, 293-94 (Mo. App. 1984); Air Economy Corp. v. Aero-Flow
Dynamics, 300 A.2d 856, 856-57 (NJ. Super. 1973); Reeves v. Chem Indus. Co., 495 P.2d 729,
732 (Or. 1972); Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 209 A.2d 810, 815-16 (Pa.
1965); Green v. Clinic Masters, 272 N.W.2d 813, 814-15 (S.D. 1978); Dyersburg Mach. Works v.
Rentenbach Eng'g Co., 650 S.W.2d 378, 380 (Tenn. 1983); Exum v. Vantage Press, 563 P.2d
1314, 1315 (Wash. App. 1977). But see Redwing Carriers v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554, 556 (Ala.
1980); Cartridge Rental Network v. Video Entertainment, 209 S.E.2d 132, 132 (Ga. App. 1974);
Dowling v. NADW Mktg., 578 S.W.2d 475, 475-76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); rev'd on other
grounds, 631 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1982).
10. See infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
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The North Carolina forum selection statute amended section 22B of
the General Statutes to read:

Any provision in a contract entered into in North Carolina
that requires the prosecution of any action or the arbitration of
any dispute that arises from the contract to be instituted or heard
in another state is against public policy and is void and unenforceable. This prohibition shall not apply to non-consumer loan
transactions.
This act becomes effective October 1, 1993, and applies to
any contract entered into on or after that date.4
Although the statute applies only to contracts entered into in North Carolina, its scope is very broad because, with the exception of nonconsumer
loans, it applies to all types of contracts and to out-of-state arbitration.1 5
Prior to the United States Supreme Court's landmark forum selection
decision, The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 6 in which the Court held
14. 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 436 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 22B-3 (1994)).
15. This arbitration provision was added by floor amendment to Representative Joseph Hackney's original House Bill 1027. North Carolina General Assembly, 1993 Session, History of
House Bill H1027. The provision excluding nonconsumer loans was also added by floor amendment to the original bill. Id. This arbitration provision reflects the General Assembly's determination to preserve inviolate North Carolina parties' rights to have their disputes heard in North
Carolina, whether by a court of law or by an arbitration panel.
16. 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972). Most commentators agree that Bremen marked a turning point in
the U.S. Supreme Court's forum selection jurisprudence. See, e.g., Solimine, supra note 5, at 55.
Bremen suggests that a court may refuse to enforce a forum selection clause if it is shown that
enforcement would be "'unreasonable' under the circumstances." Bremen, 407 U.S. at 10 (footnote omitted). The following factors play a role in determining whether enforcement would be
unreasonable: fraud, undue influence, overweening bargaining power, and serious inconvenience.
Id. at 12, 16-18. Although the Supreme Court could have limited Bremen to its facts (an action in
admiralty between international corporations), it continued to enforce forum selection clauses in
other areas of federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988)
(enforcing a forum selection clause in a lawsuit within diversity subject matter jurisdiction).
Although the Supreme Court has not yet faced the enforceability of forum selection clauses under
federal question subject matter jurisdiction, numerous federal district courts have found these
clauses enforceable in this area. See, e.g., Frontier Airlines, Inc. Retirement Plan for Pilots v.
Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 696 F. Supp. 1403, 1404-05 (D. Colo. 1988) (enforcing forum selection
clause in action brought under Employee Retirement Income Security Act); Stewart v. Murlas
Commodities, 684 F. Supp. 166, 167-68 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (enforcing forum selection clause in
action brought under Racketeer Inflenced and Corrupt Organizations Act); Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n v. Trinidad Corp., 583 F. Supp. 262, 266-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (enforcing forum selection clause in action under federal collective bargaining laws). Recently, in a much criticized
decision, Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522 (1991), the United States Supreme Court
greatly expanded the enforceability of forum selection clauses. In Shute, a Washington state consumer, Eulala Shute, purchased tickets from a Florida-based cruise line company, Carnival Cruise
Lines. Shute, 111 S. Ct. at 1524. The ticket admonished purchasers to read the conditions on the
last page, and these conditions explicitly stated that the parties would have to litigate all disputes
in Florida courts. Id. Ms. Shute was injured during her cruise, and despite the forum selection
clause, she sued Carnival in federal court in the state of Washington. Id. at 1522. Arguing that
the forum selection clause required Ms. Shute to file her lawsuit in Florida, Carnival moved for

1994]

RECENT STATUTE

1611

that forum selection clauses are prima facie valid, most federal and state
courts had refused to enforce forum selection clauses.' 7 After Bremen,",
numerous state courts revisited this issue, and many adopted rules favoring
enforcement of forum selection clauses.19 Only four state courts now rethan
fuse to enforce forum selection clauses,20 and only two states other
21
North Carolina have statutes against enforcement of the clauses.
For a brief period prior to passage of its forum selection statute, North
Carolina joined the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that enforce fosummary judgment. Upholding the district court and reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme
Court found the forum selection clause reasonable, enforced it, and granted Carnival's motion. Id.
at 1529. Many commentators have criticized Shute as supporting the enforcement of adhesion
contracts that effectively deprive many of their day in court. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 5
(arguing that enforcement of forum selection clauses in consumer contracts is unfair and will
likely result in many meritorious suits going unfiled); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case,
Some More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction,27 TEx.
INT'L LJ. 323 (1992) (arguing that the Supreme Court ignored blatant unconscionability of the
forum selection clause); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geography as a Litigation Weapon: Consumers,
Forum-Selection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 423 (1992) (examining
the burdens imposed on individual litigating in a distant forum and arguing that forum selection
clauses unfairly prejudice consumers' substantive claims). But see Solimine, supra note 5, at 8385 (1992) (arguing that Shute was correctly decided). By passing the forum selection statute, the
North Carolina General Assembly joined this chorus of critics.
17. See, e.g., Carbon Black Export v. The Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297,300 (5th Cir. 1958); Wood
& Selick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941, 942 (2d Cir. 1930); The Ciano, 58
F. Supp. 65, 66-67 (E.D. Pa. 1944); Kuhnhold v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 251 F.
387, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1918); Prince Steam Shipping Co. v. Lehman, 39 F. 704, 704 (S.D.N.Y.
1889); Parker, Peebles & Knox v. El Saieh, 141 A. 884, 889-90 (Conn. 1928); Cadillac Auto. Co.
v. Engeian, 157 N.E.2d 657, 659-60 (Mass. 1959); Gaither v. Charlotte Motor Car Co., 109 S.E.
362, 363-64 (N.C. 1921); Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. Evans, 477 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex.
1972). But see Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 367 F.2d 341, 344-45 (3d Cir.
1966); Anastasiadis v. S.S. Little John, 346 F.2d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 1965); Win. H. Muller & Co.
v. Swedish Am. Line, 224 F.2d 806, 807-08 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955); Cerro de
Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.S., 187 F.2d 990, 990-91 (2d Cir. 1951); Calzavara v.
Biehl & Co., 181 So. 2d 809, 810 (La. App. 1966); Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl &
Co., 209 A.2d 810, 815-16 (Pa. 1965).
18. Bremen and other Supreme Court decisions enforcing forum selection clauses are not
binding authority upon state courts. Solimine, supra note 5, at 56-57 n.32. The persuasive authority of these cases has nonetheless exercised great influence on state courts. Id. at 56.
19. See supra note 9.
20. The four states that refuse to enforce forum selection clauses are Alabama, Georgia,
Montana, and Texas. See Redwing Carriers v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554, 556 (Ala. 1980); Cartridge
Rental Network v. Video Entertainment, 209 S.E.2d 132, 132 (Ga. App. 1974); State ex rel. Polaris Indus. v. District Court, 695 P.2d 471, 471-72 (Mont. 1985); Dowling v. NADW Mktg., 578
S.W.2d 475, 475-76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,631 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. 1982).
Although only these four jurisdictions have affirmatively declared that they will not enforce forum
selection clauses, numerous other jurisdictions have given mixed signals about the enforcement of
the clauses. The policies of these jurisdictions are discussed in Richard D. Freer, Erie's Mid-Life
Crisis, 63 TuL. L. REv. 1087, 1096 & n.31 (1989), Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100
YALE L.J. 1935, 1980 n.216 (1991), and Robert A. de By, Note, Forum-Selection Clauses: Substantive or Proceduralfor Erie Purposes, 89 CoLum. L. REv. 1068, 1071 (1989).
21. IDAHO CODE § 29-110 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 18-1-403 and 28-2-708 (1993).
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rum selection clauses. In Perkins v. CCH Computax,22 the state supreme

court declared that enforcement of forum selection clauses was consistent
with the public policy of North Carolina. 23 The Perkins court expressed
approval of The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 4 and adopted a test similar to the Bremen test. The court explained this test in the following
manner:
A plaintiff who executes a contract that designates a particular
forum for the resolution of disputes and then files suit in another

forum seeking to avoid enforcement of a forum selection clause
carries a heavy burden and must demonstrate that the clause was
the product of fraud or unequal bargaining power or that enforcement of the clause would be unfair or unreasonable .... [T]he
trial court retains the authority to hear the case when it determines
that the forum selection clause was the product of fraud or unequal bargaining power or that the clause would be unfair or
unreasonable.'
Although the Perkins test treats forum selection clauses as presumptively enforceable, it directs that under North Carolina law, courts should
refuse to enforce these clauses if enforcement would be unfair or unreasonable.2 6 Presumably, these safeguards would protect consumers and others
with little bargaining power. Notwithstanding these safeguards, Justice
Mitchell vigorously dissented and argued that the majority's rule would too
often work to the disadvantage of those with little bargaining power.2 7 He
also found the majority's safeguards "entirely theoretical and illusory, 28
22. 333 N.C. 140, 423 S.E.2d 780 (1992). In Perkins, a North Carolina accountant entered
into a license and service agreement with a California computer software company. The agreement provided that if disputes arose between the licensor and licensee, California law would
control the agreement and any action would be brought in the courts of Los Angeles County,
California. Id. at 141-42, 423 S.E.2d at 781. A little over one year into the agreement, the accountant sued the software company in North Carolina state court, and the software company
moved to dismiss. Relying on the terms of the forum selection clause in the agreement, the
software company argued that the action had been brought in an improper venue. Id. at 142, 423
S.E.2d at 781-82. Affirming the trial court and reversing the North Carolina Court of Appeals, the
North Carolina Supreme Court enforced the forum selection clause and dismissed the action. Id.
at 146, 423 S.E.2d at 784.
23. Id.
24. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
25. Perkins,333 N.C. at 146, 423 S.E.2d at 784. The court said it based its test on a decision
of the Virginia Supreme Court, Paul Business Sys. v. Canon U.S.A., 397 S.E.2d 804, 807 (Va.
1990). Perkins, 333 N.C. at 146, 423 S.E.2d at 784. Although the Virginia test uses the terms
"unfair" and "unreasonable" instead of the Bremen terms "inconvenient" and "unreasonable," the
two tests are substantially the same. Both tests make forum selection clauses unenforceable when
there is evidence of inequitable conduct such as fraud or unequal bargaining power.
26. See Perkins, 333 N.C. at 146, 423 S.E.2d at 784.
27. Id. at 147, 423 S.E.2d at 784 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
28. Id., 423 S.E.2d at 785 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
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because persons with little bargaining power very often do not have the

financial resources to fight a court battle.2 9

North Carolina's forum selection statute was passed to overrule Perkins.30 The statute, like Justice Mitchell's Perkins dissent, reflects concern
that enforcement of forum selection clauses will work to the general public's disadvantage. In order to correct this perceived disadvantage, the
North Carolina General Assembly passed the forum selection statute-a
statute broadly drafted to protect consumers and others with little bargain-

ing power.
In light of its sweeping scope, the North Carolina forum selection statute will, of course, change contractual relations in North Carolina. These
changes can be observed by considering how state and federal courts will
apply the statute. North Carolina state courts follow the choice of law principles reflected in the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws.3" Under
these principles, the law of the state where a contract was entered controls
disputes over enforcement and interpretation of a contract.3 2 In contrast,
the law of the state where performance took place controls disputes arising
over performance of the contract. 33 Pursuant to Restatement (First) principles, when parties enter a contract containing a forum selection clause in
North Carolina, state courts will look to the North Carolina forum selection
statute and refuse to enforce the forum selection clause. When parties enter
a contract containing a forum selection clause in a jurisdiction other than

North Carolina, state courts
will look to the law of the jurisdiction in which
34
the contract was entered.

29. Id. (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
30. Telephone Interview with Joseph Hackney, Member, North Carolina House of Representatives (Sept. 3, 1993) [hereinafter Hackney Interview].
31. See Computer Sales Int'l v. Forsyth Memorial Hosp., 112 N.C. App. 633, 635, 436
S.E.2d 263,265 (1993) (citing Tanglewood Land Co. v. Byrd, 299 N.C. 260,262,261 S.E.2d 655,
656 (1980)). But see Collins & Aikman Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 335 N.C. 91,
94, 436 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1993) (holding that N.C. GEM. STAT. § 58-3-1 displaces traditional
choice-of-law rules in insurance contract cases); Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435,442,293 S.E.2d
405, 410-11 (1982) (holding that traditional choice-of-law rules are inapplicable when an action is
brought under North Carolina's version of the Uniform Commercial Code). In the present issue of
the North Carolina Law Review, one commentator notes that although the North Carolina
Supreme Court continues to adhere to the Restatement (First) position, the court has in recent
years created exceptions to this position with decisions like Collins & Aikman and Bernick. Mary
Evelyn Thornton, Note, Modem Results Without Modem Choice of Law Rules: A Look at Collins
& Aikman Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 72 N.C. L. REv. 1501, 1510 n.63 (1994).
32. RFSTATmENT (Fmst) oF Cor.icr oF LAws § 332 (1934).

33. Id. § 358.
34. For example a North Carolina court would refuse to enforce a forum selection clause in a
contract entered into in Alabama, because that state has held that forum selection clauses are per
se unenforceable. Redwing Carriers v. Foster, 382 So. 2d 554, 556 (Ala. 1980). However, a
North Carolina court would probably enforce a forum selection clause in a contract entered into in
Virginia, because that state has held that forum selection clauses are enforceable except when
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States other than North Carolina are split; some follow the choice of
35
law principles reflected in the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws,
while others follow the choice of law principles reflected in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.3 6 In those states following the Restatement
(First) principles, the analysis will be the same as that employed by North

Carolina courts.

7

In those states following the Restatement (Second) principles, the analysis will differ substantially. Under these principles, the law of the state
with the "most significant relationship" to a transaction controls disputes
over enforcement, interpretation, and performance of contracts. 8 Thus, in
these jurisdictions, the North Carolina statute will be invoked only when a
court determines that North Carolina had the most significant relationship
to the transaction.3 9
enforcement would be unfair or unreasonable. Paul Business Sys. v. Canon U.S.A., 397 S.E.2d
804, 807 (Va. 1990).
35. See, e.g., Lyles v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 393 S.W.2d 867, 868-69 (Ark. 1965);
Dworak v. Olson Constr. Co., 533 P.2d 946, 947 (Colo. App. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 551
P.2d 198 (Colo. 1976); United States Leasing Corp. v. Keiler, 290 So. 2d 427, 430 (La. App.
1974); Traylor v. Grafton, 332 A.2d 651, 659 (Md. 1975); Dicker v. Klein, 277 N.E.2d 514, 51516 (Mass. 1972); Jones v. Prudential Ins. Co., 42 S.E.2d 331, 333 (S.C. 1947); Padova v. Padova,
183 A.2d 227, 230 (Vt. 1962).
36. See, e.g., W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E.2d 417, 421 (Ind. 1945); Auten v. Auten,
124 N.E.2d 99, 101-02 (N.Y. 1954); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 420-21
(Tex. 1984).
Two other important conflict of laws theories are the "governmental interest" theory and the
"better law" theory. Under the "governmental interest" theory, it is believed that
[ejvery state ... has a governmental interest in effectuating the policies underlying its
own laws. Thus, when asked to apply the law of another forum, a court should first
inquire into the policies expressed in the respective lawsand into the circumstances in
which it is reasonable for the respective states to assert an interest in the application of
these policies.
ScoLES & HAY, supra note 1, at 16 (citations omitted). Under the "better law" theory,
a resolution [of a conflict of laws] is to be achieved by a principled weighing of conflicting policies.... These principles include (1) the choice of the state's law whose
policies are most strongly held, (2) the choice of the law reflecting an 'emerging' policy
over one embodying a 'regressive' policy, (3) the choice of a law expressing the more
specific rather than general policy, (4) selection of the rule best designed to effectuate an
underlying policy, and (5), in reverse, avoidance of a choice which would frustrate an
underlying policy.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
37. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. Whether these states will apply North
Carolina's forum selection statute, and thus hold a forum selection clause unenforceable, will turn
on whether the contract was entered into in North Carolina.
38. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 186, 188 (1971).

39. In determining what jurisdiction has the most significant relationship to a transaction,
courts look to the following factors: the place of contracting; the place of negotiation of the contract; the place of performance; the location of the subject matter of the contract; and the domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF CoN.iicr OF LAWS § 188(2). In addition, courts look at the following: the needs of
interstate and international systems; the relevant policies of the forum; the relevant policies of
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This Restatement (Second) analysis will in some instances defeat the
intention of North Carolina's forum selection statute. Under the Restatement (Second) analysis, even if parties entered into a contract in North Carolina, a court could determine that North Carolina was not the state with the
most significant relationship and refuse to apply the new statute.40 Thus,
not all forum selection clauses in contracts entered into in North Carolina
will be declared unenforceable. In contrast to its effect on state court litigation, North Carolina's forum selection statute will have no effect on litigation in the federal courts. Federal courts look to federal law to determine
the enforceability of forum selection clauses; 4 ' thus, federal courts will ignore North Carolina's forum selection statute.
The result is a form of forum shopping. Because the federal courts
have repeatedly enforced forum selection clauses,' parties seeking to enforce these clauses will prefer federal courts.43 In contrast, parties seeking
to invalidate these clauses will prefer North Carolina courts (or courts that
apply North Carolina law to contracts entered into in North Carolina). Ultimately, the enforceability of these clauses may turn on whether the parties
end up in federal or state court.
The General Assembly passed the forum selection statute because it
determined that the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Perkins v.
CCH Computax" did not adequately safeguard the interests of consumers
and others with little bargaining power."a However, the General Assembly
may have erred in its low estimation of the amount of protection the Perkins
test accords consumers. In jurisdictions applying a test similar to the Perkins test, consumers' rights have been protected. 46 For example, in Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Commission,4 7 a class of student
borrowers signed loan agreements providing, among other things, that they
other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of a particular
issue; the protection of justified expectations; the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law; certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result; and ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. Id. § 6.
40. Numerous decisions illustrate this situation. See, e.g., Rubin v. Rudolf Wolff Commodity Brokers, 636 F. Supp. 258, 259 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (applying Illinois law); Ryder Truck Rental v.

St. Paul Fire & Marine, 540 F. Supp. 66, 68 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (applying Georgia law).
41. See supra note 16.
42. See supra note 16.
43. See Linda S. Mullenix, Forum-Shoppers Should Discover A Wider Market, NAT'L

L.J.,

Aug. 19, 1991, at S12.
44. 333 N.C. 140, 423 S.E.2d 780 (1992).

45. Hackney Interview, supra note 30.
46. See, e.g., Homing v. Sycom, 556 F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Ky. 1983); Carnival Cruise Lines v.
Superior Court, 286 Cal. Rptr. 323 (Cal. App. 1991); Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship
Comm'n, 563 N.E.2d 465 (Ill. 1990); Calzavara v. Biehl & Co., 181 So. 2d 809 (La. App. 1966);
Eads v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 785 P.2d 328 (Okla. 1989).

47. 563 N.E.2d 465 (ll. 1990).
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would resolve disputes only in Cook County, Illinois. When the borrowers
defaulted on their loans, the Illinois State Scholarship Commission (ISSC)
filed collection actions in Cook County and the borrowers moved to dismiss
these actions claiming that the forum selection clause violated public policy.48 The Illinois Supreme Court agreed. The court held that the forum
selection clause deprived the borrowers of "their day in court."49 Moreover, the court held that the loan agreement containing the forum selection
clause amounted to an adhesion contract because it was a standard form
agreement prepared by the ISSC.50 Thus, if students wanted loans, they
were forced to accept the agreement.5 1
Relying on due process and general contract principles, the Illinois
Supreme Court protected the rights of persons with little bargaining power
and simultaneously preserved Illinois's policy favoring enforcement of forum selection clauses. If the Illinois Supreme Court successfully balanced
these two policies, the North Carolina Supreme Court could certainly do the
same.
The General Assembly not only erred in its estimation of the protection provided by the Perkins test, but also framed the forum selection statute too broadly. By focusing narrowly on the issue of consumers' rights,
the General Assembly framed a statute that applies equally to consumers
and sophisticated commercial parties. The General Assembly has thus deprived commercial parties of the right to agree in advance about the place
where they will resolve disputes. Commercial parties often find it advantageous to resolve disputes in a single forum; 52 in light of their sophistication,
they should be provided such an option.
Because of the deficiencies existing in the forum selection statute, the
North Carolina General Assembly should revisit the statute in its next session. The General Assembly could address the statute's deficiencies by taking one of two courses. First, the General Assembly could amend the
statute so that it applies only to consumer transactions. This remedy would
free commercial parties to enter into forum selection agreements and would
simultaneously protect consumers' rights. Second, the General Assembly
could repeal the forum selection statute and allow North Carolina courts to
determine the enforceability of forum selection clauses according to the test
articulated by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Perkins. These two
courses of action would produce the same results: both would protect con48. Id. at 467-68.
49. Id. at 487.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. For a discussion of the advantages of resolving disputes in a single forum, see supra
notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
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sumers' rights and grant commercial parties the freedom to enter forum
selection agreements.
JOSEPH E. SMrrH

Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-State v. Petersilie,
334 N.C. 169, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993)
Of course it is speech, but the question of breach
Of a right is an issue to ponder:
One may very well say, "We'll define it away,"
But what's left of the right then, I wonder?'
A citizen learns that a political candidate he opposes has not informed
the voters of the candidate's extremely unpopular stances on several critical
issues. The citizen writes a letter relating and documenting the candidate's
performance on those issues and sends it to several people whose votes he
knows would change if they learned the truth. Fearing the social and political retaliation of the candidate and his supporters, the citizen sends the
letter anonymously. Do the United States Constitution and the North Carolina Constitution permit that citizen to be criminally prosecuted for disseminating the truth? According to the North Carolina Supreme Court in State
v. Petersilie,2 the answer is yes.
In Petersilie, the North Carolina Supreme Court upheld section 163274(7) of the North Carolina General Statutes, which prohibits the anonymous publication of "any charge derogatory to any candidate or calculated
to affect the candidate's chances of nomination or election." 3 The court
found that the statute did not violate the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution or Article 1, Section 14, of the North Carolina Constitution. The
majority, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Exum, held that the state's
interest in ensuring honest and fair elections outweighed the individual interest in anonymously distributing even true information about a candidate.4
In November 1989, Frank W. Petersilie, an unsuccessful candidate for
a seat on the Town Council of Boone, North Carolina, obtained a copy of a
letter that had been sent to his mother.5 The letter discussed a commentary
written for the Washington Post by Nan Chase.6 Mrs. Chase was the wife
of Saul Chase, who was then a candidate in a run-off election for the Boone
Town Council. 7 Mrs. Chase's commentary discussed her discomfort with
1. DAVID S. BOGEN, BULWARK OF LIBERTY: THE COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 43

(1984).
2. 334 N.C. 169, 432 S.E.2d 832 (1993).
3. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274(7) (1987).
4. Petersilie, 334 N.C. at 187, 432 S.E.2d at 842-43.
5. Id. at 173-74, 432 S.E.2d at 834-35.
6. Id.
7. Id. Mr. Chase lost in the run-off election. Boone Landlord FacesSmear Charge in Town
Council Election, UPI wire report, Jan. 11, 1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
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the "intimidating and self-perpetuating" 8 Christianity she discerned in the
town of Boone, particularly in the schools; the letter writer felt these views
expressed Mr. Chase's "goal to wipe out Christian influence from" 9 Boone.
Mr. Petersilie photocopied the letter and mailed between thirty and seventy
copies to people who had voted in the October election. 10
A few days later, Mr. Petersilie received a copy of a flier referring to
Mr. Chase and Ms. Louise Miller, another candidate in the run-off election,
as the "'pro-liquor' candidates."" Mr. Petersilie photocopied the flier and
12
sent it to approximately twenty to twenty-five voters.
8. Nan Chase, The Bible Belt's Mixed Blessings; Our Schools Are Full of Religion-But I
Still Love the Place, WASH. PosT, Oct. 2, 1988, at C5.
9. Petersilie,334 N.C. at 173, 432 S.E.2d at 835. The full text of the letter reads as follows:
Chase wants to take away aggressive Christian influence from public buildings and
gathering places, such as our schools.
In an article published in the Washington Post, Mrs. Saul Chase ridiculed the people of Boone for their support of Christianity stating that here "Christianity is ... intimidating and self-perpetuating."
Calling herself an "unbeliever (in Christianity) in the midst of the pious", Mrs. Saul
Chase states that she is unable to openly criticize "religious paraphernalia displayed in
public offices and on state owned vehicles" and she also says that if (anyone) speak(s)
out forcefully against what may be an unconstitutional mixing of church and state, they
will be unable to enter the political mainstream that has the power to separate the two
spheres".-This thought has not been spoken to the people of Boone by Mrs. Chase,
only to the Washington Post. Why keep it from us? Because her husband is on our
Town Council, and was just put in the run off for re-election. If he wins, he will have
the power to take away any Christian influence from the town employees, buildings, etc.
It can be assumed that Chase allegedly has a goal to wipe out Christian influence from
our town, take it away form [sic] the very God-fearing Christian people who helped put
him in office. Candidates should be open about all of their feelings of [sic] all issues
and it appears that Saul Chase has been deceptive to us by not supporting the good,
wholesome beliefs of our people. A deception that is allegedly a deliberate attempt to
gain power to take our Christian atmosphere from us. We, the town, should stop him,
keep him out of our town government and hold fast to our Christian freedoms. Vote
against Saul Chase!
Id. at 173-174, 432 S.E.2d at 834-835.
10. Id. at 174, 432 S.E.2d at 835.
11. Id.
12. Id. The full text of the flier reads as follows:
VOTE LIQUOR BY THE DRINK FOR BOONE.
FOUR YEARS AGO, WITH THE HELP OF SAUL CHASE, THE [APPALACHIAN STATE UNIVERSITY] STUDENTS BROUGHT BEER TO BOONE. NOW
IS THE TIME TO COMPLETE THE PARTY!
SUTrLE, DUGGER & MARSH REFUSE TO ENDORSE THIS ISSUE AND
WOULD WORK TO DEFEAT THE REFERENDUM.
VOTE SAUL CHASE AND LOUISE MILLER
NOV. 7TH
THE "PRO-LIQUOR" CANDIDATES
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The trial court convicted Petersilie of eleven counts of publishing un-

signed materials about a political candidate,13 all of which were misdemeanor violations of section 163-274(7) of the North Carolina General
Statutes. 4 On appeal, Petersilie challenged the statute as unconstitutionally
vague 15 and overbroad16 and in violation of the guarantees of freedom of
18
7
speech found in the United States and North Carolina constitutions.

The majority first addressed Petersilie's claim that the statute was unconstitutionally vague.' 9 Asserting the court's duty to adopt a constitu-

tional construction when faced with two reasonable interpretations of a
statute, the court found only the statute's use of the word "charge" to be
problematic and in need of judicial interpretation.20 Relying on several dictionaries and base law from other states, the court concluded that the "legislature intended the word 'charge' to mean an accusation of wrongdoing."2
13. Id. at 172, 432 S.E.2d at 834. Mr. Petersilie also challenged the trial court's jury instruction, id.
at 191, 432 S.E.2d at 845, and its rulings on two hearsay objections, id. at 193-94, 432
S.E.2d at 846. The North Carolina Court of Appeals dismissed the case on grounds that the
superior court had lacked jurisdiction to hear this misdemeanor case. Id. at 175, 432 S.E.2d at
835. Although the North Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals' ruling on
jurisdiction, it exercised the authority established in State v. Felmet, 302 N.C. 173, 174, 273
S.E.2d 708, 709 (1981), to amend the trial record to show that the grand jury filed a presentment
motion (the grand jury's written notice of indictment) with the superior court. Petersilie,334 N.C.
at 177-78, 432 S.E.2d at 837. Thus, the supreme court was able to reach the case's important
constitutional questions. Then, Chief Justice Exum, writing for the majority, upheld the constitutionality of section 163-274(7), but reversed and remanded the case because of flaws in the jury
instructions. Id. at 191-96, 432 S.E.2d at 845-46.
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274(7) (1987). The relevant parts of § 163-274 read as follows:
Any person who shall, in connection with any primary or election in this State, do
any of the acts and things declared in this section to be unlawful, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor. It shall be unlawful:
(7) For any person to publish in a newspaper or pamphlet or otherwise, any charge
derogatory to any candidate or calculated to affect the candidate's chances of nomination or election, unless such publication be signed by the party giving publicity to
and being responsible for such charge ....
15. Petersilie,334 N.C. at 180, 432 S.E.2d'at 838.
16. Id. at 182, 432 S.E.2d at 839-40.
17. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press .. ").
18. N.C. CONsT. art. I, § 14 ("Freedom of speech and of the press are two of the great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained, but every person shall be held responsible
for their abuse.").
19. Petersilie,334 N.C. at 180-82, 432 S.E.2d at 838-39.
20. Id. at 181, 432 S.E.2d at 839; see also supra note 14. The majority turned to WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIoNARY 1837 (1976) to dispute Petersilie's assertion that the
statute's use of the word "publish" was overly vague. Petersilie, 334 N.C. at 181, 432 S.E.2d at
839. The court adopted the following definition of "publish": "'1 A. to declare publicly: make
generally known: DISCLOSE, CIRCULATE... B. to proclaim officially... c. to make public
announcement of ...D.PUBLICIZE... to give publication to ....
' "Id. (quoting WnBSTER'S
TmRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1837 (1976)).

21. Petersilie,334 N.C. at 182, 432 S.E.2d at 839-40.
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With this explanation, the court considered the statute sufficiently clear to
"avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement." 22
The court also rejected Petersilie's claim that the statute was overbroad.23 Because the statute was content-based, in that it expressly regulated political speech, the majority conceded that it should be subjected to
"exacting scrutiny."'24 However, the majority concluded that the state's interest in fair elections was compelling and that the statute could not be
drawn more narrowly and still serve that interest.' The court asserted that
the government's interest in fair and open elections would be best served by
ensuring that voters know the source of information-even true information-so that they may assess its value.2 6 Finally, the court surveyed comparable statutes that had been scrutinized in other jurisdictions and decided

that North Carolina's statute falls within the guidelines of acceptability established by those jurisdictions.27
Justice Mitchell, writing in dissent, argued that the asserted state interest could not justify the statute's clear restriction on political speech. 28 Surveying the United States Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence,
Justice Mitchell concluded that the statute's restriction on political speech
was directly inimical to "'the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust and wide-open."' 2 9 Justice Mitchell emphasized that
anonymity can be essential to an individual expressing unpopular views in a
"wide-open" debate, and concluded that criminalizing the anonymous dis22. Id.
23. Id. at 182-91, 432 S.E.2d at 839-45.
24. Id. at 183, 432 S.E.2d at 840.
25. Id. at 182, 432 S.E.2d at 840.
26. Id. at 187, 432 S.E.2d 842-43.
27. Id. at 187-90, 432 S.E.2d at 843-45; see also infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
Although it upheld the statute, the supreme court reversed and remanded Petersilie's case because
the trial judge erred in presenting the essential elements of the charge to the jury. Petersilie,334
N.C. at 191, 432 S.E.2d at 845. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274(7) declares unlawful the publication
of "any charge derogatory to any candidate or calculated to affect the candidate's chances of
nomination or election.' However, the trial judge instructed the jury that it must find beyond a
reasonable doubt that Petersilie published "a charge he intended to be derogatory ... or which he
calculated would affect such candidate's chances for election." Petersilie, 334 N.C. at 191, 432
S.E.2d at 845 (emphasis added). The court stated that the "charge erroneously included a scienter
requirement while no such requirement is present in the statute." Id. The court construed the
statute to forbid either the anonymous publication of a derogatory charge or the anonymous publication of a charge "calculated" to affect a candidate's chances for election. Id. at 192-93, 432
S.E.2d at 845-46. Because Petersilie testified that when he mailed the fliers he did not believe
Chase or Miller would win the election anyway, the court determined that the jury could have
found that Petersilie did not intend to affect the outcome of the elections, and that the case would
have been decided on whether the jury determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the charges
were objectively derogatory. Id.
28. Petersilie, 334 N.C. at 197, 432 S.E.2d at 848 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 198, 432 S.E.2d at 848 (Mitchell, J., dissenting) (quoting Hustler v. Falwell, 485
U.S. 46, 56 (1988)).
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tribution of campaign materials would have an unacceptable chilling effect
on the freedoms of speech and of the press.3"

The Petersilie decision and its reasoning may be somewhat surprising,
but a close analysis of the case is important because fourteen other states
have comparable laws.3 1 Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet considered the question raised by Petersilie,3 2 the North Carolina Supreme
Court bolstered its decision with the case law and statutes of other states.33
The court first addressed decisions of states that had struck down similar
statutes as unconstitutional. It distinguished North Carolina's statute principally by asserting that other states' statutes are "considerably broader" than
North Carolina's. 34 The court based this assertion on the fact that the comparable statutes rejected in other states either prohibited anonymous "statements" rather than "charges" or prohibited influencing any election,
including referenda and other issues put to a vote, rather than the election of
35
a candidate for office.
Not only is the distinction between "charges" designed to influence an

election and "statements" designed to influence an election an extremely
nebulous one,36 but judicial precedent does not clearly support upholding a
30. Id. at 199-201, 204-05, 432 S.E.2d at 849-51, 852-53 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
31. See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
32. However, the Court's decision in Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960), might be read
broadly enough to have already decided the question. See infra notes 37-39 and accompanying
text for a suggestion that Talley did in fact cover the Petersilie statute.
Although the North Carolina Supreme Court cited a number of cases dealing with very similar statutes in other states, Petersilie, 334 N.C. at 187-90, 432 S.E.2d at 843-45, no petitioner
from any of these states has sought certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.
33. Petersilie, 334 N.C. at 180, 187-90, 432 S.E.2d at 838-39, 844-45.
34. Id. at 190, 432 S.E.2d at 844.
35. Id. (citing Zwickler v. Koota, 290 F. Supp. 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (invalidating statute
prohibiting distribution of any handbill with any statement about a candidate in connection with
election); Schuster v. Imperial County Mun. Court, 167 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1980) (invalidating statute
prohibiting all anonymous campaign literature by all persons); California v. Bongiorni, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 565 (1962) (invalidating statute requiring signature of person publishing circulars or handbills designed to influence results of election); Illinois v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284 (Il. 1987)
(invalidating statute requiring signature of any person publishing or distributing literature for or
against any candidate or any public question submitted to a vote); Louisiana v. Fulton, 337 So. 2d
866 (La. 1976) (invalidating statute prohibiting unsigned statements about any candidate for election); Massachusetts v. Dennis, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 1975) (invalidating statute prohibiting
anonymous circulars designed to aid or defeat a candidate or question submitted to voters); New
York v. Duryea, 76 Misc. 2d 948 (invalidating statute criminalizing anonymous printing or distribution in quantity of any literature regarding any candidate or any issue on the ballot), orderaff'd,
44 A.D.2d 663 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); North Dakota v. Education Ass'n, 262 N.W.2d 731 (N.D.
1978) (invalidating statute requiring all political advertisements to disclose name of sponsor);
Pennsylvania v. Wadzinski, 422 A.2d 124 (Pa. 1980) (invalidating statute prohibiting publication
of anonymous statements concerning a candidate for election)).
36. See, e.g., Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 8-9, State v. Petersilie, 105 N.C. App. 233
(1992) (No. 9124SC313) (discussing the many possible definitions of "charges" and the legislature's options had it chosen to outlaw libellous or slanderous statements).
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restriction on speech that hinges on such a minor distinction. When the
U.S. Supreme Court rejected a statute similar to North Carolina's in Talley
v. California,37 it gave no indication that its decision would have been different had the statute referred only to "allegations of wrongdoing" focused
upon a political candidate."8 Indeed, the Talley Court deliberately compared its holding with holdings in other cases in which the right to anonymity was supported because "identification and fear of reprisal might deter
perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of importance."3 9 One
might argue that public awareness of truthful allegations of wrongdoing by
someone running for office is indeed a matter of great importance to the
citizenry. And it is in precisely this situation that the fear of reprisal becomes greatest because discreet revenge may be the only available response
where public discourse about the allegations will merely bring them more
attention and validity. Similarly, when the Court upheld the "campaignfree zone" challenged in Burson v. Freeman,4 ° it emphasized that to forbid
campaigning within 100 feet of a polling place would foreclose an extremely small amount of communication and acknowledged that other ave37. 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
38. In Talley, the Court invalidated a statute strikingly similar to-and probably even narrower than-the statute at issue in Petersilie. See id. The Los Angeles city ordinance invalidated
in Talley made it unlawful for a person to distribute a handbill unless it disclosed the names of the
printer and of the individual responsible for the handbill's distribution. Id..at 60-61. The Court
compared the statute to others that completely banned the distribution of pamphlets and leaflets,
all of which had been invalidated by the Court, and asserted that this statute improperly restricted
speech just as those statutes had. Id. at 62-63 (citing Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)). The Court also
compared the effect of the Los Angeles ordinance to that of other impermissible disclosure requirements, in which "identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions
of public matters of importance." Id. at 65 (citing Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)). The Court suggested that the state might have a
compelling interest in requiring identification if its law were more narrowly tailored to restrict the
dissemination of pamphlets resulting in "fraud, false advertising and libel." Id. at 64. Although
the Court did not expressly create a constitutional right to "freedom of anonymous speech," id. at
70 (Clark, J., dissenting), as Justice Clark suggested in his dissent in Talley, it did clearly recognize that anonymity can be critical to the uninhibited exchange of ideas, id. at XX.
39. Id. at 65.
40. 112 S.Ct. 1846 (1992). Burson illustrates how today's Supreme Court balances exacting
scrutiny against the rationality of the electoral process. In Burson, the Court upheld a Tennessee
statute that declared the area within the 100-foot perimeter around polling sites to be a "campaignfree zone" where no campaigning could take place. Id. at 1848-49. The Court first asserted that,
because the statute restricts campaign speech, it is content-based and must, therefore, be subjected
to strict scrutiny. d at 1850-51. The Court then defined the compelling state interest in the
restriction by detailing the history of abuses of the electoral process that took place in the area
around the polling booths. Id. at 1852-55. The Court concluded that the statute's actual infringement on the flow of ideas was insignificant compared to the government interest in free and
effective voting, and the statute's means of achieving the state's interests were the least restrictive
available. Id. at 1856-57. Burson is particularly instructive because it deals with a statute that
actually survives exacting scrutiny.
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nues to reach voters were still open.4 1 The North Carolina Supreme Court
made no similar effort in Petersilieto show that avenues of communication
were still open. There is no reason to think that a speaker stripped of anonymity will find any other satisfactory way to spread his or her message
without fear of reprisal.
When the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the ordinance at issue in Talley, it compared that ordinance to statutes banning completely the distribution of leaflets, all of which the Court had struck down as
unconstitutional.4 2 The Court asserted that the ordinance in Talley fell
"precisely under the ban of [these] prior cases."4 3 The fact that the Court
directly equated banning anonymous pamphlets with banning pamphlets altogether makes clear that, under the First Amendment, a ban on anonymous
speech is tantamount to a complete ban on speech. Correspondingly, North
Carolina's prohibition of anonymous campaign literature is equivalent to a
ban on all campaign literature. The Talley Court did indeed suggest that, in
Talley and in the prior cases, the statutes might have survived constitutional
challenge if they had banned more specific types of literature. 4 But the
types specified in Talley were only those that were fraudulent, false, or
libelous, not merely critical of a candidate.4 5 The North Carolina Supreme
Court's distinction of Talley is therefore tenuous at best.
The North Carolina Supreme Court's use of decisions and statutes
from other states is also rather strained. The court began its decision in
Petersiliewith the unsupported assertion that forty-three other states have
equivalent laws.46 The source of this figure was apparently a 1975 Harvard
Law Review article that the court cited in the same part of the decision.4 7
However, a survey of state election laws reveals only fourteen states with
comparable laws still on their books.4a At least two statutes of the fortythree identified in the Harvard article have been found unconstitutional:
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared a statute very similar to that in
41. Id. at 1856-57.
42. Taley v. California,362 U.S. 60, 62-63 (1960) (citing Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413
(1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)).
43. id.
at 63.
44. Id. at 64.
45. Id.
46. Petersilie,334 N.C. at 180, 432 S.E.2d at 838.
47. Id. (citing Developments in the Law-Elections, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1111, 1286-87
(1975)).
48. ALA. CODE § 17-22A-13 (1988); ALAsKA STAT. § 15.56.010 (1980); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 7-1-103(8) (1991); FLA. STAT. ch. 106.143(1) (1991); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 1463 (West 1979
& 1993 Supp.); MD.ANN. CODE art. 33, § 26-16 (1991); MAss. GmN. L. ch. 56 § 41 (1976); MIcH.
COMP. LAWS § 168.931(1)(t)(3) (1982) (limited to false, deceptive, scurrilous or malicious
claims); Nay. REv. STAT. § 294A.320 (1989); N.J. Rav. STAT. § 19:34-38.1 (1963); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3599.09 (Baldwin 1988); OKLa. STAT. tit. 21, § 1840 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 1723-2 (1958); VT. STAT. ANN.tit 17, § 2022 (1963).
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Petersilie unconstitutional,4 9 and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
5
Circuit has declared Oklahoma's statute unconstitutional. 1
The state statutes that have been upheld under judicial scrutiny do not
lend much support to North Carolina's statute. The Tennessee Supreme
Court upheld a statute that is virtually identical to North Carolina's,5 but
that decision, which occupies only two reporter pages, glosses over all substantive constitutional claims and relies on the same outdated assertion that
forty-three other states have the same statute. 2 Both the Tennessee and
North Carolina courts cited for support the California Supreme Court decision in Canon v. Justice Court,53 but the statute upheld in Canon was narrower than section 163-274(7) in that it blocked only anonymous attacks on
the "personal character" of a candidate. 54 This restriction is arguably much
different in scope from North Carolina's because it applies solely to

nonpolitical speech-personal character attacks-while still permitting
anonymous attacks on the candidate's public character and action. In short,
although there is support for the constitutionality of North Carolina's section 163-274(7) in the law of other states, that support is neither unambiguous nor persuasive.
The democratic process depends upon a free market for ideas.5 5 Such
a market is inevitably restricted by statutes such as the one upheld in Petersilie. Modem scholars have brought a new immediacy to the "marketplace
49. Pennsylvania v. Wadzinski, 422 A.2d 124, 126 (Pa. 1980).
50. Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 1987). However, the state has not repealed the law.
51. Tennessee v. Acey, 633 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Tenn. 1982).
52. Id. at 307 (citing Developments in the Law-Elections, supra note 47, at 1286-87). The
Illinois Supreme Court harshly criticized Acey in a decision that is also cited in Petersilie.Illinois
v. White, 506 N.E.2d 1284, 1290 (Tenn. 1987) (accusing the Acey court of "ignor[ing] the teachings of Talley" and failing to "even mention the impact of the statute on first amendment rights,
and conclud[ing] without analysis that there were no less restrictive means of furthering the
State's interest.").
53. 393 P.2d 428 (Cal. 1964).
54. Id. at 452.
55. The Supreme Court's acceptance of the concept of a marketplace of ideas is commonly
traced to Justice Holmes's dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,
J.,
& Brandeis, J., dissenting), although the origin of the concept in Anglo-American thought can
be traced at least as far back as John Milton's defense of the truth in John Milton, AreopagiticaA Speechfor the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing,to the Parliamentof England,reprintedin 1 THE
NORTON ANTHoLoOY OF ENGLISH LrrERAuRE 1404-05 (M.H. Abrams ed., Norton Publishing
Co. 4th ed. 1979) (1644).
Justice Holmes's formulation of the theory will be most familiar to modem scholars: "[T]he
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas ....[Tihe best test of the truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ....
" Abrams, 250
U.S. at 230. In short, if communication is free and open, the greater value of the truth will always
ensure that it rises to the top of the marketplace of ideas. For general discussions and critiques of
theory, see C. EDwIN BAKER, HuMAN LIBERTY AND THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH 6-24 (1989), and
LAURENcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrr-trONAL LAW, § 12-1, at 785-86 (2d ed. 1988).
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of ideas" analogy by taking the analogy literally and subjecting it to economic analysis. 6 Professor Daniel A. Farber has argued that political expression deserves the highest of all protections because political speech, as
a public good, is "undervalued by the market and the political system. ' 7
As a result of this undervaluation, governments and those in power are
more likely to overregulate speech than other activities." The public backlash from such overregulation will be insignificant, and the principal benefits will accrue to incumbents and special interest groups who exchange
information as insiders. 9
The Petersiliedecision ignores this compelling perspective on the marketplace of ideas. Even if the truth does not always rise to the top in modem political campaigns, it seems clear that voters are more likely to discern
the truth from a comparison of competing half-truths and exaggerations
than from exposure to the half-truths and exaggerations on only one side of
a debate. Since information is already likely to be underproduced, any statute that restricts the flow of information and exchange of ideas risks damage to the political process. Anonymous information, with its presumptive
dubiousness," is surely preferable to no information at all.
Commentators have suggested that election laws are based on a belief
in voter rationality." Faced with enough reliable information, the theory
suggests, voters will vote for the best candidate. 62 Election laws are therefore, at least in part, efforts to maximize the amount of reliable information
and minimize the amount of misleading, false, or inflammatory information, thus ensuring that the election takes place under "laboratory conditions"' 63 and that the outcome of the election "reflect[s] the true, reasoned,
and informed choice of the people."' Although voters are, in fact, rarely
56. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First
Amendment, 105 HAgv. L. REv. 554, 555-62 (1991); Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 1, 19-24, 36-39 (1986).
57. Farber, supra note 56, at 555. Professor Farber asserts that information produces significant external benefits to third parties and encourages free-riding-benefitting from the efforts of
others without making any effort of one's own-so its producers will undervalue it and will
produce less. Id. at 558-59. Similarly, since consumers of information can free-ride upon the
efforts of others to produce it, consumers will have little incentive to organize as a political force.
Id. at 560.
58. Id. at 561-62.
59. Id. at 564.
60. See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
61. See eg., James A. Gardner, Comment, Protectingthe Rationality of ElectoralOutcomes:
A Challenge to FirstAmendment Doctrine, 51 U. CHi. L. REv. 892, 892-93 (1984).
62. Id. at 897.
63. Developments in the Law-Elections, supra note 47, at 1234.
64. Gardner, supra note 61, at 892.
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informed on the issues,6 5 the courts and legislatures have recognized that
the democratic state cannot function properly, or even survive, if voting
decisions are made irrationally. 6 The state interest in section 163-274(7)
can thus be judged against this goal of rationality. The supreme court asserted that section 163-274(7) allows voters to weigh the interests of the
group making the statement,67 which suggests that the court is protecting

the rationality of elections. This assertion is made, however, in the court's
defense of the statute's restriction on true speech. If electoral rationality is
best served by exposing voters to true and useful information and insulating

them from false information, then section 163-274(7) in no way aids the
cause of rationality, but instead actually robs Voters of the opportunity to

weigh truthful information on its own merits, without being irrationally biased against the information just because it comes from an unpopular
source.

68

In a similar vein, because a group or person opposing an individual
69
already in power-or at least with significant power in the community
might fear retaliation enough to need anonymity, the statute protects the
status quo from true, negative information that might not be revealed if the
source must be named.7 ° Those who have the power are likely to keep it;
65. Id at 899-900 & nn.40-42 (citing a number of surveys and studies showing the irrationality of voting decisions).
66. Id. at 900.
67. Petersilie, 334 N.C. at 187, 432 S.E.2d at 843.
68. In fact, Robert C. Post suggests that even the Talley decision is founded on a desire to
permit unpopular groups to distribute true and useful information without its being judged by the
stigma associated with the group's name. Robert C. Post, The ConstitutionalConcept of Public
Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, DemocraticDeliberation,and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103
HARV. L. REv. 603, 640 (1990). Indeed, Professor Post goes even further by arguing that campaign speech should be treated like scientific studies, which are reviewed on an anonymous basis
to ensure that the stature of the author does not influence the reviewers' assessments of the accuracy of his or her science. Id. at 640 n. 213.
69. Such power need not necessarily be political or economic power. It may simply be the
power to bring opprobrium upon the speaker. For example, the only national notice of the Petersilie case was an article in U.S.A. TODAY, which suggested that Mr. Petersilie's criticisms of Mr.
Chase were motivated by anti-Semitism. North Carolina,U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 17, 1990, at 10A.
Even if Mr. Chase had had no political or economic power in the community, Mr. Petersilie would
have been reasonable to fear this type of negative scrutiny, as would any citizen contemplating a
true but negative attack on a minority group for which the public and the press may have great
sympathy.
70. The U.S. Supreme Court has, on numerous occasions, addressed the importance of anonymity to groups of dissidents with little political power. For a survey of the seminal cases dealing
with the so-called "right to anonymity," see Comment, The ConstitutionalRight to Anonymity:
Free Speech, Disclosure,and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084 (1961). Of particular interest in considering the ramifications of Petersilie are the cases in which the Court invalidated attempts to
force the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) to disclose its
membership rolls. The Court justified its decisions by citing the lack of a compelling state interest
and the likelihood that the disclosure would have a chilling effect on the group's associational
rights. Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544-46 (1963); Louisiana ex
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their critics will be silenced by their fear of that power and the retaliation it
can bring.
Furthermore, the court simply assumed the value of a signature on

campaign materials without grounding that value in realistic analysis. 71 As
a practical matter, it is likely that a signature on derogatory material has
much greater value to someone seeking revenge against the source than to a
voter weighing the information in the message. It would certainly be possible to satisfy the requirements of Petersilie without giving the voters any
useful information at all. For example, the name of a single individual (perhaps a member of an organization chosen for his low profile) may be meaningless to the average voter not privy to the insiders of the campaign, and
names of groups are often extremely ambiguous, if not utterly misleading.7 2

A recipient of anonymous "charges" against a candidate will already know
the source of those charges is someone opposed to the candidate being criticized, and will assess the charges from that perspective. The added value of
any more precise identification is doubtful at best.
On the other hand, consider the chilling effect that can be expected
from requiring a signature.7 3 While knowing the source of derogatory
statements may have some limited value to voters, it clearly has great value
rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 295-97 (1961); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 523-24 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-66 (1958). A
comparison with the Red Scare cases in which the Court upheld disclosure laws reveals the
Court's concern with protecting minor groups from retaliation rather than hiding presumably powerful plots behind a cloak of secrecy. In Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72, 77-81 (1959), and
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 125-34 (1959), the Court held that, when an investigation into organizational membership involves Communism, an overriding government interest justifies the infringement on First Amendment rights. Note, however, that in all of these cases, the
Court recognized a right to hide one's identity from potential oppressors, even though this right
could be balanced away by a compelling government interest.
71. Contra Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 798 (1983) ("A State's claim that it is
enhancing the ability of its citizenry to make wise decisions by restricting the flow of information
to them must be viewed with some skepticism.").
72. See, e.g., Timothy J. Moran, FormatRestrictions on Televised PoliticalAdvertising: Elevating PoliticalDebate Without Suppressing Free Speech, 67 IND. L.J. 663, 703-04, 704 n. 249
(1992) (discussing television advertisements purchased by the "Coalition for Reliable Energy,"
which was, in fact, the utilities that control Massachusetts' Seabrook nuclear power plant, as
examples of a group using its ambiguous name to mislead the public about the impartiality of the
information presented).
Of course, it could be argued that the misleading nature of groups' names is more evidence of
the need for disclosure of the actual source of information. If a group's name is misleading, then
surely a voter must be told the individuals or institutions that actually compose the group. But this
argument stumbles on Petersilie'sfatal flaw: If the information is true, then its source is irrelevant; the information must be assessed on its own merits. A voter who truly desires to assess the
value of the information can do so with greater accuracy by conducting his own research or
listening to the counter-arguments presented by the target of the information than by weighing his
individual sympathies with the information's source.
73. See Petersilie,334 N.C at 198-99, 432 S.E.2d at 849 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
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to the target of those statements who is seeking to retaliate, to subject the
source to social or economic pressure, or simply to impeach the statements
by means of a character attack rather than through direct rebuttal.
State v. Petersilieis the first case in which the validity of section 163274(7) has been challenged. It is, therefore, an extremely important case in
terms of the development of North Carolina's constitutional law and in its
affirmation of a vehicle for election reform that apparently has been dormant since the statute was passed in 1931. 7 1 It is possible that the statute
will become a new weapon for candidates who wish to bring pressure to
bear on the mudslingers and muckrakers who are tempted to use the veil of
anonymity to spread half-truths and innuendos.75 One wonders, however,
how frequently the statute will be invoked, and, when it is invoked, whether
it will be used to achieve the purpose for which it was intended. First, since
section 163-278.12 of the North Carolina General Statutes already requires
the disclosure of the name of anyone who spends more than $100 on a
campaign, "other than by contribution to a candidate, political committee,
or referendum committee," 76 an anonymous campaigner who prints a large
volume of derogatory material will have violated that provision even before
the material reaches the mailbox, regardless of its derogatory nature. Second, since section 163-274(8) of the North Carolina General Statutes currently prohibits the publication of false statements about a candidate, 77 an
anonymous publisher of false charges will more likely be charged with violating that provision, because it ensures that the truth or falsehood of the
statements will be thoroughly tested, and the defendant will not be charged
merely with publishing "derogatory" statements (which may still be true)
about the wronged candidate.
As a result, the only people subject to section 163-274(7) are those
who publish-in quantities small enough to evade the reporting requirements of section 163-278.12-true, but derogatory, statements about a candidate.78 However, unless the election is taking place in a pool of voters
74. Section 163-274(7), which has not been amended since 1931, was originally numbered
Section 348 and was itself an almost exact copy of N.C. ANN. CODE § 4185-99(b) (1927). See
Comment, A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolinain 1931, 9 N.C. L. REv. 347, 371-73
(1931).
75. See, e.g., Robert M. O'Neil, Regulating Speech to CleansePolitical Campaigns,21 CAP.

U. L. REv. 575, 575-77 (1992) (discussing the deterioration of political advertising into smear
campaigns that have disgusted even the advertising industry).
76. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-278.12 (1991).
77. Id. § 163-274(8).
78. Of course, N.C. GEN.STAT. § 163-274(7) (1991) charges could probably be tacked onto
the other violations mentioned here, but such tacking is not relevant to an analysis of the impact of
the statute. A person publishing false claims about a candidate or secretly publishing large
volumes of anonymous materials is not likely to be deterred to any additional degree by the threat

of prosecution for acting anonymously.
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that is so small that a few well-placed fliers could destroy a campaign, a
candidate may well decide that the campaign would be hurt more by a criminal action brought by the local prosecutor than by either ignoring the criticisms or directly confronting the charges made. An added advantage to
refusing to seek prosecution is that the candidate will be able to capitalize
on the anonymity of his or her critic. Ignoring the charges or directly confronting them would force the critic to either support them or allow them to
fade in the doubt inevitably cast upon anonymous communications. 9
The group of probable defendants under section 163-274(7) raises
more serious concerns. Perhaps the most significant concern is whether a
statute allowing the criminal prosecution and possible imprisonment80 of
individuals who provide true information to a fairly small group of voters
chosen precisely because the information may be important to their voting
decisions can be justified in a democratic system. Furthermore, this group
may well be precisely the people who need and deserve the fullest protection of the First Amendment. A voting pool that is small enough to be
significantly influenced by a small number of published "charges" will
most likely occur in a community small enough to guarantee that the political, social, and economic fates of all the voters within it are inextricably
intertwined. In such a community, if the sympathies of the local prosecutor
lie with the candidate who has been criticized, section 163-274(7) will simply be another weapon of retaliation against a person who could not risk
speaking without the protection of anonymity. 81
Moreover, Petersilie sounds a depressing chord for the protection anonymity might afford to small, unpopular grass-roots organizations. Without
Petersilie'sinterpretation of section 163-274(7), a narrow window existed
in which small groups or individuals whose opinions would likely bring
upon them social, financial, or political persecution could still criticize opposing candidates on a limited scale without being forced to disclose their
identities. With the court's decision in Petersilie, however, this window
has been closed. These groups must choose between remaining silent,
speaking openly and being persecuted, or speaking anonymously and facing
criminal prosecution and possible imprisonment.
79. See Petersilie,334 N.C. at 206, 432 S.E.2d at 854 (Mitchell, J., dissenting) (arguing that
"the fact that the author of a statement is unwilling to reveal his or her identity in itself serves to
put every recipient of voting age on notice that the statement may be less believable than one
which has been signed").
80. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-272.1 (1993) declares all violations of Chapter 163 to be Class 2
Misdemeanors. N.C. GEN STAT. § 14-3(a) (1991) states that a misdemeanor is "punishable by
fine, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or by both, in the discretion of the
court."
81. See Petersilie,334 N.C. at 204, 432 S.E.2d at 853 (Mitchell, J., dissenting).
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Another concern raised by Petersilie is that, contrary to the court's
assertion of specificity, the case gives the statute a rather startling breadth
of applicability. 82 The facts of Petersilie read almost like a law school hypothetical designed to test, to the point of absurdity, the limits of the statute.
Petersilie did not write or create the materials he sent, and the only clear
evidence presented was that he had addressed envelopes, but had not copied
or folded any of the fliers, or stuffed any envelopes;83 the materials contained true (if somewhat distorted) statements concerning the candidates
they criticized;8 4 Petersilie himself was connected with only eleven of the
fliers distributed; 85 and the fliers contained not personal attacks on the candidates, but substantive information about the candidates' anticipated performance in office.8 6 Yet the court's actual construction of the statute
87
suggests it would apply to individuals even less culpable than Petersilie.
As long as the statements are derogatory or designed to affect a candidate's
performance in an election, they must be signed, regardless of the size of
the publication, the targets of the publication, the proximity to election, or
the true merit and value of the publication. Presumably, any one person
who anonymously forwarded a newspaper opinion column to one other
voter, or who mailed an anonymous tip to a newspaper or television station,
would be subject to prosecution. Although the statute may be consistent
with laws in other states, its breadth is still troubling and no other court has
yet interpreted a similar statute to have such a sweeping effect.8 8
Petersilie has unreasonably upheld a statute that restricts political
speech with no compelling government interest to justify that restriction.
There are two paths of escape from the inequities of Petersilie. The first is
for a defendant convicted under the statute to challenge its validity before
the U.S. Supreme Court. The second is for the North Carolina General
Assembly to repeal the law, as so many other states have done.89 The first
path will require time and money in quantities that few defendants are
82. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
83. See Petersilie,334 N.C. at 173-74,432 S.E.2d at 834-45; Brief for Defendant-Appellant,

supra note 36, at 4.
84. See Petersilie,334 N.C. at 173-74, 432 S.E.2d at 834-35; Brief for Defendant-Appellant,

supra note 36, at 4.
85. Petersilie, 334 N.C. at 172, 432 S.E.2d at 834.
86. Id. at 173-74, 432 S.E.2d at 834-35. However, religion creates a significant subtext in
Petersilie, and the fundamentalist Christianity and possible antisemitism evident in Petersilie's
attacks on Chase may provide some insight into the outcome of the case. See North Carolina,
U.S.A. TODAY, Oct. 17, 1990, at 10A: "BOONE-Trial began for defeated Town Council candidate Frank Petersilie, 50-charged with anonymous mailing of derogatory, anti-Semitic campaign
fliers."
87. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.

88. See supra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text (showing that only 14 states still have such
statutes, compared to the 43 counted in 1975).
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likely to have. The second path will require a group of people already
elected and in power to sacrifice an established advantage for the benefit of
small, dissident groups. ° In spite of the difficulties, either of the two paths
would be superior to the place in which Petersilie has left the people of
North Carolina.
STEVEN ROBERT DANIEL

90. See supra text accompanying notes 80-82.

Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore: Does the
Contract Clause Have Any Vitality in the Fourth Circuit?
America's cities are in the midst of financial crises.' Within the past
two years, many cities have aggressively attempted to reduce their deficits
by enacting furlough plans.2 These plans reduce payroll expenditures by
requiring city employees, who often have public contracts establishing the
terms of their employment, to take a fixed number of days of unpaid leave
The enactment of furlough plans is often highly controversial because the
desire of city officials to address fiscal shortfalls directly conflicts with the
contractual expectations of city employees.4
In Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore,' the Fourth Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals addressed a furlough plan controversy. The City of
Baltimore had furloughed its employees in response to cuts in state aid.6
Aggrieved city workers brought suit arguing that the furlough plan impaired
their labor agreements in violation of Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, of the
United States Constitution.7 Reversing the district court, the Fourth Circuit
held that Baltimore's furlough plan did not violate the Contract Clause.8
Satisfied that the city had made every effort to address the concerns of its
1. See Randy Arndt, FiscalTensions Tighten Around City Budgetsfor Third Year Running:
NLC Leaders Urge National Focus on Local Economic Health, NATION'S Crrias WKLY., July 12,

1993, at 2 (noting that over half of 688 cities responding to a 1993 survey are faced with budgetary shortfalls, that results from the preceding two years are similar, and that nearly 72% expect
similar problems in 1994); Thomas McCarroll, City on the Brink: Squeezed by Budgetary Woes
and Urban Ailments, PhiladelphiaTeeters on the Edge of Bankruptcy, Tram, Jan. 7, 1991, at 58
(noting that 29 of the nation's 50 largest cities faced budget deficits in 1991). See generally
HELEN F. LADD & JOHN YINGER, AMERcA'S ALING Crrias: FIscAL .HEALTHAND THE DESIGN OF
URBAN PoucY (1989).

2. See e.g., Sari Horwitz & Marcia Slacum Greene, D.C. Teachers Stage Sickout over Furlough, WASH. PosT, Jan. 22, 1993, at Al; Laura M. Litvan & Jim Keary, Furlough Back Pay
Sought, THE WASH. TwiEs, Sept. 25, 1992, at B1; Helain Olen, City Hall Shuts As Furlough Plan
Begins, L.A. Turms, Oct. 10, 1992 at B3; Thomas C. Palmer, Jr., Carmen's Union Expresses
Bitterness at T Furlough Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 1994, at 18; Ron Sonenshine, Sonoma
County Closing For Holidays, Government Employees To Be Off Without Pay in Cost Cutting
Moves, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 12, 1992, at Al.
3. For example, Baltimore saved approximately two million dollars by placing all city employees except for firefighters on five days of unpaid leave. Baltimore City Lodge No. 3 v. Mayor
of Baltimore, 801 F. Supp. 1506, 1508 (D. Md. 1992), rev'd sub nom., Baltimore Teachers Union
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994).
4. See Horwitz & Greene, supra note 2, at Al (describing protests by furloughed teachers as
well as parents and students who supported them); Palmer, supra note 2, at 18 (describing anger
of furloughed carmen).
5. 6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1127 (1994).
6. Id. at 1014.
7. Id. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, commonly known as the Contract Clause, states in
relevant part: "No state shall... pass any ...

8. 6 F.3d at 1022.

law impairing the obligation of contracts."
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employees, the court found that the plan was a reasonable and necessary
means of reducing the city's deficit. 9
This Note first details the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Baltimore Teachers Union.1 0 After examining the United States Supreme Court's longstanding effort to reconcile the Contract Clause with state sovereignty1 and
reviewing lower courts' application of the Supreme Court standard, 2 the
Note then argues that Baltimore Teachers Union is inconsistent with the
position taken by the Supreme Court and at least one other circuit. 3 The
Note contends that the Fourth Circuit's position will destabilize public con-

tractual relationships and allow public contract holders to be unfairly disadvantaged throughout the political process. 14 In conclusion, the Note urges
the Supreme Court to clarify the extent to which the Contract Clause pro5
tects public contracts.1
The dispute in Baltimore Teachers Union centered on labor agreements that established the terms of employment for city police and teachers
for the fiscal year 1992.16 The police concluded the negotiation of their

salaries on November 19, 1991, while the teachers relied on salary terms
agreed upon in 1989.11 After the terms were agreed upon, the City Council
enacted them into law as part of an Ordinance of Estimates, which included
various 1992 budgetary obligations."
During the negotiation period, the city began to experience significant

financial difficulties. By October 1991, it had lost approximately $24.2
million in state aid.' 9 To offset the loss, the city responded with nonsalary

reductions in its payroll expenditures.2" On January 16, 1992, the city's

9. Id. at 1019-22. Only two other courts have addressed Contract Clause challenges to
furlough plans. In District of Columbia v. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, 619 A.2d 77
(D.C. 1993), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld Washington's furlough plan by
finding that the Contract Clause limits only state action, not laws enacted by Congress for the
District of Columbia. Id. at 81. In Opinion of the Justices (Furlough), 609 A.2d 1204 (N.H.
1992), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that a state furlough plan proposed by the state
legislature violated the Contract Clause. Id. at 1210-12. The court found that the bill was neither
reasonable nor necessary because the state could address its financial need with other policy alternatives. Id.
10. See infra notes 16-40 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 41-86 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 100-37 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 138-54 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
16. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1014.
17. Id. at 1024 n.3 (Widener, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 1014. It should be noted that the salary terms were developed through labor negotiations and that courts have recognized that a statute may create contractual rights. Id. at 1014-15.
19. Id. at 1014.
20. Id. The city laid off employees, encouraged early retirements, and eliminated some positions. Id.
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financial difficulties appeared to reach a critical point when the Governor
announced forthcoming additional cuts of approximately $13.3 million.2
In response, the city implemented a "furlough plan," which was designed to
reduce payroll expenditures further. 2 The plan applied to all full-time employees except firefighters and saved approximately two million dollars.23
The police and teachers brought suit, alleging that the furlough plan
violated the Contract Clause by impairing their respective labor agreements.24 The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
found that the city failed to prove that the furlough plan was a reasonable
and necessary means of addressing its budgetary problems.' Based on this
finding the court held the furlough plan to be an unconstitutional impairment of the labor agreements.2 6
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that the furlough
plan's impairment of the labor agreements was constitutionally permissible.2 7 Judge Luttig, writing for the panel's majority, applied a Contract
Clause analysis developed by the Supreme Court.2" Under that test, the
Contract Clause is violated only if: 1) state action impairs a contract; 2) the
impairment is substantial; and 3) the impairing state action is not a reasonable and necessary means of serving a significant and legitimate public purpose. 29 Moreover, the test requires courts grant less deference to legislative
judgments of reasonableness and necessity in public contract cases than in
private contract cases.30
The Fourth Circuit easily concluded that the city had entered contracts
with its employees upon enacting the Ordinance of Estimates, 3 ' and that the
21. Id.

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Baltimore City Lodge 3 FOP v. Mayor of Baltimore, 801 F. Supp. 1506, 1508 (D. Md.
1992), rev'd sub nom. Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994). Originally, the plaintiffs sought to repeal the furlough

plan. Id. However, while the United States District Court for the District of Maryland was considering summary judgment motions filed by both parties, the city discontinued the plan upon
learning the cuts in state aid would be less than anticipated. Id. After the city refused to reimburse the pay lost prior to cancellation, the plaintiffs amended their summary judgment motion to
seek restitution. Id.
25. Id. at 1513.
26. Id.
27. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1022. The court of appeals remanded because the
district court failed to consider other claims that it mistakenly believed the plaintiffs had abandoned. Id. at 1022 n.14.
28. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1015-22.

29. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 411-12
(1983) (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978)).
30. Id. at 413.
31. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1015. In support of this conclusion, the court relied
on the United States Trust Court's recognition that a statute will be treated as a contract "when the
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salary reductions constituted an impairment of these contracts.3 2 Second,
the court determined that the nearly one-percent pay reduction was substantial3 3 because the level of compensation was a contractual inducement upon
which the plaintiffs had especially relied.3 4

Addressing the third prong, the Fourth Circuit disagreed with the district court, holding that the furlough plan was a reasonable and necessary
means of serving an important public purpose.3 5 The court of appeals concluded that the furlough plan was a legitimate exercise of state power because it was narrowly tailored to address the anticipated cuts in state aid.36
The court initially emphasized that even the police and teachers did not
dispute the importance of the city's effort to maintain financial integrity.
Next, the court examined the reasonableness and necessity of the furlough
plan. 38 Because the city stood to gain financially by impairing public labor
agreements, the court purported to give less deference to the city's judgment than it would have given had the plan only impaired a private contract.3 9 Nonetheless, the court concluded that the furlough plan was both
language and circumstances evince a legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual
nature enforceable against the State." Id. (quoting United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431
U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1977)).
32. Id. at 1015-16. Because contracts are generally interpreted to incorporate existing law,
and § 2(g) of the City Charter had authorized the Board to "effect reductions ... in appropriations" in response to a budgetary deficiency, the city argued that the contract unilaterally authorized the Board of Estimates to modify it. Id. The majority, however, rejected this interpretation
of the language of § 2(g). Id. at 1016. In any event, the majority doubted that the section applied
because the furlough plan had been initiated in response to anticipated cuts in state aid rather than
an actual budgetary deficiency. Id. at 1016 n.4.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Widener argued that the court should not have found an
concurring). He interpreted § 2(g) more broadly, arguing
impairment. Id. at 1022 (Widener, J.,
that it authorized reductions in response to anticipated cuts as well as to current deficiencies. Id.
at 1023-24 (Widener, J., concurring). Additionally, he argued that § 9(a) of the Budget Reconciliation Act for Fiscal Year 1992 defeated the contractual impairment claim of the police. Id. at
1024-25 (Widener, J., concurring). That section, which authorized the City of Baltimore to meet
its financial obligations by reducing previously approved appropriations, took effect after the
teachers had negotiated their labor agreement with the city but a month before the police had
negotiated their agreement. Id. at 1024 (Widener, J., concurring). In Judge Widener's view, this
section clearly authorized the city to reduce police salaries. Id. (Widener, J. concurring). By
contrast, the majority determined that § 9(a) "so read, would almost certainly violate the Contract
Clause." Id. at 1016 n.5.
33. Id. at 1016-17.
34. Id. at 6 F.3d at 1018. Although the court felt that the Supreme Court had provided "little
specific guidance" on this issue, it determined that a substantial impairment fell somewhere between minimal alteration and total repudiation. Id. at 1017.
35. Id. at 1022.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1019.
38. Id.
39. Id. The court relied on United States Trust in determining that state actions impairing
public contracts require greater scrutiny than those impairing private contracts because the state's
self-interest is at stake in the former. Id. See infra notes 69-81 and accompanying text. The
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reasonable and necessary because it was a temporary measure designed
only to offset the lost state aid.n 0
The language of the Contract Clause suggests no exception that would
allow a state to impair a public contract. The clause states: "No state shall
41 Despite this
... pass any ... law impairing the obligation of contracts."
broad language, the Framers intended primarily to prevent states from hampering commerce by the passage of debtor-relief laws.4 2 Consequently,
courts were left to reconcile the Clause's broad language with the limited
intrusion on state sovereignty contemplated by the Framers.
In the early 1800s, Chief Justice John Marshall expressed a willingness
to interpret the Contract Clause broadly. 3 His opinion in Fletcher v.
majority assumed that action by Baltimore's Board of Estimates was equivalent to state legislative
action. Id. at 1026 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en bane). The
dissent, however, suggested that the Board's implementation of the furlough plan might be entifled to less deference because the Board was not elected and the City Council never approved the
plan. Id. (Mumaghan, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en bane). See infra
notes 88-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the different positions lower courts have
taken on the third prong of the Supreme Court's analysis of public contract cases.
40. Id. at 1020-21. Subsequent to the court of appeals decision, the city worker filed an
unsuccessful petition for rehearing with a suggestion for rehearing en banc. Id. at 1026. In dissent from denial of rehearing, Judge Muraghan questioned the panel's reasonableness and necessity determination, noting that other federal and state courts likely would have reached a different
result. Id. at 1026-27 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting from denial of petition for reh'g en bane). Judge
Mumaghan suggested that the furlough plan was not necessary because he believed the city, motivated by political expedience, chose the furlough plan over less drastic alternatives. Id.
(Mumaghan, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en bane). The workers petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was also denied. Baltimore Teachers Union v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994).
41. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
42. Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 257 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Contract Clause's inclusion in the same section as other currency provisions
suggests the Framers intended that it be applied only to debtor-relief laws); Home Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 427-28 (1934) (contending that the Contract Clause was adopted
because of the plight of debtors following the Revolutionary period); Leo Clarke, The Contract
Clause: A Basis ForLimited JudicialReview ofState Economic Regulation, 39 U. MIAMI L. Rnv.
183, 188 (1985) ("Mhe Framers . . . apparently intended [the Contract Clause] to serve the
limited purpose of preventing the states from adopting debtor-relief laws."); see also, Thomas W.
Merrill, Public Contracts,Private Contracts,and the Transformationof the ConstitutionalOrder,
37 CASE W. RES. L. Rev. 597, 600 (1987) (suggesting that the Framers did not intend the Contract
Clause to have a meaning as broad as its language). Contra United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) ("[The general purpose of the clause was clear: to encourage trade
and credit by promoting confidence in the stability of contractual obligations."); BERNARD
SCHWART
PROPERTY

A COMMENTARY ON

THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES:

THE RIGHTS

OF

273 (1965) (suggesting that the Framers intended the Contract Clause to provide broad
protection against retroactive laws); BENJAMiN F. WRIGHT, JR., THm CoNTRAcT CLAUSE OF THE
CONsTrrtrION 15 (1938) (arguing that at least some of the Framers understood the Contract
Clause to have a broader application).
43. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137 (1810) (reasoning that the Contract
Clause applies to public contracts since its language does not expressly exempt them);
SCHwARTz, supra note 42, at 270 (crediting Marshall with transforming the Contract Clause into
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Peck,' barring the Georgia legislature from rescinding land sales made by
a previous legislature, 4 5 established that the Contract Clause applies to public as well as private contracts.46 Chief Justice Marshall equated Contract
Clause protection with the strong constitutional protection provided against
ex post facto laws and bills of attainder.4 7 He reasoned that the clause was
designed "to shield [people] and their property from the effects of those
sudden and strong passions to which" legislatures are vulnerable. 48 Following Fletcher,the Marshall Court specifically recognized that the salary contracts of public officers are entitled to the same Contract Clause protection
as private employment contracts. 49
Despite Chief Justice Marshall's successful extension of Contract
Clause protection to public contracts, the Clause never assumed the expan0
sive role he envisioned. For example, in Ogden v. Saunders,"
the Court

rejected Chief Justice Marshall's position that the Contract Clause should
be extended to bar laws that impair an individual's ability to enter future
contracts. 5 ' Only two years after Marshall's death, the Court began to limit
Contract Clause protection even more severely. In CharlesRiver Bridge v.
Warren Bridge, 2 the Court defeated a Contract Clause claim by holding
that all ambiguities in public contracts would be construed in favor of the
state.53 In reaching this result, Chief Justice Taney reasoned that a strict

application of the Contract54 Clause would unduly hamper a state's ability to
act in the public interest.

"a general safeguard of the sanctity of all contractual obligations"); Clarke, supra note 42, at 189
(crediting Marshall with giving the Contract Clause importance in Constitutional history).
44. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
45. Id. at 133-137. Fletcher had purchased the property from Peck, a land speculator who
had originally purchased it from the State of Georgia. Id. at 87-88. A subsequent Georgia legislature repealed the original sale because the previous legislature had been influenced by bribes. Id.
at 89-90.
46. Id. at 137.
47. Id. at 138.
48. Id.
49. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 694 (1819).
50. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
51. Id. at 368. Ogden sued to recover debts owed him by Saunders. Id. at 214. Saunders
argued that the debt had been discharged by a New York debtor-relief statute passed after the debt
had been incurred. Id. The Court found that the law had only impaired contracts in existence
when the law was passed. Id. at 215.
52. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
53. Id. at 544. Massachusetts granted Charles River Bridge Co. a charter to operate a toll
bridge over the Charles River. Id. at 536. The contract implied that this charter was to be exclusive, but the state later granted another charter to Warren Bridge Company. Id. at 536-37. The
Court rejected Charles River Bridge Company's Contract Clause claim by construing its charter to
be non-exclusive. Id. at 559; see also Merrill, supra note 42, at 603-04 (noting that this case
established a dual standard of review because it did not suggest that the rule of strict construction
was applicable to private contracts).
54. Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 547.
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Charles River Bridge foreshadowed the subsequent development of
even broader limitations on the Contract Clause. Some forty years later, in
5 5 the Court held that a state may not restrict through
Stone v. Mississippi,
56
contract its own inalienable power to protect public health or morals.
During the Great Depression, the Court expanded police power limitations
on the Contract Clause even further. In Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v Blaisdell, 7 the Court used the police power doctrine to validate emergency legislation designed to meet a financial crisis.51 The Minnesota law that was
upheld superseded private mortgage agreements and allowed mortgagors
who were in default on their mortgages, and thus technically subject to foreclosure, to delay foreclosure.5 9 The Court applied a balancing test, noting
the following factors: whether the act (1) was an emergency measure, (2)
protected a basic societal interest rather than pariicular individuals, (3) was
tailored appropriately to its purpose, (4) imposed reasonable conditions and
(5) was limited to the duration of the emergency. 0
In 1965, in El Paso v. Simmons, 61 the Court readdressed the application of the police power doctrine to public contract cases. Under a Texas
law, public land purchasers whose land was retaken by the state for tax
delinquency retained an apparently unlimited right to redeem the land.6 2
After oil and natural gas were discovered on many of the retaken lands,
Texas amended the statute to require that all redemption rights be exercised
within five years of the amendment. 63 Relying on the police powers doctrine,' the Court upheld the statute. 65 The Court gave the legislature wide
discretion in determining that the impairment of the redemption rights was
55. 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
56. Id at 817-19. Mississippi, which had granted Stone a charter to operate a lottery, later
amended its constitution to prohibit lotteries. Id. at 814-15. The Court reasoned that the Contract
Clause offered Stone no protection because Mississippi could not restrict contractually its general
police power to prohibit lotteries. Id. at 819; see also Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 232
U.S. 548, 559 (1914) (implying that a regulation will fall within the police power so long as it
benefits the community in some way and employs means that are not arbitrary); Clarke, supra
note 42, at 191 ("The 'police power doctrine' established in Stone signalled the end of the significance of the Contract Clause.").
57. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
58. Id. at 439-40.
59. Id. at 447-48.
60. Id. at 444-47. The Court found that Minnesota had been under severe economic distress,
had no effective alternative, and had only enacted a temporary measure. Id. Also, the Court noted
that the law was tailored to the emergency at hand because it required mortgagors, who had been

protected from ouster, to pay the rental value for the period during which foreclosure was delayed.
Id. at 445.
61. 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
62. Id. at 498-99.
63. Id. at 499.
64. Id. at 509.
65. Id. at 516-17.
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necessary for the public welfare.6 6 Moreover, the Court, finding that the

impairment was only a "technical" one affecting a redemption right on
which an original purchaser would not likely have relied,67 suggested that
the degree of impairment would affect its constitutionality. However, El
Paso, like Blaisdell, provided no clear restrictions on police power.68
Although the Supreme Court tolerated expansive exercises of state police power impairing contractual rights during the forty years after Blaisdell, that climate of toleration changed in United States Trust Co. v. New
Jersey.69 In 1962, New York and New Jersey signed a covenant promising
Port Authority bondholders that future revenues pledged as bond security
would not be used to fund further takeover of unprofitable passenger railroad systems.70 A dozen years later, as the national energy crisis intensified, New York and New Jersey repealed the covenant.7 1 Giving new life
to the Contract Clause,7 2 the Court invalidated the repeal.7 3 Initially, the
Court determined that the police power doctrine does not excuse states from

binding financial obligations 74 and that funding mass rail transit with the
pledged revenues would seriously impair a public contract.75 The Court
next considered whether the impairment was nevertheless constitutional as
66. Id. at 508-09 (citing East N.Y. Say. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 232-33 (1945)). The
Court noted that the state sought, among other things, to remove clouds from land titles and to
ensure more efficient utilization of mineral wealth. Id. at 515-16.
67. Id. at 512-15. The Court believed original purchasers assumed that, after retaking the
land, the state would quickly resell it to third parties. Id. at 514. As the state's subsequent resale
ended the original buyer's redemption rights, the Court concluded that the purchasers had not
bargained for extensive redemption rights and would receive windfall gains if given an unlimited
redemption right. Id. at 514-15.
68. See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 16 (1977) ("Both of these cases
eschewed a rigid application of the Contract Clause to invalidate state legislation. Yet neither
indicated that ... its limitation on state power was illusory.").
69. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
70. Id. at 9-10. The 1962 covenant excepted the Port Authority's proposed takeover of the
Hudson & Manhattan Railroad. Id.
71. Id. at 12-14.
72. For a discussion on the revitalization of the Contract Clause see Richard A. Epstein,
Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CH. L. Rsv. 703, 770 (1984); Note,
Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1414, 1415 (1984).
73. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 32.
74. Id. at 25. In support of this proposition, the Court quoted the following passage:
The truth is, States and cities, when they borrow money and contract to repay it with
[T]he contract should be regarded as an
interest, are not acting as sovereignties ....
assurance that such a right will not be exercised. A promise to pay, with a reserved right
to deny or change the effect of the promise, is an absurdity.
Id. at 25 n.23 (quoting Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432, 445 (1878)); see also, Energy Reserves
Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.14 (1983) ("In almost every case,
the Court has held a governmental unit to its contractual obligations when it enters financial or
other markets.").
75. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 27-28.
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a reasonable and necessary means of serving an important public purpose.7 6
In assessing reasonableness and necessity, the Court determined that "complete deference to [the] legislative assessment ... is not appropriate because the [State]," as a party to the contract, has incentive to abuse an
unchecked power of unilateral modification.7 7 According to the Court, the
impairment was not necessary because the states could have employed a
less drastic means of mass transit financing by partially honoring the covenant rather than totally repealing it.78 Additionally, the Court noted that the
states could have discouraged automobile use and funded mass rail transit
by alternative means such as taxing gasoline or parking.7 9 Addressing the
issue of reasonableness, the Court held that the impairment was not reasonable because the states knew of the need for mass rail transit and of the

problems associated with automobile use when they entered into the 1962
covenant.8 0 Although these concerns had become more urgent twelve years
later, "the subsequent changes were of degree and not of kind."'"
In Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus,8 2 a case decided two years
after United States Trust, the Court also briefly "revitalized" the Contract
Clause as applied to private contracts.8 3 In doing so, the Court employed a
balancing text significantly more favorable to contract-impairing state action than that applied in United States Trust. 4 Since Spannaus, however,
76. Id. at 28-32. See also id. at 25 ("(Ain impairment may be constitutional if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose.").
77. Id. at 26.
78. Id. at 30. The pledged revenues were generated from toll tunnels and bridges. Id. at 30
n.28. The Court suggested that the states could have used only the additional amounts obtained
from the increased rates and the increased number of toll facilities to finance mass rail transit. Id.
Also, the Court suggested expanding the covenant exception that allowed the acquisition of rails
operating at a "permitted deficit" or modifying the covenant to ease the difficulty of obtaining
bondholder approval of mass rail funding. Id.
Justice Brennan was particularly troubled by this aspect of the majority opinion. He dissented, arguing that judicial examination of policy alternatives was rarely appropriate and that
bondholder financial interests were adequately protected by the market and political process. Id.
at 61-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 30 n.29. The Court took these specific alternatives from 38 Fed. Reg. 31389
(1973), an Environmental Protection Agency regulation unrelated to the 1962 covenant.
80. 431 U.S. at 31-32.
81. Id. at 32.
82. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
83. Id. at 250-5 1.
84. In Spannaus, the Court utilized the Contract Clause to strike down a Minnesota statute
that expanded the pension obligations of certain employers. Id. In determining that the statute did
not represent a legitimate use of police power, the Court employed a balancing approach reminiscent of Blaisdell analysis. Id. at 247-51; see Clarke, supra note 42, at 200 ("By stressing the
factors that distinguished Blaisdell and El Paso rather than applying the United States Trust test,
Stewart seemed to be reverting to pre-UnitedStates Trust analysis."). The Court emphasized that
the statute was not a response to an emergency, was designed to benefit only a narrow class,
regulated an area not previously subject to regulation, and altered contractual relationships severely and permanently. Spannaus, 438 U.S. at 250-51.

1642

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

the Court has been relatively unreceptive to Contract Clause claims, and
none of the more recent decisions have involved public contracts.85 By
explaining that the considerable deference given legislative judgments only
applies in private contract cases, the Court has, however, indicated that the

more scrutinizing
United States Trust analysis still controls in public con86
tracts cases.
Accordingly, lower courts have applied United States Trust in public
contracts cases, but they have struggled with some of the ambiguities in that
decision.87 In particular, courts have struggled with the third prong of the
United States Trust analysis. United States Trust specified only that "complete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity
is not appropriate because the State's self-interest is at stake."'8 8 The
Supreme Court applied this standard of reduced deference in assessing the
reasonableness and necessity of legislative means.89 Although some lower
courts have followed suit,9" others have applied differing amounts of deference to legislative judgments. The Third Circuit apparently interpreted this
85. See General Motors Corp. V. Romein, 112 S. Ct. 1105, 1110 (1992) (rejecting a Contract
Clause challenge by finding that collective bargaining with private employers had given employees no contractual rights); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 50506 (1987) (rejecting a Contract Clause challenge by deferring to an implicit state legislative determination that the impairment of a private contractual right was necessary); Exxon Corp. v.
Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 187-88 (1983) (rejecting a Contract Clause challenge by finding that
private contractual rights had not been impaired); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power
and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 413-15 (1983) (rejecting a Contract Clause challenge by finding that
private contractual rights of participants in a highly regulated industry had not been substantially
impaired).
86. See DeBenedictis,480 U.S. at 472 (explaining the deference given to the legislative judgment as dependent upon the fact that the state was not a party to the contract in question); Energy
Reserves, 459 U.S. at 412 n.14 (recognizing that, if a public contract had~been impaired, the
legislative action would have been subject to greater scrutiny).
87. See cases cited infra notes 90-92.
88. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 26.
89. See id. at 29. ("We can only sustain the repeal of the 1962 covenant if that impairment
was both reasonable and necessary to serve the admittedly important purposes claimed by the
State.").
90. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Miller, 795 F. Supp. 1476, 1487 (D. Nev. 1992)
(determining under a standard of "less deference" that a Nevada statute which gave additional
process to residents charged with NCAA violations was really designed to alter the NCAA's
contract with state institutions-not to protect the livelihoods of Nevadans). See Gardiner v.
Tschechtelin, 765 F. Supp. 279, 288-89 (D. Md. 1991) (analyzing state action under "closer scrutiny" that included an examination of legislative alternatives but ultimately recognizing the legitimacy of the legislative motives set out in statute); Maryland State Teachers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hughes,
594 F. Supp. 1353, 1361-1371 (D. Md. 1984) (recognizing that courts do not it as "superlegislatures," but examining legislative documents extensively before determining that no less drastic
alternatives existed); Pineman v. Oechslin, 494 F. Supp. 525, 549 n.43 (D. Conn. 1980) (noting
that the examination of the reasonableness and necessity of legislative means does not necessitate
reassessing the wisdom of state policy objectives), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 637
F.2d 601 (1981).
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language to require that very little deference be given in public contract
cases, 9 1 but a first First Circuit case applied an almost completely deferential standard. 92
The Second Circuit, especially, has been willing to give the clause
some backbone. In Association of Surrogates v. New York,93 the court
adopted a standard of reduced deference.9 4 Using this standard, the court
invalidated a New York statute that would have financed the expansion of
the court system by deferring the payment of court employee wages for two
weeks. 95 The state argued that the measure was necessary, in light of a
fiscal crisis, to provide adequate court services.96 After assuming arguendo
the legitimacy of legislative ends, the court found that the means chosen by
the state were not necessary. 97 Relying on United States Trust and its suspicion that the state was motivated by political expedience, the court determined that raising taxes was an obvious and less drastic alternative.9" In
contrast, the wage deferments placed a disproportionate amount of the cost
for the expanded court system on a narrow class-court employees-who
relied on their wages to pay for essentials such as food and housing. 99
Although the Baltimore Teachers Union court also purported to apply
United States Trust, it reached a different result from that reached by the
91. See West Indian Co., Ltd. v. Government of V.I., 844 F.2d 1007, 1022 (3rd Cir. 1988)
(dictum) ("Because the Virgin Islands Government is a party to the contract, we need not defer to
the judgment of the Sixteenth Legislature, but 'may inquire whether a less drastic alteration of
contract rights could achieve the same purpose and whether the law is reasonable.' ") (citation
omitted); Nieves v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 819 F.2d 1237, 1243 (3rd Cir. 1987) (stating that customary deference to legislative judgment is inappropriate where the state is a party to the contract).
92. See Local Div. 589, Amalgamated Transit Union v. Massachusetts, 666 F.2d 618, 641-43
(lst Cir. 1981) (assessing legislative motives and alternative solutions in a deferential manner that
did not require the state to show actual legislative purpose and arguing that the legislature is far
better suited to determine the reasonableness and necessity of a particular statute).
93. 940 F.2d 766 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 936 (1991).
94. Id. at 771-72.
95. Id. Court employees were to receive the deferred paycheck after the termination of their
employment with the state. Id. at 768-70.
In Condell v. Bress, 983 F.2d 415, 420, cert. denied, 113 S. CL 1849 (1993), the Second
Circuit relied on Surrogates to invalidate a lag payroll provision that applied to New York State
executive employers. In that case, the defendants attempted to distinguish Surrogates by arguing
that the lag payroll was an insubstantial impairment because it involved only five days of deferred
pay whereas Surrogates involved twice as many days. Id. at 417-18. The court rejected this
contention and applied the "reasonable and necessary" test. Id. at 419. The court found that a
fiscal crisis worse than the state's billion dollar deficit would be required to justify a lag payroll.
Id. at 417, 420. After recognizing that the state faced a difficult problem and had considered a
number of alternatives, the court concluded that the lag payroll was not necessary because the
state could have raised taxes. Id. at 420.
96. Surrogates,940 F.2d at 773.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 772-73.
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Second Circuit in a remarkably similar factual situation. In both Surrogates
and Baltimore Teachers Union, city employees challenged a city's effort to
meet its financial shortcomings by taking promised wages from its employees. The conflicting holdings illuminate the degree to which the circuits
have reached different conclusions regarding the proper application of the
United States Trust test"° and point to the need for further Supreme Court
review of this issue.
First, the Fourth Circuit misapplied the reasonableness test. In determining reasonableness in United States Trust, the Supreme Court focused
on whether the impairing state action was a response to an unforeseen
change of circumstances. 10 ' The Court determined that New York and New
Jersey could have foreseen the growing need for mass transit when they
entered the 1962 covenant with bondholders." ° Even though costly environmental protection and energy conservation demands on the Port Authority had become more acute, the Court reasoned that these subsequent
changes should have been foreseen because they "were of degree and not of
kind."" 3 In Baltimore Teachers Union, the Fourth Circuit addressed the
Supreme Court's reasonableness analysis only in a footnote. °4 Inverting
the Supreme Court's language, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the furlough
plan was reasonable because "the magnitude of the reductions in state aid
rendered the budgetary shortfall ... tantamount to a difference in kind'
rather than degree. 0 5 In making this assertion, the court failed to truly
address the narrower issue suggested by United States Trust-whether
Maryland's announcement of additional cuts of $13.3 million, the announcement that brought about the furlough plan, signalled an unforeseen
change of circumstances. By addressing the many reductions the city had
experienced and the city's general financial plight, 10 6 rather than excluding
the financial difficulties that already had arisen when the Ordinance of Estimate was ratified, the court improperly applied the reasonableness test set
forth in United States Trust.
100. See supra note 28-30 and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit seems to have combined the United States Trust "reasonable and necessary" test with the "reasonable and appropriate" test used by the Supreme Court in connection with a private contracts cases. Compare United
States Trust v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 (1976) (discussing the "reasonable and appropriate"
test in connection with Blaisdell) with Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1022 (concluding that
the furlough plan was justified because it was "reasonable and appropriate").

101. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 31-32.
102. Id. at 31-32.
103. Id. at 32.
104. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1021 n.13.
105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. See id. at 1021 ("[Pjrior to the implementation of the furlough plan, [the city] 'was
approaching the point where it [had] to begin cutting basic government services.' ") (citation
omitted).
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Ignoring the distinction between public and private contract cases, the
Fourth Circuit supported its reasonableness analysis by a general examination of a number of factors that the Supreme Court has deemed important in
private contracts cases. 10 7 Under a balancing approach reminiscent of
Blaisdell,10 8 the Fourth Circuit found the public contract at issue to be reasonable. First, the court determined that the furlough plan was enacted to
redress a "broad, generalized economic or social problem."'0 9 Although it
has relied on this factor in private contracts cases, the Supreme Court has
linked it to the legitimacy of legislative ends, not the reasonableness of

legislative means. 110 In Baltimore Teachers Union, the legitimacy of the
ends behind the furlough plan was not at issue because the plaintiffs conceded that the city could act to address its financial difficulties."' Second,
suggesting that the furlough plan was equivalent to a "generally applicable
rule of conduct," the court determined that city employees did not constitute
a narrow class." 2 Arguably, city employees were a narrow class.'1 3 In
addition, the furlough plan did not define general rules of conduct; it did not

apply to non-employees, and its main effect was to alter contractual terms.
Third, and most inexplicably, the Fourth Circuit equated the legitimate expectations of public employees with those of highly regulated private industry. 1 4 In effect, the court argued that public employees relied less on their
107. Id. The court cited Blaisdell, Spannaus, Energy Reserves and Exxon, all cases that involved private contracts. ld.The court also cited page 22, note 19 of the United States Trust
opinion. Id. This portion of the United States Trust opinion discussed the determination of reasonableness in Blaisdell, a private contracts case. United States Trust v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1,
22 n.19 (1977).
108. See Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1021 (discussing the following five factors
emphasized in Blaisdell and Spannaus: whether the furlough plan 1) was a response to an emergency, 2) was appropriately tailored to its purpose, 3) targeted only a narrow class, 4) regulated a
previously regulated area, and 5) was only a temporary measure). See supra notes 57-60 and
accompanying text.
109. 6 F.3d at 1021 (quoting Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 250 (1978)).
110. See Spannaus,438 U.S. at 250 ("The law was not even purportedly enacted to deal with a
broad, generalized social problem."); Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 445 (1934) ("The legislation was
addressed to a legitimate end, that is, the legislation was not for the mere advantage of particular
individuals but for the protection of a basic interest of society.").
111. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1019.
112. Id. at 1021.
113. Cf. Association of Surrogates v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 772-73 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 936 (1991) (arguing that it was impermissible for a state to place all the costs of
an expanded court system on court employees where it could have distributed the costs more
broadly among state taxpayers).
114. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1021. In private contract cases, the Court has analyzed this factor as having only an indirect effect on the reasonableness of legislative means.
Compare Energy Reserves Group Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 413 ('CThe
threshold determination is whether the ...Act has impaired substantially... contractual rights.
Significant here is the fact that the parties are operating in a heavily regulated industry.") with
United States Trust v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 27 (1976) ('The extent of impairment is certainly a
relevant factor in determining ...

reasonableness").
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labor agreements than did private employees because public employees

might anticipate being asked to sacrifice for the public interest. 1 ' However, the court failed to recognize that traditionally underpaid public em-

ployees are likely already making substantial sacrifices for the public
interest and may not be in a position to make additional financial
1 16
sacrifices.
The Fourth Circuit's determination under the necessity prong was
equally flawed. In UnitedStates Trust, the Supreme Court employed a twopart necessity determination that first considered whether a "less drastic
modification would have permitted the contemplated" state action. 1 7 Addressing this issue, the Fourth Circuit correctly noted that the furlough plan
would have been more drastic had it effected a pay reduction that was larger
than or lasted longer than needed to meet the budgetary shortfalls. 1 1 The
court, however, failed to realize that the city could have made the plan less
115. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1021. The Supreme Court's rationale for using a
plaintiff's participation in a highly regulated industry as a factor against finding a Contract Clause
violation has been that the plaintiffs could have foreseen additional regulation when they entered
the contract. Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176, 194 n.14 (1983).
The Fourth Circuit, however, did not assert that public employees are subject to greater regulation than private ones. Instead, the court employed an analysis reminiscent of the "extra-loyalty" doctrine-a somewhat dated doctrine used to limit the development of public employee
collective bargaining rights. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1021. See Stephen A. Befort,
Public SectorBargaining: FiscalCrisisand UnilateralChange, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1221, 1232-33
(1985). Historically, this doctrine extended the scope of sovereign powers by implying that public
employees owed extra duties to the state. Id. Commentators have severely criticized the extraloyalty doctrine and noted that courts no longer rely on it. See id. at 1232, 1274 (criticizing
"extra-loyalty" theory as paternalistic, outmoded, and discriminatory against public employees);
Harry T. Edwards, The Developing Labor Relations Law in the Public Sector, 10 DuQ. L. Rev.
357, 361 (1972) (describing "extra-loyalty" theory as vague, conclusory and not viable in modem
society).
116. A recent evaluation of 100 widely held jobs indicated that police officers and teachers
had median annual earnings slightly below average in 1992. Jersey Gilbert, The Best Jobs in
America, MoNEY, Mar. 1994, at 72-73. Compared with an average median annual earning of
$34,195 for the 100 jobs, police earned $32,900 while high school teachers earned $32,500 and
grade school teachers earned $31,000. Id.
117. UnitedStates Trust, 431 U.S. at 30. In United States Trust, the Supreme Court concluded
that the total repeal of the 1962 covenant was unnecessary because New York and New Jersey
could have subsidized mass transit by simply modifying the covenant. Id. at 29-30. According to
the Court, the states could have amended the covenant to exclude revenues from toll facilities built
after 1962, allow restricted Port Authority involvement with mass transit, or ease the procedures
for obtaining bondholder approval. Id. at 30 n.28.
118. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1020. The court also found that the plan would
have been more drastic had it required additional layoffs. Id. It supported this conclusion by
analyzing the furlough plan's avoidance of layoffs with a New Jersey law provision that allowed
bondholders of insolvent municipalities a partial recovery. Id. (citing Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v.
Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 516 (1942)). This comparison was, however, inappropriate because
bondholders in Faitoute would not have been entitled to recovery without the new law. Faitoute,
316 U.S. at 515-16. In contrast, prior to the furlough plan, the Baltimore teachers and police
presumably had contractual protection from layoffs.

1994]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1647

drastic had it considered compensating employees in some manner for their
lost wages. Rather than making an unqualified refusal to pay the owed
money, the city could have committed itself to repayment at a later date" 9
or to providing additional nonsalary benefits. 2 '
The second part of the Supreme Court's necessity determination in
United States Trust asks whether, "without modifying the [public contract]
at all, the [State] could have adopted alternative means of achieving [its]
S.. goals."''
In United States Trust, the Supreme Court considered the
contention that choosing among alternatives was more properly a matter for
legislative discretion,'2 2 but rejected this assertion because it doubted legislative impartiality in public contract cases. 123 Instead, the Court established
a presumption in favor of alternatives that did not impair public

contracts.124
Without modifying the labor agreements, Baltimore could have met its
budgetary shortfalls by raising taxes or shifting funding from less essential
programs, such as those for cultural activities." Either of these alternatives would have been preferable to the furlough plan. Raising taxes would
have more equitably spread the burdens of the city's financial difficulties
among those who benefitted from city spending, since the deficit presumably had been accumulated by spending in the interest of all city taxpayers
rather than just in the interest of city employees.' 26 Also, reducing spending on the arts, arguably a less essential area than education or police pro119. But see Association of Surrogates v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 774 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S.Ct. 936 (1991) (finding that even a lag payroll provision violated the Contract
Clause because deferring payment would likely lead to eventual cancellation of wages).
120. Cf. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 30 n.28 (finding that, rather than completely repealing a bondholder covenant, the states could have attempted to modify it in a manner consistent
with its broader objectives).
121. Id. at 30. In United States Trust, the Court found that the repeal of the covenant was
unnecessary because the states could have discouraged automobile use by subsidizing mass transit
through increased tolls, gasoline taxes, or parking taxes. Id. at 30 n.29.
122. Id. at 30.
123. See id. at 26 ("[C]omplete deference to a legislative assessment of reasonableness and
necessity is not appropriate because the State's self-interest is at stake.").
124. Id. at 30-31 ("[A) State is not completely free to consider impairing the obligations of its
own contracts on a par with other policy alternatives.").
125. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1027 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for reh'g en bane); see also Association of Surrogates v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 773
(2d Cir.) (finding that a lag payroll provision was not necessary because the state could have
raised taxes or shifted funds from other government programs), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 936
(1991).
126. Equity includes the notion that those who benefit from a certain action also carry its
burdens. Cf. Ronald G.Aronowsky & Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of ParentCorporationsfor Hazardous Substance Releases Under CERCLA, 24 U.S.F. L. Rev. 421, 437-38 (1990) (arguing that
persons profiting from an activity should bear environmental clean-up risks and costs).
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tection, would have allowed the city to address its financial problems
without violating its contractual obligations to the police and teachers.
The Fourth Circuit, however, eschewed the examination of alternatives
required by United States Trust. It reasoned that, as a court, it was illequipped to consider evidence relevant to a substantive policy decision. 127
Although it purported to give only some deference to the legislature's judgment,12 8 the Fourth Circuit effectively accorded complete deference to the
city's decision to adopt the furl9ugh plan. The Fourth Circuit refused to
consider the alternative of raising taxes because it believed that this alternative would always be available to overturn a state's impairment of its own
financial obligations.' 2 9 However, the Supreme Court has indicated that
1 30
governments should almost always be held to their financial obligations.
And the Fourth Circuit's refusal to examine the alternative of raising taxes

directly contradicts the Supreme Court's rationale for requiring additional
scrutiny in public contract cases-that states are motivated to impair public
13 1
contracts precisely because of political pressure not to raise taxes.
The Fourth Circuit's misapplication of United States Trust cannot be
explained by compelling factual differences because Baltimore Teachers
Union presents an even stronger case for the application of the Contract
Clause than did United States Trust. Baltimore employees suffered a definite loss in wages,13 2 and Port Authority bondholders were never able to
demonstrate clearly that the repeal of the 1962 covenant decreased the market value of their bonds.1 33 Furthermore, city employees certainly de134
pended on their wages to purchase essentials such as food and housing,
127. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1022.
128. Id. at 1019 n.10 ("The Court has never expressly stated that any deference is owed legislative judgment in the context of public contract impairment. However, . . . some degree of
deference is appropriate even where a state acts to impair its own contracts.").
129. Id. at 1019-20.
130. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
131. United States Trust v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 26 (1977) ("A governmental entity can
always find a use for extra money, especially when taxes do not have to be raised."); see also
Association of Surrogates v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 773 (2d Cir.) (recognizing that "[this]
alternative would [not] have been popular among politician-legislators, but that is precisely the
reason that the Contract Clause exists-as a 'constitutional check on state legislation"' (citation
omitted)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 936 (1991).
132. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1014.
133. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 19 ("iNjo one can be sure precisely how much financial
loss the bondholders suffered."); id. at 41 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The repeal ... has occasioned only the most minimal damage on the part of the ... bondholders."). The Baltimore
employees also suffered a more definite loss than the court employees in Surrogates who only
suffered a temporary loss of wages. See Surrogates,940 F.2d at 769 (noting that the lag payroll
effectively delayed the payment of two weeks wages until an employee terminated his state job).
134. See Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1027 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for reh'g en bane) (citing Association of Surrogates & Supreme Court Reporters v. New
York, 588 N.E.2d 51, 54 (N.Y. 1992)); see also, Surrogates, 940 F.2d at 772 (finding that the
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while the United States Trust bondholders in all probability used their
bonds solely for investment purposes. 135 Moreover, the change in circumstances was more easily foreseen in Baltimore Teachers Union. Baltimore

impaired labor agreements that had been implemented just prior to the in-

tensification of an already acute financial crisis.' 3 6 In contrast, New York
and New Jersey waited a dozen years before finding the increased need for
37
mass transit unforeseeable.1

Important policy considerations also suggest that the holding in Baltimore Teachers Union is antithetical to United States Trust. Commentators
have justified United State Trust's invocation of the Contract Clause as a
means of promoting economic stability.' 3 ' In contrast, the Baltimore
Teachers Union decision will hamper economic growth because it allows
cities and states too much freedom to alter contracts unilaterally. In the
public contract context, the dangers of a weakened Contract Clause are particularly apparent. Public employees who believe that states will be free to
unilaterally reduce wages will demand a risk premium before agreeing to
work. 1 39 In turn, states will be forced to spend more on essential governemployees affected by the lag payroll provision "surely relied on full paychecks to pay for such
essentials as food and housing," and that many "undoubtedly committed themselves to personal
long-term obligations such as mortgages, credit cards, car payments, and the like").
135. The tax exemption given to municipal bonds pursuant to I.R.C. § 103 (1994) makes them
an appealing investment primarily for individuals in the highest income tax bracket because they
compose the class whose after-tax return is most affected by the switch from taxable to taxexempt securities.
136. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1024 (Widener, J., concurring).
137. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 32.
138. See Clarke, supranote 42, at 248-53 (supporting the UnitedStates Trust result by arguing that it protected individual reliance interests and encouraged states to contract efficiently);
Epstein, supra note 72, at 770 (arguing that United States Trust preserved the long-term soundness
of the lending market at the expense of short-term opportunistic behavior); John L. Kraft et al,
Accommodating the Rights of Bondholdersand State PublicPurposesBeyond United States Trust,
55 TuL. L. REv. 735, 743-45 (1981) (arguing that the United States Trust decision was sound
because it restored investor confidence in the municipal bond market). But see Merrill, supranote
42, at 618 (citing United States Trust, 431 U.S. 1, 61-62 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)) (arguing
that Contract Clause protection was not necessary in United States Trust because lost investor
confidence in government bonds would be offset by the higher rate of return that future investors
would be able to obtain).
139. See Clarke, supra note 42, at 242-43 (discussing risk premiums); Stewart E. Sterk, The
Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contractsand the Contract Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 647, 664
(1988) (noting that risk premiums might be included in government contract prices to compensate
for the possibility of breach); cf.David D. Haddock et al, An Ordinary Economic Rationalefor
ExtraordinaryLegal Sanctions, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1, 46 (1990) (noting that employees who face
physical hazards negotiate risk premiums in advance); Richard A. Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL
SruD. 83, 90-91 (1977) (characterizing the risk of impossibility of performance as an expected
cost that parties consider in contract pricing); Steven Walt, Expectations, Loss Distribution and
Commercial Impracticability,24 IND. L. Rav. 65, 68 (1990) (noting that the reliability of contract
enforcement affects pricing in commercial contracts). Given the weak Contract Clause protection
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ment services or to reduce the quality of services offered. 140 Raising taxes,
all
reducing police protection, or reducing the quality of public education
141

tend to discourage business and individuals from locating in an area.

In addition to creating the problems associated with a risk premium,
weakened Contract Clause protection will tend to cause deterioration in the
work ethic of employees. Public employees who doubt the stability of their
42
employment agreements will likely perform less efficiently on the job.1
Those disadvantaged by unilateral alterations will certainly feel angered and
slighted. Consequently, the quality of essential government services may
be reduced as employees hold "sickouts" and engage in other forms of protest. 14 3 Those under increased fear of unilateral alterations but unable to
negotiate for risk premiums may engage in more subtle forms of protest.
For example, employees may take it upon themselves to compensate for

their increased insecurity by making their work less productive but more
enjoyable.
Consideration of the possible economic effects of reduced public contract security supports the UnitedStates Trust decision and suggests that the
court in Baltimore Teachers Union should have reached a different result.
Some commentators, however, have argued that United States Trust provided too much protection for public contractual rights,' 4 4 suggesting that
the Fourth Circuit's less protective approach might produce better results.
Most notably, United States Trust has been criticized as allowing inappropriate judicial intrusion on legislative judgment.145 Commentators have
available under Baltimore Teachers Union, parties will be unable to allocate this risk through
contract, and even cities with an exemplary record of upholding public contracts will be forced to
pay some risk premium. Risk premiums will likely be highest for cities or states already suffering
financial trouble because these governmental entities will be perceived as most likely to renege on
their financial obligations.
140. A city may choose to pay the risk premium through deficit spending. This approach will,
however, tend to increase risk premiums, trapping the city in a downward spiral.
141. For example, the reduction in the quality of government services will be less pronounced
in the Second Circuit, where risk premiums will be smaller. Thus, businesses and individuals will
have incentive to locate there rather than in the Fourth Circuit.
142. See Association of Surrogates v. New York, 940 F.2d 766, 773 (2d Cir.) ("If a state
government could so cavalierly disregard the obligations of its own contracts, of what value would
its promises ever be?"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 936 (1991).
143. See, Horwitz & Greene, supra note 2, at Al (describing sickout and protests held by
furloughed Washington teachers); Palmer, supra note 2, at 18 (describing bitterness of furloughed
carmen).
144. See e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the JudicialImpairment "Doctrine"
and its Lessonsfor the ContractClause, 44 STAN. L. Rev. 1373, 1462-63 (1992) (questioning the
United States Trust decision's rationale for closely scrutinizing legislative judgments in public
contract cases).
145. See Clarke, supra, note 42, at 251-52 (suggesting that the United States Trust test should
be replaced with an approach that would invoke Contract Clause protection only upon legislative
failure "to recognize the reliance interest of the contractors"); Douglas W. Kmiec & John D.
McGinnis, The ContractClause: A Return to the Original Understanding, 14 HAsTNG~s CONST.
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proposed an alternative process-oriented approach under which the Contract
Clause would be invoked to protect contract holders inadequately represented in the political forum.146 However, a closer examination of this approach only casts further doubt on the Baltimore Teachers Union result.
A process-oriented approach would require that courts invoke Contract
Clause protection only as a response to failings in the political process.1 47
Such failings would often be characterized by legislation burdening public
contract holders who are politically weak or easy targets for the imposition
of the costs of impairment. 14 8 In addition, process failings might also be
characterized by legislative willingness to burden public contractors simply
L.Q. 525, 526 (1987) (arguing that courts should employ the Contract Clause to guard against the
danger that the political majority will disregard minority rights); Note, A Process-OrientedApproach to the Contract Clause, 89 YALE L.J. 1623, 1645 (1980) (arguing that courts should focus
on whether the legislature made the judgments necessary to support its decision and whether
interested parties had a fair opportunity to challenge the impairment through the political process);
Janice C. Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Escapingfrom the Governmental/Proprietary
Maze, 75 IowA L. Rnv. 277, 345 (1990) (suggesting that the Contract Clause was enacted to allow
judicial protection against short-lived republican passions); Merrill supranote 42, at 45 (contending that courts should focus on whether a state's impairing action was motivated by a desire to
protect the interest of groups not represented in the political process); Michael B. Rappaport,
Note, A ProceduralApproach to the Contract Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 918, 926-27 (1984) (arguing
that the Contract Clause should prevent politically powerful groups from expropriating investments in contracts).
146. See authors cited supra note 145.
United States Trust has been subject to a second major line of criticism. Commentators
advocating a Takings Clause analysis have argued that the United States Trust approach should be
abandoned because a finding of a Contract Clause violation may require specific performance of
contract terms where a damage remedy would be more efficient. See Rappaport, supra note 145,
at 925 (arguing that states should be required to pay damages for impairing public contractual
rights). For example, the United States Trust Court's reinstitution of the bondholder's covenant
arguably hampered the states' effort to expand mass transit while providing at most a negligible
increase in the value of the bonds. See Clarke, supra note 42, at 255 (arguing the Contract Clause
provides holders of public contractual rights unnecessary constitutional protection). Under the
Takings Clause approach, the United States Trust Court should have allowed New York and New
Jersey to modify the bondholder's covenant after compensating the bondholders for the lost security provision.
The Takings Clause solution proposed above is not directly applicable to the Baltimore
Teachers Union facts. Because the city had reinstituted the labor agreements after unilaterally
modifying them for a three-month period, the continued enforcement of the labor agreements was
not at issue because plaintiffs instead sought damages for the past Contract Clause violation.
Baltimore City Lodge 3 FOP v. Mayor, 801 F. Supp. 1506, 1508 (D. Md. 1992), rev'd sub nom.
Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1127 (1994). In addition, when the contract impairment at issue involves a furlough plan,
the logic of the Takings Clause alternative is inapposite. Because the measure of damages the
government would be required to pay in compensation exactly equals the amount saved by
furloughing the public employees, the government gains nothing under the Takings approach.
147. The process-oriented approach is a rearticulation of the view that the Supreme Court's
role in evaluating state legislation should be limited to "representation-reinforcement." GEOFFRaY
R. STorNm ET AL., CoNsrrrtrONAL LAw 68 (2nd ed. 1991).
148. See Note, A Process-OrientedApproach to the ContractClause, supra note 145, at 1625.
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to benefit the political majority.149 Under this approach, suspicious legislative impairments would be upheld only if the legislature offered sufficient

justification for burdening public contractors. 150 Requiring the legislature
to articulate the reasons for choosing impairment over other alternatives

would subject it to checks by public criticism, not by courts. 151
This process-oriented approach does not support the result in Baltimore Teachers Union. The Board of Estimates, the municipal executive

agency that enacted the furlough plan, was not an elected body, and thus not
subject to direct political checks. 15 2 Furthermore, even if the furlough plan

had been enacted by a legislative body, it would still have been questionable under the process-oriented approach. The plan burdened an easily
targeted group-municipal employees. The plan allowed the city to refuse
to disperse funds rather than undertake the political 5 3 and administrative
burdens of raising the taxes of all of Baltimore's taxpayers. Additionally,
city employees had relatively less political strength than city taxpayers, who
greatly outnumbered them and had incentives to pressure Baltimore not to
raise taxes.154 Lastly, the Board of Estimates offered no justification for
149. Id. The process-oriented approach suggests that the United States Trust test is overprotective because it protects public contract holders who have adequate political representation
merely because the state could not have foreseen the need for the impairment when it entered the
contract. Id. at 1640-41.
150. Id. at 1646. The usual justification for burdening a particular group is a determination
that the group was causally responsible for the problem being addressed. Id. at 1634-35.
151. Id. at 1646.
152. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1026 (Mumaghan, J., dissenting from denial of
petition for reh'g en banc).
153. Baltimore taxpayers likely strongly opposed raises because the cuts in state aid came
during the recession. See Richard Tapscott, Schaefer Says Md. Can't Keep Cutting, WAsH. POST,
Dec. 18, 1991, at Cl (Maryland's "public mood-darkened by the recession-is far from friendly
toward any additional taxes."). The effects of the recession were likely felt the most in Baltimore,
home to 59% of the state's poor. Richard Tapscott, A Storm of Reaction Swirls Around Md.
Governor: Schaefer's Budget Cutting Plan Draws Ire of State Employees, Advocates for the
Poor, WASH. Posr, Oct. 2, 1991, at Dl.
154. On the other hand, proponents of collective action theory might argue that the police and
teachers, represented by organized unions, would be able to exert a disproportionately strong
political voice. Collective action theory suggests that majority interests will likely be inadequately represented because the public will face difficulties organizing and its members will have
incentive to become free-riders. See MANC=R OLsoN, JR., THE Looic oF COLLmECTVE AcrboN 6697 (1965).
Collective action problems are, however, likely to be overcome by the majority in times of
political crisis. James G. Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct PopularPower in the
American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 287, 320 (1990). "Republican moments"
theory asserts that legislatures pass laws in the public interest in response to the media's ability to
raise public awareness in times of crisis. Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide
Regulation on the Paradigmsand Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REo.
369, 418 (1993) (citing Daniel A. Farber, Politicsand Procedurein Environmental Law, 8 J. L.
EcoN. & ORG. 59, 66 (1992)). Thus, "republican moments" theory suggests that had the furlough
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burdening city employees. Equity demands that the whole city, not just its
employees, carry the burden of the fiscal crisis.
The Supreme Court's summary refusal to consider Baltimore Teachers
Union 5 ' and its reluctance to invoke Contract Clause protection in private
contract cases cast doubt on the continued viability of United States Trust.
Yet the Court continues to cite United States Trust,'5 6 and has twice within
the past year summarily affirmed the Second Circuit's willingness to constitutionally protect lag payroll provisions."5 7 The Second Circuit's interpretation of the Contract Clause is clearly in conflict with that of the Fourth
Circuit. 5 By denying certiorari in both cases, the Court has further
clouded the murkiest area of the United States Trust decision. Maintaining
significant Contract Clause protection for public contracts depends upon
according only a limited amount of deference to legislative judgments of
reasonableness and necessity. In light of the growing importance of public
contracts and the increased willingness of public entities to employ drastic
measures like furlough plans, the Court should reaffirm the availability of
significant Contract Clause protection for public contracts. By considering
a public contract case, the Court could reaffirm United States Trust and
provide assurance that the Contract Clause's strong language still has meaning. In doing so, the Court could also address the perceived shortcomings
of United States Trust that have plagued its application.
THOMAS

H.

LEE, JR.

plan been a "legislative action," municipal employees might have been a politically disadvantaged

group considering the financial crisis faced by the City of Baltimore.
155. 6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994).

156. See cases discussed supra note 86 and accompanying text.
157. See cases discussed supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
158. Compare cases discussed supra notes 93-99 with case discussed supra notes 16-40.

Corporate Law-Limited Liability Company Act, N.C. Gen.
Stat. §§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07 (1993)
Two people nervously sit in the reception area of a small North Carolina bank waiting for a turn with the loan officer. One is a middle-aged
man who needs money to realize his lifelong dream of operating a deep-sea
fishing charter service on the Outer Banks with his brother-in-law. Across
from him sits a young woman. She and several of her former classmates
want to start a private law practice in the mountains. Although they have
different goals, the man and woman have a common decision to make:
each must select the best business form for his or her needs. In the past, the
only choices available for entrepreneurs in North Carolina were the corporation,1 the subchapter S corporation, 2 the general3 or limited partnership,4
and the sole proprietorship.5 In 1993 the North Carolina General Assembly
introduced another choice, the limited liability company (the "LLC").6
The Limited Liability Company Act ("the Act"), 7 which took effect
November 1, 1993,8 allows business owners, professionals, and entrepre1. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-1-01 to -17-05 (1990 & Supp. 1993). North Carolina allows
professionals to incorporate under the Professional Corporation Act. Id. §§ 55B-I to -15 (1991 &
Supp. 1993). In a corporation, shareholders are not liable for the acts or debts of the company
beyond the extent of their capital contribution; however, their income is taxed twice, once at the
corporate level and again when it is personally received as dividends. See infra notes 9-10 and
accompanying text.
2. The federal government has provided taxation requirements for subchapter S corporations. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-79 (U.S.C.C.A.N. 1993). Shareholders in a subchapter S corporation
enjoy limited liability, and their income is only taxed once, but there are limitations on this business format. See infra notes 120-30 and accompanying text.
3. N.C. Gt. STAT. §§ 59-31 to -84.1 (1989 & Supp. 1993). In a general partnership, all
partners are jointly and severally liable for the debts and obligations of the partnership. Id. § 5945(a) (Supp. 1993).
4. Id. §§ 59-101 to -1106 (1989 & Supp. 1993). In the limited partnership, only general
partners are liable for the debts and obligations of the partnership. Limited partners can be held
liable if they exercise a requisite amount of control over the management of the business. Id.
§ 59-303(a) (1989); see also infra notes 63-70, 131-34 and accompanying text.
5. The sole proprietorship is the oldest business form and is in many respects the simplest.
The single owner receives all profits but is also responsible for all losses. Income from the business is treated as personal income and is therefore not subject to double taxation, and the business
dissolves upon the death of the owner. HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAws or CoRwoRATiONs 57-60 (3d ed. 1983).
6. The bill was introduced in the House on April 14, 1993, and was ratified on July 15,
1993. See H.R. Res. 923, 2d Sess. (1993).
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07 (1993). The Act had a relatively smooth journey through both houses of the General Assembly. Thirteen members sponsored the original bill;
it was ratified three months after introduction. The North Carolina Limited Liability Company
Act, ch. 354, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 499 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07
(1993)). See supra note 6.
8. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07 (1993).
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neurs to take advantage of the best features of both the corporation and the
partnership: limited liability and partnership tax treatment, respectively.
The corporation provides limited liability for all its shareholders.9 However,
its income is taxed twice-once at the applicable corporate rate and once at
the shareholder's personal rate. 10 Partnership income is taxed only onceat the individual partner's personal income tax rate-but partners in a general partnership and general partners in a limited partnership do not enjoy
limited liability." The S corporation offers limited liability and its income
is taxed only once, but there are numerous restrictions to this format.' 2
Members of an LLC, by contrast, receive partnership tax treatment, limited
liability (regardless of the extent of their participation in the management of
the business), and are not subject to the restrictions of an S corporation.' 3
While the LLC may not be the perfect choice for everyone, it offers an
interesting alternative to the business entities it now joins.
This Note examines in detail the main provisions of the Act and summarizes the concepts underlying the statute.' 4 Next, the Note tracks the
development of the LLC in other states' 5 and describes past IRS treatment
of associations organized under existing LLC state statutes. 16 The Note
then compares the LLC to the corporation, the subchapter S corporation, the
partnership, and the limited liability partnership, and examines the likely
tax treatment of a properly organized North Carolina LLC.' 7 Finally, the
Note determines the types of businesses best suited to form or convert to an
LLC, paying particular attention to the advantages of LLCs for
professionals. 18
The North Carolina Limited Liability Company Act' 9 combines several familiar provisions in an unfamiliar way. The first article of the Act is
devoted to various procedural and filing requirements.2" Article 2 sets forth
the purposes and powers of an LLC and the process of its formation. 2 ' Ar9. See I.R.C. §§ 1, 11 (U.S.C.C.A.N. 1993).
10. Id.
11. All partners in a general partnership are jointly and severally liable for the partnership's
debts and obligations. N.C. GaN. STAT. § 59-45 (Supp. 1993). General partners in a limited

partnership are also fully liable. Id. § 59-403 (1989).
12. I.R.C. §§ 1361-79 (1993); see also infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
13. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-79 (1993); infra notes 126-35 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 19-62 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 63-94 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 95-119 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 120-41 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 142-48 and accompanying text.

19. N.C. GEM. STAT. §§ 57C-1-01 to -10-07 (1993).
20. Id. §§ 57C-1-01 to -1-29. This article contains, among other things, the schedule of fee
assessments for organizing an LLC and the procedure for correcting filed documents.
21. Id. §§ 57C-2-01 to -2-43; see infra notes 31-38 and accompanying text.
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ticle 3 discusses the various aspects of membership and management 2 2 Article 3 contains the most important provision of the Act-a provision that

limits the liability of all members and managers to their initial capital investment, just like shareholders in a corporation.23 Article 4 of the Act
24
deals with financing the LLC, including contributions and distribution.
Article 5 of the statute borrows a familiar requirement from partnership law
by restricting the transferability of LLC interests from a member to a nonmember,' and Article 6 provides for dissolution upon the occurrence of
certain events.2 6 Article 7 addresses foreign limited liability companies,2 7
while Article 8 deals with derivative actions.2" Article 9 sets forth the requirements for mergers, 2 9 and Article 10 contains the miscellaneous provi-

sions of the statute.3"
The Act contains many procedural requirements for the formation of
an LLC, and several of these closely resemble filing and formation requirements for North Carolina corporations. 3 1 To organize an LLC, the members of the proposed company must deliver properly executed articles of
organization to the Secretary of State,3 2 who in turn files the

22. Id. §§ 57C-3-01 to -3-32; see infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
23. Id. § 57C-3-30.
24. Id § 57C-4-01 to -4-08.
25. Id. §§ 57C-5-01 to -5-06. The restrictions on transferability of partnership interests are
found in N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 59-301, -48(7), -401 (1989).
26. Id. §§ 57C-6-01 to -6-09 (1993).
27. Id. §§ 57C-7-01 to -7-14. Under the North Carolina Act, the State will recognize foreign
limited liability companies if they file a certificate of authority with the Secretary of State. Id.
§ 57C-7-02(a). The laws of the state under which the LLC is organized will govern the affairs of
the LLC. Id. § 57C-7-01. North Carolina requires the foreign LLC to maintain both a registered
office and registered agent within the state. Id. § 57C-7-07.
28. Id. § 57C-8-01. Members of the LLC may bring derivative actions against the managers
of the LLC to recover damages in favor of the company. Id.
29. Id. §§ 57C-9-01 to -9-06. This provision allows one or more LLCs to merge with another LLC upon unanimous consent of the members. See Id.
30. Id. §§ 57C-10-01 to -10-07. This article contains provisions for jurisdiction, id. § 57C10-04, and rules of construction, id. § 57C-10-03, and it classifies the LLCs for state taxation
purposes "in accordance with their classification for federal income tax purposes," Id. § 57C-1006.
31. CompareN.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-1-20 to -1-29 (1990 & Supp. 1993) with 57C-1-01 to -129 (1993) (noting the similar requirements in the formation of LLCs and corporations).
32. Id. § 57C-2-20(a) (1993). An LLC must be comprised of at least two people. Id. To be
properly executed, the articles of organization must contain the name of the LLC, the latest date
by which dissolution will occur, the name and address of each person executing the articles, the
address of the LLC's initial registered office, and a statement designating which members will be
managers. In the absence of this last requirement, all members will be presumed to be managers.
Id. § 57C-2-21(a), -3-20(a).
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articles.3" The LLC comes into existence upon the proper filing of the
articles.3 4
Once the LLC is created, it may engage in "any lawful business unless
a more limited lawful purpose is set forth in its articles of organization."3' ' 5
It may "do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its business and
affairs .... "I' It can sue, be sued, contract, lend money, purchase land, or
take any other legal action available to an individual or corporation. 37 Professionals may organize in the LLC form under the same conditions and
guidelines that govern the operation of a professional corporation. 38
Article 3 sets forth the requirements of membership and the duties of
managers.3 9 The executors of the articles of organization become members
40
of the company when the articles are filed with the Secretary of State.
New members can be admitted only through compliance with the applicable
rules set forth in the articles of organization or the written operating agreement.4 ' If there are no rules dealing with admission of members, new
members can be admitted only with the unanimous approval of the existing
members. 42
Every member is considered to be a manager of the LLC unless the
articles of organization or operating agreement provide otherwise. 43 Unless
specified differently in the articles or operating agreement all managers
have equal power. Management decisions require the consent of a majority
of the managers.' Each manager is also an agent of the LLC and can bind
33. Id. § 57C-1-25.
34. Id. § 57C-2-20(b)(1). Filing fees must be paid upon the filing of the articles of organization and at other times throughout the existence of the LLC. Id. § 57C-1-22. The present fee for
filing the articles of organization with the Secretary of State is $100.00. Id. § 57C-1-22(a)(1).
35. Id. § 57C-2-01(a).
36. Id. § 57C-2-02.
37. Id. The LLC can be a member of another LLC, a shareholder in a corporation, or a
partner in a partnership. Id.
38. ld. § 57C-2-01(c). For the conditions and guidelines governing professional corporations
see id. §§ 55B-1 to -15 (1991 & Supp. 1993).
39. Id. § 57C-3-01 to -3-26 (1993).
40. Id. § 57C-3-01(a).
41. Id. An operating agreement is "[a]ny agreement, written or oral, of the members with
respect to the affairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its business that is binding
on all the members." Id. § 57C-1-03(16).
42. 1d. § 57C-3-01(b). Unless the articles of organization or the written operating agreement
provides otherwise, the consent of all members is also required to "[aldopt or amend an operating
agreement;... [to s]ell, transfer, or otherwise dispose of all or substantially all of the assets of the
limited liability company prior to the dissolution of the limited liability company; for to m]erge
the limited liability company into or with another limited liability company." Id. § 57C-3-03.
43. Id.
44. IM.§ 57C-3-20.
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the company in the ordinary course of business, unless the other party to the
transaction knows that the manager has no authority to bind the LLC.4 5

The most revolutionary feature of the LLC is the limited liability provision contained in Article 3.46 This provision limits the liability of each
member of the company, including managers, to his or her contribution of
capital4 7 for debts or obligations of the LLC not arising from the member's
own conduct.4 8 For example, a lawyer in a firm that was formed under the
Act cannot be held liable for the malpractice of his partner but could be
held personally liable for his own malpractice. 49 Furthermore, an LLC's
articles of organization or operating agreement can limit, or even eliminate,
the managers' liability for a breach of the duty of care.5 0 Liability for
51
breach of the duty of loyalty, however, may not be limited or eliminated.
While interests in an LLC are not freely transferable from members to
nonmembers, 52 an interest may be assigned to a nonmember. An assignee,
however, is accorded only the right to receive whatever profits or distributions the assignor is entitled to receive.5 3 The assignee can become a mem-

ber only if the remaining members unanimously consent to the assignee's
membership in the company. 4 When a member assigns her entire interest
in an LLC, her membership terminates unless the articles of organization or
operating agreement provide otherwise. 55 Assignment, however, normally
does not dissolve an LLC. 6
45. Id. § 57C-3-23. A manager cannot bind the LLC for an act "that is not apparently for
carrying on the usual course of the business" of the LLC unless the remaining managers approve
the act through authorization or ratification. Id.
46. Id. § 57C-3-30.
47. Another provision in Article 4 allows a member's capital contribution to be in the form
of cash, property, promissory notes, or services rendered. Id. § 57C-4-01.
48. § 57C-3-30 (a) provides:
A person who is a member or manager, or both, of a limited liability company is not
liable for the obligations of a limited liability company solely by reason of being a
member or manager or both, and does not become so by participating, in whatever
capacity, in the management or control of the business. A member or manager may,
however, become personally liable by reason of his own acts or conduct.
49. See id. § 57C-2-01(c) (stating that a member of a professional LLC is not liable for the
malpractice of another member).
50. Id. § 57C-3-32(a)(1).
51. Id. § 57C-3-32(b).
52. Id. § 57C-5-02. Nonmembers include relatives or business associates. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. § 57C-5-04. The unanimous-consent requirement can presumably be changed in the
articles of organization or operating agreement, but making such changes could have certain adverse tax consequences. See infra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
55. Id. § 57C-5-02.
56. Id. The LLC would be dissolved if the member makes an assignment for the benefit of
creditors. Id §§ -3-02(3)(a), -6-01(4).
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Although the Act does not specifically limit the life of an LLC to a
certain term of years, the LLC automatically dissolves upon certain
events,57 including the bankruptcy 58 or death 59 of a member. The LLC may
continue after one of these events only if certain conditions are met: (1)
there is at least one remaining member; (2) the articles of organization or
operating agreement provide that remaining members may continue the
business; and (3) the remaining members unanimously vote to carry on the
business.60 An LLC also may be dissolved by the written consent of all the
members,6 1 or by judicial decree in certain circumstances.6 2
The forerunner of the LLC was the limited partnership. The nation's
first limited partnership statute was enacted in Pennsylvania in 1874,63 and
other states followed suit.64 North Carolina's limited partnership statute
was enacted in 1941.65 It was extensively revised in 1986.66 It requires the
filing of a certificate of limited partnership with the Secretary of State 67 and
allows limited partners to escape the debts and obligations of the partnership unless they are also general partners or they "take[ ] part in the control
of the business." 68 The disadvantage to the limited partnership is that not
57. Id. § 57C-6-01.
58. Id. § 57C-3-02(3)(b).
59. Id. § 57C-3-02(5). An LLC also could be dissolved if a court determines a member is
"incompetent to manage his person or property." Id. In addition, the law provides for dissolution
"in the case of a member who is acting as a member by virtue of being a trustee of a trust" when
the trust involved terminates. Id. § 57C-3-02(6). An LLC likewise will dissolve upon the dissolution of a member partnership, corporation or LLC. Id. § 57C-3-02(7). If an estate is a member,
the LLC will dissolve when the trustee of the estate has distributed the "estate's entire interest in
the limited liability company:' Id. § 57C-3-02(9).
60. Id. § 57C-6-01(4)(i)-(iii).
61. Id. § 57C-6-01(3). The articles of organization, the written operating agreement, or both,
can also specify a duration for the existence of the LLC or specify other events that will trigger
dissolution. Id. § 57C-6-01(2).
62. Id. § 57C-6-02. An LLC can be judicially dissolved "whenever it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with the articles of organization or an operating
agreement." Id. § 57C-6-02(a). The articles of organization or the operating agreement could
conceivably eliminate all the events that can cause dissolution under the Act. However, such a
clause could give the LLC the corporate characteristic of continuity of life, perhaps jeopardizing
the LLC's favorable partnership tax treatment. See infra notes 88, 112.
63. See Act of Dec. 19, 1975, 1975 Pa. Laws 524, No. 155, § 1 (codified at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 59, § 341 (1964)), repealed by Act of Dec. 21, 1988, Pub. L. 1444, No. 177, § 302(e)(1)
(effective Oct. 1, 1989). The old limited partnership statute was replaced by the Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, 59 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. §§ 501-569 (Supp. 1993).
64. See generally HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 85 (discussing the history of the
liimited partnership).
65. Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1941, ch. 251, 1941 N.C. Sess. Laws 354 (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 59-1 to -30.1 (1941)).
66. See Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1986, ch. 989, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws
319 (current version at N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 59-101 to 1106 (1989 & Supp. 1993)).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-201(a) (1989 & Supp. 1993).
68. Id. § 59-303(a).
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every partner escapes liability. One or more partners must be general partners with unlimited liability to third persons for the partnership's obligations. 69 An advantage, however, is that limited partnerships are entitled to
7°
certain tax benefits that a corporation does not enjoy.
Wyoming enacted the first LLC statute in 1977.7 1 The purposes of the
statute were the same as those of North Carolina's LLC Act: all members
would enjoy limited liability to third parties, 72 but would avoid double
taxation.73
The Wyoming Act differs from the North Carolina Act in one important respect. Unless the articles of organization or the operating agreement
provide otherwise, the Wyoming Act limits the LLC to a thirty-year duration.74 In contrast, North Carolina's Act requires that the articles of organization state "[tihe latest date on which the limited liability company is to
dissolve," but sets forth no minimum or maximum duration. 75 However, the
many circumstances that can cause a North Carolina LLC to dissolve effectively limit its continued existence.7 6
An LLC revolution did not commence with the enactment of the Wyoming statute. In fact, five years passed before another state, Florida, enacted a similar statute.7 7 A central motivation behind the enactment of the
Florida LLC statute was attracting investments from Central and South
69. Id.§ 59-403.
70. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2, -3 (as amended in 1993). The main tax benefit is that
income in a partnership is taxed only once, to the individual partners when they receive their share
of the partnership income. See HEN & ALEXANDER, supra note 5 at 80-81. Corporations lack
this "pass-through" tax treatment. See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
71. Act of Mar. 4, 1977, ch. 158, § 1, 1977 Wyo. Sess. Laws 537 (codified at Wvo. STAT.
§ 17-15-101 to -15-143 (1993)).
72. Id. § 17-15-113 (1989).
73. See Marybeth Bosko, Note, The Best of Both Worlds: The Limited Liability Company, 54
OHIO ST. LJ. 175, 177 (1993). The Wyoming legislators wanted to use the new LLC format to
attract new business into the state and "reap associated benefits from acting as the national haven
for 'tramp' LLCs that would bring their activities ... to Wyoming in order to avail themselves of
the LLC statute." Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the LimitedLiability Company, 41
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 387, 389 (1991). Apparently, Wyoming wanted to become to LLCs what
Delaware is to corporations. It is estimated that more than one-third of Fortune 500 corporations
are incorporated in Delaware and "only one-du Pont-has its general headquarters in Delaware." HEN & ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 7 n.12. Unfortunately for Wyoming's business
community and tax base, this never occurred. The first eleven years produced only 26 LLCs in
Wyoming. See Joseph P. Fonfara & Corey R. McCool, Comment, The Wyoming Limited Liability
Company: A Viable Alternative to the S Corporationand the Limited Partnership?,23 LAND &
WATER L. REv. 523, 523 (1988).
74. Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-107(a)(ii) (1993).
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-2-21(a)(2) (1993).
76. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
77. See Act of Apr. 21, 1982, 1982 Fla. Laws ch. 82-177, § 2 (codified at FLA. STAT. Ch.
608.401 to .471 (1993 & Supp. 1994)).
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America.7 8 After Florida's enactment, there was a lull in state LLC activity
until 1990 when both Colorado and Kansas unveiled LLC statutes.79
The scarcity of state statutes is probably attributable to uncertainty
over the tax treatment of the LLC entity.8" The IRS settled some of this
uneasiness in 1988 when it released Revenue Ruling 88-76, 81 which classified a Wyoming organization operating under the Wyoming LLC act as a
partnership for tax purposes.82 The IRS used a four-factor test previously
outlined in a treasury regulation to determine whether the association was a
partnership or a corporation for tax purposes. 83 The regulation's test defines the four characteristics of a corporation as continuity of life, centralized management, limited liability, and free transferability of interests.8 4
The IRS recognized that if an association "possesses more corporate charac-

teristics than non-corporate characteristics, it constitutes an association taxable as a corporation."8 "
The IRS found that the Wyoming LLC had only two of the four corporate characteristics. Since three designated managers ran the association,
the IRS determined that the LLC had centralized management. 86 Next, the
IRS determined that the characteristic of limited liability was present since
78. See Richard Johnson, Comment, The Limited Liability Company Act, 11 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 387, 387 (1983). The countries from which Florida was trying to attract investment had a
business form known as limitada, which is similar to an LLC. See id. at 387-88. Despite Florida's effort, few businesses took advantage of this statute. Id.
79. See Act of April 18, 1990, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 414, § 1 (codified at CoLo. Rav. STAT.
§§ 7-80-101 to -80-913 (Supp. 1993)); Act of July 1, 1990, ch. 80, § 1, 1990 Kan. Sess. Laws
(codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7651 (Supp. 1993)).
80. The IRS initially proposed regulations that would have halted the development of the
LLC by denying the LLC tax treatment similar to that of a partnership. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2, 45 Fed. Reg. 75, 709 (1980). These regulations would have denied partnership tax
treatment to any association that shielded all its members from liability. Id. Ironically, the first
hint that the IRS would treat the LLC as a partnership for tax purposes came that same year in a
private letter ruling that classified a Wyoming LLC as a partnership. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8106082
(Nov. 18, 1980).
81. Revenue rulings are opinions issued by the IRS; they are similar to reported cases and
contain facts, a summary of the law, analysis and a conclusion. MICHAEL D. ROSE & JOHN C.
CHOMMIE, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 771 (3d ed. 1988). These rulings may be

used by taxpayers to determine the consequences of certain actions that are factually similar to the
rulings. Id.
82. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360-61.
83. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1993).
84. Id.
85. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361. Equal weight must be given to each of the four
characteristics. Id.
86. Id. The IRS stated that centralized management exists "if any person (or group of persons that does not include all the members) has continuing exclusive authority to make management decisions necessary to the conduct of the business for which the organization was formed."
Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1983)).
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limited liability was conceded in the title and purpose of the Act under
7
which the association was organized.
However, the IRS determined that the Wyoming organization did not
have continuity of life because, under the act, the occurrence of certain
events would dissolve the LLC unless all the remaining members voted to
continue the business. 8 Finally, the IRS found that the association did not
have the corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests, s9 since
transfer required unanimous approval.9 0 Since the LLC did not have more
corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics-it had two of
each-the IRS classified it as a partnership for tax purposes. 9 1
That revenue ruling triggered a flood of legislation. Thirty-five other
states have since authorized the LLC,92 and ten others have introduced lim87. Id. (noting that "an organization has the corporate characteristic of limited liability if
under local law there is no member who is personally liable for the debts of, or claims against, the
organization") (citing Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(1) (as amended in 1983)). "Personally liable"
means that a creditor can seek damages from an individual partner, even beyond the capital investment she has made, if the organization's assets are not enough to satisfy the claim. Id.
88. Id. The Act provided for termination of the LLC when the fixed period of duration
expired, upon unanimous written consent of all the members, or upon the death, bankruptcy, or
dissolution of a member. Id.
89. Id. The IRS noted that "[ain organization has continuity of life if the death, insanity,
bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member will not cause a dissolution of the
organization." Id. (quoting Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1983)).
90. Id. The IRS distinguished the transfer of an interest from the assignment of an interest.
It stated that an assignee did not "become a substitute member and [did] not acquire all the
attributes of the member's interest." Id. Therefore, while the ability to transfer a complete interest without the requirement of consent by the remaining members gives the LLC the corporate
characteristic of free transferability of interests, the ability to merely assign a right to share in the
profits does not. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
91. Id.
92. See ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -12-61 (Supp. 1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-601 to
-857 (Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-32-101 to -32-1316 (Michie Supp. 1993); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 7-80-101 to -80-913 (Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1107 (1993);
FLA. STAT. ch. 608A01 to .471 (1993 & Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-11-100 to -11-1109
(Michie Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 53-601 to -672 (Supp. 1993); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 805, para.
180/1-1 to /1-60 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 490A.100 to .1601 (West Supp.
1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7651 (Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:1301 to 1369 (West Supp. 1994); MD. CORPS. & Ass'Ns CODE ANN. §§ 4A-101 to -1103 (1993 & Supp.
1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 322B.01 to -960 (West Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-8101 to -8-1307 (1993); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. 304-C:1 to C:85 (Supp. 1993); 1993 N.J. Laws
210; N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-19-1 to -19-74 (Michie Supp. 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 57C-1-01
to -10-07 (1993); N.D. CNr. CODE § 10-32-01 to -32-155 (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, §§ 2000-2060 (Supp. 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-16-1 to -16-75 (1992 & Supp. 1993); S.D.
CODIFIED LAws ANN. §§ 47-34-1 to -34-59 (Supp. 1993); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n
1.01-11.07 (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2b-101 to -2b-157 (1994); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 13.1-1000 to -1-1073 (Michie 1993); W. VA. CODE §§ 31-lA-1 to -1A-69 (Supp. 1993);
Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 183.0102 to -.1305 (West Supp. 1994); Wvo STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -15-143
(1989 & Supp. 1993); 1993 Conn. Acts 267 (Reg. Sess.); 1993 Mich. Pub. Acts 23; 1993 Miss.
Laws 530; 1993 Mo. Laws 146; 1993 Or. Laws 173. Kentucky also recently passed 1994 Ken-
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ited liability company bills.93 Thus, only three states have no LLC legislation at all.94

After Revenue Ruling 88-76, the Internal Revenue Service did not issue another ruling on the tax status of LLCs under the various state statutes
until 1993. The first of several 1993 rulings considered the classification of
an LLC formed under the Virginia statute.9 5 Applying the same four-factor
test,96 the IRS determined that the Virginia association lacked two corporate
characteristics-continuity of life and free transferability of interests-but
did possess the characteristics of limited liability and centralized management. 97 Based on these conclusion, the Virginia LLC received partnership
tax treatment. The IRS followed its Virginia ruling with eleven others in
rapid succession. Each dealt with an LLC organized under a different state
98
statute, and each classified the LLC in question as a partnership.
tucky Senate Bill No. 184 authorizing LLCs. 1994 KY S.B. (SN), available in WESTLAW, KYBILLTRK database.
93. These states are California, Hawaii, Indiana, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont.
94. The remaining states are Alaska, Maine, and Washington.
95. See Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-1 C.B. 227 (examining an LLC formed under VA. CODa ANN.
§§ 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Michie 1993)).
96. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
97. Rev. Rul. 93-5, 1993-1 C.B. 227.
98. See Rev. Rul. 94-6, 1994-3 I.R.B. 11 (Alabama); Rev. Rul. 93-93, 1993-42 I.R.B. 13
(Arizona); Rev. Rul. 93-6, 1993-1 C.B. 229 (Colorado); Rev. Rul. 93-38, 1993-1 C.B. 233 (Delaware); Rev. Rul. 93-53, 1993-26 I.R.B. 7 (Florida); Rev. Rul. 93-49, 1993-25 I.R.B. 11 (Illinois);
Rev. Rul. 94-5, 1994-2 I.R.B. 21 (Louisiana); Rev. Rul. 93-30, 1993-1 C.B. 231 (Nevada); Rev.
Rul. 93-92, 1993-42 I.R.B. 11 (Oklahoma); Rev. Rul. 93-81, 1993-38 I.R.B. 7 (Rhode Island);
Rev. Rul. 93-91, 1993-41 I.R.B. 22 (Utah); Rev. Rul. 93-50, 1993-25 I.R.B. 13 (West Virginia).
Apparently, the IRS intends to issue a revenue ruling analyzing an LLC organized under each
state's statute. With the numerous new statutes enacted in 1993 and 1994, many more revenue
rulings on this subject are likely. The IRS has also issued other revenue rulings which do not
directly examine an LLC but have implications for the conversion to an LLC. See, e.g., Rev. Rul.
84-52, 1984-1 C.B. 157. This ruling did not specifically deal with an LLC, but ruled on the
consequences of converting a general partnership to a limited partnership. The partnership in
question was formed as a general partnership under the Uniform Partnership Act, and the four
partners had equal interests in the partnership. The partners wanted to amend the partnership
agreement to convert to a limited partnership that would continue to carry on the partnership's
business. Two of the partners became general partners, two became limited partners, and all the
partners' contributions to capital remained the same. The IRS held that none of the partners had a
recognizable gain or loss as a result of the conversion. Id. at 157-58. Although this conversion did
not involve an LLC, the IRS later held that the conversion of a general partnership to a limited
liability company was "directly analogous" to the situation in Revenue Ruling 84-52. Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 9226035 (Mar. 26, 1992). Thus, the conversion of a general partnership to an LLC would not
result in any recognized gain or loss by the members, the LLC, or the partnership. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
9350013 (Sept. 15, 1993).
Private letter rulings apply the law to a particular set of facts and are issued by the IRS to a
specific taxpayer. The rulings are then made available to the public with certain information
deleted. The IRS maintains that private letter rulings cannot be used or cited as precedent. See
I.R.C. § 61100)(3) (U.S.C.C.A.N. 1993).
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Other federal statutes may affect the organization of new LLCs or conversion of existing associations to the LLC form. The Internal Revenue
Code establishes the methods of tax accounting that a business may use.
The general rule states that "[t]axable income shall be computed under the
method of accounting on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books."9 9 The two methods of accounting
which are permissible under the Code are the cash method"' 0 and the accrual method.'0 1
Generally, corporations, partnerships with a corporate partner, and tax

shelters may not use the cash method of accounting. 10 2 However, the Code
exempts qualified personal service corporations (such as incorporated law
firms) from this restriction. 10 3 In a 1993 private letter ruling, the IRS determined that a partnership converting to an LLC could continue using the

cash method of accounting because it was not treated as a corporation,
it did
°4

not have a corporate partner, and it was not a tax shelter.'
Aside from limited liability, the most attractive feature of the LLC is
its favorable tax treatment. A corporation's earnings are subject to double
taxation because they are taxed first as income to the corporation," 5 and
then again as income to the shareholder when and if the earnings are distributed as dividends.'" 6 Under the IRS revenue rulings outlined above, an
99. I.R.C. § 446(a) (U.S.C.C.A.N. 1993). The Code states that "[i]f no method of accounting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or if the method used does not clearly reflect income,
the computation of taxable income shall be made under such method as, in the opinion of the
Secretary, does clearly reflect income." Id. § 446(b).
100. Under the cash method of accounting, "cash, property, and services constituting gross
income are reported in the taxable year of actual or constructive receipt and expenditures are
deducted when actually made .... " BoRis'L BrrrKER, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATnON § 35.1, at 35-6 to 35-7 (student ed. 1983).
101. I.R.C. § 446(c)(2) (U.S.C.C.A.N. 1993). Under the accrual method, "income is included
(and deductions are allowed) in the taxable year in which all events fixing the taxpayer's right to
receive the income (or the taxpayer's liability to pay) have occurred and the amount can be determined with reasonable accuracy." Br-rKER, supra note 100, § 35.1 at 35-7.
102. I.R.C. § 448(a) (U.S.C.C.A.N. 1993).
103. Id. § 448(b)(2).
104. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9350013 (Sept. 15, 1993). The cash method of accounting is generally
preferred by professionals "because of lagging collections and the traditional nature of professional service organizations (where charging interest on late payments is viewed as uncomfortable
for both the firm and its client). Use of the accrual method by professionals typically results in
accelerated recognition of taxable income." Sheldon 1.Banoff, New IRS Ruling EncouragesProfessionals to Form Limited Liability Companies, 79 J. TAX'N. 68, 68-69 (1993).
105. See I.R.C. § 11 (U.S.C.C.A.N. 1993). See generally HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 5,
at 132-38 (discussing the double taxation of corporate income).
106. See LR.C. § 61(a)(7) (U.S.C.C.A.N. 1993). Corporations that wish to avoid taxation at
the shareholder level by accumulating income without distributing it to the shareholders can be
penalized through what is called the accumulated earnings tax, a levy equal to 28% of the accumulated taxable income. Id. § 531. A corporation is subject to this tax when "the earnings and
profits of a corporation are permitted to accumulate beyond the reasonable needs of the business."
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LLC organized under the North Carolina Limited Liability Company Act
should receive tax treatment akin to that of a partnership. 10 7 To take advantage of that beneficial tax treatment, the North Carolina LLC must possess
no more than two of the four corporate characteristics recognized by the
IRS.' 0 8 An LLC organized under the North Carolina Act will automatically
have the corporate characteristic of limited liability. 10 9 The other three
characteristics will depend on how the members choose to organize the
LLC.
An organization properly drafted under the North Carolina Act will

have neither continuity of life nor free transferability of interests." 0 Treasury regulations provide, and the IRS has ruled, that an LLC that is dissolved
upon the death, bankruptcy, insanity, retirement, resignation, or expulsion
of a member lacks continuity of life."' Since under the North Carolina Act
a member's death, bankruptcy, incompetence, withdrawal, or removal will
cause the LLC to dissolve unless the remaining members vote to continue
the business,"' an LLC properly organized under the Act will lack continuity of life under IRS rules.
Under the North Carolina Act, an assignee of a membership interest
may not become a member without the unanimous consent of all the remaining members, "except as otherwise provided in the articles of organizaId. § 533(a). See generally HEmN & ALEXANDER, supra note 5, at 944-48 (discussing the tax
treatment of dividends).
107. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text. In addition to avoiding double taxation,
the LLC is also exempt from the North Carolina Franchise Tax, which corporations are required-to
pay. See N.C. Gm. STAT. § 105-122 (1992 & Supp. 1993). The tax is levied at the rate of $1.50
per $1,000 of capital stock "for the privilege of carrying on, doing business, and/or the continuance of the articles of incorporation or domestication of each such corporation in this State." Id.
§ 105-122(d). The North Carolina Secretary of Revenue feared the exemption for LLCs would
cause "potential revenue loss [from] new entities formed as LLC's in lieu of corporations, [and]
potential revenue loss from corporations converting to LLC status ...." Memorandum from
Janice H. Faulkner, Secretary of Revenue, to Rep. Robert C. Hunter & Rep. Annie Brown Kennedy 1 (April 30, 1993) (on file with the University of North CarolinaLaw Review).
108. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1993). The four corporate characteristics are limited liability, centralized management, continuity of life, and free transferability of
interests. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
109. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-3-30 to -3-32 (1993).
110. See id. § 57C-5-04 (stating that the assignee of membership interest can become a member only with the consent of all other members); id. § 57C-6-01 (stating that the company dissolves upon the happening of certain events).
111. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1993); Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B.
360, 361.
112. N.C. GrEN. STAT. §§ 57C-3-02, -6-01 (1993). However, the statute provides that the
articles of organization or operating agreement can change, add to, or eliminate the events which
cause dissolution. If the changes deviate too much from the statutory provisions, the LLC could
have the corporate characteristic of continuity of life, jeopardizing its partnership tax treatment.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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tion or operating agreement." '13 The IRS has ruled that when an assignee
cannot become a member without the consent of all the remaining members
an LLC lacks the corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests. 1 4 The IRS has not addressed directly the issue of whether a provision

in the articles of organization or operating agreement that allows a twothirds or simple majority vote on transfer of membership would establish
free transferability of interests. However, the IRS has stated that, "[i]n
order for [free transferability of interests] to exist ... the member must be
able, without the consent of other members, to confer upon the member's
substitute all the attributes of the member's interest in the organization."I t By this definition, a requirement of majority consent appears sufficient to
negate free transferability.
If LLC members desire freely transferable interests, they may still be
able to obtain favorable partnership tax treatment by foregoing another corporate characteristic such as centralized management. Centralized management is present when "a designated manager or managers" have
"continuing exclusive authority to make management decisions." '16 The
North Carolina statute allows management to be vested equally in all the
113. Id. § 57C-5-04(a).
114. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
115. Id. The IRS has concluded that "free transferability of interests [exists] if each of its
members or those members owning substantially all of the interests in the organization have the
power, without the consent of other members, to substitute for themselves in the same organization a person who is not a member of the organization." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e)(1) (as
amended in 1993). Read literally, this language would mean that free transferability would not
exist when the operating agreement provided that the consent of only two or more members would
allow a member to transfer his interest. In a 50-member LLC, such a limitation could restrict the
transferability of interests. When the IRS has addressed this issue in Revenue Rulings, it has
stated only that free transferability of interests does not exist when the transferring member must
gain unanimous consent from the other members. When the requirement is something less than
unanimous consent, it becomes unclear whether or not the LLC lacks free transferability. See
infra notes 81-91, 94-98 and accompanying text. If the members of the LLC provide in their
articles of organization or their operating agreement that less than unanimous consent by all the
remaining members is sufficient to allow an assignee of a membership interest to become a member, the characteristic of free transferability of interests might exist, which could preclude the LLC
from gaining partnership tax treatment. On the other hand, a supermajority requirement of eighty
or ninety percent of the remaining members might be sufficient to find that the LLC lacks free
transferability of interests. A two-thirds majority vote requirement might also be enough of an
impediment to transferability, but the closer one moves to a simple majority, the more likely it
becomes that the IRS will find that the LLC has freely transferable interests. In order to be safe,
organizers should follow the statutory requirement of unanimous consent to ensure that the LLC
will be treated as a partnership for tax purposes. See Kristen E. Hazel, Drafting the Operating
Agreement for a Limited Liability Company, 21 TAx'N FOR LAw. 184, 186 (NovJDec. 1992).
116. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361. Centralized management may be very desirable
in a large organization where complete member democracy would be impractical; however, vesting management power in all the members may work well in a smaller organization where all
members prefer to be involved in the decision-making process.
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members of an LLC. 117 If the operating agreement or articles of organization allow all or nearly all of the members to have an equal voice in the
management of the company-or a voice in proportion to their intereststhe company should be found to lack centralized management. 1 8 If a particular LLC lacks centralized management, an LLC could conceivably retain its partnership tax status yet allow free transferability of interests. 119
Another entity, the "Subchapter S" (S) corporation, 120 has benefits
similar to those of the LLC. This business form allows members to retain
limited liability like a corporation, while enjoying the single taxation benefits of a partnership. 12 ' However, there are several drawbacks to the S cor-

poration. For instance, an S corporation cannot have more than thirty-five
shareholders.' 22 By contrast, the size of an LLC is not expressly limited
under the North Carolina Act.' 3 Other limitations on the S corporation are
that it can have only individuals as shareholders, cannot have a nonresident
alien as a shareholder, and cannot have more than one class of stock. 24
The Internal Revenue Code imposes no such statutory limitations on
25

LLCs.1

117. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 57C-3-20 (1993).

118. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 9010027 (Dec. 7, 1989). Some commentators suggest that a taxpayer
can also avoid centralized management by "having member managers own at least twenty percent
of the member interests." Gazur & Goff, supra note 73, at 446. This proposition rests on an
analogy between "member-managers and general partners of a partnership." Id. n.317. This conclusion is based on Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-1 C.B. 798, which states that "[1]imited partner interests, excluding those held by general partners, may not exceed 80 percent of the total interests in
the partnership, or the Service will not rule that the partnership lacks centralized management."
Id. at 801. This ruling implies that if member-managers own more than 20 percent of the LLC
interests, the LLC may lack centralized management. Gazur and Goff suggest that "[e]ven if that
analogy is apt, an LLC could not rely on the percentage guideline without securing a private letter
ruling." Gazur & Goff, supra note 73, at 446 n.317.
119. For practical purposes, however, an LLC large enough to desire free transferability of
interests would probably need centralized management. Voting power vested in all members
would become cumbersome in an organization that desires a quick and efficient decision-making
process.
120. See I.R.C. §§ 1361-79 (1993).
121. Id.
122. Id. § 1361(b)(1)(A).
123. N.C. Gm. STAT. § 57C-3-01 (1993). It should be noted, however, that such a limitation
could exist as a matter of practice because the absence of free transferability and continuity of life
would make a large LLC difficult to maintain. For example, compare an LLC with 100 members
to one with 10. The likelihood that a dissolution event will occur is greater for the larger LLC,
and it would also be more difficult for the large LLC to secure unanimous consent when a membership interest assignee wants to become a member. Nevertheless, even with these practical
limitations, it is still possible to operate an LLC with more than 35 members and retain favorable
tax treatment, whereas the size of an S corporation is strictly limited. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A)
(1993).
124. Id. § 1361(b).
125. The holder of an interest in an LLC can be an individual, corporation, partnership, trust,
estate, or other LLC. See N.C. GEM. STAT. § 57C-3-02 (1993).
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While the S corporation shares the single taxation benefit with the
LLC, some differences in tax treatment exist between the two entities.
First, there is taxation at the corporate level when an S corporation has
"[traditional corporate] earnings and profits" at the end of the taxable year

and "gross receipts more than twenty-five percent of which are passive investment income."12' 6 Such a taxable event can occur when a traditional
but should not be a problem when
corporation converts to an S corporation,
127

a corporation converts to an LLC.

Second, an important difference between the tax treatment of an LLC
and that of a subchapter S corporation occurs when a member contributes to
the company property whose liabilities exceed its basis. 1 28 in an S corpora-

tion, the shareholder/contributor will recognize gain in the amount that the
liabilities exceed the basis. 29 In most situations, a contribution of this type

by a member of an LLC will not result in gain to the member. 3
Limited liability companies are also similar in form to the limited partnership. An LLC and a limited partnership will receive similar tax treatment because both presumably will be taxed as a partnership,1 31 and the
limited partners in a limited partnership enjoy limited liability.1 32 However,
general partners are responsible to third parties for all debts and obligations
of the partnership.1 33 In addition, limited partners may become liable to the
same extent as a general partner if they exercise control over the manage126. I.R.C. § 1375(a) (1993). Passive investment income is defined as "gross receipts derived
from royalties, rents, dividends, interest, annuities, and sales or exchanges of stock or securities
...
." Id. § 1362(d)(3)(D)(i).
127. See Louis A. Mezzullo, Limited Liability Companies: A New BusinessForm?, 21 TAX'N.
FOR LAW. 296, 298-99 (MarJApr. 1993).
128. The basis is generally the price paid for the property, adjusted for depreciation, capital
expenditures, and losses. See I.R.C. §§ 1011, 1012, 1016 (U.S.C.C.A,N. 1993). In addition, the
basis will be calculated differently when the property is acquired by gift or inheritance. See id.
§§ 1014, 1015. See also DANiL Q. PosIN, FEDERAL INcoME TAxAIoN 152-53 (student ed. 1983)
("Where the property is not acquired by purchase, but in a tax-free exchange or by gift or inheritance... other techniques than cost will have to be used to establish basis in order to compute
gain or loss properly on a subsequent disposition.").
129. See I.R.C. § 357(c) (U.S.C.C.A.N. 1993); see also R. Donald Turlington & Susan Pace
Hamill, Tax Aspects of Limited Liability Companies, in FoRMINGaND Usmo LmIrrED LiAau.rY
COMPANiEs 103, 139 (Martin I. Lubaroff & Brian L. Schorr eds., 1993) ("Shareholders of S corporations contributing property with liabilities exceeding the property's basis recognize gain to the
extent of the excess.").
130. Turlington & Hamill, supra note 129, at 139 ("[T]he contributing member only recognizes gain to the extent the distribution equal to the amount of the debt exceeds the member's
basis equal to its shares of that debt at the LLC level plus the basis of all property or any money
contributed as part of the same transaction."). See Mezzullo, supra note 127, at 298-99. The tax
consequences of transactions involving an S corporation and transactions in an LLC are divergent.
For a good discussion of these differences, see Turlington & Hamill, supra note 129, at 121-43.
131. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1993).
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 59-303(a) (1989).
133. Id. § 59-403.
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ment of the business.134 By contrast, presumably all members of a limited
liability company-even those who are also managers-will be liable only
to the extent of their investment. 135 Because an LLC retains the tax benefits
of a partnership and assures all members limited liability, it is preferable to
the limited partnership.
The North Carolina Legislature recently created another entity, a
watered down version of the LLC known as the limited liability partnership
(LLP). 13 6 The LLP, which also became effective in 1993, allows partners
to enjoy limited liability for the "debts and obligations of the partnership
arising from errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or malfeasance
committed in the course of the partnership business .. ." by fellow partners
and other representatives of the partnership. 137 Unlike the LLC, however,
partners still remain jointly and severally liable for all other debts and obligations of the partnership that arise from any other cause of action, such as
breach of contract.'13 The only advantage that the LLP would seem to have
over the LLC is the relative ease with which an existing general partnership
can change over to an LLP. All the partnership is required to do is file an
application with the Secretary of State along with a registration fee of
$100.13 Even with this advantage, an LLC may be a better choice because
134. Id. § 59-303(a).
135. Id. § 57C-3-30 (1993). Absolute limited liability may not exist because of the doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil, under which the corporate entity can be disregarded and shareholders
held liable for the obligations of the corporation. The doctrine may apply where the corporation is
"a mere instrumentality or alter ego of the sole or dominant shareholder and a shield for his
activities in violation of the declared public policy... " Henderson v. Security Mortgage & Fin.
Co., 273 N.C. 253, 260, 160 S.E.2d 39, 44 (1968). Under the instrumentality rule, three elements
are required to pierce the corporate veil: (1) complete domination of finances and policy, (2) used
"to commit [a] fraud or wrong," (3) which "proximately cause[s] the injury complained of."
Glenn v. Wagner, 313 N.C. 450, 455, 329 S.E.2d. 326, 330 (1985). Factors that will be considered to justify piercing the corporate veil are inadequate capitalization, failure to comply with
corporate formalities, complete control over the corporation, and "excessive fragmentation of a
single enterprise into separate corporations." Id., 329 S.E.2d at 330-31. These factors, taken
individually, do not automatically compel shareholder liability, but combined, they can be dispositive of a court's disregard of the corporate entity. The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil can
likely be applied to an LLC; Colorado law expressly provides that "the court shall apply the case
law which interprets the conditions and circumstances under which the corporate veil of a corporation may be pierced." CoLo. Rnv. STAT. § 7-80-107 (1993).
136. See N.C. Gm. STAT. §§ 59-32(7), 59-45, 59-84.1 to -84.2 (Supp. 1993).
137. Id. § 59-45(b). The frst partner is not liable when the partner or representative who
committed the wrongdoing is "not working under the supervision or direction of the first partner at
the time the [wrongdoing] occurred, unless the first partner was directly involved in the specific
activity in which the [wrongdoing was] committed by the other partner or representative." Id.
138. Id. § 59-45(c).
139. Id. § 59-84.2. The application must state "the name of the partnership, the address of its
principal office, the number of partners, and a brief statement of the business in which the partnership engages." Id. The registration is only effective for one year, and must be renewed annually.
Id. Each time the registration is renewed, the $100 fee must be paid. Id.
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its members enjoy limited liability for all of the debts and obligations of the
14 1
company, 14 ° while the partners in an LLP do not.
Although the LLC may look like the perfect hybrid business form, it is
not suitable for every association. For example, a corporation with more
than 100 shareholders that converts to an LLC may find it almost impossible, and certainly impractical, to obtain the unanimous consent of all the
members to continue the business after the occurrence of one of the statutory dissolution events. 14 2 Furthermore, members who are inclined to
freely trade their shares would find it difficult to negotiate the restrictions
43
on the free transferability of their interests.'
On the other hand, individuals currently involved in general partnerships, limited partnerships, or subchapter S corporations may find converting to an LLC advantageous. 1" For those who want to limit their
personal liability, the LLC offers a safe haven from great financial risk.
Any business that has not found it cumbersome and restrictive to operate as
either a partnership or an S corporation would be well advised to convert to
an LLC. In addition, those entrepreneurs who are considering forming
either a partnership or a close corporation and who do not anticipate doing a
great deal of their business across state lines 145 should seriously consider
the new LLC format offered under North Carolina law.
Perhaps the group that will benefit most from the new LLC Act will be
those professionals who are incorporated or who are involved in a limited
or general partnership. While LLC members remain liable for their own
malpractice, the LLC will insulate individual partners from liability for their
partners' negligence and malpractice.' 46 Consequently, conversion to the
140. Id. § 57C-3-30 (1993).
141. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text. The sentiment in the business community is that the LLC is the better choice. As of June 10, 1994, the Secretary of State reported that'

1172 businesses had either converted to LLC status or started a new business as an LLC, while
only 169 businesses have taken advantage of the LLP. Telephone Interview with Bonnie Elek,
Office of the Secretary of State of North Carolina (June 10, 1994).
142. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
144. A corporation or partnership wanting to convert to an LLC could go about it in several
ways. Some states have statutory merger or consolidation provisions, but a corporation or partnership could also exchange its assets for those of the LLC, liquidate the corporation or partnership
and transfer the assets to the LLC, or simply exchange the ownership interests in the corporation
or partnership for similar interests in the LLC. See Rita Cain & Larry R. Garrison, The Limited
Liability Company: When Is It the Right Choice?, 11 J. ST. TAX'N 52, 59-61 (1993).
145. An entity that does a great deal of business in other states may not want to convert to the
LLC format for fear that the limited liability status would not be honored in states that do not have
LLC legislation. Id. at 59. The rapid enactment of LLC legislation in most states may soon
eliminate this fear. Quite possibly, every state may enact LLC legislation in the next few years to
make itself more competitive in attracting new businesses.
146. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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LLC form may reduce the cost of malpractice insurance for doctors and
lawyers. 147
With the introduction of the limited liability company, North Carolina
now has a business form that incorporates the best attributes of both a corporation and a partnership. With the advantages of limited liability and
partnership taxation treatment, the LLC offers an alternative to the limited
partnership and the S corporation. As awareness of the LLC form spreads,
a significant number of new businesses will likely start up as LLCs, and
many existing businesses may convert to the LLC form.' 4
The LLC offers particular promise to professionals who wish to shield
themselves from liability for their partners' malpractice and who wish to
retain the cash method of tax accounting. Although the LLC is not as well
established and doctrinally developed as the corporation or the partnership,
it should be the entity of the future for small associations in North Carolina.
LEE STANFORD SHBRRiLL, JR.

147. Alan E. Weiner, Considerations When Asking: To Be or Not to Be an LLC?, 24 TAX

ADVISER 645, 645 (1993). If professionals are currently organized under either a general or limited partnership, conversion to an LLC should be a tax-free transfer. See Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 9010027
(Dec. 7, 1989) and 9119029 (Feb. 7, 1991). On a personal level, conversion to an LLC could
reduce individual stress for partners who might then stop worrying about whether they will suffer
if their partners commit malpractice. See Weiner, supra, at 645. Moreover, it appears that professional organizations that convert to LLCs may be able to continue using the cash method of
accounting for tax purposes. See Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 9350013 (Sept. 15, 1993); 9321047 (Feb. 25,
1993).
148. See Telephone Interview, supra note 141.

State v. Jennings: Public Fervor, the North Carolina Supreme

Court, and Society's Ultimate Punishment
Public concern about violent crime has risen sharply.' The United
States Congress has responded to the outcry by considering an omnibus
crime bill,2 and many state legislatures are debating similar measures.'
Across the country, citizens and lawmakers alike have called for longer
sentences for criminals4 and have demanded that those convicted actually
serve their full sentences.' Many also call for swifter and more frequent use
of the death penalty.'
1. See, e.g., Richard Lacayo, Lock 'Em Up!, TmE, Feb. 7, 1994, at 51 ("In one of the most
startling spikes in the history of polling, large numbers of Americans are abruptly calling crime
their greatest concern."); President Bill Clinton, State of the Union Address (Jan. 25, 1994) in
L.A. TInEs, Jan. 26, 1994, at A19 ("Violent crime and the fear it provokes are crippling our
society, limiting personal freedom and fraying the ties that bind us.").
It is not clear that the increased fear corresponds exactly to increased crime. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation announced that crime in general decreased by five percent during JanuaryJune, 1993. Judy Keen, Besieged by Crime, USA TODAY, Jan. 25, 1994, at 1A. Some categories
of crime showed marked increases, however; between 1982 and 1992, the rate of violent crime
rose by almost one third, 142% more juveniles were arrested for homicide, and murders of children involving firearms increased by 143%. Id. In North Carolina in 1993 the total number of
violent crimes increased by only one percent, and crime overall decreased by one percent. Angela
Wright, N.C. Violent Crime Rate Holds Steady, But Urban Homicides Rise 24 Percent in '93,
CHARLOTrE OBSERVER,Mar. 3, 1994, at 3C. Attorney General Michael F. Easley commented on
these statistics: "Overall crime appears to be leveling... [b]ut this is the same unacceptable high
rate of crime that propelled this state from 41st to 16th in the nation. North Carolinians cannot
tolerate this level." Id.
2. President Clinton's crime proposals include community policing programs, funding for
100,000 new police officers, more regulation of the sale of handguns, and drug treatment and
prevention, among other initiatives. Clinton, supra note 1, at A19.
3. Governor James Hunt called the North Carolina General Assembly into a special session
on February 8, 1994 and introduced a 34-point package for the legislature's consideration. Rob
Christensen & Joe Drew, Hunt, Legislature Target Crime, RALEIGH NEws & OnsBRVER, Feb. 9,
1994, at IA. Ultimately, the General Assembly passed, among other bills, the Crime Control Act
of 1994, which increases penalties for firearm possession, allows juvenile defendants age 13 or
above to be transferred to Superior Court, and mandates life imprisonment for defendants convicted of a third violent crime, commonly referred to as "three strikes, you're out." Act of March
26, 1994, ch. 22, 1994 N.C. Sess. Laws (to be codified at various sections of N.C. GEN. STAT.
Chs. 14 & 7A). The Legislature also passed a statute mandating life sentences without parole for
first degree murderers not sentenced to death. Act of March 23, 1994, ch. 21, 1994 N.C. Sess.
Laws (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17).
4. For example, a "three strikes, you're out" proposal, mandating life imprisonment without
parole for third-time violent offenders, has been widely touted by President Clinton (among
others), Clinton, supra note 1, at A19, and passed by the North Carolina General Assembly on
March 26, 1994. Crime Control Act of 1994; see also supra note 3.
5. E.g., Charles Babington, Maryland Legislators Urge Tightening of Parole, WASH. POST,
Jan. 26, 1994, at B5.
6. A crime bill currently before the United States House of Representatives would add 65
crimes to the list of those eligible for the federal death penalty, including "fatal carjackings, driveby killings, murders by federal prisoners and retaliatory killings of witnesses, victims and infor-
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Missing from much of the public discourse is concern for the rights of
criminal defendants. 7 In this context, the duty of judges to safeguard the
constitutional rights of accused and convicted criminals becomes even more
critical.8 The North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed a death sentence in
19939 and failed to fulfill this duty.10 Most individuals would agree with
the court that Patricia Jennings's murder of her elderly husband was horrible. 1 Nonetheless, in allowing the death penalty to stand under constitutionally questionable circumstances, 12 the supreme court has demonstrated
a willingness to assume that a jury did not unconstitutionally apply its in-

even
structions, even when that jury sentenced a defendant to death, and
3
when strong arguments suggest that instructions were misapplied.'
Patricia Jennings was convicted of the first degree murder of her hus-

band and sentenced to death on October 8, 1990.1' In her direct appeal to
mants." Brad Todd, Watt Resists Rush to PassCrime Bill, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Apr. 16,
1994, at 3A. North Carolina State Senator Frank Ballance, a death penalty opponent, introduced a
bill in the General Assembly's special session devoted to crime, proposing public executions,
apparently in hopes of sparking debate about the death penalty. Joseph Neff, LegislatorProposes
Public Executions, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 11, 1994, at 3A. Some members of the
public clearly support expansion of capital punishment: "What are we going to do about these
kids (monsters) who kill with guns??? Line them up against the wall and get a firing squad and
pull, pull, pull. I am volunteering to pull, pull, pull." Anonymous letter written to a judge in Dade
County, Florida, quoted in Lacayo, supra note 1, at 51.
7. For example, a TIME/CNN poll found that 47 percent of those surveyed favored
"[a]llowing police in [their] area to stop and search people for weapons if these people fit a
criminal profile." Lacayo, supra note 1, at 53. At least one writer, however, has cautioned readers not to disregard constitutional rights: "inn our rush to judgment, best that we watch our step,
careful not to trample on the constitutional rights of any individual, lest we go over the edge." Joe
Murray, Lock 'Em up and Throw Away the Constitution?,RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Feb. 9,
1994, at 13A.
8. North Carolina Supreme Court Chief Justice Jim Exum, a death penalty opponent, said,
"When you're facing the ultimate penalty of death, naturally you're not going to leave any procedural stone unturned .... That's our obligation, our duty." Bill Krueger, Death Penalty Frustrates Victims, Lawyers, Judges, RALEIGH NEws & OBSERVER, Feb. 22, 1994, at 1A,6A. Former
United States Supreme Court Justice Powell wrote: "I speak for myself, and I am sure other
judges in both the state and federal systems, in saying that one reviews a capital sentence with the
greatest care and concern." Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Commentary: CapitalPunishment, 102 HARv.
L. REv. 1035, 1041 (1989). Justice Powell went on to argue, however, that the current system of
collateral federal review of death sentences defeats capital punishment's purposes of retribution
and deterrence. Id. at 1042.
9. State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 430 S.E.2d 188, cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 644 (1993).
10. See infra notes 159-68 and accompanying text.
11. Jennings, 333 N.C. at 627-28, 430 S.E.2d at 213; see also infra text accompanying notes
18-23.
12. See infra notes 121-54 and accompanying text.
13. Given that supreme court justices are elected officials in North Carolina, this decision
might be read as part of the larger social context in which lawmakers are responding to increased
public concern about crime. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
14. 333 N.C. at 589, 430 S.E.2d at 191.
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the North Carolina Supreme Court,15 she raised a number of issues, most of

which the court dismissed with little or no discussion.

6

The court con-

cluded "that the jury selection and the guilt and sentencing phases of the
defendant's trial were free from prejudicial error, and that the sentence of
death was not disproportionate [to her crime].' 7
The State's evidence showed that the defendant tortured, stomped, and
beat her elderly husband"8 ("Mr. Jennings") to death in a motel room.'
When paramedics arrived on the scene, the defendant was wearing the cowboy boots that she had used to stomp Mr. Jennings, and she lied about how
long he had been "down."2 Forensic evidence showed that the victim was
severely cut and bruised, that his anus had been penetrated with an object,
and that his penis was marked with sharply defined imprints probably
caused by forceps found in the hotel room.2 '
Prosecution witnesses testified that prior to his death Mr. Jennings had
told them of the defendant's ongoing abuse;2 2 one witness said Mr. Jennings once told him that his wife had beaten him, dragged him across the
room, and threatened to stomp him to death with her cowboy boots. 2 3 The
defendant's expert witnesses concluded that Mr. Jennings suffered from dementia.24 The state's expert witnesses, however, disputed these conten15. Under North Carolina's capital punishment statute, a death-sentenced defendant may automatically seek review by the state supreme court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(1) (1988).
16. For example, the court found no error in the trial court's decision to allow the testimony
of a forensic pathologist that the victim had been tortured, Jennings,333 N.C. at 597, 430 S.E.2d
at 196; the court found that defense counsel essentially invited a State Bureau of Investigation
agent to comment on the defendant's decision to remain silent after her arrest, id. at 604, 430
S.E.2d at 200; and the court noted that "cowboy boots, when worn to kick or stomp an elderly
man, may be a deadly weapon," thus supporting the trial court's "deadly weapon"jury instruction,
id. at 614,430 S.E.2d at 206. The court found other possible errors harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, including testimony about the defendant's refusal to consent to a warrantless search, id. at
605, 430 S.E.2d at 200, and the trial court's initial improper instructions on the essential elements
of first-degree murder, which were promptly and effectively corrected. Id. at 612-13, 430 S.E.2d
at 205.
17. Id. at 589, 430 S.E.2d at 192. By statute, the supreme court must consider whether "the
sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant." N.C. GaN. STAT. § 15A-2000(d)(2) (1988).
18. At the time of the murder, the defendant was 46 years old, and her husband was 80. See
Jennings,333 N.C at 590, 430 S.E.2d at 192.
19. Id. at 589, 430 S.E.2d at 192.
20. Id. at 590, 430 S.E.2d at 192. The defendant told a paramedic that her husband had been
on the floor five or ten minutes, id., but the local medical examiner testified that he had been dead
six to eight hours. Id. at 591, 430 S.E.2d at 192.
21. Id., 430 S.E.2d at 193.
22. Id. at 590, 430 S.E.2d at 192.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 592, 430 S.E.2d at 193.
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tions, having found no evidence of any brain disorder.2 In her defense, the
defendant claimed only that Mr. Jennings's injuries were self-inflicted.2 6
At the sentencing phase of the trial, the judge submitted, and the jury
found, three statutory aggravating factors:2 7 (1) "that the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of or while attempting the penetration of the anus with an object";21 (2) that the murder
was committed for pecuniary gain;2 9 and (3) that the murder was especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 30 The jury found four mitigating circumstances: (1) the defendant had no record of criminal convictions; 3 1 (2) she
had been an otherwise peaceful person; (3) she had no prior record of violent crimes; and (4) she showed no indication of a habitually violent nature.3 2 Finding the mitigating circumstances insufficient to outweigh the
aggravating ones, and the aggravating circumstances sufficiently substantial

to call for the death penalty,33 the jury recommended death.34
On appeal, the defendant advanced three assignments of error.35 First,
she objected to the trial court's instructions on the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance.3 6 Second, she objected to the written instructions on the
verdict sheet related to the sexual assault aggravating circumstance. 37 Finally, she contended that the jury considered two aggravating circumstances
premised upon the same evidence. 38 Justice Whichard, writing for the ma25. Id.
26. Id. at 593, 430 S.E.2d at 194. The defendant's rather bizarre account of Mr. Jennings's
injuries included her testimony that her husband occasionally retreated into "canine behavior."
She testified that, on the day he died, he had beaten his testicles with a shoe, hit himself with a
piece of old cheese, and fallen in the bathtub. Id.
27. Id. at 594, 430 S.E.2d at 194.
28. Id. This circumstance was intended to reflect the following statutory aggravating factor:
The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an aider or
abetter, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or
attempting to commit, any homicide, robbery, rape or a sex offense, arson, burglary,
kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a
destructive device or bomb.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(5) (1988).
29. Jennings, 33 N.C. at 594, 430 S.E.2d at 194 (applying § 15A-2000(e)(6)).
30. Id. (applying § 15A-2000(e)(9)).
31. Id. (applying § 15A-2000(f)(1)).
32. Id. These three circumstances are not specifically described in the statute but are admitted by way of a section that allows consideration of "[a]ny other circumstance arising from the
evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating value." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9);
see also infra note 72 and accompanying text.
33. See infra text accompanying note 67.
34. Jennings, 333 N.C. at 594, 430 S.E.2d at 194.
35. This Note will refer to these assignments of error as first, second, and third, although
these numbers do not correspond to the defendant's actual assignments of error.
36. See infra notes 122-41 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 142-45 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 146-54 and accompanying text.
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jority, found no prejudicial error in the defendant's trial or sentence. 39 Justice Frye, joined by Chief Justice Exum, concurred in the guilt-innocence
phase and dissented in the sentencing phase.4" Justice Frye focused on the
cumulative effect of several potential errors and contended that, when taken
together, they demanded a new sentencing proceeding, even though each
standing alone might not constitute prejudicial error.4 1
Justices Frye and Exum disagreed with the four-justice majority on
three issues. First, they objected to the trial judge's instructions on the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance. The judge stated that an aggravating circumstance would exist if the jury found that the defendant "stood to
benefit" financially from the victim's death.4 2 The defendant maintained
that this circumstance should apply only when a defendant killed the victim
for the purpose of obtaining money. The majority approved the jury instructions and found "substantial evidence" that the murder had been committed for pecuniary gain.43 Justice Frye agreed with the defendant that the
instructions were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, because they allowed the jury to apply the circumstance even if the defendant merely "expected to receive money as a result of her husband's death."4 4
Second, the dissent took issue with the written instructions on the verdict sheet relating to the sexual assault aggravating circumstance. The defendant argued that the aggravating circumstance of the murder's
commission during penetration of the victim's anus with an object was improperly submitted as a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance. 45 Because
the defendant had not objected at trial to the wording on the verdict sheet,
the majority limited its review to determining whether the trial court committed plain error.46 Finding no plain error, the court overruled the assignment of error.4 7 Justice Frye, like the majority, found that the trial judge
gave a proper oral instruction on this circumstance, 48 requiring the jury to
find that penetration occurred by force and against the will of the victim for
the act to constitute a sex offense. 49 He also found, however, that the ver39. Jennings, 333 N.C. at 589, 430 S.E.2d at 192.
40. Id. at 637, 430 S.E.2d at 219 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Parker did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case. Id.
41. Id. at 638, 430 S.E.2d at 219-20 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42. Id., 430 S.E.2d at 220 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Id. at 622, 430 S.E.2d at 210.
44. Id. at 640, 430 S.E.2d at 221 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45. Id. at 640-41, 430 S.E.2d at 221 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46. Id. at 616, 430 S.E.2d at 207.
47. Id. at 619, 430 S.E.2d at 208.
48. Id. at 642, 430 S.E.2d at 222 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
49. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.5(a)(1) (1993) for a definition of sexual offense.
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dict sheet required only penetration,50 and thus did not meet the sex offense
criteria for a statutory aggravating circumstance. 1 He believed there was
no way to know whether the jury based2 its finding on the proper oral in5
struction or the improper verdict sheet.
Finally, the dissent argued that the court improperly submitted two aggravating circumstances supported by the same evidence.5 3 Two circumstances-that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and
that it was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission
of a sex offense-might have been supported by the finding of forced penetration of the anus against the will of the victim, thus leading to automatic
cumulation of aggravating circumstances. 4 The majority found independent evidence to support both circumstances and declined to find plain error
in the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it must not use the same
evidence to support two factors.55 Justice Frye agreed with the majority
that the evidence was probative of both aggravating circumstances, but con-

cluded that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the evidence should not be used as the basis for two aggravating circumstances. 56
Ultimately, the majority affirmed the defendant's death sentence,5 though
Justices Frye and Exum would have vacated and remanded for a new sentencing proceeding.5"
A brief review of North Carolina's death penalty scheme, 59 which promotes individualized determinations of the appropriateness of capital punishment based on guided discretion,6" will help demonstrate the
50. Jennings, 333 N.C. at 642, 430 S.E.2d at 222 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
51. Id. (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. Id. (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
53. Id. at 627, 430 S.E.2d at 213.
54. Id. at 642, 430 S.E.2d at 222 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. Id. at 628, 430 S.E.2d at 214.
56. Id. at 642, 430 S.E.2d at 222 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. Id. at 636, 430 S.E.2d at 219.
58. Id. at 644, 430 S.E.2d at 223 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
59. For a discussion of North Carolina's death penalty in light of United States Supreme
Court death penalty jurisprudence, see State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 354, 259 S.E.2d 510, 544
(1979) (holding that North Carolina's death penalty scheme is constitutional), cert. denied, 448
U.S. 907 (1980); see also Joel M. Craig, Comment, CapitalPunishment in North Carolina: The
1977Death Penalty Statute and the North CarolinaSupreme Court, 59 N.C. L. Rav. 911, 914-42
(1981) (scrutinizing North Carolina's death penalty scheme in light of U.S. Supreme Court guidelines); Geoffrey C. Mangum, Comment, Vague and Overlapping Guidelines: A Study of North
Carolina'sCapitalSentencing Statute, 16 WAKE FoREsT L. R v. 765, 768-818 (1980) (analyzing
North Carolina's death penalty scheme); Christopher R. Opalinsky, Comment, Evolving Standards
of Decency: The Constitutionality of North Carolina's Capital Punishment Statute, 16 WAKE
FoRasT L. Rav. 737, 759-64 (1980) (discussing North Carolina's death penalty scheme in light of
the U.S. Supreme Court's guidelines).
60. See Barfield, 298 N.C. at 351, 259 S.E.2d at 542. This same fundamental approach
underlies North Carolina's Fair Sentencing Act, which applies to non-capital crimes. N.C. GEM.
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significance of Jennings. Capital defendants61 are tried and sentenced in
bifurcated proceedings, 62 generally by the same jury.63 In light of the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia,' capital sentencing guidelines must "narrow the class of murderers subject to" the death
penalty. 65 Accordingly, the judge must instruct the jury to consider any
aggravating or mitigating circumstance(s) listed in the statute66 and to recommend a sentence based upon the following guidelines:
(1) Whether any sufficient aggravating circumstance or circumstances as enumerated in [the statute] exist;

(2) Whether any sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances as enumerated in [the statute], which outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found, exist; and
(3) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should
be sentenced
to death or to imprisonment in the State's prison for
67
life.
The North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions direct the jury to weigh the

aggravating and mitigating circumstances not by "applying a mathematical
formula," 68 but by considering the "relative substantiality and persuasiveSTAT. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1988) (repealed effective 10/1/94, Act of March 26, 1994, ch. 24, 1994
N.C. Sess. Laws (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.10)). The Act lists aggravating
and mitigating circumstances trial judges must consider in making their sentencing decisions. Id.
§ 1340.4(a)(1)-(2). These circumstances should guide the judges in deciding individual sentences
that fall between the statutory "presumptive" and maximum sentences. Id. § 15A-1340.4(a). For
an overview of North Carolina's Fair Sentencing Act, see Susan Kelly Nichols, Comment, Criminal Procedure-TheNorth CarolinaFairSentencing Act, 60 N.C. L. Rav. 631 (1982). The legislature passed a structured sentencing law which will replace the Fair Sentencing Act as of October
1, 1994. Act of July 24, 1993, ch. 538, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 1359. The new sentencing scheme
"eliminates paroles and lengthens sentences for violent crimes." Christensen & Drew, supra note
3, at IA.
61. Although North Carolina's Constitution lists murder, arson, burglary, and rape as punishable by death, N.C. CONST. art. XI, § 2, under the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977), a defendant cannot be put to death for the rape of an adult
woman. Id. at 597. In light of Coker, arson and burglary may not constitutionally be punishable
by the death penalty. Cf. id. at 598 ("We have the abiding conviction that the death penalty.,, is
an excessive penalty for the rapist who, as such, does not take human life.").
62. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(a)(1) (1988).
63. Id. § 15A-2000(a)(2). 64. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
65. Id. at 196. In Gregg the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Georgia's
statute imposing the death penalty for the crime of murder. Id. at 158. The Court held that the
"punishment of death does not invariably violate the Constitution." Id. at 169. The Court recommended bifurcated proceedings, stressing that the jury must receive relevant information as well
as guidance from the court. Id. at 195. The Court approved Georgia's capital punishment statutes, which "focus the jury's attention on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant." Id. at 206. For an analysis of Gregg's impact on
capital punishment in North Carolina, see Craig, supra note 59, at 913-14.
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(b) (1988).
67. Id.
68. N.C. PATrERN JURY INsTRUCrIONs-CRIM. § 150.10, at 44 (1993).
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ness of the existing aggravating and mitigating circumstances" and determining "how compelling and persuasive the totality of the aggravating
circumstances are when compared with the totality of the mitigating
circumstances. 6 9
The jury may consider only aggravating circumstances that are enumerated in the statute. 70 These factors embrace aspects of the defendant's
actions that make the murder "worse"' in some measure than other

murders.7 ' Mitigating circumstances, on the other hand, are not limited to
those in the statute and can include "[a]ny other circumstance arising from
the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating value." 72 The jury
73

must assign weight to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

Even if the jury finds that the mitigating circumstances do not outweigh the
aggravating circumstances, it is not required to recommend a death
74
sentence.
When defendants sentenced to death have challenged trial courts' jury
instructions on aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the North Carolina Supreme Court has followed the standard of Estelle v. McGuire.7 5 In
that case, the United States Supreme Court reviewed a jury instruction to
determine "whether there [was] a reasonable likelihood that the jury has
Id.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e) (1988).
"An aggravating circumstance is a fact or group of facts which tend to make a specific
particularly deserving of the maximum punishment prescribed by law." N.C. PATrERN
JURY INSTRJCrONS-CRIM. § 150.10, at 7 (1993).
72. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(f)(9). The United States Supreme Court has held that the
sentencer in a capital case may "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigatingfactor, any
aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the
defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604
(1978) (footnote omitted). In 1990, the United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional the
North Carolina requirement that the jury unanimously find mitigating circumstances before giving
them any weight. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 435 (1990) (citing Mills v. Maryland,
486 U.S. 367 (1988)). For an analysis of the McKoy case and its implications for capital punishment in North Carolina, see Carolyn A. Martin, Note, Sifting Through the Falloutof North Carolina's Death Penalty Jurisprudence: Getting Down to the Real McKoy, 69 N.C. L. REv. 1504
(1991).
73. N.C. PArraI JURY INSTRUCriONS-CRIM. § 150.10, at 42 (1993). One commentator
argued:
It is much easier to find that a given aggravating circumstance exists beyond a reasonable doubt than it is to conclude that an aggravating factor outweighs a mitigating factor.
Thus the balancing process is the point in the sentencing procedure at which the sentencer's discretibn plays its most important role.
John R. Perkins, Jr., Comment,, Capital Punishment: Impairment of a Death Sentence by the
Invalidity of an Aggravating Circumstance, 52 U. CRn. L. REv. 541, 552 (1983).
74. McDougall v. Dixon, 921 F.2d 518, 530-31 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2840
(1991).
75. 112 S. Ct. 475, 482 (1991). See, e.g., State v. Montgomery, 331 N.C. 559, 573, 417
S.E.2d 742, 750 (1992).
69.
70.
71.
murder
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76
applied the challenged instruction in a way that violates the Constitution.
The North Carolina Supreme Court explained that although this standard
requires a defendant to show "more than a 'possibility' that the jury applied
the instruction in an unconstitutional manner, .. .a defendant need not
establish that the jury was 'more likely than not' to have misapplied the
instruction."7 7
The North Carolina Supreme Court applied the Estelle standard in Jennings when it considered the trial court's instructions regarding the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance.7" The North Carolina Pattern Jury
Instructions suggest applying the pecuniary gain factor when the defendant,
in committing the murder, "has obtained, or intends or expects to obtain,

money or some other thing which can be valued in money, either as compensation for having committed the crime, or as a result of the death of the
victim."7 9 The court has considered this circumstance in several previous
cases. For example, in State v. Oliver, 0 the supreme court held that submitting the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance to the jury was proper
when the defendants murdered two men after robbing a convenience
store.8 1

Three years after Oliver, the supreme court specifically found that the
pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance is not limited to cases involving
contract murders. In State v. Gardner 2 the capital defendant objected to
submission of the pecuniary gain factor, contending that a 1983 amendment
76. Estelle, 112 S. Ct. at 482 (quoting Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)). This
standard contemplates a balancing of the needs for finality and accuracy, and it seeks to eliminate
cases in which the possibility of error is remote:
Jurors do not sit in solitary isolation booths parsing instructions for subtle shades of
meaning in the same way that lawyers might. Differences among them in interpretation
of instructions may be thrashed out in the deliberative process, with commonsense understanding of the instructions in the light of all that has taken place at the trial to prevail
over technical hairsplitting.
Jennings, 333 N.C. at 621, 430 S.E.2d at 210 (quoting Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380-81).
77. Jennings, 333 N.C. at 639, 430 S.E.2d at 220 (citing Boyde, 494 U.S. at 380).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 620, 430 S.E.2d at 209 (citing N.C. PArrEN JURY INSTRUCrloNS-CRIM.
§ 150.10, at 17-18 (1993)).
80. 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183 (1981).
81. Id. at 62, 274 S.E.2d at 204. Although the defendants argued that they had already acquired the money from the robbery and did not consider further pecuniary gain, the court held that
"[tihe murder of [one victim] was apparently committed in an effort to eliminate a witness to the
robbery; and the murder of [another victim], in the hope that defendants could successfully escape, avoid prosecution, and enjoy the fruits of their sordid endeavor." Id. The court held that the
jury could find that the "murders were committed for the purpose of permitting defendants to
enjoy pecuniary gain." Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the submission of both pecuniary gain and the underlying felony as aggravating circumstances, see infra notes 115-20 and
accompanying text.
82. 311 N.C. 489, 319 S.E.2d 591 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985).

19941

CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

1681

to the Fair Sentencing Act's8" pecuniary gain provision clarified the circumstance as applicable when the "defendant was hired or paid to commit
the offense. '8 4 The court wrote that the legislative act amending the Fair
Sentencing Act85 applied only to the Fair Sentencing Act, and not the death
penalty; thus, the court refused to modify Oliver's holding that the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance in a capital sentencing proceeding may
be submitted "when the killing [is] for the purpose of getting money or
something of value." 86
Jennings also raised questions about the "especially heinous, atrocious,
or cruel" circumstance.8 7 This statutory circumstance has prompted academic criticism88 and constitutional challenge.8 9 The United States
Supreme Court addressed a similar circumstance in Godfrey v. Georgia,90
in which it held that the Georgia Supreme Court had affirmed an unconstitutional interpretation of the "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and
inhuman" circumstance. 9 1 Because "[a] person of ordinary sensibility
could fairly characterize almost every murder as 'outrageously or wantonly
vile, horrible and inhuman,' "the Court found "no principled way to distinguish [that] case, in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many
92
cases in which it was not."
In 1988 the United States Supreme Court addressed Oklahoma's interpretation of the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance. 93 In Maynard v. Cartwright,the Court noted that "an ordinary
person could honestly believe that every unjustified, intentional taking of
human life is 'especially heinous.' "9' The Court held that, like the circum83. See supra note 60.
84. Gardner, 311 N.C. at 513, 319 S.E.2d at 606 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A1340.4(a)(1)(c) (1988)).
85. Act of Oct. 1, 1983, ch. 70, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 43 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1340.4 (1993)).
86. Jennings, 311 N.C. at 513, 319 S.E.2d at 606; see also supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
88. See Richard A. Rosen, The "Especially Heinous" Aggravating Circumstance in Capital
Cases-The StandardlessStandard, 64 N.C. L. Rv. 941, 992 (1986) ("[IThe especially heinous
aggravating circumstance, by itself, has unnecessarily provided an opportunity for [arbitrariness,
caprice and discrimination] to reenter the capital sentencing process and therefore should be
eliminated.").
89. E.g., State v. Boyd, 311 N.C. 408, 434, 319 S.E.2d 189, 206 (1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1030 (1985); State v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 253-55, 278 S.E.2d 214, 219-20, cert. denied,
454 U.S. 933 (1981).
90. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
91. Id. at 432.
92. Id. at 433.
93. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
94. Id. at 364 (citing Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29).
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stance in Godfrey, this circumstance was unconstitutionally vague.95 Maynard and Godfrey instruct state courts that these aggravating circumstances

must be construed in such a way as to appropriately narrow the class of
murderers subject to the death penalty.

The North Carolina Supreme Court has limited the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" circumstance by clarifying that it does not apply
in every capital case.96 In State v. Goodman, the court held that the circumstance applies to "the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim."9 7 Under such a construction, the court
reasoned, the especially heinous circumstance "will not become a 'catch all'
provision which can always be employed in cases where there is no evidence of other aggravating circumstances." 9 Similarly, the North Carolina
Pattern Jury Instructions explain that, for this circumstance to apply, "any

brutality which was involved in [the murder] must have exceeded that
which is normally present in any killing, or this murder must have been a
conscienceless or pitiless crime which was unnecessarily torturous to the
victim." 99

Regardless of which aggravating circumstances apply in a particular
capital case, the North Carolina Supreme Court has been relatively clear
about submitting two aggravating circumstances based upon the same facts:

Two or more aggravating factors may not be supported by the same evidence. In State v. Goodman,10 0 the court addressed whether the trial court
erred in submitting the aggravating circumstances that the "capital felony
95. Id.
96. State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 24-25, 257 S.E.2d 569, 585 (1979).
97. Id. at 25, 257 S.E.2d at 585 (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla, 1973), cert.
denied sub nom. Hunter v. Florida, 416 U.S. 943 (1974)). "By using the word 'especially' the
legislature indicated that there must be evidence that the brutality involved in the murder in question must exceed that normally present in any killing before the jury would be instructed upon this
section." Id. (citing State v. Rust 250 N.W.2d 867, 874 (Neb.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 912 (1977);
State v. Simants, 250 N.W.2d 881, 891 (Neb.), cert. denied,434 U.S. 878 (1977); State v. Stewart,
250 N.W.2d 849, 522-23 (Neb. 1977)).
98. Id. (citing Harris v. State, 230 S.E.2d 1, 10 (Ga. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933
(1977)). In Goodman, the court found submission of the circumstance proper based on the following facts:
[The] decedent was shot several times and then cut repeatedly with a knife. Still living,
he was placed in the trunk of a car where he remained for several hours. His struggle to
escape from the trunk could be heard. Decedent, still in the trunk, was then driven into
another county where he was taken from the car. He was placed upon the ground with
his head resting upon a rock and then shot twice through the head. This murder is
marked by extremely vicious brutality.
Id. at 26, 257 S.E.2d at 585.
99. N.C. PATrERN JURY INSTRUCONS-CRIM. § 150.10, at 23 (1993); see, e.g., State v.
Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 392-93, 428 S.E.2d 118, 141, cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 392 (1993); State v.
Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 349, 307 S.E.2d 304, 320 (1983).
100. 298 N.C. 1, 257 S.E.2d 569 (1979).
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was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any governmental
function or the enforcement of laws,"' 0 1 and the "capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest.110 2 The
supreme court found the latter of these circumstances properly submitted,
because the jury could have inferred that the defendant committed a murder
to avoid or prevent being arrested. 10 3 The court agreed with the defendant
that submission of both circumstances was improper, however, because the
trial court grounded the two aggravating circumstances on essentially the
same evidence." °4 This, the court held, "amounted to an unnecessary duplication of the circumstances enumerated in the statute, resulting in an automatic cumulation of aggravating circumstances against the defendant." 0 5
To prevent an overly broad reading of the Goodman decision, Justice
Britt wrote that the court did not intend to suggest that "the aggravating
circumstances enumerated in G.S. 15A-2000(e) can never overlap or that
more than one of them can never arise from a single incident."' 0 Noting
that such situations might commonly occur when both the defendant's motive and a specific factual aspect of the crime were at issue, the court addressed the importance of the trial court's resolution of these situations:
In such cases it will be difficult for the trial court to decide which
factors should be presented to the jury for their consideration.
We believe that error in cases in which a person's life is at stake,
if there be any, should be made in the defendant's favor, and that
the jury should not be instructed
upon one of the statutory circum07
stances in a doubtful case.1
Courts have subsequently applied Goodman without much discussion
or modification. For example, in State v. Hutchins'0 8 the supreme court
upheld submission of the aggravating circumstances that the murder was
committed against an officer in the performance of his duties and that the
murder was for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest."0 9 According to the
court, the first circumstance addressed the act itself, and the second ad101. N.C. GSN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(7) (1988).
102. Id. § 15A-2000(e)(4).
103. Goodman, 298 N.C. at 27, 257 S.E.2d at 586. The court noted that "[in a broad sense

every murder silences the victim, thus having the effect of aiding the criminal in the avoidance or
prevention of his arrest." Id. at 26, 257 S.E.2d at 586. This aggravating factor, however, applies
only where "at least one of the purposes motivating the killing.was defendant's desire to avoid
subsequent detection and apprehension for his crime." Id. at 27, 257 S.E.2d at 586.
104. Id. at 28, 257 S.E.2d at 587.

105. Id. at 29, 257 S.E.2d at 587. The court also recognized the difficulty presented by these
two aggravating circumstances, which will often overlap and cause confusion for trial courts and
juries. Id. at 28, 257 S.E.2d at 587.
106. Id. at 30, 257 S.E.2d at 588.
107. Id.
108. 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788 (1981).
109. Id. at 355, 279 S.E.2d at 809 (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-2000(e)(8), (e)(4) (1988)).
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dressed the defendant's motivation. 110 Similarly, in State v. Green,' the
supreme court upheld submission of two aggravating circumstances related
to the murder of a witness: "The circumstance of violent course of conduct" 2 directs the jury's attention to the factual circumstances of defendant's crimes. The circumstance of witness elimination 1 3 requires the jury
to consider not defendant's actions but his motive in shooting a man in a
'' 4
defenseless posture."
When the first degree murder conviction is based upon felony murder,
the same principles apply. One statutory aggravating factor requires consideration of whether the capital crime was committed while the defendant
was perpetrating another serious offense." 5 The supreme court held that
the felony underlying the felony murder conviction should not be used as
the basis for this aggravating circumstance," 6 unless the defendant was also
convicted of first-degree murder based upon deliberation and premeditation." 7 In State v. Oliver,"' however, the court found that the pecuniary
gain aggravating circumstance could be submitted to the jury even though
the case involved a felony murder conviction in which the underlying robbery could not be submitted as an aggravating circumstance. 19 The court
wrote that the pecuniary gain circumstance "examines the motive of the
defendant rather than his acts. While his motive does not constitute an element of the offense, it is appropriate for it to be considered on the question
of his sentence."' 120
In light of this background, it appears that the Jennings court misapplied the Estelle standard. That standard requires consideration of whether
there is a "reasonable likelihood" of unconstitutional application of jury instructions. 2 ' There is clearly a reasonable likelihood-and perhaps even a
110. Id. at 355, 279 S.E.2d at 809.
111. 321 N.C. 594, 365 S.E.2d 587, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900 (1988).
112. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)( 1) (1988).
113. Id. § 15A-2000(e)(8).
114. Green, 321 N.C. at 610, 365 S.E.2d at 597.
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(5).
116. State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 113, 257 S.E.2d 551,567-68 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
941 (1980).
117. State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 24,257 S.E.2d 569,584-85 (1979). For a critical analysis
of the felony murder rule and the use of the underlying felony as an aggravating circumstance, see
Richard A. Rosen, FelonyMurder and the EighthAmendment Jurisprudenceof Death, 31 B.C. L.
REv. 1103, 1120-37 (1990). Professor Rosen noted that "[n]o state has premeditation and deliberation as an aggravating circumstance... [but] a felony murder narrowing device does no more
to narrow the class than one based on premeditation and deliberation." Id. at 1125.
118. 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183 (1981).
119. Id. at 62, 274 S.E.2d at 204.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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probability-that the jury applied its instructions unconstitutionally in sentencing Patricia Jennings to death.
Under the defendant's first assignment of error, the Jennings court endorsed a broad reading of the meaning of pecuniary gain as an aggravating
circumstance by refusing to find error in the trial court's jury instructions.
In her first assignment of error, the defendant challenged not the court's use
of the North Carolina Pattern Instructions on pecuniary gain, 22 but the
court's description of the particular pecuniary gain that could be based on
the evidence in the case:' 2 3 "[tihe defendant stood to benefit from the remaining partnership accounts at the Merrill Lynch [sic] in the name of the
decedent."' 2 4 The defendant argued that this language failed to "narrow the
class of murderers subject to capital punishment" as required by the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia,2 ' because "incidental financial gain will accrue to the surviving spouse of virtually every
126
marriage."'
The majority and the dissent 2 7 both evaluated the trial court's pecuniary gain instruction under Estelle v. McGuire.128 The majority agreed with
the State: "[W]hen read in conjunction with the first paragraph, and in the
context of the trial record, the instruction is not constitutionally infirm."' 12 9
The majority buttressed this conclusion by reviewing facts in the record
tending to support the existence of pecuniary gain as an aggravating
130
circumstance.
Justice Frye, however, wrote that the State's argument 13 did not address the real issue on appeal-whether the jury was properly instructed on
122. See supra text accompanying note 79.
123. The Pattern Instructions guide the trial court's explanation in this way: "describe pecuniary gain, e.g., had been hired to do so." N.C. PATmN JuRY INsmucrioNs-Ctm. § 150.10, at
18 (1993).
124. Jennings, 333 N.C. at 620, 430 S.E.2d at 209 (citing N.C. PATrERN JURY INsTRuC-

TiONs-CRIM. § 150.10, at 14-15 (1993)) (emphasis omitted).
125. Id. at 620, 430 S.E.2d at 209 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187, 196 (1976));
see also supra note 65 and accompanying text.
126. Jennings, 333 N.C. at 620, 430 S.E.2d at 209.

127. This Note refers to Justice Frye's opinion as the dissent because, although he concurred
in part and dissented in part, only the dissenting portions of his opinion are relevant to this
analysis.
128. 112 S. Ct. 475, 482 (1991); see also supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
129. Jennings, 333 N.C. at 622, 430 S.E.2d at 210.

130. Id. at 622-24, 430 S.E.2d at 210-11. When the defendant killed Mr. Jennings, he had
approximately $21,000 that the defendant had apparently unsuccessfully attempted to have transferred to her. Id. at 623, 430 S.E.2d at 211. Furthermore, "witnesses testified that Jennings frequently complained that defendant was draining him of money to the point of destitution." Id. at
624, 430 S.E.2d at 211.
131. Justice Frye noted that the State implicitly recognized that the instruction "sweeps too far
in that it directs the jury to find this aggravating circumstance on the mere fact that defendant
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the aggravating circumstance such that it could weigh the competing evidence. 132 Justice Frye concluded:
[Tlhere is a "reasonable likelihood" that the jury applied this instruction in an unconstitutional manner, that is, in a manner which
allowed it to find this aggravating circumstance without regard to
whether defendant killed the victim for the purpose of obtaining
the money. The pecuniary gain instructions were therefore unconstitutionally vague and overbroad as applied in this case.' 3 3
It is plausible that the defendant did not murder her husband with the
intention or expectation of obtaining money. 134 Evidence presented at trial
showed that Mr. Jennings had a brokerage account containing approximately $170,000 when he married the defendant. 135 Shortly after their marriage, Mr. Jennings transferred large sums of money to the defendant,
bought her a car, and paid credit card bills with funds from the account. 36
For some period of time, the defendant had power of attorney over the accounts. 137 By the time of his death, Mr. Jennings had only $21,000 in his
account.138 That the defendant had already managed to obtain most of Mr.

Jennings's assets without killing him indicates that she may not have killed

139
her husband for the purpose of pecuniary gain.
Jennings's effect on future cases involving the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance may prove to be minor, since the supreme court's
broad reading of pecuniary gain originated in previous cases. 140 Nevertheless, Jennings leaves the reach of the circumstance unsettled. For instance,
although it is settled that pecuniary gain need not have been the only moti-

'stood to benefit' financially from the death of her husband." Id. at 639, 430 S.E.2d at 220 (Frye,
J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. Id. at 640, 430 S.E.2d at 221 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. Id. (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The court has upheld a purpose
requirement for the aggravating circumstance of avoiding lawful arrest. See State v. Goodman,
298 N.C. 1, 27, 257 S.E.2d 569, 586 (1979).
134. See supra text accompanying note 124 (setting forth the language of the instruction).
135. Jennings, 333 N.C. at 623, 430 S.E.2d at 211.
136. Id.
137. She claimed she had such power of attorney at the time of Mr. Jennings's death, although
a representative of the brokerage firm testified that the company refused to transfer funds from
Mr. Jennings's account unless several conditions were first satisfied. Id. at 623-24, 430 S.E.2d at
211. Those conditions required Mr. Jennings to write a letter requesting that money be transferred
to his new broker, formally request liquidation of the accounts, or have his new broker agree to
accept the accounts. Id.
138. Id. at 623, 430 S.E.2d at 211.
139. The point of this analysis is not to excuse the defendant's actions, or to suggest in any
way that they are less horrible because financial benefit was not her specific motivation for the
murder. Instead, the analysis challenges the majority's facile conclusion that the potentially erroneous instruction had no probable effect on the jury's deliberation.
140. See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 311 N.C. 489, 319 S.E.2d 591 (1984) (discussed supra notes
82-86 and accompanying text), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1230 (1985); State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28,
274 S.E.2d 183 (1981) (discussed supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text).
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vation for a murder, it is unclear how significant a role it must have played
in the decision to murder. If incidental financial gain to a surviving
spouse 14 satisfies the circumstance, must a significant amount of money be
involved? Must the murdering spouse even be aware of the precise amount
of money she is likely to receive?
Under the defendant's second assignment of error, the majority and the
dissent again disagreed about the impact of irproper jury instructions. The
defendant argued that, although the trial court's oral instructions properly
set forth the elements of the aggravating circumstance of sexual offense, the
instructions on the jury's verdict sheet were improper.' 4 2 Noting that the
defendant had failed to object at trial to the wording of the verdict sheet, the
majority limited its review to whether the incorrect sheet amounted to plain
error."' The court concluded that since the oral instructions were proper,
there was no plain error, because "the additional or alternative written instructions ... suggested by defendant would have had no probable effect on
the jury's response to the issue." 1"
Justice Frye disagreed. He concluded that the mistakes on the verdict
sheet did constitute plain error, because the trial court effectively submitted
a nonstatutory aggravating circumstance for the jury's consideration. 14 5
Justice Frye's argument is bolstered by the fact that the jury heard the oral
instructions only one time-buried amongst numerous other instructions on
complicated legal issues-but the incorrect written verdict sheet remained
in the jury room throughout deliberations, allowing the jury to ponder its
every word.
In her third assignment of error, the defendant argued that the trial
court improperly submitted two aggravating circumstances that were based
upon the same factual evidence.' 4 6 Specifically, she contended that the
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" circumstance 47 and the fact that
the murder was committed during a sex offense 48 both stemmed from evidence that she penetrated Mr. Jennings's anus with an object.' 49 The majority and dissent agreed that the trial court should have instructed the jury
that the same evidence could not be used to support two aggravating cir141. See supra text accompanying note 126.
142. Jennings,333 N.C. at 615-16,430 S.E.2d at 206; see also supranotes 45-52 and accom-

panying
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

text.
333 N.C. at 616, 430 S.E.2d at 207.
Id. at 617-18, 430 S.E.2d at 207.
Id. at 641, 430 S.E.2d at 221 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 627, 430 S.E.2d at 213.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2000(e)(9) (1988).
Id. § 15A-2000(e)(5).
Jennings, 333 N.C. at 627, 430 S.E.2d at 213.
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cumstances' 5 0 and that the record contained sufficient evidence to support
151
the finding of both circumstances based on independent evidence.
The justices disagreed, however, about the effect of the incomplete
instructions. The majority distinguished Jennings from cases that had disallowed the submission of two aggravating circumstances supported by completely overlapping evidence. 152 In spite of potential partial overlap of
evidence in Jennings, the majority found that the evidence could clearly

support both aggravating circumstances independently: "We do not believe
the failure to so instruct had a probable impact on the jury's finding of these

circumstances; we thus decline to find plain error in the failure to so instruct."' 5 3 The dissent agreed with the majority that prior cases were distinguishable, but adopted the defendant's argument that there was "a
reasonable likelihood that a jury would find the sexual offense alleged, the
forced penetration of the anus with an object against the will of the deceased, to be also especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. This would result
in the 'cumulation of aggravating circumstances against the defendant.' "54
Ostensibly, the majority upheld the North Carolina rule disallowing
two aggravating circumstances based on the same facts; in effect, however,
the court implicitly recognized an exception to the rule.' 55 When, as here,
150. Id. at 628, 430 S.E.2d at 214; id. at 642, 430 S.E.2d at 222 (Frye, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
151. Id. at 627, 430 S.E.2d at 213 ("There was substantial evidence of the especially heinous,
atrocious, or cruel nature of the killing apart from the evidence as to whether the murder was
committed 'while attempting the penetration of the anus with an object.' "); id. at 643, 430 S.E.2d
at 222 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I agree with the State that there was
evidence other than the sexual offense which would have supported the proper submission of the
aggravating circumstance of especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.").
152. Id. at 628, 430 S.E.2d at 214; see also State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 29, 257 S.E.2d
569, 587 (1979) (discussed supranotes 96-107 and accompanying text); State v. Quesinberry, 319
N.C. 228, 239, 354 S.E.2d 446, 453 (1987) (finding error in trial court's submission of aggravating circumstances that murder was committed while defendant was engaged in commission of a
robbery and committed for pecuniary gain), rev'd on other grounds,494 U.S. 1022 (1990).
153. Jennings, 333 N.C. at 628, 430 S.E.2d at 214.
154. Id. at 643, 430 S.E.2d at 223 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Goodman, 298 N.C. at 29, 257 S.E.2d at 587).
155. Other kinds of exceptions could be said to exist as well:
(1) In a conviction for felony murder based on robbery, pecuniary gain may be submitted as
an aggravating circumstance, since pecuniary gain speaks to the motive of the defendant rather
than his acts. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text. It could be argued that pecuniary
gain is an inextricable part of the robbery, and therefore of the felony that gives rise to a first
degree murder conviction. Thus, it should not be a separate aggravating circumstance.
(2) The "especially heinous, cruel or atrocious" aggravating circumstance often overlaps
with other aggravating circumstances, as the defendant argued in this case. This has been called a
"standardless standard," Rosen, supra note 88, at 992, although the North Carolina courts have
insisted that it is not intended to be a "catch-all." See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.
In this case, the overlap is even moie apparent because it is not clear that the jury even properly
found that the defendant committed the murder while engaged in a sex offense.
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the supreme court determines that the jury would have found two separate
aggravating circumstances if properly instructed, the court will overrule an
assignment of error related to the improper instructions.
The majority found nothing in the defendant's sentencing proceeding
that would entitle her to a new trial.'5 6 The dissent, however, would have
vacated her sentence and remanded for a new proceeding.' 5 7 Justice Frye
clearly stated that he did not decide whether any one of the three errors he
found would in and of itself justify new sentencing. Instead, he focused on
their cumulative effect and found them "sufficiently prejudicial to require a
Justice Frye's reliance upon "cumunew capital sentencing proceeding."'
lative errors" to reach his conclusion suggests that, even in the eyes of the
dissenters, none of the errors standing alone amounted to a miscarriage of
justice. Thus, it is unclear how the dissenters would treat similar errors if
they arose in another case.
The Jennings court perhaps let the horrifying facts of the case cloud its
reasoned judgment; the defendant stomped, sexually assaulted, and tortured
her elderly husband to death.'5 9 Not surprisingly, Patricia Jennings aroused
little sympathy or compassion. Whatever one concludes about death as an
appropriate penalty for this particular defendant, the case suggests that the
supreme court does not, as one critic has claimed, "search for any reason to
order new sentencing hearings."' 6 0 The court could have held that "pecuniary gain" applies only to murders for hire and murders specifically committed for the purpose of financial gain, rather than murders that simply offer
the possibility of financial gain. Furthermore, the court could have held
that evidence of "sexual torture" would support either, but not both, of two
aggravating circumstances. Were this the case, the jury might have
weighed one aggravating circumstance against four mitigating circumstances. 6 ' Although it could be argued that the aggravating circumstance
would nonetheless outweigh the mitigating circumstances, it is at least possible that the jury would have found the balance to mitigate against a sentence of death. Because the supreme court declined to remand for a new
sentencing proceeding, and instead substituted its judgment as to the appro156. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
157. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
158. Jennings, 333 N.C. at 638,430 S.E.2d at 219-20 (Frye, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
160. Foon Rhee, Does Court Thwart N.C. Death Penalty? 12 Percent of Capital Sentences
aER, June 13,
Upheld Since 1990, But Justice Says U.S. Law Is the Reason, CHARLOTFM OaSB
1993, at 1C. Many critics apparently subscribe to such a belief; A.A. 'Dick" Adams, chairman of
the N.C. Crime Victims Compensation Commission, said, "In the interests ofjustice, they've done
absolutely nothing.... In terms of exonerating inmates on death row, they've done a lot." Id.
161. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
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priateness of the death penalty, the possibility of an alternative balance will
162
never be tested.
Jennings undermines North Carolina's death penalty scheme, which
depends upon the discretion of juries to find and weigh aggravating and
mitigating circumstances to determine whether death is an appropriate sentence. The supreme court itself has recognized in previous cases that whenever doubt exists about either the applicability of a particular aggravating
circumstance or about whether the evidence supports more than one aggravating circumstance, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant,
and the circumstance should not be submitted. 163 Because the jury is specifically instructed that its weighing function is not to be based upon a simple mathematical equation, 1" it is free to consider the circumstances in
their contexts. Under present constitutional standards, the imposition of the
by
death penalty must be based on guided, yet discretionary consideration
1 65
the sentencer of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Trial courts may infer from Jennings that they need not be scrupulously careful in presenting aggravating circumstances to capital juries; yet
this appears contrary to both legislative intent and United States Supreme
Court dictates.1 66 It does not, however, appear contrary to current popular
167
sentiment demanding harsh and swift punishment for violent offenders.
North Carolina's elected supreme court justices may be responding more to
162. In previous cases, the supreme court has recognized its inability to substitute its own
judgment for the weighing function of the jury. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 426,
384 S.E.2d 437, 456-57 (1981) (remanding for new sentencing after finding that "it is reasonably
possible that the submission of the erroneous issue may have tipped the balance in favor of the
death sentence"), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 932 (1982); State v. Cherry, 298 N.C. 86, 114, 257 S.E.2d
551, 568 (1979) (remanding for new sentencing after the jury considered one erroneous aggravating circumstance out of three total, and only limited mitigating circumstances), cert. denied, 446
U.S. 941 (1980); State v. Goodman, 298 N.C. 1, 29-30, 257 S.E.2d 569, 587-88 (1979) (remanding for new sentencing even though "the jury answered the issues submitted on five aggravating
circumstances against defendant and only one issue on mitigating circumstances in his favor").
163. See supra text accompanying note 107.
164. N.C. PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONs-CRIM. § 150.10, at 44 (1993); see also supra notes
66-69 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 59-67 and accompanying text. Some commentators debate whether the
death penalty can ever be constitutional. In February, 1994 Justice Blackmun announced his
belief that "the death penalty experiment has failed." Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127 (1994)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 998 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1993). For earlier arguments
that the Constitution does not permit any imposition of capital punishment, see the concurring
opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257-306, 314-71
(1972). For an argument against the death penalty as it is presently applied in the United States,
see Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of CapitalPunishment,99 HARV. L. RPv. 1670,
1675 (1986) ("ITrhe real American system of capital punishment clearly fails when measured
against the most common justifications for the infliction of punishment, deterrence, and
retribution.").
166. See supra notes 59-74 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
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public sentiment than to reasoned judicial principles; Jennings may lead
one to ask whether an elected judiciary may be counted on to protect the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants in the face of political winds
calling for constriction of those rights.16 8
The North Carolina Supreme Court has arguably misapplied the standard for convicted defendants challenging jury instructions on appeal. The
majority ostensibly would overturn a sentence if it found a reasonable possibility that the jury applied an instruction unconstitutionally, but the majority failed to find such a reasonable possibility despite having recognized
two errors. The dissent's view-that cumulative errors warranted a new
sentencing proceeding-would have more appropriately fulfilled the
court's duty to ensure a procedurally fair application of capital punishment.
SARA WYCHE HIGGINS

168. It must be noted that appointed judges also respond to some degree to the political climate in which they live and judge. Moreover, the appointed federal judiciary has also become
less responsive to the claims of death-sentenced petitions, cf., e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct.
853 (1993) (denying habeas corpus relief to death row inmate), so it is not clear to what degree the
decisions of North Carolina's state judges are influenced by their elected status.

Inmate Access to Prison Computers for Legal Work and the
Right of Access to the Courts: Bryant v. Muth
Over the past thirty years, lawsuits concerning the rights of prisoners
have become a substantial portion of the civil rights litigation in this country.' In the past, courts were extremely reluctant to acknowledge that prisoners had any rights at all.2 In part, this reluctance was an emanation of the
"hands off" doctrine, which establishes that the courts will not interfere in
the administration of prisons and will give great latitude and deference to
prison officials.' This doctrine weakened over time as courts began recognizing that prisoners retain many of their constitutional rights notwithstanding their incarceration. 4
Although largely dormant, the "hands off" doctrine recently emerged
in the case of Bryant v. Muth.5 In Bryant, the Fourth Circuit addressed the
question of whether prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity for
confiscating computer disks from a prisoner who was using the disks to
store legal materials pertinent to his ongoing legal actions. 6 Distinguishing
two of its prior cases which held that officials could be liable for seizing
and destroying an inmate's legal materials, 7 the court ruled that the prisoner
had no right to the information on the disks because the disks were contraband under federal regulations and because the prisoner had created the
legal materials through unauthorized access to prison computers."
This Note will outline the facts of Bryant and present the reasoning of
the court.' Next, it will discuss background law helpful to understanding
the opinion 10 and will then analyze and criticize the court's reasoning."
Finally, this Note will comment on the impact of Bryant and make policy
arguments for reconsideration of the government's current unpublished poll. During fiscal year 1991, the number of prisoner-filed civil rights complaints in federal
district courts rose to 26,045, constituting 12% of all filings. Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking
PrisonerCivil Rights Cases and the Provision of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 419 & nn.1-2
(1993) (citing ANNUAL REPORT OF TH DIREcTOR OF THE ADIUNISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURT 1991, at 190 tbl. C-2A. In contrast, 19,340 other civil rights cases were filed
during the same fiscal year. Id. at 419 n.2; see also id. at 419-20 & nn.3-7 (discussing other
statistics relating to prisoner civil rights filings).
2. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
5. 994 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 559 (1993).
6. Id. at 1086.
7. Carter v. Hutto, 781 F.2d 1028 (4th Cir. 1986); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405
(4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
8. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1087.
9. See infra notes 13-63 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 64-148 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 149-226 and accompanying text.
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icy of severely restricting inmate microcomputer access for preparing legal
materials.

12

On November 13, 1987, prison officials at the Federal Correctional
Institute (FCI) in Butner, North Carolina, confiscated three computer floppy
disks belonging to Victor George Bryant. 3 The disks contained legal
materials necessary to his efforts to prevent his extradition to England and
"to pursue other post-conviction remedies." 14 Bryant had prepared the
materials on the disks by using computers in the prison's Education Department.1 5 The officials seized the disks because they suspected that Bryant
had taken them from the prison's Education Department and because they
believed that Bryant's use of the computers to create his legal materials was
unauthorized. 6 Shortly after seizing the disks, officials placed Bryant in
disciplinary segregation pending a hearing to be held a few days later. 7 At
the hearing, inmate Richard Lopez testified that he received the disks from
an instructor at the prison and in turn gave them to Bryant as a gift. 8 Upon
being satisfied that the disks were not stolen government property, officials
released Bryant from disciplinary segregation.' 9 Bryant maintained
throughout the inquiry that he believed that using computers in the Education Department for legal work was permitted during evening hours. 20
12. See infra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.

13. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1083.
14. Id. at 1084. Most of the material on the disks consisted of legal documents and "ram-

bling reconstructions... of circumstances surrounding his arrest and prosecution." Petitioner's
Petition for Certiorari at 5, 27, Bryant v. Muth, 114 S. Ct. 559 (1993) (No. 93-5842) (denying
certiorari). The disks also contained Bryant's petition for federal habeas corpus. Id.
Although the facts are sketchy, it appears that one of the disks was a program or boot disk
necessary in order to use the computers on which he was preparing his legal work, and the other
two disks were data disks on which Bryant had stored his legal material. Bryant,994 F.2d at 1084
n.6.
15. Id. at 1083; Petition for Certiorari at 5 n.5, Bryant (No. 93-5842).
16. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1083.
17. Petition for Certiorari at 4, Bryant (No. 93-5842).
18. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1084; Petition for Certiorari at 4, Bryant (No. 93-5842). The instructor had brought the disks from her home. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1084.
19. Petition for Certiorari at 4-5, Bryant (No. 93-5842).
20. Id. at 5. Bryant and other inmates believed that the prison enforced no specific policy in
the computer room during evening hours. Id. at 5 n.5. Indeed, during the evening, Bryant and
other prisoners "'played computer games, wrote personal letters, wrote legal work and generally
tried to accustom themselves with this new technology."' Appellant's Opening Brief at 3, Bryant
v. Muth, 994 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir.) (No. 91-6672), cert. denied, 114 S.CL 559 (1993). Prison
officials apparently did not post any rules regarding the use of computers outside the computer lab
until after the seizure of Bryant's disks in November, 1987. Id. at 29 n.19. Furthermore, three
prison inmates attested in affidavits that they had never heard of nor seen posted BOP Policy
Statement 1237.6, discussed infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text, the unpublished policy
statement relied upon by the court and by Muth and Robbins for the position that Bryant's access
to the computers in the Education Department was unauthorized. Id.; see Bryant, 994 F.2d at
1083 n.2, 1087.
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On November 14, 1987, one day after the disks were seized, the officials who had seized the disks turned them over to William Muth, the

prison's Supervisor of Education.21 Knowing that the disks contained Bryant's legal materials, Muth then delivered the disks to Gregg Robbins, a
computer instructor at FCI Butner, and ordered him to reformat the disks. 2
However, Robbins objected to such a "harsh" penalty for unauthorized
computer access, and suggested that they find a way of enforcing the penalties for unauthorized computer access while preserving Bryant's legal
materials.2 3 As a result, the disks were never reformatted.2 4
Approximately two weeks after the seizure of the disks, Bryant requested that the prison provide him with a hard copy of the contents of the
disks, explaining the critical nature of the material on the disks to his ongoing court actions.2 5 Robbins and Muth, believing that Bryant had no right
to a complete printout of the materials, decided that they would provide
Bryant with an edited version of the disks' contents that would contain what
they regarded as "'raw factual data"' and not material" 'which was elaborated into a prose document."' 2 6 In total, the printout only amounted to
approximately one-third of the disks' contents.2
Upon complaining to Muth and being rebuffed,2 8 on March 16, 1988,
Bryant filed a pro se ex parte motion with the United States District Court
As far as the particular systems Bryant used to prepare his materials, the facts indicate only
that they were 'TRS-80 computers located at the back of the prison computer classrooms." Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1085. The author of this Note strongly suspects that the computer system Bryant
used was a TRS-80 Model III or Model 4, hardly a dangerous piece of technology even in 1987.
The facts indicate that the computers involved were not equipped with modems, Petition for Certiorari at 5, Bryant (No. 93-5842), and the computers were not otherwise networked, either with
each other or with computer systems outside the classroom. See id.
21. Petition for Certiorari at 6, Bryant (No. 93-5842).
22. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1084; Petition for Certiorari at 6, Bryant (No. 93-5842).
23. Petition for Certiorari at 6, Bryant (No. 93-5842). See Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1084.
24. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1084.
25. Id.; see supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
26. Petition for Certiorari at 6-7, Bryant (No. 93-5842); Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1084-85. The
court's opinion indicates that Robbins and Muth maintained that Bryant was not entitled to any of
the disks' contents. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1084. In contrast, the petition for certiorari indicates that
Robbins and Muth believed that Bryant was at least entitled to some portion of the disks' contents.
Petition for Certiorari at 6, Bryant (No. 93-5842). Because the petition for certiorari quotes from
the joint appendix in support of that point, and given that Robbins and Muth provided Bryant with
a portion of his legal materials, it stands to reason that Robbins and Muth believed that they had
some obligation to provide Bryant with at least a portion of his legal materials.
27. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1085.
28. Muth told Bryant that no more material would be forthcoming and that his decision was
final. Appendix to Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari at 21a, Bryant v. Muth, 114 S. Ct. 559
(1993) (No. 93-5842) (denying certiorari). Bryant also stated in his ex parte motion for injunctive
relief that Muth had told him at one point that "[w]e should not have strung you along the way we
did, [sic] actually we have done you a diservice [sic]. WE [sic] should have told you that the
discs had been reformatted." Id.
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for the Eastern District of North Carolina §eeking an injunction and a temporary restraining order (TRO) barring Muth and Robbins from reformatting the disks or otherwise destroying or corrupting the stored legal
materials.2 9 The court granted and entered the TRO on March 25, 1988.30
On April 1, 1988, David Farmer, FCI Butner's Executive Assistant, supplied Bryant with what he believed to be a complete printout of all the
materials on the disks. 3 Muth and Robbins then successfully moved for
summary judgment on the ground that Bryant now had a complete printout
of his legal materials.3 2 Approximately one month later, Bryant filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming that he had not received a complete
printout of his legal materials.33 The District Court found that prison officials mistakenly had believed that the two data disks were copies of each
other and, because of this error, had printed only the contents of one of the
data disks.3 4 Shortly thereafter, the court struck its previous summary judgment order and reinstated Bryant's complaint.35 The court eventually ordered that the disks be turned over for a commercial printout and that a
copy of the printout be filed with the court.36 Bryant finally received a full
and complete printout of the disks' contents on July 19, 1989, more than
twenty months after the original seizure. 37
After Muth and Robbins once again moved for summary judgment,
Bryant moved to amend his complaint to state claims for compensatory and
punitive damages against Muth and Robbins for depriving him of his legal
materials "in violation of his clearly established constitutional right" of access to the courts.38 Muth and Robbins responded by moving for summary
judgment on the amended complaint on the grounds that they were entitled
to qualified immunity.39 Affirming and adopting the report of the magistrate judge, Judge James C. Fox ruled that although Bryant may not have
been entitled to the disks themselves as a matter of constitutional law, he
was entitled to the legal materials on the disks because of his clearly established constitutional right of access to the courts.4 0 Muth and Robbins im29. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1085.

30. Id. The court also construed Bryant's motion as a complaint against Robbins and Muth
individually because it had been prepared on a form used by prisoners filing civil rights complaints. Id.
31. Appellant's Opening Brief at 6, Bryant (No. 91-6672).
32. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1085.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Petition for Certiorari at 7, Bryant (No. 93-5842).
37. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1085.
38. Id. at 1085.
39. Id. at 1086; see infra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
40. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1086. The magistrate judge, assuming the allegations of Bryant's
complaint to be true, found that Bryant had sufficiently stated a claim for violation of his constitu-
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mediately appealed Judge Fox's order denying their qualified immunity
41
defense to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
In an opinion written by Senior Circuit Judge Chapman, the Fourth

Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity for Muth

and Robbins.42 First determining that Bryant's three disks were contraband
under Bureau of Prisons regulations,4 3 the court held that as such they were

"subject to seizure and confiscation by prison officials." 44

After reviewing the defense of qualified immunity,4 5 the court next
examined the constitutional right of access to the courts. 4 6 Noting the "well
settled" principle that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the
47
courts,
the court briefly discussed Carterv. Hutto48 and Oxendine v. Wil49
liams, two Fourth Circuit cases in which the court found that confiscation
of a prisoner's "handwritten legal materials"50 and denial of writing supplies5 1 could violate the right of access to the courts. 52 The district court
relied on Carterand Hutto in finding that Bryant's right to his legal materitional right of access to the courts. Appendix to Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari at 14a, Bryant
(No. 93-5842). Furthermore, the magistrate judge found that Bryant would be entitled to damages
for deprivation of his constitutional right provided that the averments in his complaint were true.
Id.
41. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1086. Denial of qualified immunity by a district court is an immediately "appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291." Mitchell v. Forsyth,
472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988)).
42. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1088.
43. Id. at 1084. The regulations regarding property of inmates in federal prisons are found at
Part 553, Subpart B of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) regulations, 28 C.F.R. §§ 553.10-15 (1993)
(originally promulgated in 1983). The court quoted two regulations from this subpart in support
of its conclusion that the disks were contraband. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1084 nn.3-4. First, the court
quoted from § 553.10, which states that BOP policy is to permit inmates to retain only property
that is authorized to be possessed when the inmate is admitted, that is issued to the inmate during
incarceration, that the inmate purchases from the commissary, or that the prison staff permits to be
mailed or otherwise delivered to the inmate. 28 C.F.R. § 553.10 (1993); Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1084
n.3. The court also quoted the definition of contraband, which designates as contraband property
an inmate has in his possession that does not fit into one of the above-mentioned categories. See
28 C.F.R. § 553.12(a) (1993); Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1084 n.4. Through the use of a constructive
dilemma, the court reasoned that because the disks were either stolen government property or a
gift of property from another inmate, under 28 C.F.R. § 553.13(b)(2)(ii), Bryant could not make a
claim of ownership to the disks. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1084. As such, they were contraband within
the meaning of § 553.12, and thus subject to confiscation. Id.
44. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1084.
45. Id. at 1086. See infra notes 141-48 and accompanying text for a more thorough discussion of qualified immunity.
46. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1086-87.
47. Id.
48. 781 F.2d 1028 (4th Cir. 1986).
49. 509 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
50. Carter,781 F.2d at 1032.
51. Oxendine, 509 F.2d at 1407.
52. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1087.
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als was clearly established. 3 The Fourth Circuit distinguished Carter and
Oxendine on the ground that the inmates in those cases used authorized
means to create their legal materials:
Unlike the inmates in Carterand Oxendine, Bryant chose not to
create his legal materials by writing or typing, or getting written
authorization to use a prison computer. Instead, he violated established prison regulations by creating his materials from the
knowingly unauthorized use of prison computers. Instead of paper, Bryant recorded his legal materials on contraband computer
disks....
... Therefore, unlike the legal materials in Carterand Oxendine,
under [Bureau of Prisons] regulations, Bryant's legal materials
composed and stored on disks were contraband. 4
After concluding that Bryant had no constitutional right to his legal
materials, the court considered the defendants' claim of qualified immunity.55 Chiding the district court for its failure to distinguish Carter and
Oxendine from the case at bar,5 6 the court went on to state that, "[hlad
Muth and Robbins confiscated Bryant's legal materials, legally prepared
and retained, there is no question that they would not be entitled to qualified immunity."5 7 However, because Bryant violated "established prison
rules and regulations" regarding the use of computers by inmates, the court
found that he had no constitutional right to his legal materials.5 8 Accordingly, because a nonexistent constitutional right is the antithesis of a
"clearly established statutory or constitutional right... which a reasonable
person would have known," the court concluded that Muth and Robbins
were entitled to qualified immunity.5 9 Directly addressing the seizure and
withholding of the disks, the court found that Muth and Robbins had followed BOP procedures in their treatment of the disks.60 Furthermore, the
court considered the delay in delivering a printout to Bryant to be a consequence of the unorthodox manner in which he had stored his material on the
disks.6 1 The court also stated that because Bryant used unauthorized means
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1088 (quoting Harlow v. Fizgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). The court also
stated that under Harlow, it should not hold Muth and Robbins to the standard of "constitutional
lawyers." Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1088.
60. Id.
61. Id at 1087. The court had previously stated that Bryant formatted his disks for use on the
TRS-80 computers in the rear of the computer lab and not for use with IBM-compatible machines.
Id. at 1085. Furthermore, Bryant apparently created directories on the disks that led Muth and
Robbins to believe the data on the two data disks was identical. Id. Thus, when Muth and Rob-
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to prepare his legal materials, to hold that he had a constitutional right to the

legal materials "would allow him to benefit from the fruits of his unauthorized activity."' The court 'concluded by arguing that prison regulations
63
regarding use of computers by inmates should be strictly enforced.

In order to understand the court's holding in Bryant, it is necessary to
consider it in the context of the growth of prisoners' rights over the past
century. Prisoners historically have had few, if any, legally enforceable
rights, and they often have found the courthouse doors closed when they
have sought the courts' protection.' 4 Judicial reluctance to hear the complaints of prisoners or otherwise interfere in the administration of prisons
has appropriately been dubbed the "hands off" doctrine. 6 - Prior to the
1960s, the federal courts generally refused to entertain complaints by pris-

oners that prison conditions violated the Constitution. 66 One of the concerns underlying this doctrine was the principle of separation of powers;
judges felt it was not within the province of the judiciary to tell the execu-

tive and legislative branches how to run the nation's prisons.67 Another key
concern was federalism and the judicial distaste for invading the province
of the states. 68 Courts also believed that they lacked the expertise to become involved in this area and feared an avalanche of prisoner complaints
if they attempted to dispense relief to prisoners.69
bins first attempted to make a hard copy of the disks' contents, they mistakenly printed out only
the contents of one disk. Id. The court also noted that because of the sheer volume of material
Bryant had stored on the disks, it took three hours of continuous printing in order to print out all of
the material. Id. Conspicuously absent from the court's opinion is any mention of the commercial
printout the district court ordered at the time Bryant had his original complaint reinstated. See id;
see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
62. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1087.
63. Id. at 1088. See infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
64. E.g., Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871) ("[A prisoner] is for
the time being a slave, in a condition of penal servitude to the State, and subject to such laws and
regulations as the State may choose to prescribe."). But see Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105,
108 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (noting that the view expressed in Ruffin had long since been rejected), aff'd
per curiam sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
65. James M. Hill, Comment, An Overview of Prisoners' Rights: Part 1,Access to the
Courts Under Section 1983, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J 957, 959 (1983). The commentators seem to
agree that the term was first coined by FRIcH, Civis Ricrrs oF FEDERAL PRISON INMATES 31
(1961), cited in Hill, supra, at 959 n.14; 1 MICHAEL MUSHLIN, RioHTS OF PRIsomRs, § 1.02, at 7

n.22 (2d ed. 1993).
66. Hill, supra note 65, at 959; 1 MUSHLiN, supra note 65, § 1.02, at 7. One court went so
far as to say that "it is not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of
prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from imprisonment those who are illegally confined." Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951),
quoted in I MusHLiN, supra note 65, § 1.02, at 7.
67. 1 MUSHLIN, supra note 65, § 1.01, at 7.
68. Id. § 1.02, at 7-8.
69. Id. § 1.02, at 8.
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Beginning in the 1960s, lower courts began to entertain the complaints
of prisoners about conditions in the nation's prisons.70 Among other factors,7 1 the incorporation of most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed
many more prisoners to allege violations of federal rights.72 Furthermore,
in 1961, the Supreme Court declared in Monroe v. Pape73 that the "under
color of law" requirement of 42 U.S.C. section 1983 extended not only to
actions taken by state officials pursuant to state law, but also to misconduct
by state officials. 74 Ten years later, the Supreme Court held in Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau ofNarcotics7 5 that officials acting under the color of federal law could be sued directly under the Constitution for deprivations of federal rights.76 Monroe and Bivens both served to
open the courthouse doors to prisoners alleging violations of their federal
rights.
Over time, as the courts took a more active role in supervising the
nation's prisons, they began to recognize that prisoners, despite their status,
retained many of their constitutional rights. As the Supreme Court stated
ten years ago in Hudson v. Palmer:7 7 "We have repeatedly held that prisons are not beyond the reach of the Constitution. No 'iron curtain' separates one from the other ... Indeed, we have insisted that prisoners be
accorded those rights not fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of incarceration."7 Occasionally,
however, states have argued that the courts should stay out of the business
of prison administration, but these arguments largely have been rejected. 79
70. Id. § 1.03, at 9.
71. See id.§ 1.03, at 9-11.
72. Id. § 1.03, at 11.
73. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
74. See id. at 183-87.
75. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
76. Id. at 389. At issue in Bivens was whether narcotics agents who, without search or arrest
warrants, searched Bivens's apartment, arrested him, and required him to submit to a strip search,
could be held liable for violating his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Id. The Court held that the complaint stated a cause of action and that Bivens was
entitled to damages for the injuries he suffered. Id. at 390-97.
77. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
78. Id. at 523.
79. For example, in Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 832 (1977), North Carolina argued that
the federal courts should refrain from "'sit[ting] as co-administrators of state prisons"' and that
the district court had "'exceeded its powers [by putting] itself in the place of the [prison] administrators."' (quoting the Brief of the Petitioners). The Supreme Court acknowledged that the
courts should exercise restraint when dealing with cases involving prison administration, but it
held that such restraint could not be used to refuse to entertain the constitutional claims of prisoners. Id.
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One of the key rights the courts recognized that prisoners retained was
the right of access to the courts. 80 The Supreme Court first determined that
prisoners retained this right in Ex parte Hull in the limited context of applications for writs of habeas corpus.8 1 In Hull, the Court addressed the legality of a Michigan prison regulation requiring that all legal documents of
prisoners be screened through the legal investigator of the state parole board
prior to filing.8 2 Hull had attempted to file a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, only to have the legal investigator return it with comments that it
was technically deficient in several respects. 8 3 Striking down the regulation, the Court held that states and their officials may not obstruct prisoners
from exercising their right to seek a writ of habeas corpus. 84 The Court
added that the federal courts alone have the power to decide whether a
habeas corpus petition is defective. 85
After Hull, the Court once again confronted the right of prisoners to
seek writs of habeas corpus in Johnson v. Avery."6 At issue in Johnson was
the validity of a Tennessee prison regulation barring prisoners known as
"writ writers" from helping other prisoners prepare petitions for writs of
habeas corpus. 87 The Court observed that Tennessee's prison system, like
the prison systems of most other states, had a high percentage of illiterate or
functionally illiterate prisoners.88 Because there is no general right to
court-appointed counsel while pursuing post-conviction relief, and since in
the federal system counsel ordinarily is not appointed until after an initial
judicial evaluation, a prisoner is often left to his own devices when first
seeking post-conviction relief.89 For indigent and illiterate prisoners, the
only source of help may be other prisoners knowledgeable in the process of
drafting habeas corpus petitions.90 Without the assistance of other prisoners, indigent and illiterate prisoners effectively would be denied access to
the courts to present their petitions. 91 The Court held that so long as a state
fails to provide "some reasonable alternative" to the assistance of "writ
writers," states may not categorically prohibit prisoners from assisting other
prisoners, although reasonable time, place, and manner regulations are per80. See id.
81. 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
82. Id. at 547.
83. Id. at 547-48 n.1. Hull eventually had his father smuggle a subsequent petition out of the
prison and file it with the Supreme Court. Id. at 548.
84. Id. at 549.
85. Id.
86. 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
87. Id. at 484, 488.
88. Id. at 487.
89. Id. at 487-88.
90. Id. at 488.
91. Id.
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missible.92 On its face, Johnson applied only to writs of habeas corpus.
However, in Wolff v. McDonnell,9 3 the Court applied the holding of Johnson to section 1983 suits brought by prisoners.9 4
The Court in Johnson suggested that the states could avoid permitting
"writ writers" from assisting other prisoners if it provided "reasonable alternatives" such as assistance by public defenders and advanced law students.95 However, it was still unclear what else might satisfy the
"reasonable alternatives" requirement, and moreover, whether prisoners had
a constitutional right to one or more of those alternatives.
The Court began to tackle this issue in Younger v. Gilmore, decided in
1971. 96 In Gilmore, the Court heard an appeal from a three judge district
court decision that the restricted law libraries California permitted its prisoners to use violated their right of access to the courts. 9 7 California Department of Corrections Regulation 330.041 permitted law libraries in prisons
to contain only certain enumerated "basic codes and references." 98 The district court was particularly dismayed by the fact that the regulations permitted virtually no federal materials and very few California materials.9 9 The
court emphasized the lack of federal materials would make it extremely
difficult for prisoners to compose and file petitions for writs of habeas
corpus.' 0 0 The district court opined that California's concern with "economy and standardization" was insufficient to override the rights of the prisoners to adequate law libraries. 1° 1 In a terse two paragraph per curiam
opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court, citing only Johnson
for support. 10 2 As one commentator observed, this "cryptic cite to Johnson" caused much confusion in the circuits over whether Johnson required
that states provide adequate law libraries to their prisoners as part of the
constitutional right of access to the courts.' 0 3
The Court revisited the issue of whether prisoners have the right to a
law library in the landmark case of Bounds v. Smith.1" Bounds arose out of
92. Id. at 490.
93. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
94. Id. at 577-580.
95. Johnson, 393 U.S. at 489-90.
96. 404 U.S. 15 (1971) (per curiam).
97. Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 110-11 (N.D. Cal. 1970), aff'dper curiam sub nom.
Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971).
98. Id. at 107. The authorized materials are listed id. at 107 n.2. The regulation provided
that materials in prison law libraries that were not authorized in the regulation were to be "removed and destroyed." Id.
99. Id. at 110.
100. Id.
101. See id. at 111.
102. Gilmore, 404 U.S. at 15.
103. Hill, supra note 65, at 965 & n.53 (collecting cases).
104. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
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a section 1983 suit filed by several prisoners incarcerated in North Carolina
who alleged various constitutional violations.105 Among the alleged violations was the state's failure to supply the inmates with "legal research facilities."' 0 6 Finding the state's only prison library "severely inadequate" for
legal research, the district court granted the inmates' motion for summary
judgment on the claim of lack of access to law libraries, citing Gilmore as
support.10 7 Pursuant to the district court's decision, the state proposed establishing several regional prison law libraries, to which inmates could have
access by appointment. 08 Ruling against the inmates' objections, the district court found the proposed library arrangements adequate and rejected
the inmates' request for a law library at every prison.10 9 The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 1 0
In an opinion written by Justice Marshall, the Court began by asserting
that "[lt is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts." ' Rejecting the state's Johnson-based
claim that it only was obligated to permit inmates to seek the assistance of
"writ writers," the Court stated that it had not attempted in Johnson to
outline the full scope of the right of access to the courts; nor did the Court
believe that Johnson prevented it from determining whether "additional
measures" might be necessary to assure inmates of meaningful access to the
courts. 1 2 The Court then stated that it has long required the states to assume "affirmative obligations" to ensure the right of prisoners to "meaning1 3
ful access to the courts":
It is indisputable that indigent inmates must be provided at state
expense with paper and pen to draft legal documents, with notarial services to authenticate them, and with stamps to mail them.
States must forgo collection of docket fees otherwise payable to
the treasury and expend funds for transcripts.... This is not to
105. Id. at 818.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 819. The state proposed to include basic North Carolina materials (the North Carolina General Statutes, the North Carolina Reports and Court of Appeals Reports, Strong's North
Carolina Index, and the North Carolina Rules of Court); United States Code titles pertinent to
federal criminal law, civil rights law, and court procedure; the Supreme Court Reporter, the Federal Reporter, Second Series, and the Federal Supplement dating from 1960; and several treatises
and hornbooks germane to habeas corpus and civil rights actions. Id. at 819 n.4. The Court noted
that the proposed collections met the minimum standards recommended for prison law libraries
with the notable omission of Shepard's citations, certain other treatises, and the local rules of
court. Id.
109. Id. at 820.
110. Id. at 821.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 823-24.
113. Id. at 824.
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say that economic factors may not be considered, for example, in
choosing the methods used to provide meaningful access. But the

cost of11 protecting
a constitutional right cannot justify its total
4
denial.

The Court reiterated that civil rights actions and habeas corpus petitions

hold a place of "'fundamental importance... in our constitutional scheme'
because they directly protect our most valued rights.""1 5 The Court therefore held that as part of the constitutional right of access to the courts,
prison officials must assist inmates in preparing and filing "meaningful
legal papers" by either establishing "adequate law libraries" or permitting
prisoners to obtain "adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.""' 6
Although there is no express constitutional basis for the right of access
to the courts, a point Justice Rehnquist emphasized in his dissent in
Bounds,'1 7 the courts have stated that the right emanates from several provisions of the Constitution, in particular, the First Amendment," 8 the Privileges and Immunities Clauses of Article IV Section 2 and Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment,119 and the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 120 Furthermore, several courts have indicated
that an added basis for the right of access is the implicit grant of other
rights-were prisoners not permitted to seek redress of those rights in the
courts, those rights would be "meaningless."'' In this vein, the right of
access to the courts is merely incident to the more substantive rights the
courts have recognized that prisoners possess.
114. Id. at 824-25.
115. Id. at 827 (quoting Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969); Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974)).
116. Bounds, 430 U.S. at 828. The Court emphasized that establishing prison law libraries
was only one way states could satisfy their constitutional obligations, noting that approximately
one-half of the states and the District of Columbia had established programs that provided prisoners with legal assistance. Id. at 830-31.
117. See id. at 837 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("There is nothing in the United States Constitution which requires that a convict serving a term of imprisonment in a state penal institution
pursuant to a final judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction have a 'right of access' to the
federal courts in order to attack his sentence.").
118. California Motor Transp. Co v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
119. In Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., the Supreme Court wrote, "[tlhe right to sue and
defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right conservative
of all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and
most essential privileges of citizenship .. " 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
120. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,579 (1974); see Simmons v. Dickhaut, 804 F.2d 182,
183 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 971-72 (5th Cir. 1983).
Although it is often invoked by prison inmates, the right of access to the courts protects
persons generally and not just prisoners. See California Motor Transp., 404 U.S. at 509-16;
Chambers, 207 U.S. at 146-51.
121. E.g., Laaman v. Perrin, 435 F. Supp. 319, 327-28 (D.N.H. 1977); Hooks v. Wainright,
352 F. Supp. 163, 167-68 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
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In keeping with the Supreme Court's decision in Bounds, the lower
courts have declared that the right of access to the courts is a "fundamental"
constitutional right. 2 However, Bounds made clear that the right requires
that states ensure only "meaningful" and "adequate" access to the courts.123
In fact, Bounds only required the states to provide an adequate law library
or adequate legal assistance, but not both. 2 4 If a state chooses to provide
law libraries, those libraries need only be adequate for legal research; they
need not contain the full complement of legal materials normally found in

law libraries of law schools.'" 5 Additionally, states need not allow prisoners to have unlimited access to prison law libraries; reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions on law library usage are permissible.' 26 Regarding
legal assistance, prisoners have no right to assistance by an attorney but
may be assisted by paralegals,' 2 7 law students, 128 and
even "jailhouse law129
yers" if more adequate assistance is not available.
The courts have construed the right of access to the courts to include
the right to basic supplies needed to prepare personal legal materials. 3 As
the Supreme Court stated in Bounds, states must supply indigent prisoners

with basic writing materials so that they may enjoy their right of access to
the courts.' 31 However, the courts have, in keeping with the holding in
122. E.g., Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483, 485 (1969)); Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Gilmore
v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105, 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (commenting that "[rieasonable access to the
courts is a constitutional imperative .. "), aff'd per curiain sub nom. Younger v. Gilmore, 404
U.S. 15 (1971).
123. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 823, 828 (1977).
124. Id. at 828, 830; see also Hill, supra note 65, at 971 n.90 (citing cases reiterating that
Bounds does not require that states provide both law libraries and legal assistance).
125. See, e.g., Blake v. Berman, 877 F.2d 145, 147-48 (Ist Cir. 1989) (holding that a Massachusetts prisoner transferred to the federal penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, was not denied
his right of access to the court by lack of Massachusetts legal materials because of the availability
of legal assistance through a program at the Kansas School of Law); Sahagian v. Dickey, 827 F.2d
90, 98-99 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that a federal prisoner was not denied his right of access to the
courts by the law library's lack of Wisconsin legal materials, especially when he had the assistance and counsel of a public defender while pursuing a pro se petition for discretionary review to
the Wisconsin Supreme Court); Brown v. Sielaff, 363 F. Supp. 703, 705 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (holding
that right of access to courts not denied by lack of the most current legal materials).
126. For example, in Flittie v. Solem, 827 F.2d 276, 280 (8th Cir. 1987), the Eighth Circuit
held that reasonable regulations on access to prison law libraries are permissible. The plaintiff in
that case was permitted to use the library three days a week, which the court believed was not an
unreasonable restriction, especially given the fact that the plaintiff had filed six other lawsuits
prior to the present case. Id.
127. See Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1006 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1415
(1993); Morrow v. Harwell, 768 F.2d 619, 624 (5th Cir. 1985).
128. See Blake, 877 F.2d at 147-48.
129. See Rudolph v. Locke, 594 F.2d 1076, 1078 (5th Cir. 1979).
130. See generally 2 MusiuN, supra note 65, § 11.08, at 60-65 (discussing prisoners' right to
writing supplies).
131. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824 (1977).
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Bounds that access to the courts only be "meaningful" and "adequate," permitted prison officials to put reasonable restrictions on this right. Indigent
prisoners have no right to unlimited supplies of paper,132 nor do they have
the right to unlimited free postage 133 or photocopying. 134 Furthermore,

prisoners have no constitutional right to use a typewriter to prepare legal

documents. 135 The main justification given for this rule is that inmates are
136
not prejudiced by filing handwritten documents.

Confiscation or other deprivation of legal materials by prison officials
has been held to state a claim under section 1983.137 However, in order to

state successfully a claim for relief, a prisoner must allege not only that he
was deprived of his legal materials, but additionally that the deprivation
interfered with his right of access to the courts; bare allegations of confiscation are insufficient. 138 Moreover, deprivation of legal materials for short
132. See Morgan v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Com'rs, 593 F. Supp. 621,624 (D. Nev. 1984)
(holding that the state was required to supply a reasonable amount of paper and envelopes to
indigent prisoners for legal work, but temporary deprivations for lack of supplies might not prejudice prisoner's rights); see also Conklin v. Wainwright, 424 F.2d 516, 517 (5th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam) (holding that prison did not obstruct a prisoner's right of access to the courts by supplying
him with only ten sheets of bond paper per day).
133. E.g., Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352,359 (10th Cir. 1978) (citing Bach v. Coughlin, 508
F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1974)).
134. E.g., Harrell v. Keohane, 621 F.2d 1059, 1061 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that lack of free
photocopying privileges did not deny inmate access to the U.S. Supreme Court, especially given
the availability of "suitable alternatives" to photocopying).
135. E.g., American Inmate Paralegal Assoc. v. Cline, 859 F.2d 59, 61 (8th Cir.), cert. denied
sub nom. Tyler v. Cline, 488 U.S. 996 (1988); Twyman, 584 F.2d at 358; Wolfish v. Levi, 573
F.2d 118, 132 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub non. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979); Eisenhardt v. Britton, 478 F.2d 855, 855-56 (5th Cir. 1973); Stubblefield v. Henderson,
475 F.2d 26, 27 (5th Cir. 1973); Sprouse v. Moore, 476 F.2d 995, 995-96 (5th Cir. 1973); Williams v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 433 F.2d 958, 959 (5th Cir. 1970); see also
Durham v. Blackwell, 409 F.2d 838, 839 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that withdrawal of free typing
by library staff did not deprive inmate of his right of access to the courts).
136. Twyman, 584 F.2d at 358 (citing Tarlton v. Henderson, 467 F.2d 200 (5th Cir. 1972)).
Despite the refusal of courts to find that inmates have a constitutional right to typewriters, federal
prisoners are permitted by regulation to use typewriters to prepare legal documents. 28 C.F.R.
§ 543.15(h) (1993).
137. Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344,346 (2d Cir. 1987); Simmons v. Dickhaut, 804 F.2d 182,
183-84 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Carter v. Hutto, 781 F.2d 1028, 1031-32 (4th Cir. 1986);
Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 312 (5th Cir. 1986); Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968
(lth Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Slie v. Bordenkircher, 526 F. Supp. 1264, 1265 (N.D. W. Va.
1981); Tyler v. "Ron" Deputy Sheriff, 574 F.2d 427, 428-29 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam); Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F.2d 105,
107 (7th Cir. 1969); DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682, 685-66 (9th Cir. 1966).
Because the right of access to the courts is based on the federal constitution, federal prisoners
may sue directly under the Constitution when federal officials deprive them of the right. See
Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 391 (1971).
Although the court in Bryant seemed to treat Bryant's case as a § 1983 action, see Bryant, 994
F.2d at 1086, the case was actually a Bivens action, since Muth and Robbins were acting under the
color of federal law, not state law.
138. E.g., Tyler v. "Ron" Deputy Sheriff, 574 F.2d 427, 429 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam).
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periods of time has usually been held not to have prejudiced complaining
prisoners. 139 Courts typically hold that deprivation of legal materials for
long periods of time or wilful destruction of0 legal materials is a violation of
14
the inmate's right of access to the courts.

Although federal and state officials may be sued for violating prisoners' right of access to the courts, officials may be entitled to invoke the
defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is an affirmative defense that an official accused of infringing a constitutional or statutory right

of a person may invoke in defense against a suit for damages proximate to
the deprivation. 14 1 The defense insulates officials performing discretionary

functions from liability for their conduct so long as their conduct did not
violate a "clearly established statutory or constitutional right[ ] of which a
reasonable person would have known."14 2 The plaintiff overcomes the defense if he demonstrates that the right he accuses the official of infringing
was "clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue."'143 The "con-

tours of the right must [have been] sufficiently clear that a reasonable offi44
cial would [have understood] that what he [did] violate[d] that right."'
Furthermore, a "necessary concomitant" to ascertaining whether a right was
"clearly established" is whether the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant
infringed a constitutionally recognized right. 4 5

139. E.g., Vigliotto v. Terry, 873 F.2d 1201, 1202-03 (9th Cir. 1989); Tyler, 574 F.2d at 429.
140. E.g., Carter v. Hutto, 781 F.2d 1028, 1031-32 (4th Cir. 1986); Wright v. Newsome, 795
F.2d 964, 965, 968 (1lth Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F.2d 105, 106-07 (7th
Cir. 1969); Steinberg v. Taylor, 500 F. Supp. 477, 478-80 (D. Conn. 1980).
141. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815 (1982). Qualified immunity may not be invoked
where the relief sought is a declaratory judgment or an injunction; the defense may be invoked
only where the defendant stands to be found liable for monetary damages. See Kit Kinports,
Habeas Corpus, Qualified Immunity, and Crystal Balls: Predicting the Course of Constitutional
Law, 33 ARiz. L. Rv.115, 117 n.11 (1991).
142. Harlow,457 U.S. at 818. Before Harlow, the Court had held that the defense of qualified
immunity had both an "objective" and a "subjective" component. Id. at 815 (citing Wood v.
Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975)). However, the Harlow Court concluded that the subjective
element of the defense has become "incompatible" with the stated object of the defense to prevent
frivolous and unsound cases from proceeding to trial. Id. at 815-17. Thus, the Court declared that
naked allegations of malicious conduct on the part of government officials would not be sufficient
to overcome summary judgment. Id. at 817-18. Rejecting the subjective component of the test for
qualified immunity, the Court then stated that consideration of the merits of the defense should
"turn primarily on objective factors." Id. at 819.
Two years later, in Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 191 (1984), the Court made clear that
Harlow had scuttled the subjective component of the test in favor of a purely objective test.
Through Justice Powell, the Court declared in Davis that Harlow "rejected the inquiry into state of
mind in favor of a wholly objective standard." Id. The Court went on to hold that the only
relevant issue in a qualified immunity determination is whether the official's conduct was objectively reasonable under clearly established law at the time. Id.
143. Davis, 468 U.S. at 187.
144. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
145. Siegert v. Gilley, Il1 S.Ct. 1789, 1793 (1991).
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Qualified immunity is a threshold issue that must be dealt with on
summary judgment and prior to any discovery. 14 6 The scope of qualified
immunity is the same for state officials sued under section 1983 and for
federal officials sued in Bivens actions.14 7 As Professor Kinports states, the
primary rationale behind recognizing the defense is that "subjecting public
officials to liability for every error of judgment might unfairly penalize
them for good faith mistakes, divert their attention from their public duties,
prevent them from independently exercising their discretion in the public
interest, and discourage qualified persons from seeking public office at
a11.,,148

Against this backdrop, the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Bryant appears
problematic for several reasons. The court's decision turned on whether
Muth and Robbins were entitled to qualified immunity, and that determination turned on the primary issue of whether Muth and Robbins infringed
Bryant's constitutional right of access to the courts by not supplying Bryant
with a hard copy of his legal materials for approximately twenty-one
months. 4 9 Clearly, the court's holding that Muth and Robbins did not violate Bryant's constitutional rights is driven by its conclusions that Bryant's
access to the computers on which he prepared his legal materials was not
authorized, 5 ' and that the disks on which he stored his legal materials were
contraband. 15 ' The court's preoccupation with these two points caused it to
ignore the vast body of law regarding the constitutional right of access to
the courts, resulting in the erroneous decision that Bryant had no right to the
legal materials he had stored on the disks.
First, the court's analysis of whether Bryant's computer disks and the
legal materials stored thereon were contraband is flawed. Federal regula52
tions distinguish between "hard contraband" and "nuisance contraband."'
"Hard contraband" are those items that "pose[ ] a serious threat to the security of the institution and which ordinarily [are] not approved for possession by an inmate or for admission into the institution."' 53 The regulation
gives three examples of hard contraband: "weapons, intoxicants, and currency (where prohibited)."' 5 4 "Nuisance contraband" comprises those
items that do not fall into the category of hard contraband but either are not
146. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
147. See id. at 819 n.30; Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194 n.12 (1984). For a recap of
Bivens actions, see supra notes 75-76, 137 and accompanying text.
148. Kinports, supra note 142, at 120-21.
149. See Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1086-87.
150. Id. at 1083.
151. See id. at 1084-87. The court emphasized this point by repeatedly referring to the disks
as "contraband computer disks." See id.
152. 28 C.F.R. § 553.12(b) (1993).
153. Id. § 551.12(b)(1).
154. Id.
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authorized for possession or are possessed in such quantities as to pose a
safety risk to the institution. 155 If prison officials seize an item suspected to
be contraband, the regulations state that the "[s]taff shall dispose of [the
item] in accordance with [set] procedures."' 15 6 Government property is to
be returned to the "institution's issuing authority," unless it is needed as
evidence. 5 7 Personal property must be inventoried, and the inmate must be
presented with a copy of the inventory as soon as possible. 5 8 The regulation provides further as follows:
The inmate shall have seven days following the receipt of the
inventory to provide staff with evidence of ownership of the listed
items. A claim of ownership may not be accepted for an item
made from the unauthorized use of government property. Items
obtained from another inmate (for example, through purchase, or
as a gift) without staff authorization may be considered nuisance
contraband for which a claim is not ordinarily accepted.' 59
If ownership is established but the item is contraband, then the staff is
to mail the item, provided that it is not hard contraband, to a place of the
inmate's choosing and at the inmate's expense, except where the inmate
lacks the funds to pay for the shipment, in which case the warden may
authorize the prison to pay shipping costs.' 60 If ownership is not established, then the staff is to make "reasonable efforts" to determine who owns
the item prior to any decision to destroy the property. 6 ' Hard contraband is
to be forwarded to law enforcement authorities if it is needed for a criminal
prosecution; otherwise, it is to be destroyed. 6 2
In Bryant,the court quoted a portion of the foregoing regulation 163 and
concluded that it was inconsequential whether the disks were stolen government property or a gift from another inmate: they were contraband subject
to seizure by prison officials.'" The explicit conclusion that the disks constituted some form of "contraband" appears correct. However, the court's
implicit conclusion that Muth and Robbins were then entitled under BOP
regulations to reformat the disks does not follow from its explicit conclusion that the disks were contraband. 6 Since the regulations require that
"government property contraband" be treated differently from "personal
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. § 553.12(b)(2).
Id. § 553.13(b) (emphasis added).
Id. § 553.13(b)(1).
Id. § 553.13(b)(2)(i).
Id. § 553.13(b)(2)(ii).
Id. § 553.13(b)(2)(iii).
Id. § 553.13(b)(2)(iv).
Id. § 553.13(c).
Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1084.
Id.
The court wrote:
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property contraband," determining which type of contraband the disks constituted is crucial. From the available facts, the most reasonable conclusion
is that the disks were not stolen government property. The testimony of

Bryant and Lopez at the hearing strongly suggests that the disks were a gift
from Lopez to Bryant and not stolen from FCI Butner's education department.16 6 Accordingly, the disks could have qualified as "personal property
contraband,"' 67 in which case the prison staff would have been obligated to
mail the disks to an address chosen by Bryant, and the contents of the disks
could have been printed out and mailed back to Bryant.'6 8 Instead, the
prison officials continued to treat the disks as stolen government property
despite their own satsifaction that the disks were not stolen, and they con169
tinued to allow Muth and Robbins to exercise control over them.
At least two objections could be made to the conclusion that the disks
were "personal property contraband" and should have been treated as such.
The first objection is that under the regulation, "[iltems obtained from another inmate (for example, through purchase, or as a gift) without staff authorization may be considered nuisance contraband for which a claim of

ownership is not ordinarily accepted."' 17 0 Accordingly, the court might argue that Bryant would have been unable to establish the claim of ownership
required by the regulations in order for the property to be treated as "perThe day after the disks were seized, they were turned over to appellant Muth. In conformuity with BOP regulations Muth treated the disks as contraband and ordered appellant Robbins to reformat them.
Bryant had no right to any materials, placed without authority and in violation of BOP
regulations, on contraband computer disks. Therefore, Muth and Robbins followed correct BOP procedures when they confiscated both Bryant's contraband computer disks
and the materials stored on them.
Id. at 1084, 1087.
166. See id. While stating that prison officials had confiscated Bryant's disks because they
believed that they were stolen from the Education Department, the court observed in a footnote
that disks authorized for use on computers in the Education Department were etched with a serial
number and that Bryant's disks lacked an etched serial number. Id. at 1083 & n.1. The court's
placement of the footnote suggests that it believed that disks issued for use on prison computers
were etched prior to issuance, thus suggesting that the disks were in fact stolen. See id. However,
Bryant's attorneys argued that the lack of etched serial numbers on the disks strongly suggested
that the disks were not stolen government property. Appellant's Opening Brief at 15, Bryant (No.
91-6672). Since computer disks are fragile and sensitive to pressure, it seems highly unlikely that
Education Department officials would themselves etch serial numbers upon blank disks prior to
issuing them. More likely than not, the prison purchased disks pre-etched at the factory with
serial numbers. If this was in fact the case, then the lack of etched serial numbers indicates that
the disks were not stolen government property, but rather Bryant's personal property.
167. See 28 C.F.R. § 553.13(b)(2)(iii); Petition for Certiorari at 20 n.13, Bryant (No. 935842).
168. 28 C.F.R. § 553.13(b)(2)(iv); Petition for Certiorari at 20 n.13, Bryant (No. 93-5842).
169. See 28 C.F.R. § 553.13(b)(1); see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
170. Id. § 553.13(b)(2)(ii).
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sonal property contraband." 17 ' This regulation can be read in two different
ways, but neither interpretation supports the court's conclusion that Muth
and Robbins were entitled to retain the disks and reformat them if they so
chose. One way to read the regulation is to read it in pari materia with the
requirement that staff make reasonable efforts to locate the owner if the
inmate is unable to establish a claim of ownership.' 7 2 Under this alternative
reading, the regulation primarily contemplates situations in which the inmate makes a naked assertion that another inmate gave or sold the property
to him, when in fact the inmate may have stolen the property from another
inmate. 73 Under those circumstances, it is eminently reasonable not to accept a claim of ownership and to return the property to its true owner.
However, in Bryant's case, Lopez testified that he gave the disks to Bryant
as an unconditional gift, thus negating any suspicion that Bryant stole the
disks from Lopez. 174
The other way to read the above quoted regulation is to treat the phrase
in parentheses literally and allow prison officials to refuse to accept claims
of ownership of property received from other inmates by purchase or by
gift. However, since prison officials evidently refused to accept Bryant's
claim of ownership, the regulations then required the officials to take reasonable steps to locate the owner of the property (presumably so the property could be returned to its owner) before destroying the item.' 75 Despite
the apparent preemptive effect it would have on state law principles regarding the transfer of title to personal property, the second reading of the regulation would seem to require that the officials return the disks to Lopez
(who might then help his friend by sending them to another of Bryant's
friends outside the prison), not to Muth and Robbins as the court suggests.
Lastly, on its face, the regulation permits prison officials to accept a
claim of ownership to property received from other inmates, even though
such claims are ordinarily not accepted. 176 In contrast, a claim
of owner177
ship may never be accepted for stolen government property.
The second possible objection is that even if the disks were "personal
property contraband" under the regulations, Bryant still had no claim to the
171. See id. § 553.13(b)(2)(iii).
172. Id. § 553.13(b)(2)(iv).
173. See id. § 553.13(b)(2)(ii).
174. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1084.
175. 28 C.F.R. § 553.13(b)(2)(iv) (1993).
176. The regulation states: "Items obtained from another inmate (for example, through
purchase or as a gift) without staff authorization may be considered nuisance contraband for which
a claim of ownership is ordinarilynot accepted." 28 C.F.R. § 553.13(b)(2)(ii) (1993) (emphasis
added).
177. "Staff shall return to the institution's issuing authority any item of government property
seized as contraband ....
Id. § 553.13(b)(1) (emphasis added).
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legal materials on the disks since they were produced through unauthorized
use of government property, namely the computers in the prison's education
department. The response to this objection is that the regulations treat legal
materials separately from other inmate property, 178 and furthermore, the
constitutional right of access to the courts requires that inmate legal materials be treated differently from other inmate property. 179 To the extent that

"items made from the unauthorized use of government property" can be
construed to cover an inmate's personally prepared legal materials, the regulation may be unconstitutionally overbroad. s° Thus, legal materialsprepared through unauthorized access to prison computers cannot lightly be

brushed off1 as "items made from the unauthorized use of government
18

property.'
Even more problematic than the court's analysis of the contraband issue is its conclusion that Bryant had no right to the legal materials on the
disks. As previously noted, the Fourth Circuit had decided two cases involving inmate legal materials: Carter v. Hutto'82 and Oxendine v. Wil-

liams."83
' In Carter, prison officials seized and destroyed "legal materials
relating to [Carter's] application for a writ of habeas corpus."'
In Oxendine, the Fourth Circuit considered whether an inmate's allegations of
denial of the right of access to the courts warranted a hearing on the merits.' 85 The Bryant court summarily distinguished Carter and Oxendine by
holding that those cases dealt with "handwritten legal materials" and "the
denial of writing supplies," or more simply, that the underlying medium in
178. See id. § 553.11(d).
179. See infra notes 203-07 and accompanying text.
180. Cf. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held
that prison regulations authorizing the censoring of prisoner mail must, in order to be valid, "further an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression,"
and must limit First Amendment liberties no more "than is necessary or essential to the protection
of the particular governmental interest involved." The Court also held that a limitation on inmate
correspondence might further a substantial or important governmental interest but still be invalid
if its scope is excessively broad. Id. at 413-14.
181. 28 C.F.R. § 553.13(b)(2)(ii) (1993).
One might argue that not treating Bryant's legal materials as contraband "would allow him to
benefit from the fruits of his unauthorized activity." Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1087. However, as
Bryant's attorneys argued to the Supreme Court, it would not have been inconsistent for prison
officials to have punished Bryant for his unauthorized use of prison computers while at the same
time providing him with a hard copy of his legal materials. Petition for Certiorari at 27, Bryant
(No. 93-5842). Since the Constitution gives special protection to prisoner's legal materials, see
infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text, the court's "fruits analysis" seems to be
inappropriate.
182. 781 F.2d 1028 (4th Cir. 1986).
183. 509 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam).
184. Carter,781 F.2d at 1030.
185. Oxendine, 509 F.2d at 1407.
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those cases was paper and not computer disks.18 6 However, the court's
holdings in Carterand Oxendine do not appear to have turned on the fact
that the legal materials had been prepared on paper. In Carter,for example,
the court clearly stated that it was the prisoner's allegation of deprivation of
his "legal materials, some of which were irreplaceable" that triggered the
constitutional violation. 1 87 In a footnote, the court mentioned that the
materials included "Carter's handwritten notes of his trial, the basis of his
habeas corpus attack on his conviction." 88 Moreover, the footnote appears
after the word "irreplaceable,"' 8 9 indicating that the court was primarily
concerned with the fact that the materials contained Carter's personal recollections of his trial which he needed for his habeas corpus application. 9 '
Likewise, in Oxendine, the court decided that, based on affidavits filed by
prisoners attesting that prison officials had denied them writing materials,
there was a "possibility of unreasonable interference with access to the
courts," and thus summary judgment was inappropriate.' 9 ' Although Oxendine dealt with the unavailability of writing supplies, the court's reasoning does not suggest that it was the writing supplies qua writing supplies
that triggered the possible violation, but rather the potential effect the deprivation stood to have on the prisoners' right of access to the courts.' 92
The courts seem to be in agreement that to state a claim for deprivation
of the right to access through the confiscation or destruction of legal materials, a prisoner must only allege that he was deprived of his legal materials
and that the deprivation prejudiced his court actions. 193 Instead of adhering
to this well-established body of law, the Bryant court engrafted upon it a
requirement that the legal materials must have been "legally prepared and
retained" in order to qualify for protection under the right of access to the
courts.' 9 4 Accordingly, in the court's opinion, "Bryant's legal materials
composed and stored on disks were contraband."'95 Although the court's
conclusion that the disks constituted some sort of contraband has merit, the
court's holding that the legal materials on the disks were contraband is not
justified under current law. The court cited no authority for its holding in
197
this regard. 9 6 Furthermore, no authority for the holding appears to exist.
In fact, what authority there is strongly suggests otherwise. For example, in
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1087.
Carter,781 F.2d at 1032.
Id. at 1032 n.4.
Id. at 1032.
Id.
Oxendine, 509 F.2d at 1407 (citation omitted).
See id.
See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1087.
Id. (emphasis added).
Petition for Certiorari at 16, Bryant (No. 93-5842).
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Justice Stevens observed

that "the Constitution prohibits a State from treating letters and legal materials as contraband."' 99 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit stated in Wright
v. Newsome that "[ilt is the fact that [the plaintiff] was denied his legal
materials and law books, and not the deprivation, that brings this claim
within the scope of constitutional protection."2 "0 The D.C. Circuit also
stated in Crawford-Elv. Britton that an official violates a prisoner's right of
access to the courts if he deprives a prisoner of his legal materials with the
specific intent to interfere or with deliberate indifference to the interference
the deprivation might cause.2 ' Thus, it is apparent that the courts have
regarded inmate legal materials as a distinct class of property entitled to
heightened constitutional protection.20 2 Absent a clearer statement from the
Supreme Court or other circuits as to how legal materials prepared with
197. After a thorough search, the author of this Note has not been able to locate any case that
suggests that the court's holding in this regard is justified. Bryant's attorneys were also unsuccessful in finding authority that would support Judge Chapman's conclusion that an inmate forfeits his right to his legal materials by preparing them through unauthorized use of government
property, regardless of the impact loss of the materials would have on his legal actions. See
Petition for Certiorari at 16-17, Bryant (No. 93-5842).
Furthermore, in his treatise on prisoner's rights that was published shortly before the court
decided Bryant, Mushlin states that there were no reported decisions regarding inmate use of
computers. 2 Musm.mr, supra note 65, § 11.08, at 62 n.329. The only reported case involving a
computer-like device is Sands v. Lewis, 886 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir. 1989). In Sands, prison officials
refused to permit a prisoner to take possession of a typewriter with a forty character memory. Id.
at 1168. Prison regulations prohibited prisoners from possessing typewriters with memories in
excess of twenty-eight characters. Id. Sands argued, inter alia, that denial of the typewriter infringed on his right of access to the courts. Id. Adopting the Third Circuit's reading of Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977), the court held that Sands had not alleged that the deprivation of the
typewriter actually interfered with his right of access to the courts. Id. at 1171. However, the
court remanded the case so that Sands could have the opportunity to amend his complaint to allege
actual interference. Id. at 1172.
198. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
199. Id. at 548 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Vigliotto v.
Terry, 873 F.2d 1201, 1202 (9th Cir. 1989) (implicitly rejecting the defendants' contention that
seized legal materials containing newspaper clippings concerning the prisoner's trial, law review
articles, and photocopied cases were "contraband," but going on to hold that deprivation of those
materials for 3 days at the most did not violate the prisoner's right of access to the courts).
Federal regulations do permit prison officials to put limits on the amount of legal materials
prisoners may keep in their cells in order to prevent the materials from becoming safety hazards.
28 C.F.R. § 553.11(d) (1993).
200. Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
201. Crawford-El v. Britton, 951 F.2d 1314, 1318 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
202. Cf. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 530, 543-44 (1981) (holding that a prisoner's deprivation of a hobby kit through the negligence of prison staff did not rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation of due process and that the prisoner's sole remedy would be an action in the
state's court of claims for tortious deprivation of property), overruled in part on other grounds,
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). See also Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344, 348 (2d Cir.
1987) (stating that "[i]ntentional, substantive violations of constitutional rights are not subject to
the rule of Parratt").
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unauthorized use of government property should be treated, the court
should not have been so quick to label Bryant's legal materials as
"contraband."
Notwithstanding the lack of authority for the court's conclusion that
Bryant's legal materials were contraband, the practical implications of this
holding stand to frustrate the right of access to the courts. As Bryant's
attorneys argued to the Supreme Court:
Taken to its logical conclusion, the Fourth Circuit's ruling
would permit prison officials to seize and destroy a prisoner's
complaint merely because it was contained in a briefcase which
the prisoner was not authorized to possess. Or, prison officials
could seize a habeas corpus petition simply because it was written
with a pen the inmate improperly obtained from the supply room.
If a prisoner used the prison library during an unauthorized period, prison officials could completely deny that prisoner's ability
to prepare a complaint by confiscating over a year's worth of that
inmate's legal work prepared during the unauthorized time.20 3
Other scenarios come to mind as well. For instance, prisoners have occasionally resorted to preparing pleadings and other court documents on toilet
paper.2 " A case is imaginable where, because prison officials failed to
supply appropriate writing materials, a prisoner might be forced to prepare
a complaint on prison-issued toilet paper, using a pen carelessly dropped by
a prison guard, alleging deprivation of his right of access to the courts because of the lack of adequate writing materials.20 5 Under the Bryant court's
holding, prison officials could seize and destroy this complaint. Prison officials could argue under Bryant that toilet paper is issued to prisoners only
for hygienic purposes, not for preparing court documents. Accordingly, by
using toilet paper and a pen belonging to the government to prepare his
complaint, the prisoner converted government property to an unauthorized
use and produced an "item" through unauthorized use of government property. He therefore was entitled to claim no right of ownership to the complaint so drafted and, therefore, was not deprived of his right of access to
the courts. Whether or not prison officials deprived him of adequate writing materials would be an entirely different question that the prisoner could
take to court, provided he could prepare and file a complaint using author203. Petition for Certiorari at 26, Bryant (No. 93-5842).
204. See Procup v. Strickland, 760 F.2d 1107, 1115 (11th Cir. 1985), on reh'g, 792 F.2d 1069
(1lth Cir. 1986); Conklin v. Wainwright, 424 F.2d 516, 517 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 965 (1970).
205. This scenario is similar to the situation in Conklin, where a prisoner prepared and filed a
complaint on four and one half feet of toilet paper. Conklin, 424 F.2d at 517. However, the court
was unimpressed with what it deemed an attention-getting tactic, especially in light of evidence
that the prison provided prisoners with ten sheets of white bond per day. Id.
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ized means. As should be clear, the result Bryant would arguably compel in
this hypothetical case would completely frustrate the right of access to the
courts, a right the courts have considered "fundamental."2 6
The Fourth Circuit's resolution of the issue regarding whether Muth
and Robbins had deprived Bryant of his right of access to the courts is very
much intertwined with its conclusion that Muth and Robbins were entitled
to qualified immunity. Since the court concluded that Bryant had no right
to his legal materials as the law stood in 1987, it naturally follows that Muth

and Robbins could not have violated any "clearly established" right of Bryant's.2 ° 7 However, it is not the case that Bryant had no clearly established

right to his legal materials despite the fact that the disks upon which he had
stored them were contraband. By 1987, it was "clearly established" that
prisoners had a constitutional right of access to the courts and that intentional or knowing deprivation of legal materials that interfered with a pris20 8
oner's access to the courts could constitute a violation of that right.
Moreover, reasonable officials well-versed in prison regulations and procedures 2 9 should have known that their actions stood to infringe that right.
Muth and Robbins were keenly aware that the disks contained Bryant's
206. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
207. See Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1087.
208. See, e.g., Morello v. James, 810 F.2d 344, 345-48 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding that a prisoner
whose legal materials were confiscated during transfer could state a claim under § 1983 for infringement of this right of access to the court); Simmons v. Dickhaut, 804 F.2d 182, 183 (1st Cir.
1986) (per curiam) (stating that "[mlany courts have found a cause of action for violation of the
right of access... where it was alleged that prison officials confiscated and/or destroyed legal
materials or papers"); Carter v. Hutto, 781 F.2d 1028, 1031-32 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that a
prisoner's allegations that prison officials "confiscated and/or destroyed" legal materials described
as "irreplaceable" stated a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of the right of access to the courts);
Wright v. Newsome, 795 F.2d 964, 968 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (holding that seizure and
destruction of prisoner's legal materials by prison officials states a claim under § 1983 for infringement of right of access to the courts); Tyler v. "Ron" Deputy Sheriff, 574 F.2d 427, 429 (8th
Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (stating that depriving prisoners of legal materials states a claim under
§ 1983 if that deprivation results in interference with the right of access to the courts); Oxendine
v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (maintaining that a prisoner stated a
claim under § 1983 for deprivation of right of access to courts by alleging confiscation of legal
materials); Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1320 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding that intentional
deprivation of prisoner's trial transcript stated a § 1983 claim for deprivation of the right of access
to the courts); Sigafus v. Brown, 416 F.2d 105, 106-07 (7th Cir. 1969) (holding that confiscation
and destruction of legal materials necessary for post-conviction evidentiary hearing stated a claim
under § 1983 for infringement of right of access to the courts); DeWitt v. Pail, 366 F.2d 682, 68586 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding that a prisoner states a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of the right
of access to the courts by alleging confiscation of his trial transcript by prison officials); She v.
Bordenkircher, 536 F. Supp. 1264, 1265 (N.D. W. Va. 1981) (holding that under Oxendine, a
prisoner states a claim under § 1983 for deprivation of right of access to the courts by alleging
confiscation of prisoners' "court papers"); Steinberg v. Taylor, 500 F. Supp. 477, 480 (D. Conn.
1980) (holding that confiscation and destruction of a prisoner's legal materials, labeled as such,
impeded the prisoner's court actions, and thus interfered with his right of access to the courts).
209. See Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1087-88.

1716

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

legal materials and that Bryant had requested a hard copy of those documents.21 Despite their knowledge that the disks contained Bryant's legal
materials, they treated the disks and the materials on them with callous disregard for Bryant's rights.2" The court maintained that "[u]nder Harlow[,
Muth and Robbins] ...may not be held to the standard of constitutional
lawyers."2" 2 However, there is no need to hold Muth and Robbins to the

standard of "constitutional lawyers" in order to find that they, as reasonable
persons familiar with prison regulations, ought to have known that they
were infringing on Bryant's right of access to the courts. Because Muth

and Robbins were sufficiently attentive to be cognizant of prison regulations, they should have been attentive enough to their constitutional responsibility not to interfere with an inmate's right of access to the courts.
One commentator has stated that courts deciding cases after Harlow
involving qualified immunity generally have followed three methods to determine whether a right was "clearly established."21' 3 Under the first approach, courts look for a "strict factual correspondence" between cases at
bar and other cases in the jurisdiction where a right was found to be clearly
established.2" 4 Under the second approach, the courts require defendants to
take heed of analogous situations in other cases establishing the right. 2 15 In
the third approach, the courts require defendants to anticipate future legal
210. See supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
212. See Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1087-88 (stating that 'Muth and Robbins followed correct BOP
procedure when they confiscated both Bryant's contraband computer disks and the material stored
confiscating Bryant's computer disks, Muth and Robbins were carrying
on them" and that "[i]n
out the clear mandate of the BOP Manual").
213. Comment, Harlow v. Fitzgerald: The Lower Courts Implement The New Standardfor
QualifiedImmunity Under Section 1983, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 901, 923 (1984) [hereinafter Qualified Immunity under Section 19831.
214. Id. The commentator discussed Calloway v. Fauver, 544 F. Supp 584 (D.N.J. 1982) as
an example of this approach. At issue in Calloway was whether prison officials deprived prisoners of their due process rights by placing them in protective custody without a hearing. Qualfied
Immunity UnderSection 1983, supra note 213, at 924 (citing Calloway, 544 F. Supp. at 588-92).
Ruling against the prisoners, the court found that the right that the prisoners claimed prison officials violated was not clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Id. at 925. The court
found that the Supreme Court had not addressed the "specific issue of whether an inmate was
entitled to periodic hearings regarding the continuation of involuntary, long-term, protective custody." Id. (citing Calloway, 544 F. Supp. at 607). The court also rejected a line of cases in other
circuits deciding related issues, an Eighth Circuit case regarding hearings for prisoners in protective custody, and recent decisions in other districts that were directly on point. Id. (citing Calloway, 544 F. Supp. at 607).
The commentator concluded that "[tihe court apparently required [mandatory authority]
exactly, or nearly exactly, on point." Id. at 925 (footnote omitted). Criticizing the decision, the
commentator stated that the court required "an unrealistically high and generally unattainable
degree of certainty in the applicable law" that could lead to the granting of qualified immunity in
every conceivable case. Id. at 926 (footnote omitted).
215. Qualfied Immunity UnderSection 1983, supra note 213, at 927-30 (discussing Anderson
v. Central Point School District No. 6, 554 F. Supp. 600 (D. Or. 1982)).
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developments which may in retrospect demonstrate that their conduct was
unconstitutional.2 1 6
The court's opinion in Bryant represents most closely the first of the
three approaches to deciding whether a right was "clearly established" since
it distinguishes Carter and Oxendine on the particularly narrow grounds
that the underlying medium of the legal materials in those cases was paper.
Although the Supreme Court in Harlow emphasized that one of the policies
behind qualified immunity was protecting officials from baseless lawsuits, 2 17 another policy the Court expressed was that court action may be
the only way to protect constitutional rights.2 18 The narrow approach employed by the Fourth Circuit stands to undermine the latter policy judgment,
and additionally the entire scheme for redress of constitutional rights under
2 19
section 1983 and Bivens.
The court also makes much of its belief that Muth and Robbins were
merely following prison regulations in treating the disks in the way they
did.220 However, officials accused of depriving prisoners of their constitutional rights are not entitled to claim the protection of rules if the official
knew or reasonably should have known that following the rules would result in the violation of a constitutional right.2 2 Furthermore, by not treating
the disks as personal property contraband, it is arguable that Muth and Robbins were not actually adhering to the rules they claimed to be following.22 2
Accordingly, Muth and Robbins should not have been entitled to qualified
immunity for depriving Bryant of his legal materials for almost two years.
Finally, at the end of the opinion in Bryant, the court posited the following arguments for restricting inmate access to computers:
In the future, an inmate engaging in the unauthorized access to
prison computers could learn to access prison records and computer monitored security systems. Unauthorized inmate access to
computers linked with computers outside the prison could create
even greater chaos. It is therefore imperative that the rules perId. at 930-32 (discussing Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 551 F. Supp. 1247 (E.D. Pa. 1982)).
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Id. at 814; Qualified Immunity under Section 1983, supra note 213, at 926.
See id. at 926.
Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1084, 1087-88.
As the Eighth Circuit wrote:
An official's actions are not immunized because they were taken according to orders or regulations if the defendant still knew or should have known that he was violating [the] plaintiff's constitutional rights.... The appropriate inquiry, apart from any
justification of following orders or regulations, is whether reasonable persons in the
defendants' position should have known that their conduct violated clearly established
constitutional rights.
J.H.H. v. O'Hara, 878 F.2d 240, 244-25 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1072 (1990).
222. See supra notes 153-81 and accompanying text.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
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taining to inmate use of prison computers be vigorously
enforced.223
While these are generally valid concerns, they do not justify the result the
court reaches. First, the facts indicate that the computers Bryant used in
this case were not equipped with modems, nor were they otherwise
networked with each other or with any other computers outside the Education Department.22 4 Furthermore, the facts indicate that the prisoners using
the computers were not engaged in malicious or illegal activities. 2z Bryant
used the computers only for word processing-hardly an activity that could
be characterized as computer crime. Lastly, the court's fears simply do not
comport with common sense. As a simple matter of security, any computer
to which an inmate could conceivably have access would not be networked
with systems controlling prison security or with computers outside the
prison. Ideally, any computer to which an inmate could have access should
either not be on a network or should be networked only with a local file
server that would hold programs and other files only for the inmate computer facility. Furthermore, networked systems should be configured to allow inmate users to run only specified programs on the file server.22 6
Overall, the analysis above leads to the conclusion that the Fourth Circuit decided Bryant wrongly, and thus, allowed to go unremedied the violation of an important constitutional right. The court overly concerned itself
with the fact that Bryant's access to the computers in the Education Department was unauthorized under prison regulations, and it ignored a vast body
of law regarding the right of access to the courts when ruling that Bryant
had no right to his legal materials. The court's overly narrow distinguishing
of Carter and Oxendine is unwarranted, and the court's emphasis on the
fact that Muth and Robbins were merely following prison regulations
sounds an ominous tone that the court may be reverting to the purportedly
rejected "hands-off" doctrine.
After Bryant, federal prisoners in Bryant's situation must hope for
some major changes in policies concerning the use of computers by prison
inmates. First, no promulgated federal regulations exist regarding inmate
223. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1088.
224. See supra note 20.

225. See supra note 20.
226. For example, Microsoft Windows Version 3.1 easily can be configured to permit a user to
execute only a certain set of programs. The procedure involves building in a "restrictions" section
into the PROGMAN.INI initiation file read by the Windows Program Manager on startup. Restrictions that can be placed on users include disabling of the "Run" and "Exit Windows" commands under the File menu, preventing the user from altering and/or saving changes to the
Program Manager's program groups or other icons, and disabling the File menu completely. See
MICROsoFr CORPORATION, MICROsoFr WINDOWS RESOURCE KIT: COMPLETE TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR THE SUPPORT PROFESSIONAL FOR THE MICROSOFr WINDOWS OPERATING SYSTEM
VERSION 3.1 221, 276 (1992); FRED DAVIS, THE WINDOWS 3.1 BIBLE 122 (1993).
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use of computers.22 7 The only standards that govern inmate access to computers are outlined in the unpublished BOP Statement 1237.6, relied upon
heavily by the court in Bryant. The BOP should propose, receive comments on, and promulgate federal regulations regarding the use of computers by inmates through the normal administrative rulemaking process.
Furthermore, with regard to inmate use of computers for legal work, those
regulations should be more reasonable than the standards outlined in the
existing policy statement. According to the policy statement,
[a]ccess and use of any computer resource by inmates must be
carefully monitored and controlled to prevent misuse, fraud or
abuse. While inmates may have access to microcomputers for vocational training, educational or FPI programs, no other access or
use of computers is permitted except as indicated below.
[linmates may not be permitted the use of computer equipment
for... legal work without specific written authority on an individual basis from the CEO [Chief Executive Officer].
[D]isks or tapes, if provided, remain the property of the institution and may not be permitted as approved personal property.22 8
In drafting regulations governing inmate use of computers, the BOP should
take the following considerations into account. First, requiring inmates to
seek approval of the warden before using computers for legal work is simply not reasonable.2 2 9 The regulation should permit officials more closely
associated with computing resources to issue authorizations or at least make
clear that the warden may delegate the authority to issue authorizations to
subordinate officials. Second, prisoners should be permitted to purchase
disks at reasonable prices from the prison for use in the inmate computer
facility. As a security matter, the BOP might require prisoners who have
purchased disks to allow the computer staff to keep the disks in a secure
location in the computer lab to prevent the introduction of computer viruses
or programs that might present a threat to prison security. Inmates would
be permitted to use the disks while in the computer lab, but the disks would
have to be locked up while not in use. While prison staff would be responsible for safeguarding the disks against destruction, tampering, or theft,
prison staff would be barred from inspecting the data on the disks absent a
bona fide suspicion that the disks contained unauthorized information or
227. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 500.1-553.15 (1993).
228. Bryant, 994 F.2d at 1083 n.2 (quoting BOP Statement 1237.6).

229. Federal regulations state that the warden is the chief executive officer of a Federal Corrections Institute. 28 C.F.R. § 500.1 (1993).
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programs.? ° Third, inmates would have access to computers at reasonable
times to perform their legal work subject to computing needs with higher
priorities, such as classroom instruction and the needs of other inmate users.
Fourth, the BOP might reasonably limit the programs that an inmate could
use to those germane to legal work, the most obvious example being a word
processing package. Lastly, the policy regarding inmate use of computers
for legal work should be made known to all inmates who might desire such
services.
Given the fact that federal regulations already permit prisoners to use
typewriters for legal work," 1 no legitimate reason exists for putting excessively tight restrictions on inmate computer access for similar undertakings.
Indeed, allowing inmates to keep voluminous legal work on computer disks
rather than reams of paper in prisoners' cells reduces the risks of fire and
other safety hazards.23 2 One of the reasons the controversy in Bryant developed was that prison officials had not indicated that they had any policy
regarding inmate use of computers for personal and legal purposes, and
furthermore, inmates apparently thought they were generally permitted to
use the computers after hours.2 33 The controversy easily could have been
avoided had the BOP promulgated regulations such as those suggested
above and made those regulations known to the prison population. Until
the BOP does so, a situation similar to the one in Bryant is likely to arise
again.
J. WILLIAM SNYDER, JR.

230. Of course, inmates should be entitled to remove their disks from the computer facility
upon release or transfer from the institution in which they are confined.
231. 28 C.F.R. § 543.11(h) (1993).
232. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
233. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.

The Convergence of Plain Error and Lesser Included Offense
Rules in State v. Collins
Should our criminal justice system give defendants a second chance
when their lawyers mishandle their defenses? This Note explores this question by examining the convergence, in a recent North Carolina Supreme
Court decision, of two rules of North Carolina's criminal law: the plain
error rule' and the lesser included offense rule.2 The Note begins with a
summary3 of the court's holding in State v. Collins.4 After exploring the
relevant background law,5 the Note observes that the Collins decision clarifies the law of plain error and lesser included offenses.6 The Note concludes that North Carolina appropriately answers the question raised above.
Although North Carolina courts are willing to give criminal defendants a
second chance when their lawyers mishandle their defenses, the courts will
do so only under narrow circumstances; this restrained approach conserves
judicial resources and prevents miscarriages of justice.
At a party on December 20, 1992, several witnesses saw Jehue Collins
shoot David Brown in the chest with a .22 caliber rifle. Brown later died.7
The State charged Collins with murder. At trial, he asserted two defenses:
he maintained that someone else shot had Brown and that, alternatively,
even if he shot Brown, the gunshot wound did not cause Brown's death. 8
To buttress this second defense, Collins called North Carolina's longtime
Chief Medical Examiner, Dr. Page Hudson. Dr. Hudson testified that, in
his expert opinion, the gunshot wound was not the proximate cause of
1. The plain error rule permits criminal defendants to appeal errors even if they failed to
bring the errors to the trial court's attention. State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375,
378 (1983).
2. The lesser included offense rule requires a trial court to instruct the jury on a lesser
included offense if the evidence supports a verdict on the offense. State v. Powell, 277 N.C. 672,
677, 178 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1971). Criminal defendants may also seek relief for their attorneys'
mishandling of their cases under the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. See
generally IRviNG JOYNER, CRVIINAL PROCEDURE IN NORTH CAROLINA 834-36 (1989) (highlighting the obligation of attorneys to file "no merit" briefs to allow appellate review); WAYNE R.
LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMNAL PROCEDURE 562-95 (2d ed. 1992) (providing that ineffective assistance of counsel may be based upon state interference, attorney conflict of interest and
lawyer incompetence). This Note does not address this issue, because the defendant did not raise
it on appeal. Record at 45-50, State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 431 S.E.2d 188 (1993) (No.
366A92).
3. See infra notes 7-32 and accompanying text.
4. 334 N.C. 54, 57, 431 S.E.2d 188, 190 (1993).
5. See infra notes 33-46 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 47-88 and accompanying text.
7. Collins, 334 N.C. at 57, 431 S.E.2d at 190.
8. Id.
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Brown's death. He suggested instead that a pre-existing gallbladder disease
caused Brown's death. 9
Pursuant to the State's indictment, and without objection from Collins,
the trial court instructed the jury on murder. 10 Facing the choice of acquitting Collins of all wrongdoing or convicting him of murder, the jury con-

victed 2him."
Court.'

Collins appealed directly to the North Carolina Supreme

A critical basis for Collins's appeal 3 was that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct the jury that they could find Collins
guilty of lesser included offenses if they did not reach a guilty verdict on
murder.' 4 Even though he did not ask for instructions on attempted murder
and felonious assault, Collins argued that the trial court should have instructed the jury on these two lesser included offenses. 15

The North Carolina Supreme Court partially agreed with Collins. It
found that attempted murder was a lesser offense within the offense of murder,' 6 but that felonious assault was not.' 7 Based on this finding, the court
held that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to submit the
18
charge of attempted murder to the jury.
9. Id. at 61, 431 S.E.2d at 192.
10. Id. at 61, 431 S.E.2d at 193. The trial court gave the following instruction: "Now as you
know, ladies and gentlemen, in this case the defendant has been accused of first degree murder.
Under the law and evidence of this case, it is your duty to return one of the two following verdicts:
guilty of first degree murder or not guilty.. " Transcript at 149, State of North Carolina General
Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, Forsyth County (No. 92-CRS-3345). Although Collins
did not object to the trial court's instructions on murder, he did object to the court's instructions
on proximate cause. The court overruled this objection. Record at 29.
11. Collins, 334 N.C. at 56, 431 S.E.2d at 190.
12. Id.
13. Other errors that Collins assigned included the denial of funds to hire an investigator; the
sustainment of numerous objections by the state; and a lay witness's testimony about the victim's
excellent health prior to the shooting. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at i-ii.
14. Collins, 334 N.C. at 57, 431 S.E.2d at 190.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 59, 431 S.E.2d at 191.
17. Id. at 63, 431 S.E.2d at 193-94. The court found, based on "[a] proper regard for the
doctrine of stare decisis," that felonious assault was not a lesser offense within the offense of
murder. Id. at 63, 431 S.E.2d at 194. The court reached this conclusion in State v. Gibson, 333
N.C. 29, 38-39, 424 S.E.2d 95, 100 (1992) and State v. Whiteside, 325 N.C. 389, 402, 383 S.E.2d
911, 918 (1989). As the court explained, "an indictment charging that defendant unlawfully,
willfully and feloniously and of malice aforethought did kill and murder [the victim) is insufficient to support a verdict of guilty of assault, assault inflicting serious injury or assault with intent
to kill because such murder indictment does not specify a murder accomplished by assault." Collins, 334 N.C. at 63, 431 S.E.2d at 194 (quoting Whiteside, 325 N.C. at 403, 383 S.E.2d at 919)
(internal quotations omitted).
18. Collins, 334 N.C. at 63, 431 S.E.2d at 193. Because the court reached its result on state
law grounds, it refused to reach the question of whether Collins's federal constitutional rights
were violated. Id. at 58, 431 S.E.2d at 190.
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To reach this decision, the court had to address the failure of Collins's
counsel to object to the trial court's jury instructions. 19 Under North Carolina law, counsel must object at trial to errors in jury instructions; the purpose of this rule is to give the trial court a chance to cure those errors.2 °
Absent objection, a party waives his right to appeal an alleged jury instruction error.2 1 Under the plain error exception to this general rule, however,
North Carolina appellate courts will hear assignments of error if the error is
"so fundamental as to amount to a miscarriage of justice or [if the error]
probably resulted in the jury reaching a different verdict than it otherwise
would have reached." 2
The Collins court found a case of plain error.23 According to the court,
the jury confronted an impermissible dilemma: They could convict Collins
of murder or they could let him go free.2 4 Although the jury chose the
former, the court speculated that, given the choice, the jury would have
preferred to convict Collins of attempted murder.' In short, if the trial
court had instructed the jury on attempted murder, the jury would have
reached a different verdict, suggesting that the failure to so instruct
amounted to plain error.26
Justice Meyer concurred in the majority's holding that attempted murder was a lesser included offense of murder.2 7 He dissented, however, from
the majority's holding that the trial court committed plain error by failing to
instruct the jury on attempted murder.2 8 Justice Meyer believed Collins
made a tactical decision not to ask for an instruction on attempted murder.
19. Id. at 61, 431 S.E.2d at 193.
20. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 2, at 1158. This so-called "raise-or-waive" rule has a

number of other rationales:
[I]t is a necessary corollary of our adversary system in which issues are framed by the
litigants and presented to a court; ... fairness to all parties requires a litigant to advance
his contentions at a time when there is an opportunity to respond to them factually, if his
opponent chooses to; ... the rule promotes efficient trial proceedings; ... reversing for
error not preserved permits the losing side to second-guess its tactical decisions after
they do not produce the desired result; ... there is something unseemly about telling a
lower court it was wrong when it never was presented with the opportunity to be
right....
Id. (quoting State v. Applegate, 591 P.2d 371, 373 (Or. App. 1979)).
21. N.C. R. APP. P. 10(b)(2).
22. Collins, 334 N.C. at 62, 431 S.E.2d at 193 (quoting State v. Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 213,
362 S.E.2d 244, 251 (1987) (citing State v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 37, 340 S.E.2d 80, 82 (1986);
State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983)), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036
(1988)).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 62-63, 431 S.E.2d at 193.
27. Id. at 64, 431 S.E.2d at 194 (Meyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
28. Id. (Meyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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He speculated that Collins believed Dr. Hudson's testimony would lead the
jury not to convict on murder.2 9
In Justice Meyer's opinion, Collins gambled on acquittal and lost."
He believed Collins should suffer the consequences of this gamble. To find
otherwise, Justice Meyer reasoned, would permit criminal defendants to
hope for acquittal and then, upon conviction, to raise on appeal matters that
should have been remedied at trial.3 Justice Meyer also noted that an unintended consequence would flow from the majority's decision. Because future trial courts would be forced to instruct juries on all lesser included
offenses supported by the evidence, defendants could no longer waive submission of these instructions; thus, defendants would be deprived of the "all
32
or nothing" strategy that Justice Meyer believed Collins used at his trial.
Two lines of North Carolina case law help explain Collins. The first
deals with the plain error rule; the other, with jury instructions on lesser
included offenses. North Carolina adopted the plain error rule in State v.
Odom.3 3 The Odom court grafted the plain error rule onto Rule 10(b)(2) of
the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. 34 That rule states:
A party may not assign as error any portion of the jury charge or
omission therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly that to which he objects and the grounds of his objection; provided, that opportunity
was given to the party to make the objection out of the hearing of
the jury, and, on request of any party, out of the presence of the
35
jury.

The defendant in Odom failed to state his objections at trial pursuant to
Rule 10(b)(2), but urged the Supreme Court to adopt a plain error rule exception to the rule.3 6 The court did so, modelling its exception on a federal

rule providing that: "Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may
be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. 37
29. Id. at 64-65, 431 S.E.2d at 194-95 (Meyer, I., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
30. Id. (Meyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). No evidence in the record
supports the inference that Collins refrained, as a trial tactic, from asking for instructions on the
lesser included offense. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
31. Id. at 65, 431 S.E.2d at 195 (Meyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
32. Id. at 66-67, 431 S.E.2d at 196 (Meyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33. 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E.2d 375 (1983).
34. Id. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378.
35. N.C. R. ApP. P. 10(b)(2).
36. Odom, 307 N.C. at 659, 300 S.E.2d at 378.
37. FED. R. Cram. P. 52(b). The court noted that Rule 10(b)(2) was "virtually the same" as
Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378.
Federal courts could, however, mitigate the harshness of Rule 30 by invoking Rule 52(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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The Odom court thought this exception a sensible way to mitigate the

harshness of Rule 10(b)(2).3 s
The Odom rule did not negate Rule 10(b)(2).39 Defendants must meet
a high standard to convince a court to overturn a conviction under the plain
error rule. The Odom court listed the kinds of cases that would meet such a
standard: cases involving 'fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done"; situations in which a "grave error ...amounts to a denial of a fundamental right

of the accused"; errors that result "in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial"; errors that "seriously affect the fairness,
integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings"; or cases in which
"the instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury's finding that
the defendant was guilty."40 Having set a high standard for the plain error
rule, the Odom court correctly predicted that it would rarely use the rule to
overturn criminal convictions.4 1 Beginning with Odom itself,42 North Carolina courts have rejected numerous defendants' pleas to overturn criminal
convictions based on the plain error rule.43

The lead North Carolina case on lesser included offenses is State v.
Powell.'

In that case, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a trial

38. Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378. The plain error rule is now codified at N.C.
R. App. P. 10(c)(4).
39. Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378.
40. Id. (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995,'1002 (4th Cir. 1982) (citations
omitted)).
41. Id. at 660-61, 300 S.E.2d at 378.
42. Id. at 661-62, 300 S.E.2d at 379 (finding no plain error when trial court failed to instruct
jury on a lesser included offense, but the record strongly suggested defendant was guilty of the
greater offense).
43. E.g., State v. Loftin, 322 N.C. 375,381-82, 368 S.E.2d 613, 617 (1988) (finding no plain
error when trial court failed to instruct the jury on accident in a murder prosecution, because the
defendant's testimony was contradicted and the defendant's credibility was impeached); State v.
Bagley, 321 N.C. 201, 212, 362 S.E.2d 244, 251 (1987) (finding no plain error when trial court
failed to instruct jury on attempted sexual offenses, because the evidence did not support such an
instruction), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1036 (1988); State v. Lilley, 318 N.C. 390, 394, 348 S.E.2d
788, 791 (1986) (finding no plain error when, in an instruction on assault with a deadly weapon,
the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the defendant had no duty to retreat to his home); State
v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 39-40, 340 S.E.2d 80, 84 (1986) (finding no plain error when the prosecution cross-examined the defendant about his silence after he was arrested, because the record as
a whole indicated that the prosecution's tactics did not cause the jury to reach a decision that it
would not have reached otherwise); State v. Morgan, 315 N.C. 626, 646, 340 S.E.2d 84, 96 (1986)
(finding no plain error when the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the defendant's right to
stand his ground if he was not the aggressor, because the record as a whole cast doubt on the
importance of the trial court's failure); State v. Harris, 315 N.C. 556, 564, 340 S.E.2d 383, 388
(1986) (finding no plain error when trial court failed initially to instruct the jury on a theory of
acting in concert but corrected the instruction on the jury's second day of deliberation). But see
State v. Bell, 87 N.C. App. 626, 635-36, 362 S.E.2d 288, 293-94 (1987) (finding plain error when
the trial court failed to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense).
44. 277 N.C. 672, 178 S.E.2d 417 (1971).
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court need not instruct a jury on a lesser included offense, unless there is
evidence to support a verdict on that offense.45 On the other hand, a long

line of cases prior and subsequent to Powell established that, if this evidence existed, a trial court has a duty to instruct the jury on the lesser in46
cluded offense, even if the defendant failed to ask for such an instruction.

The plain error rule and the lesser included offense rule converge in
three decisions, State v. Odom,4 7 State v. Bell,45 and State v. Liner.49 In
Odom, the jury convicted David Ambrose Odom of attempted robbery with
a firearm.5" On appeal, Odom argued that the trial court erred by failing to
submit the lesser included offense of simple assault to the jury.5 1 The
45. Id. at 677, 178 S.E.2d at420 (citing State v. Williams, 275 N.C. 77, 88, 165 S.E.2d 481,
488 (1969); State v. Lentz, 270 N;C. 122, 126, 153 S.E.2d 864, 868, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 866
(1967); State v. Bridges, 266 N.C. 354, 355, 146 S.E.2d 107, 108 (1966); State v. Hicks, 241 N.C.
156, 159, 84 S.E.2d 545, 547 (1954)); cf. State v. Strickland, 321 N.C. 31, 42, 361 S.E.2d 882,
887 (1987) (holding that trial court need only submit second-degree murder to the jury when
defendant shows sufficient evidence to negate specific intent of first-degree murder).
46. State v. Wallace, 309 N.C. 141, 145, 305 S.E.2d 548, 551 (1983); State v. Ferrell, 300
N.C. 157, 163, 265 S.E.2d 210, 214 (1980); State v. Moore, 300 N.C. 694, 699, 268 S.E.2d 196,
201 (1980); State v. Dooley, 285 N.C. 158, 163, 203 S.E.2d 815, 818 (1974); State v. Riera, 276
N.C. 361, 368, 172 S.E.2d 535, 540 (1970); State v. Gray, 58 N.C. App. 102, 106,293 S.E.2d 274,
276, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 746, 295 S.E.2d 482 (1982); State v. Lang, 58 N.C. App. 117, 118,
293 S.E.2d 255, 256, cert. denied, 306 N.C. 747, 295 S.E.2d 761 (1982); State v. Little, 51 N.C.
App. 64, 67, 275 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1981); State v. Williams, 51 N.C. App. 397, 399, 276 S.E.2d
715, 716, cert. denied, 303 N.C. 319, 281 S.E.2d 658 (1981).
47. 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E.2d 375 (1983). This is, of course, the same case that adopted the
plain error rule in North Carolina. See supra notes 35-43 and accompanying text.
48. 87 N.C. App. 626, 362 S.E.2d 288 (1987).
49. 98 N.C. App. 600, 391 S.E.2d 820, disc. rev. denied, 327 N.C. 435, 395 S.E.2d 693
(1990).
50. Odom, 307 N.C. at 656, 300 S.E.2d at 376.
51. Id. at 658-59, 300 S.E.2d at 377. The trial court's instructions to the jury were as
follows:
COURT: Members of the Jury, this is a criminal case wherein the defendant,
[David Ambrose Odom], is charged with the crime of ... attempted robbery with a
firearm.
So, then, Members of the Jury, I charge you that if you find from the evidence...
that ... the defendant ... intended to rob William Streater, and in furtherance of this
intent, he possessed a firearm which he used or threatened to use in such a manner as to
endanger or threaten the life of William Streater, and that this was an act designed to
bring about the robbery and which, in the ordinary course of things, would have resulted
in robbery, had it not been stopped or thwarted, it would be your duty to return a verdict
of guilty as charged of attempted robbery with a firearm.
However, if you do not so find, or have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of
these things, it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.
Any further requests by the State?
MR. MURPHY: No, Your Honor.
THE COURT: For the defendant?
MR. ACTON: No further requests, Your Honor.
Record at 12-16, State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E.2d 375 (1983) (No. 551A82).
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North Carolina Supreme Court rejected Odom's argument and sustained his
conviction.5 2 The court noted that, under the plain error rule, it was proper
to consider Odom's assignment of error even though he did not object to the
jury instructions at trial. 3 Nevertheless, the court explained, "[iln deciding
whether a defect in the jury instruction constitutes 'plain error,' the appellate court must examine the entire record and determine if the instructional
error had a probable impact on the jury's finding of guilt." 54
Looking at the entire record, the Odom court found no plain error. It
pointed out that Odom's victim identified him and that a witness corroborated the victim's testimony. The court contrasted this evidence with
Odom's uncorroborated testimony that he was not present at the crime
scene, and it pointed out that the State contradicted and impeached this
testimony. In sum, the Odom court found the trial court erred by failing
to instruct the jury on simple assault; however, in light of the entire record,
this error did not amount to plain error.
In State v. Bell,56 the State indicted Dwight Bell on two offenses: assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and discharging a firearm into
an occupied vehicle. After instructions on these charges,5 the jury convicted Bell of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill.5 8 Bell appealed his conviction and argued that the trial court erred by failing to
submit to the jury a lesser included offense, simple assault.5 9
The North Carolina Court of Appeals agreed with Bell's argument and
granted him a new trial. 60 The court began its discussion by noting that
"[b]ecause the defendant failed to object at trial to the instruction given,
our review is limited to whether the omission constitutes 'plain error.' ,6i
The court next explained that "to obtain relief under [the plain error] doctrine, defendant must establish that the omission was error, and that, in light
'6 2
of the record as a whole, the error had a probable impact on the verdict."
52. Odom, 307 N.C. at 662, 300 S.E.2d at 379.
53. Id. at 661, 300 S.E.2d at 378.
54. Id. at 661, 300 S.E.2d at 378-79 (citing United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d 1003 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978)) (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 661-62, 300 S.E.2d at 379.
56. 87 N.C. App. 626, 362 S.E.2d 288 (1987).
57. Neither defense nor prosecution counsel requested instructions on lesser included offenses. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at app. 39a-41a, State v. Bell, 87 N.C. App. 626, 362 S.E.2d
288 (1987) (No. 8714SC186).
58. Bell, 87 N.C. App. at 627, 362 S.E.2d at 289. At the end of the state's case, the trial
court dismissed the second charge against Bell: discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle.
Id.
59. Id. at 627-28, 362 S.E.2d at 289.
60. Id. at 635-36, 362 S.E.2d at 293-94.
61. Id. at 634, 362 S.E.2d at 293.
62. Id. at 635, 362 S.E.2d at 293 (citing State v. Sams, 317 N.C. 230, 241, 345 S.E.2d 179,
186 (1986)) (emphasis added).
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Looking at the entire record, the Bell court found plain error. It noted there
was evidence from which the jury could have found the defendant guilty of
simple assault. Specifically, there was conflicting evidence about whether
Bell used a firearm when he assaulted the victim.6" The Bell court distinguished Odom by pointing out that, in Odom, "the State's evidence of guilt
was clear and the defendant's evidence [was] neither credible nor
corroborated."'
In State v. Liner,6 5 the State indicted and tried Barry Dean Liner on
second-degree murder charges. In the course of the charge conference, the
judge questioned Liner and found that he willingly elected not to have
lesser included offenses submitted to the jury. 66 The jury subsequently convicted Liner of murder.6 7 Liner appealed his conviction and argued that the
trial court erred by failing to submit involuntary manslaughter to the jury.6 8
The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected Liner's argument and
sustained his conviction.6 9 The court said that although the trial judge must
submit lesser included offenses when supported by the evidence, prior cases
did not establish that a "defendant cannot waive his right to have verdicts of
lesser included offenses submitted to the jury even though the evidence
63.
64.
65.
(1990).
66.

Id. at 635, 362 S.E.2d at 293.
Id. at 636, 362 S.E.2d at 293.
98 N.C. App. 600, 391 S.E.2d 820, disc. rev. denied, 327 N.C. 435, 395 S.E.2d 693

Id. at 608-09, 391 S.E.2d at 824. The charge conference went as follows:
MR. HUNT [defendant's counsel]: ... If I might ask the Court to inquire-I don't
know if this is proper, but I discussed lesser included offenses also with my client, as to
whether or not he wanted me to request that, and he has indicated, and I have a signed
statement to that effect, that he is aware of the circumstances and has elected only to
request that the Court submit it on second degree murder or not guilty, and I just wanted
the record to reflect that, and if the Court wanted to inquire, I have no objection.
COURT: Mr. Liner, if you would stand, please, sir.
Mr. Liner, you have conferred with your attorney, Mr. Hunt, as to your election not
to request this Court [to] submit to the jury' the lesser included offenses of voluntary
manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter, is that correct?
MR. LINER: Yes, your Honor.
COURT: Has he explained to you those charges?
MR. LINER: Yes.
COURT: ... and you have asked him any questions you desired?
MR. LINER: Yes, sir.
COURT: And is it your decision after conferring with your attorney not to request
this Court to instruct on involuntary manslaughter and voluntary manslaughter?
MR. LINER: Yes, your Honor.
Id. (quoting Brief for the State at 26-27, State v. Liner, 98 N.C. App. 600, 391 S.E.2d 820, disc.
rev. denied,327 N.C. 435, 395 S.E.2d 693 (1990) (No. 8915SC888) (quoting Transcript at 29293, State of North Carolina General Court of Justice, Superior Court Division, Alamance County
(No. 88-CRS-21207))).
67. Id. at 604, 391 S.E.2d at 822.
68. Id. at 608, 391 S.E.2d at 824.
69. Id. at 609-10, 391 S.E.2d at 825.

1994]

CRIMINAL LAW

1729

1994)CRIMIAL
LA1172
might give
rise to such verdicts. 7 ° Instead,
defendants may knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waive instructions on lesser included offenses. 7 ' Based on this rule, the court then held that Liner had "knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily waived" 72 his right to submit the lesser included offenses to the jury.
Liner and State v. Collins73 are distinguishable. In Liner, the trial
court expressly asked the defendant if he wanted an instruction on a lesser
included offense; 74 in Collins, the trial court did not. During the Collins
charge conference, the trial court never expressly asked the defendant if he
wanted an instruction on a lesser included offense-in this case, attempted
murder. The trial court asked only if the defendant had "any requests for
special instructions, or any recommended alternative verdicts to be submitted."7 5 Later, after charging the jury on murder, the trial court again failed
to ask the defendant if he wanted an instruction on attempted murder.7 6
Thus, the record discloses that Collins's counsel did not make clear whether
Collins wanted to waive his right to submit the lesser included offense to
the jury. Collins and Liner are distinguishable on this basis, as Liner did
make clear his intention to waive his right.7 7
The distinction between Collins and Liner is a sensible one. Under
Collins, a trial judge must clarify the defendant's waiver of jury instructions
on a lesser included offense. Unless such a waiver appears on the record,
an appellate court will grant the defendant a new trial so that a jury can
consider whether the defendant is guilty of the omitted lesser offense. This
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
follows:

Id. at 609, 391 S.E.2d at 825.
Id. at 609-10, 391 S.E.2d at 825.
Id.
334 N.C. 54, 431 S.E.2d 188 (1993).
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
Brief for the State at 29.
Record at 28-29. The conversation between the trial court and defense counsel went as

THE COURT: Ms. Sunshine [prosecutor], Mr. Saunders [prosecutor], Mr. Siskind
[defense counsel], before sending this verdict form into the jury and allowing them to
begin their deliberations, I'll now consider any requests for corrections to the charge or
any additional matter that any of you may feel is necessary or appropriate to submit a
proper charge to the jury.
On behalf of the State, are there any specific requests for corrections or additions to
the charge?
MS. SUNSHINE: No, sir.
THE COURT: Mr. Siskind, on behalf of the defendant are there any specific requests or additions to the charge?
MR. SISKIND: Your Honor, I still object to the footnoted portion that you gave on
proximate cause.
THE COURT: All right. Objection overruled. Please hand the verdict [form] in to
the jury, please.
Id.
77. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
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rule reflects a sensible policy: Courts should not allow criminal defendants
to waive their rights unless they fully understand the consequences of waiving those rights.78
The distinction also sheds light on State v. Bell.7 9 In Bell, as in Collins, the trial judge failed to elicit properly the defendant's waiver of jury
instructions on a lesser included offense. The Bell court consequently overturned the defendant's conviction and granted him a new trial so a jury
could consider whether he was guilty of the omitted lesser offense.8 0
Although one can harmonize Collins with Liner and Bell-two of the
cases in which the plain error rule and the lesser included offense rule converge-harmonizing Collins with State v. Odom8 is more difficult. In
Odom, as in Collins and Bell, the trial court failed to elicit the defendant's
waiver of jury instructions on a lesser included offense; the Odom court,
however, refused to find plain error.
On closer examination, though, Odom is distinguishable from Collins
and Bell in light of one important factor: "In deciding whether a defect in
the jury instruction constitutes 'plain error,' [an] appellate court must examine the entire record and determine if the instructional error had a probable impact on the jury's finding of guilt."8 2 The complete Odom record
suggested that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on a lesser included offense did not result in plain error, because the State presented a
very strong case, and the defendant a weak one.83 Even absent the error,
the jury likely would have convicted the defendant. In contrast, the Bell
court found strong evidence -from which the jury could have found the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and innocent of the greater offense.8 4
Absent the error, it is likely the jury would not have convicted the defendant of the greater offense.
Similarly, the entire Collins record suggested that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on attempted murder resulted in plain error. The
Collins court stressed Dr. Hudson's service as North Carolina's Chief Medical Examiner 5 and noted Dr. Hudson's unequivocal conclusion that a pre78. Cf. State v. Roux, 263 N.C. 149, 155-58, 139 S.E.2d 189, 193-95 (1964) (holding that
defendants may waive a right only after intelligent consideration of the consequences of this
waiver).
79. 87 N.C. App. 626, 362 S.E.2d 288 (1987).
80. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
81. 307 N.C. 655, 300 S.E.2d 375 (1983).
82. Odom, 307 N.C. at 661, 300 S.E.2d at 378-79 (citing United States v. Jackson, 569 F.2d
1003 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 907 (1978)) (emphasis added).
83. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
85. "Dr. Page Hudson [was] a forensic pathologist of impeccable medical credentials who
had performed approximately 5,000 autopsies and who had taught forensic pathology at several
nationally recognized medical colleges ....
" Collins, 334 N.C. at 62, 431 S.E.2d at 193.
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existing gallbladder disease, not a gunshot wound, caused the victim's
death. 6 The strength of Dr. Hudson's evidence, coupled with the trial
court's failure to give the instruction on attempted murder, led the Collins
87
court to find plain error.
After Collins, the relationship between the plain error rule and the
lesser included offense rule is clearer. First, Collins suggests that the North
Carolina Supreme Court is ready to use both rules to aid criminal defendants. After refusing, in earlier cases, to overturn convictions based on the
rules,8" the court showed that, under proper circumstances, it would use the
rules to overturn convictions.
Second, Collins reveals that, although the court will use the rules, it
will do so only in limited circumstances: when the entire trial record indicates that the jury could reasonably have reached a different verdict. This
standard puts a heavy burden on defendants seeking to use the rules to overturn convictions.
Finally, Collins indicates that the court will not easily find that defendants have waived their rights to instructions on lesser included offenses.
The court will demand that defendants make their waivers expressly and
that the trial court get these waivers on the record. At first glance, this rule
seems overly technical; upon closer examination, however, the rule is sensible. Courts should not allow criminal defendants to waive their rights unless they fully understand the consequences of waiving those rights. By
demanding that defendants expressly waive their rights on the record, courts
will ensure that full understanding is reached.
Collins thus establishes that criminal defendants should, under narrow
circumstances, get a second chance when their lawyers mishandle their defenses at trial. This narrowly tailored rule conserves judicial resources and
prevents miscarriages of justice.
JOSEPH

E. SMrrH

86. The court found that "[tihe testimony of Dr. Hudson was substantial evidence tending to
show that no action by the defendant either caused or directly contributed to the death of the
victim." Collins, 334 N.C. at 61, 431 S.E.2d at 192. The court further found that "the testimony
of Dr. Page Hudson... clearly and unequivocally tended to show that the defendant's action in
shooting the victim had nothing to do with the victim's death.' Id. at 62, 431 S.E.2d at 193.
87. Id. at 62, 431 S.E.2d at 193.
88. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.

Crawford v. Air Line Pilots Association: The Fourth Circuit
Determines What Expenses a Union May Charge to
Nonunion Workers
Tension between the competing policies of labor empowerment and
the workers' right to dissent from union policies has been an enduring feature of the law of organized labor. The United States Supreme Court generally has supported both "union shop" agreements,' under which all3
employees are required to join the union,2 and "agency-shop" agreements,
which require nonunion employees to pay union dues.4 However, the Court
has determined that the First Amendment limits the purposes for which a
union may use compulsory fees. 5 Unfortunately, the Court has been anything but clear in its delineation of which purposes are permissible.6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently
confronted the issue of compulsory fees in Crawford v. Air Line Pilots
Ass'n,7 a case decided under the federal Railway Labor Act (RLA). 8 The
1. Railway Employees Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 235 (1956).
2. Abood v. Detroit Bd.of Educ. 431 U.S. 209, 217 n.10 (1977) (stating that a union-shop
provision in a collective bargaining agreement requires employees to join the union within a certain period of time and to pay all dues and fees uniformly required by the union).
3. Id. at 225-26.
4. Id. at 211 (stating that an agency-shop agreement requires all employees either to join the
union or to pay to the union an agency fee for the union's services in representing them in collective bargaining with the employer). For further comparison of the union shop and the agency
shop, see ROBERT A. GoRMAN,LABOR LAW 642 (1976).
5. E.g., Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S.Ct. 1950, 1957 (1991) ('To force employees
to contribute... to the promotion of [social, political, and ideological] positions implicates core
First Amendment concerns."); Abood, 431 U.S. at 222 ('To compel employees financially to
support their collective-bargaining representative has an impact upon their First Amendment interests."); see also infra notes 66-125 and accompanying text. The Lehnert Court cited Wooley v.
Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977), which established that "[t]he right of freedom of thought
protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and
the right to refrain from speaking at all." The state action that implicates the First Amendment in
this context is the statutory authorization of compulsory fees. Communications Workers v. Beck,
487 U.S. 735, 760 (1988); Abood, 431 U.S. at 226; Hanson, 351 U.S. at 232.
The issues of mandatory membership and dues also arise in the legal profession. See David
F. Addicks, Renovating the Bar After Keller v. State Bar of California: A Proposalfor Strict
Limits on Compulsory Fee Expenditure, 25 U.S.F. L. Rv. 681, 681-82 (1991); Mary Bannister,
Keller v. State Bar of California: Freedomfrom Ideological Associationfor Members of IntegratedBarAssociations, 35 ST. Louis U. LJ.903, 903 (1991).
6. See infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
7. 992 F.2d 1295 (4th Cir. 1993) (en bane), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 195 (1993).
8. See id. at 1297 (citing 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1988)). For a discussion of the origins of
the RLA, see infra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. The RLA applies to airlines as well as
railroads. 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1988). Section 2, Eleventh, of the RLA-the provision at issue in
Crawford, see Crawford, 992 F.2d at 1297-expressly preempts state law. 45 U.S.C. § 152,
Eleventh (1988). The RLA thus applies even in states where the "right to work" is guaranteed by
the state constitution. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 228, 232-33 (1956);
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court was asked to determine whether the defendant union, the Air Line
Pilots Association (ALPA), could charge nonunion pilots for several categories of expenditures made to support strikes by ALPA members at other
airlines.? It found each of the expenses to be chargeable to the nonunion
workers, holding that "extra-unit bargaining expenditures are legitimate if
there is 'some indication that the payment is for services that may ultimately enure to the benefit of the members of the local union by virtue of
their membership in the parent organization."1 0
This Note first discusses the competing analyses of the Crawford plurality, concurrence, and dissent." The Note then tracks the evolution of the
standard used to determine what expenses a union may charge to nonunion
employees, 2 and critiques the reasoning of the Crawford court in light of
Supreme Court precedent.' 3 Finally, the Note suggests an alternative solution to the problem of expenses that promise only indirect benefits to objecting workers.' 4
The facts of Crawford arose from a series of strikes by ALPA pilots in
the mid-1980s. During that period, ALPA represented pilots at forty-three
different airlines,' 5 serving as the exclusive bargaining representative for all
pilots employed by the airlines-union members and nonmembers alike.' 6
ALPA's "agency-shop" contracts with airline management required all pilots either to join ALPA or to pay the union an agency fee for its services as
the pilots' exclusive bargaining representative.' 7 The plaintiffs were nonunion pilots from eight of the airlines whose pilots ALPA represented.'"
cf 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1988) (establishing a preserve for state right-to-work laws in the National

Labor Relations Act).
9. See infra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
10. Crawford,992 F.2d at 1300 (plurality opinion) (quoting Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n,
111 S. Ct. 1950, 1961-62 (1991)).
11. See infra notes 38-58 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 59-125 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 126-68 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 169-86 and accompanying text.
15. Crawford, 992 F.2d at 1297 (plurality opinion).
16. Crawford,992 F.2d at 1297 (plurality opinion). "Exclusivity," the idea that the union has
the sole power to negotiate for workers in a bargaining unit, "is a fundamental premise of American labor policy." WALTR E. OBERER Er AL., LABOR LAw 213 (3d ed. 1986); see also 45 U.S.C.
§ 152, Fourth (1988) (providing for election of exclusive bargaining representatives); Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50,65 (1975) (acknowledging "long

and consistent adherence to the principle of exclusive representation.'); Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 194-95 (1944) (recognizing that, under the RLA, a majority of
workers has the right to choose the exclusive representative); DONALD P. ROTHSCHILD Er AL.,
COLLECnVE BARGAInING AND LABOR ARBrrRATION 27 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing the principle of
exclusivity). For a general discussion of exclusive representation, see Benjamin Aaron, Rights of
Individual Employees Under the Act, in AMERICAN LABOR POLICY: A CamcAL APPRAISAL OF
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 119, 122-38 (Charles J. Morris ed., 1987).

17. Crawford, 992 F.2d at 1297 (plurality opinion).
18. Id. (plurality opinion).
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In 1983 Continental Air Lines filed for bankruptcy and sought to cancel its collective bargaining agreement with ALPA.19 In response, the Continental pilots went on strike.2" ALPA members in other airlines voted to
pay a special dues assessment to support the strikers.2" Two years later,
during negotiations between ALPA and United Air Lines, the United pilots
went on strike.22 Again, ALPA provided benefits to the striking pilots.2 3
The strikes substantially reduced ALPA's financial strength. 24 Consequently, the union became concerned that its bargaining position had been
weakened by the perception of the airlines' management that ALPA would
be unable to sustain future strikes.' In late 1985, ALPA members voted to
increase their dues to create a contingency fund for unforeseen fiscal
needs.2 6 The fund initially was used to continue the support of the striking
pilots at Continental and United,27 as well as to offset the expense of litigation associated with the strikes.2" The fund also provided the means with
which ALPA prepared for a strike at Eastern Air Lines.2 9 In each instance,
30
the expenses were charged to both nonunion and union pilots.
The nonunion pilots sued, arguing that "use of agency fees for expenses related to bargaining outside the unit at the airline where a pilot
works violates both the Railway Labor Act and the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected right of free association. '31 After a bench trial in the
Eastern District of Virginia, the district court ruled that the expenses in
question were appropriately charged to the nonunion pilots. 32 A Fourth
Circuit panel affirmed.3 3 The circuit subsequently granted a rehearing en
19. Id. at 1298 (plurality opinion).
20. Id. (plurality opinion).
21. Id. (plurality opinion).
22. Id (plurality opinion).
23. Id. (plurality opinion).
24. l (plurality opinion).
25. Id. at 1299 (plurality opinion) (citing the findings of the district court).
26. Id. at 1298 (plurality opinion).
27. Id. (plurality opinion).
28. Id. at 1303 (Russell, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 1298 (plurality opinion). The fund was also used to finance union-organizing
drives, a purpose acknowledged by ALPA to be one for which nonunion pilots cannot be charged.
Id. (plurality opinion).
30. See id at 1297-98 (plurality opinion).
31. Id. at 1299 (plurality opinion). The Railway Labor Act authorizes the agency shop.
Compare Act of Jan. 10, 1951, ch. 1220, 64 Stat. 1238 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (a)
(1988)) with Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 452 n.11 (1984) ("§ 2, Eleventh
...may be read to authorize negotiation of an agency shop") and Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 219 n.10 (1977) ("Under federal law, [a union shop] is the 'practical equivalent' of
an agency shop.") (citation omitted).
32. Crawford, 992 F.2d at 1297 (plurality opinion).
33. ld. (plurality opinion).
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banc,3 4 but the decision was postponed to await the Supreme Court's disposition of a similar case, Lehnert v. FerrisFaculty Ass'n.3 5 On rehearing, a
plurality of the Fourth Circuit affirmed its earlier holding. 6 The plurality
determined that a "pro rata share" of the expenses in question "may be
charged to objecting agency-fee payers." 37
The Crawford plurality focused on two categories of expenditures
within the general classification of extra-unit costs: (1) expenses associated
with strikes at other airlines, including preparations for strikes and support
of striking pilots, and (2) capitalization of the major contingency fund.38 It
recognized the standard that Lehnert had established for determining the
constitutionality of charging a nonunion worker for a particular expenditure: "Chargeable activities must '(1) be "germane" to collective-bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the government's vital policy interest in
labor peace and avoiding "free-riders"; and (3) not significantly add to the
burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of an agency or
union shop."'
Although it acknowledged that certain expenses cannot be charged to
nonunion workers,4 ° the plurality ultimately adopted the broad statement of
the Lehnert Court that "extra-unit bargaining expenditures are legitimate if
there is 'some indication that the payment is for services that may ultimately enure to the benefit of the members of the local union by virtue of
34. Id. (plurality opinion).
35. Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, Ill S. Ct. 1950 (1991)).
Lehnert originated under state law, Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1955, so the Supreme Court focused on
the constitutionallimitations within which the state statute was to be interpreted, id. at 1954-55.
Crawford, by contrast, involved a federal cause of action under the Railway Labor Act. Crawford, 992 F.2d at 1297 (plurality opinion).
36. Crawford, 992 F.2d at 1297 (plurality opinion). Judge Butzner wrote for the plurality,
and was joined by Chief Judge Ervin and Judges Hall, Phillips, and Murnaghan. Id. (plurality
opinion).
37. Id. at 1301 (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court denied the pilots' petition for certiorari.
114 S.Ct. 195 (1993).
38. Crawford,992 F.2d at 1299-1301 (plurality opinion). In their supplemental briefs, both
parties addressed a third category of expenditures-those made to cover extra-unit litigation costs.
Id. at 1301 (plurality opinion). The court declined to rule on the merits of the issue, finding that
the plaintiffs had failed to present the question properly because there was no mention of it in the
complaint, stipulations of fact, or findings of the district court. Id. (plurality opinion). The dissent
vehemently objected to the manner in which the plurality disposed of this issue. Id. at 1303-04
(Russell, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 1299-300 (plurality opinion) (quoting Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct.
1950, 1959 (1991)).
40. Id. at 1300 (plurality opinion) ("mhe Constitution bars 'a direct donation or interestfree loan to an unrelated bargaining unit for the purpose of promoting employee rights or unionism generally,' as well as a 'contribution by a local union to its parent' that is 'in the nature of a
charitable donation.' ") (quoting Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1961).
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their membership in the parent organization."' 4 ' Applying this standard,
and stressing the Supreme Court's finding that the power of a national
union is in many cases essential to the bargaining strength of the local
units,42 the plurality determined that expenses in preparation for and in support of extra-unit strikes were vital to the bargaining power of the units that
represented the nonunion pilots.4 3
With respect to the contingency fund, the court rejected the nonunion
pilots' contention that the fund constituted an impermissible "'involuntary
loan."'" It acknowledged the Lehnert Court's holding that agency fees
could not be used for an "interest-free loan" to another bargaining unit to
" 'promot[e] employee rights or unionism generally.' "I4 The Crawford
Court held, however, that the purposes of the contingency fund were not to
" 'promot[e] employee rights or unionism generally,' "46 but were "germane to collective bargaining"47 because they "were designed to further the
union's duty of representation [and thus] were by definition justified by the
policies underlying the RLA."4
In a concurring opinion joined by Judge Wilkins,4 9 Judge Wilkinson
argued that Lehnert was not merely instructive, but direct precedent. 50 As
the basis for his analysis, he reiterated the statement in Lehnert that an expense may be charged to nonunion workers if it might "'ultimately enure to
the benefit of the members of the local union."' 5 ' Relying on the finding of
the district court that "'collective bargaining negotiations at any one airline
are directly affected by, and also directly affect, negotiations at all other
airlines,"' 5 2 Judge Wilkinson determined that the strike expenses could
"'ultimately enure to the benefit"' of pilots other than those at the airlines
whose pilots were striking.53 As a result, and because the expenses were
neither political, ideological, nor intended to foster unionism generally, he
concluded that the constitutional rights of the dissenting workers had not
been violated.54
41. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, Ill S. Ct. 1950, 1961-62
(1991)).
42. Id. (plurality opinion) (citing Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1959).
43. Id. (plurality opinion).
44. Id. (plurality opinion).
45. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1961).
46. Id. (plurality opinion) (quoting Lehnert, 11 S. Ct. at 1961).
47. Id. (plurality opinion).
48. Id.at 1300-01 (plurality opinion).
49. See icL at 1303 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
50. l at 1302 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
51. Id. (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (quoting Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950,
1961-62 (1991)).
52. Id. (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring).
53. Id. at 1303 (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring) (quoting Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1961-62).
54. Id. (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring) (citing Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1957-58).
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Judge Russell, representing five judges,55 dissented, criticizing the
court's interpretation and application of Lehnert.56 He argued that the plurality and concurrence, by embracing a single sentence from the Lehnert
opinion, had interpreted Lehnert too broadly, and thus misapplied the wellestablished standard that an objecting worker can be charged only for those
expenses that are "germane" to collective bargaining in the local unit.57 An
expense is germane, he contended, only if it is "'necessarily or reasonably
incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management
issues.' ",58
Complete analysis of Crawford requires an understanding of its heritage. In the early part of this century, the right of an employee to contract

freely was vigorously protected by the Supreme Court as a basic constitutional right.5 9 Congress passed the RLA in 1926, to facilitate collective
bargaining between railroad workers and their employers.6 0 The original
Act allowed each class of employees of a common carrier to choose, by
majority vote, an exclusive representative to negotiate for the entire class.6"
However, the Act expressly proscribed agreements requiring union membership or support as a condition of employment.6 2 After the Second World
War, Congress became concerned with the problem of "free riders"-workers who were not union members but "obtain[ed], without cost to themselves, the benefits of collective bargaining procured through the efforts of
the dues-paying members. 6 3 In response, Congress amended the Act in
55. Id. at 1318 (Russell, J., dissenting). Judges Widener, Niemeyer, Hamilton, and Luttig
joined the dissent. Id. (Russell, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1303-18 (Russell, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 1306 (Russell, J., dissenting) (citing Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S.
435, 448 (1984); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977); Brotherhood of Ry.
Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 121 (1963)).
58. Crawford, 992 F.2d at 1310 (Russell, J., dissenting) (quoting Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448).
Judge Russell argued that an even closer relationship to collective bargaining is necessary in the
case of an activity involving "'communicative content."' Id. at 1317 (Russell, J., dissenting)
(quoting Ellis, 466 U.S. at 437).
59. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905); Calvin Siemer, Comment, Lehnert v.
Ferris Faculty Ass'n: Accounting to FinancialCore Members: Much A-Dues About Nothing?, 60
FoRD. L. REv. 1057, 1060 n.19 (1992).
60. Act of May 20, 1926, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (current version at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88
(1988)). The Act was amended to include airlines in 1936. Act of April 10, 1936, ch. 166, 49
Stat. 1189 (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1988)).
61. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1988).
62. Id.; cf. Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 750 (1988) (noting that the
original Act required unions to protect the rights of nonunion employees, but did not require that
workers join or otherwise contribute to the unions) (citing H.R. REP. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1950)).
63. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 763-64 & n.14 (1961).
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1951 to permit union-shop agreements-requirements that employees join
the unions.' 4
The amendment-Section 2, Eleventh of the RLA 6 5-soon was subjected to constitutional challenge. In Railway Employees' Department v.

Hanson,66 decided in 1956, nonunion railroad employees urged the
Supreme Court to hold that a union-shop agreement violated their freedoms
of association and expression under the First Amendment.67 The Court rejected the plaintiffs' argument, but with an important caveat: If the charges
were "in fact imposed for purposes not 'germane' to collective bargaining, a
different problem would be presented. 6 8
Five years later, the Court confronted the situation posed in its Hanson
caveat. In International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,6 9 union members
challenged the union-shop provision of the RLA on the ground that it permitted unions to use compulsory dues to support political candidates. 70 The
Court, speaking through Justice Brennan, acknowledged that the plaintiffs
had presented a constitutional issue.7 1 It recognized, however, that
"[flederal statutes are to be so construed as to avoid serious doubt of their
constitutionality. ' 72 Noting that the narrow policy behind Section 2, Eleventh was to eliminate the "free rider," 73 the Court construed the statute "to
64. Act of Jan. 10, 1951, ch. 1220, 64 Stat. 1238 (codified at 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (a)
(1988)); see Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 231 (1956). The Court subsequently ruled that approval by Congress of the less intrusive agency shop-the type of arrangement at issue in Crawford-canbe inferred from § 152, Eleventh. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 217 n.10 (1977).
Section 152, Eleventh was modeled after an analogous provision of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Beck, 487 U.S. at 745-46 (citing the LaborManagement Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-1-1, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-87 (1988))). The Act permitted authorized arrangements requiring
workers to join the union within thirty days of being hired. See Siemer, supra note 59, at 1061 &
n.29 (citing S. RP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEoISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEmENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 413 (1985)). In Beck, the
Supreme Court found the material provisions of the RLA and NLRA to be "in all material respects
identical," and thus ruled that they are controlled by the same analysis and precedent. 487 U.S. at
746.
65. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh.
66. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
67. lId at 236-37.
68. Id. at 235. For further discussion of Hanson, see GOEmAN, supra note 4, at 655-56.
69. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
70. Id. at 744-45. The union members were compelled, as a condition of employment, to pay
union fees pursuant to a union-shop agreement. Id. at 742.
71. Id. at 749.
72. Id. The Court avoided deciding the constitutionality of the statute, however, by applying
another "cardinal principle"-before reaching the issuedof constitutionality, the "Court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided." Id. at 749. The Court found an "entirely reasonable" construction which made it unnecessary to decide the constitutional issue. Id. at 750.
73. Id. at 763-64 & n.14, 767.
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deny the unions, over an employee's objection, the power to use his exacted
funds to support political causes which he opposes."'74 The Court expressly
left open the question of expenditures for purposes falling between the extremes of political costs and collective bargaining expenses. 75
In Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,7 6 the Court addressed a case
within that gray area. The plaintiffs contended that their First Amendment
rights were violated by use of compulsory fees for "'social .... economic,
political, professional, scientific, and religious"' activities.7 7 The Court
recognized that coercing an employee to pay dues to a union, even if solely
for collective bargaining purposes, interferes with the employee's rights
under the First Amendment. 71 It affirmed, however, the holdings of Hanson and Street, in which the Court had concluded that the effect of
mandatory support for collective bargaining purposes on First Amendment
freedoms is justified by the congressional policy of preventing free riders.79
Nevertheless, the Court agreed with the plaintiffs that employment could
not be conditioned on contributions for ideological purposes not "germane"
to the collective bargaining duties of the union. 0
The Supreme Court has confronted the issue of mandatory union fees
more frequently during the past decade. In Ellis v. Brotherhoodof Railway
74. Id. at 768-69. The Court's conclusion was based on an examination of the legislative
history of § 152, Eleventh. Id. at 749-60. But cf Norman L. Cantor, Uses and Abuses of the
Agency Shop, 59 NoTE DAME L. REv. 61, 108 (1983) (arguing that the prohibition on compulsory fees for political purposes is based on "an inaccurate appraisal of congressional intent"). The
phrase "over an employee's objection" is critical. A union is precluded from charging an employee for political purposes only if the employee makes known her objection to the use of her
funds for such purposes. Street, 367 U.S. at 774; cf. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S.
113, 118-19 (1963) (holding that while dissent must be affirmative, it need not be specific-"it is
enough that [the employee] manifests his opposition to any political expenditures by the union").
75. Street, 367 U.S. at 769. For a discussion of Street, see GORmAN, supra note 4, at 656-57.
In Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963), which originated in North Carolina,
the Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Street that employees who expressly object may not
be charged for political expenses. Id. at 118. However, it held that objection does not entitle an
employee to withhold all payments to the union. Id. at 119-20. No relief is ordinarily available,
the Court ruled, until final judgment is entered in favor of the employee. Id. at 120. For a discussion of Allen, see GoimAN, supra note 4, at 657-58.
76. 431 U.S. 209 (1977). Unlike Street and Hanson, but like Lehnert, Abood arose in the
public sector under a state statute. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 211. The Court determined that the
same constitutional analysis applied despite the difference. See id. at 217.
77. Id. at 213 (quoting Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint). For a general discussion of the
constitutional issue in the public sector, see David B. Yelin, ConstitutionalConsiderationsAffecting the Methods of Exacting Union "Fair-Share"Collective BargainingFees FromNon-Member
Public Employees, 3 DET. C.L. REv. 767 (1985).
78. Id. at 222.
79. Id.; see also supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
80. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36. The Court also held that a union could not avoid violation of
the act by "limit[ing] the use of the actual dollars collected from dissenting employees to collective-bargaining purposes." Id. at 237 n.35. Such a remedy would be "of bookkeeping significance only rather than a matter of real substance." Id.
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Clerks,"' which arose under the RLA, the Court addressed the legality of

expenses for purposes that were neither political nor directly connected to
collective bargaining. 2 It reaffirmed its earlier decisions, holding that a
union may charge objecting employees for expenses "'germane to collective bargaining."'"3 More importantly, it explained the degree of relationship that "germane" was intended to describe. The Court defined

"germane" expenses as those "necessarily or reasonably incurred for the
purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues." 4 Applying its analysis to the facts, the Court held that dissenters could not be

charged for the costs of union organizing efforts.8 5 It reasoned that enhancement of union strength was not within the legislative policy that
prompted the passage of Section 2, Eleventh. 6 Organizing expenses, the
Court determined, "can afford only the most attenuated benefits to collective bargaining on behalf of the dues payer.""7 In contrast, the Court ruled
that the union could charge dissenters for conventions, social activities, and
portions of the union magazine dealing with collective bargaining issues.88
It reasoned that those expenses were for normal activities that improved the

union's effectiveness at the bargaining table by fostering communication
among its officers and members.8 9
The next major case in this area was Communications Workers v.
Beck,9" decided in 1988. The Court again noted that the legislative purpose
of Section 2, Eleventh is to eliminate free riders, 9' and reaffirmed its holdFor commentary on Abood, see Milton L. Chappell, From Abood to Tierney: The Protection
of Nonunion Employees in an Agency Shop; You've Come a Long Way, 15 Onio N.U. L. Rav. 1,
1-3, 16 (1988).
81. 466 U.S. 435 (1984).
82. lad at 440. Expenditures were made for "the quadrennial Grand Lodge convention, litigation not involving the negotiation of agreements or settlement of grievances, union publications,
social activities, death benefits for employees, and general organizing efforts." Id.
83. Id. at 456 (quoting Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963)).
84. Id. at 448.
85. Id. at 452-53.
86. lad at 451-52.
87. Id. at 452. While the Court explained that the policy of preventing free riders does not
justify charging for such expenses, id., it acknowledged that
employees [may] ultimately ride for free on the union's organizing efforts outside the
bargaining unit. But the free rider Congress had in mind was the employee the union
was required to represent and from whom it could not withhold benefits obtained for its
members. Nonbargaining unit organizing is not directed at that employee.
Id.
88. Id at 448-51.
89. Id.
90. 487 U.S. 735 (1988). The Supreme Court heard Beck on writ of certiorari from an en
banc decision of the Fourth Circuit. Id. at 741 (citing Beck v. Communications Workers, 800 F.2d
1280 (4th Cir. 1986) (en bane)).
91. Id. at 762; see also supra notes 63-64, 73 and accompanying text.
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ing in Ellis that the statute permits a union to charge dissenting employees

only for expenses incurred by the union in its role as exclusive bargaining
representative.9 2 More importantly, the Court disregarded the fact that Beck

arose under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), rather than the
RLA. 93 It determined that the relevant portions of the statutes are "in all
material respects identical" and thus deemed Street to be controlling. 4
The most recent decision of the Supreme Court in this area-a decision on which the Crawford court heavily reliedg 5-is Lehnert v. Ferris
Faculty Ass'n.96 Lehnert involved a Michigan statute that authorized
agency shops in the public sector.9 7 The plaintiffs alleged that their rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments had been violated by the allocation of their dues "for purposes other than negotiating and administ[er]ing a collective-bargaining agreement" at the local level.9" The
Supreme Court, sharply divided on the issues,99 produced four opinions,
none of which was joined in full by a majority of the Court. 1°°
Justice Blackmun wrote for the Court.' 0 ' From prior cases, he derived
the three-prong test that was later relied upon by the Crawford court: For

an expense to be chargeable, its purpose "must (1) be 'germane' to collec92. Id. at 762-63 (citing Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984)).
93. Id. at 745-46 (citing the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141-87 (1988); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1988)).
94. Id. at 745, For more extensive examination of Beck, see Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt,
Union Security Agreements Under the National Labor Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court's Opinion in Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 51 (1990); Elena Matsis, Proce-

dural Rights of FairShare Objectors after Hudson and Beck, 6 LAB. LAw. 251 (1990); Rex H.
Reed, Revolution Ahead: Communications Workers v. Beck, 13 HAIv. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 635
(1990); Lisa Rhode, Note, Section 8(a)(3) Limitation to the Union's Use of Dues-Equivalents:The
Implications of Communications Workers v. Beck, 57 U. CIN. L. REv. 1567 (1989).
95. See Crawford,992 F.2d 1295 passim; see also supra notes 35-54 and accompanying text.
96. Ill S.Ct. 1950 (1991).
97. Id. at 1955 (citing the Public Employment Relations Act, MICH. CoMP. LAws

§§ 423.201-.216 (1978) (amended 1994)).
98. Id. at 1956. The defendant, Ferris Faculty Association (FFA), was a local affiliate of
larger state and national organizations. Id. at 1955. Of the annual dues paid by FFA members,
less than 10% was allotted directly to the local union. Id. at 1955-56.
99. Id. at 1950-82.
100. Id.Lehnert was the first case to address the agency fee issue after the retirement of
Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinions of the Court in Street,Allen, and Beck. His replacement,
Justice Souter, joined the opinion of Justice Scalia. Id. at 1975.
101. Id. at 1954. The opinion was joined in its entirety by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice
White, and Justice Stevens. Id. Justice Marshall joined the opinion in selected parts, which together constituted the only majority opinion in the case. Id. In the discussion that follows, references to "the Court" will indicate portions of the opinion that were joined by Justice Marshall, and
references to "Justice Blackmun" will indicate portions that Justice Marshall did not join, and
which therefore represent the view of only four justices. It should be noted that even those portions that Justice Marshall did not join state the decision of the Court, because on those issues the
votes of the plurality were aligned with those Justices who joined the opinion of Justice Scalia.
See id. at 1975-81 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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tive bargaining activity; (2) be justified by the government's vital policy
interest in labor policy and avoiding 'free riders'; and (3) not significantly
add to the burdening of free speech that is inherent in the allowance of an
agency or union shop."' 0 2 With respect to the first prong, the Court explained that to be "germane" an expense need not directly benefit the bargaining unit of the objecting employee.1 °3 It stated that the connection is
sufficient if there is "some indication that the payment is for services that
may ultimately enure to the benefit of the members of the local union by
virtue of their membership in the parent organization."' 0 4
Although five justices agreed on the rule, a majority of the Court could
not agree on how the rule should be applied to the specific expenses in
question. Justice Blackmun found that unless the issue is the "ratification
or implementation of a dissenter's collective bargaining agreement," lobbying expenses are insufficiently related to collective bargaining to be chargeable to the objector. 10 5 Applying the rule expounded by the Court, he
reasoned that in such a situation the "'free-rider' concern is inapplicable,"
and the infringement on First Amendment rights is significant because of
the public nature of the speech.' 06 Justice Marshall, though he applied the
same rule as Justice Blackmun, concluded that the lobbying costs in question were chargeable.' 0 7 He noted that the objective of the lobbying was to
increase public funding for jobs, pay, and benefits for teachers,108 and contended that the need to prevent free-riding was as important in that context
as in direct contract negotiations. 10 9
Justices Blackmun and Marshall also disagreed with respect to expenditures for public-relations support of the teaching profession in general.
Justice Blackmun found the connection between such expenses and the
union's function as collective bargaining agent insufficient to justify "'increas[ing] the infringement of [the employee's] First Amendment rights
already resulting from the compelled contribution to the union.' ' 110 Justice
Marshall contended that the public-relations campaign had taken place during bargaining with the union and was intended to arouse public opinion in
support of a favorable contract for the teachers."' The campaign was
within the duty of the union as bargaining representative for the employees,
102. Id. at 1959; see also supra note 39 and accompanying text.
103. Id. at 1961.
104. Id. at 1961-62.
105. Il at 1959-60 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).
106. Id. at 1960 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).
107. Id. at 1968-69 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108. IL at 1967 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
109. See id. at 1968-69 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110. Id. at 1964 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks,
466 U.S. 435, 456 (1984)).
111. Id. at 1971 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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he argued, 12 and therefore should be chargeable to the nonunion

employees."

A final point of disagreement was whether extra-unit litigation expenses could be charged. 1 3 Justice Blackmun stated that such expenses
were not chargeable because (1) litigation is by nature political and expressive, and (2) extra-unit litigation is not "germane to the union's duties as
exclusive bargaining representative.""' 4 However, Justice Marshall argued
that the extra-unit litigation expenses were "germane" to the duties of the
15
union in both collective bargaining and grievance disputes.'
The five Justices who applied Lehnert's three-prong test did agree with
respect to several particular expenses. They determined that expenditures
in preparation for a threatened strike by the local union are chargeable to
nonunion members, even if the strike would be illegal. 1 6 Even mere prepa-

ration, they reasoned, is a useful bargaining tool for the union in its capacity
as exclusive representative." 7 In addition, the five justices permitted the
union to charge workers for portions of a union magazine that concerned
"teaching and education generally."" 8 Perhaps most important to the
Crawford court, they agreed that dissenting employees can be charged for
their share of the common collective bargaining costs of the national

union."

9

Justice Scalia, writing for himself and three other justices, vigorously
disagreed with the rule established by the Court.' 20 He suggested a narrower rule: Costs can be charged to objecting employees only if expended
112. Id. at 1967, 1971 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In response to
Justice Blackmun's concern about the infringement of free speech rights, Justice Marshall quoted
Justice Blackmun's own language: "'[T]he extent of one's disagreement with the subject of
compulsory speech is relevant to the degree of impingement upon free expression that compulsion
will effect,"' he argued, so general promotion of the teaching profession does not significantly
impinge upon the free expression of teachers. Id. at 1972 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting id. at 1960 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion)).
113. Id. at 1967, 1972 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
114. Id. at 1963-64 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion) (citing Ellis, 466 U.S. at 453; NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963)).
115. Id. at 1973 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion of
the Crawford court's treatment of extra-unit litigation expenses, see supra note 38.
116. Id. at 1965.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1964.
119. Id. at 1963.
120. Id. at 1975-81 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
Justices O'Connor and Souter, and Justice Kennedy in part, joined Justice Scalia's opinion. Justice Scalia argued that the Court's test offers little or no guidance to lower courts and potential
litigants, id. at 1976 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part), and that
the test is not, as the Court claimed, suggested by prior cases, id. at 1975 (Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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1

affecting "the

Such duties, he

contended, do not include strike preparation or magazine articles concerning "teaching and education generally."' 2 3 Nor do they include costs in-

curred by the national union in dispensing collective bargaining support
services, except for services "actuallyprovided' to the local union.' 24 The
duties are limited, he argued, to "'negotiating and administering a collective-bargaining agreement and representing the interests of employees in
settling disputes and processing grievances.' 2212
The Crawfordplurality and concurrence cited Lehnert's three-part test
and applied it to the facts with little reference to the reasoning employed by
the cases that preceded Lehnert.'z6 Since the Lehnert Court professed to do

no more than clarify the holdings of earlier cases, 27 complete examination
of the Lehnert test requires analysis of those cases.
The ban on charging dissenters for expenses not germane to collective
bargaining has been part of RLA jurisprudence since Hanson, 28 when the

Court first addressed the constitutionality of compulsory fees under the stat121. Id. at 1981 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
122. Id. at 1975 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
123. Id. at 1979-81 (Scalia, J.,concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting id. at 1964 (Blackmnun, J., plurality opinion)). Justice Kennedy wrote separately to disagree with Justice Scalia regarding the strike expenses, which he considered "indistinguishable in
substance from other expenses of negotiating a collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 1981
(Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). With the exception of
that single issue, he joined in full the opinion of Justice Scalia. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
124. Id. at 1980-81 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
125. Id. at 1978 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (quoting
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209, 221 (1977)). Prior to Crawford,only one other circuit
had interpreted the Lehnert decision. In Pilots Against Illegal Dues v. Air Line Pilots Association,
938 F.2d 1123 (10th Cir. 1991), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted the Lehnert proposition
that an expense may be charged if it might ultimately benefit the members of the local union, and
concluded that the expense must assist the unit in its bargaining with the employer. Id. at 1128
(quoting Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950, 1961-62 (1991)). It explained, however, that the expenditures in question-used to cover "negotiating and administrative expenses
incurred outside of the.., bargaining unit"'-were permissible because they were used to create a
"bargaining tool" for the local bargaining unit. Id. For a more extensive analysis of Pilots
Against Illegal Dues, see Craig Negler, Tenth Circuit Survey: Transportation, 69 DENv. U. L.
REv. 1097, 1102-03 (1992).
For further analysis of the Lehnert decision, see generally Joseph A. Ciucci, Defining the
PermissibleUses of Objecting Members' Agency Dues: Is the Solution Any ClearerAfter Lehnert
v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n?, 70 U. Dar. MERCY L. REv. 89 (1992); Charles J. Ogeka, Comment,
Respecting Nonunion Member Employees' Rights While Avoiding a Free Ride, Lehnert v. Ferris
Faculty Ass'n, 10 HorsTRA LAa. LJ.349 (1992); Siemer, supra note 59.
126. See supra notes 38-54 and accompanying text.
127. Lehnert, 11 S.Ct. at 1959; see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
128. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); see also supra notes 66-68
and accompanying text.
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ute.' 29 The Hanson Court allowed the fees only because "[t]he financial
support required relate[d] ... to the work of the union in the realm of
collective bargaining."'130 Since Hanson, the Court repeatedly has reaffirmed that standard and attempted to clarify its meaning. 131 The Ellis
Court applied the test liberally, ruling that to be germane an expense need
not directly affect collective bargaining.132 However, the Court was careful
to qualify its holding by reiterating that the expense must be within "the
employees in dealing with the
duties of an exclusive representative of the
33
employer on labor-management issues."1
That qualification by the Ellis Court is consistent with the legislative
34
policy that underlies Section 2, Eleventh-the prevention of free riders.'
That policy, in turn, applies only in the context of the broader policy of the
RLA-the facilitation of collective bargaining.131 The Court has made
clear that compelling agency fees always infringes on the First Amendment
rights of the employee, even when the fees are used solely to finance the
services of the union at the bargaining table.' 36 It has permitted such infringement only because of the importance of the underlying legislative policies.137 Following this line of reasoning, an expense that does not
encourage workers to free ride on the union's advocacy vis-h-vis the employer, and thus is not supported by legislative policy, should never be
charged to dissenting workers. That a union expense may benefit workers
is irrelevant if the benefit is not of the type that Congress intends unions to
foster-increased leverage "in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues.' 3 8
129. Hanson, 351 U.S. at 231-38.
130. Id. at 235.
131. See supra notes 69-125 and accompanying text.
132. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984).
133. Icl; see also supra note 84 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 63-64, 73 and accompanying text.
135. See Herbert R. Northrup, The Railway Labor Act-Time for Repeal?, 13 HARv. J.L. &
Pu. PoL'Y 441, 442 (1990); William E. Thomas & Frank J. Dooley, Collective Bargaining
Underthe Railway Labor Act, 20 TRA sP. L.J. 275, 275 (1992); Beth S. Adler, Comment, Deregulation in the Airline Industry: Toward a New Judicial Interpretationof the Railway Labor Act,
80 Nw. U. L. Rav. 1003, 1004-05 (1986); cf. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471
U.S. 724, 757 n.32 (1985) ("The Railway Labor Act... seeks to provide a means by which
agreement may be reached .... ") (citing Terminal R.R. Ass'n v. Railroad Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1,
6-7 (1943)). The text of the RLA does not address union activities other than dealings with
management. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1988).
136. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 455 ("[Bly allowing the union shop at all, we have already countenanced a significant impingement on First Amendment rights."); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977).
137. See Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735,762 (1988); Ellis,466 U.S. at 45556; Abood, 431 U.S. at 222.
138. Ellis,466 U.S. at 448; accord Beck, 487 U.S. at 762-63; see also supra notes 58, 133 and
accompanying text.
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Subtly, but with significant impact on the Crawford court, the
Supreme Court in Lehnert shifted away from its previous emphasis on the
nexus between the expense and collective bargaining. Unlike its predecessors, Lehnert did not stress that the benefit to the unit must be in the area of
collective bargaining13 9 or labor-management issues.' 40 Its statement that
for an expense to be charged "[t]here must be some indication that the
payment is for services that may ultimately enure to the benefit of the members of the local union" ' 141 implies that the benefit to the worker need not be
in the form of increased leverage against the employer.
Although the Court's decision with respect to several expenses certainly comports with the notion that expenses must result in a benefit at the
bargaining table,142 one expense that the Court considered chargeable was

related to the bargaining position of the union only very remotely, if at all.
The Court allowed the union to charge dissenters for the costs of producing
portions of the union magazine that consisted of general information about
the teaching profession. 43 Its justification was curious: "[T]hese expenditures are for the benefit of all and we discern no additionalinfringement of
First Amendment rights that they might occasion."'" The Court made no
effort to link the expenses to the collective bargaining policies underlying
the statute, even though it previously had held that such a link is required to
justify the First Amendment infringement caused by compulsory charging
of any expense. 45 Clearly, the Court placed great weight on its statement
that an expense may be charged if it "may ultimately enure to the benefit of
139. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).
140. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448. The Lehnert Court focused on the necessity of a benefit to the
local unit in general, without specifying the nature of that benefit. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty
Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950, 1961-62 (1991). The Court allowed an expense to be charged if it offered
"some tangible benefit to the dissenters' bargaining unit," even if "not actually expended on that
unit in any particular membership year," or "not performed for the direct benefit of the objecting
employees' bargaining unit." Id.
141. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1961-62; see also supra note 104 and accompanying text.
142. The Court ruled that ALPA can charge dissenters for collective bargaining at other bargaining units, preparations for a strike at another unit, and even the national union convention. Id.
at 1963-66. All of those expenses have the potential to benefit the local unit in its negotiations
with the employer, if only indirectly.
143. Id. at 1964; see also supra note 118 and accompanying text; cf Gerald D. Wixted, Note,
Agency Shops and the First Amendment: A Balancing Test in Need of Unweighted Scales, 18
RurGEPS L.J. 833, 862 (1987) (arguing that courts should not permit compulsory fees for "'social'
expenditures such as conventions and newspapers, which primarily aggrandize the union's position and relate to collective bargaining only in the sense that all union activities can be said to
relate to collective bargaining").
144. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1964 (emphasis added).
145. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977); see also supra note 78 and
accompanying text. Even the Lehnert Court's own test appears to dictate such an inquiry. Cf
supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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'
the members of the local union,"146
and little weight on the relationship of
the benefit to the collective bargaining function.
The Lehnert test acknowledges a second, independent requirement in
addition to the condition that an expense be germane to the collective bargaining function: Even germane expenses are not chargeable if they infringe on the First Amendment rights of dissenters more than is justified by
the recognized legislative policies. 14 7 The previous cases did not express
this requirement separately, but incorporated it into their germaneness inquiries. In those cases, activities that the Court found to involve excessive
First Amendment infringement were deemed not to be germane to collective bargaining.' 4 8 Such analysis served only to confuse the issues. As
noted by the Lehnert defendants, even expressive activities can have significant effects on collective bargaining; 49 to deny the connection is disingenuous. The problem with activities such as lobbying, litigation, and union
organization is not that they are unconnected to collective bargaining, but
that they are unavoidably intertwined with First Amendment
0
considerations. 15
Nevertheless, despite recognizing First Amendment infringement as a
separate prong of its test,' 51 the Lehnert Court's analysis failed to distinguish adequately between expenses that are not germane to collective bargaining and those that are germane but pose too great a burden on the
speech rights of the dissenters. Consider, for example, the Court's treatment of the portions of the union magazine that provided general information about the teaching profession. 152 The Court reached the third-prong
issue of whether the expenses created "additional infringement" of the dissenters' rights' 5 3 without first addressing the relationship of the expenses to
collective bargaining."'

146. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
147. See Lehnert, 111 S. CL at 1964.
148. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1977); International Ass'n of

Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 768-69 (1961); see also supra notes 69-80 and accompanying
text.
149. Brief for Respondents at 29-31, Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950 (No. 891217) (1991); see also Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1967, 1971 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (arguing that a public-relations campaign was intended to influence collective
bargaining); see also supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text; cf. Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act Must be Revised to PreserveIndustrialDemocracy, 34 ARiz. L. REv.
397, 429 (1992) (arguing that the NLRA should be amended to permit unions to charge for their
advocacy of the political interests of workers).
150. Cf.Lehnert, ill S. Ct. at 1964 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion) (discussing lobbying and
public-relations support for unions); see also supra notes 106, 110 and accompanying text.
151. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1959; see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 118, 143-45 and accompanying text.
153. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1964.
154. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
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Similarly revealing is the Court's reasoning with respect to extra-unit
litigation expenses.15 5 At first, the Court's treatment of the issue appears to
acknowledge a distinction between "germane[ness]" and "additional infringement." 1 6 The Court stated: "While respondents are clearly correct
that precedent established through litigation on behalf of one unit may ultimately be of some use to another unit, . . . [w]e long have recognized the
important political and expressive nature of litigation."15 7 Restated in the
terminology of the Court's own test, the quoted language appears to mean
that the expenses at issue are "germane to collective bargaining," but that
they cannot be charged because they cause "additional infringement" above
that which is inherent in the agency shop.1 58 That is not, however, the resolution the Court reached. It did not refer to the "additional infringement"
prong of its test, 5 9 but held instead that the extra-unit litigation expenses
were not "germane to the union's duties as exclusive bargaining representative."' 160 In sum, while distinguishing between the two concepts in stating
its rule, the Court did not give effect to the distinction in its application of
the rule to the expenses in question.
The Lehnert Court's failure to specify the type of benefit that an expense must provide1 61 made its mark on the Crawfordcourt. The Crawford
plurality acknowledged the importance of the actual bargaining function,
resting its decision on the finding that the purposes of the expenses in question constituted" 'reasonable bargaining tools.' ,1 62 The concurrence, however, did not recognize the necessity that the expense be intended to
increase leverage against the employer. Instead, it contended that Crawford
was controlled by the statement in Lehnert that an expense is chargeable if
1 63
it might "'enure to the benefit of the members of the local union.' ,,
Lehnert's failure to distinguish adequately between "germaneness" and
"additional infringement ' ' 164 proved less problematic for the Crawford
court, but it caused disagreement nonetheless. The Crawfordplurality rec155. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
156. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1963.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1959, 1964; see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
159. Id. at 1963-64 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion) (citing Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry.
Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 453 (1984)); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963)); see also supra
note 114 and accompanying text.
160. Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1964.
161. See supra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
162. Crawford, 992 F.2d at 1300 (quoting Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1961-62).
163. Id. at 1302 (Wilkinson, J., concurring) (quoting Lehnert, 111 S. Ct. at 1961-62). In
dissent, Judge Russell rebuked the plurality and the concurrence for unduly stressing this phrase.
Id. at 1306 (Russell, J., dissenting) (citing Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448; Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ.,
431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977); Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 121 (1963)); see
also supra note 51 and accompanying text.
164. See sukra notes 151-60 and accompanying text.
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ognized the distinction in its analysis of the major contingency fund. It first
determined that the purposes of the fund were "germane to collective bargaining," and only subsequently that the "burden to constitutional ights...
'
[was not] heightened."165
The concurrence only acknowledged that an expense that may "enure to the benefit" of the bargaining unit is nevertheless
not chargeable if "assessed to promote either the cause of unionism in general or political positions that a union leadership might support but to which
individual members might take vigorous exception."' 6 6 The dissent, consistent with the Lehnert Court's own application of its test, intertwined the
two concepts. It did not interpret additional infringement on constitutional
rights to be a condition that can preclude the charging of a germane expense. Instead, it contended that additional infringement only raises the
issue of the degree of germaneness necessary for the expense to be chargeable.' 6 7 Because no majority of the Fourth Circuit agreed on how to apply
Lehnert, Crawford offers no clearer guidance to district courts than Lehnert
provides to the circuits. 6
The Lehnert test should be modified to clarify both the meaning of
germane and the significance of additional infringement on dissenters'
rights. The ambiguity in the germaneness inquiry is manifest in its separation of three inextricably intertwined factors: (1) the causal relation between an expense and its potential benefit to the dissenter's unit,' 6 9 (2) the
nature of the possible benefit,' 7 ' and (3) the degree to which charging the
expense to dissenters is necessary to prevent free riders.17' Any expense
that is not charged to dissenting workers, but from which they benefit, encourages free riding.' 72 To discuss the free-rider issue in isolation overemphasizes its importance, and thereby reinforces the idea that any expense is
chargeable if it benefits the dissenter's bargaining unit in any way. Furthermore, any expense that may bolster the position of the local unit vis-&-vis
the employer is by definition one that may benefit the members of the unit.
It is, therefore, sufficient to require that an expense potentially augment,
165. Crawford, 992 F.2d at 1300-01 (plurality opinion).
166. Id. at 1303 (Wilkinson, J., concurring).
167. See id. at 1317 (Russell, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 56-58 and accompanying
text.
168. How the Supreme Court will apply the Lehnert test in future cases, or whether it will
retain the test at all, will be influenced greatly by the changing composition of the Court. The
inability of the Lehnert Court to assemble a clear majority may be attributable in part to the
retirement of Justice Brennan, who wrote the opinions in Street, Allen, and Beck. See B. Glenn
George, Visions of a Labor Lawyer, The Legacy of Justice Brennan, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv.
1123, 1164-65 (1992). Furthermore, three of the five Justices who voted to establish the Lehnert
test have since retired, including the author of the opinion of the Court, Justice Blackmun.
169. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, Ill S. Ct. 1950, 1961-62 (1991).
170. The Lehnert plurality did not discuss this factor at all. See id. at 1954-66.
171. Id. at 1960.
172. Cf. supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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directly or indirectly, the ability of the union to carry out its duties as exclusive bargaining representative.

Although it may appear similar, this definition of germane is not the

"statutory duties" test advanced by Justice Scalia.173 His test is much narrower, for it would permit unions to charge only the direct costs of collective bargaining.174 Even the costs of a strike by the dissenter's own unit
would not be charged.' 75 Such a rule would force the union into a narrow
choice between two equally unattractive options: (1) refrain from acting to
improve its workers' bargaining position except through activities in which

it is duty-bound to engage, or (2) advocate zealously on all fronts, but without the support of dissenting workers. To forego a valuable tool such as the

possibility of a strike would undoubtedly damage the bargaining power of a
union.176 Yet strikes are expensive, and some workers surely would consider withholding support of a strike if they could nevertheless reap its benefits. Such a scenario is precisely the type that Congress sought to prevent
when it adopted Section 2, Eleventh: If the expense is not charged to dissenters, they will be encouraged to free-ride on the efforts of the union to
177
negotiate a more beneficial employment contract.
The new test should be expressed as follows: A union can charge a
dissenting employee for an extra-unit expense only if its purpose (1) is germane to strengthening, directly or indirectly, the bargainingposition of the
employee's own bargaining unit "in dealing with the employer in labormanagement issues,"' 178 and (2) does not "significantly add to the burdening
of free speech that is inherent" in compelling dissenters to pay for the
union's performance of its statutory duties as exclusive bargaining repre173. Lehnert, 111 S.Ct. at 1976 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part); see also supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
174. Id. at 1981 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
175. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia
argued that: "In conducting a strike, a union does not act in its capacity as the governmentappointed bargaining agent for all employees. ... [F]or that reason, nonmembers cannot be
assessed the costs of the strike." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part). Like the Michigan statute at issue in Lehnert, Public Employment Relations Act, MicH.
CoMP. LAWS §§ 423.201-.216 (1978) (amended 1994); see also supra note 97 and accompanying
text, the RLA does not expressly authorize unions to strike, see 45 U.S.C. § 151-88 (1988); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 378-81 (1969). It appears,
therefore, that Justice Scalia would reach the same conclusion under the RLA.
176. See Crawford,992 F.2d at 1300 (plurality opinion); PAID v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 938
F.2d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 1991); cf Lehnert, II S.Ct. at 1965 (stating that "preparations for a
potential strike serve as an effective bargaining tool").
177. See supra notes 63, 73 and accompanying text. Under the test proposed in this Note,
dissenting workers would be charged for the costs of strikes during collective bargaining, even
strikes at other airlines. Despite the indirect relation between the strikes and the benefit to the
local unit, the costs would be chargeable because the benefit itself is in the form of a bargaining
tool for use in negotiations with the local employer. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
178. Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984).
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sentative. 179 An expense should be required to satisfy both prongs of the
test independently, so that neither prong colors the determination made
under the other.
In the context of Crawford, this test would apply as follows. Strikes at
other airlines would satisfy both prongs of the test. First, since a strike is a
valuable bargaining tool, 80 and the district court found that bargaining at
other airlines "directly affect[s]" bargaining within the unit, 18 ' such strikes
are germane to strengthening the bargaining positions of the plaintiffs' own
units. Second, because the message of a strike is directed toward the employer, and relates directly to issues on which unions are statutorily authorized to speak for nonunion employees, compulsory charging of strike
expenses does not significantly increase the burden on free speech that is
inherent to the agency shop.
Capitalization of the major contingency fund also would be chargeable
under the suggested test. The district court found that "ALPA [had] lost its
credibility with management because the other airlines knew it could not
financially sustain a long strike .... [The creation of the fund [was] a
device reasonably employed to implement the duties of the union as exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit."'" 82 Thus the
fund was germane to strengthening the bargaining position of each unit.
Furthermore, because the purpose for which the fund was to be usedstrike support-is itself permissible under the test, capitalization of the fund
caused no additionalburden on free speech. Thus, had the Crawfordcourt
applied the test suggested by this Note, its decisions on the merits would
have been the same.' 83 It might have avoided, however, the disjointed result it produced: the rendering of three opinions, none of which represented
a majority of the court.' 84
The proposed test gives a union leeway to charge dissenters for almost
any activity designed to enhance the bargainingposition of the workers it
represents. It excludes a beneficial expense only in two situations: (1)
when the potential to benefit collective bargaining, if it exists at all, is too
remote to justify even the minimal infringement of dissenters' rights that is
necessary to carry out the legislative policy, and (2) when the infringement
is so great that it cannot be justified by the advancement of that policy, even
if the expense would significantly add to the unit's bargaining power. Per179. See Lehnert, 111 S.Ct. at 1959.
180. See id. at 1965.
181. Crawford, 992 F.2d at 1302 (Wilkinson, J., concurring); see also supra note 52 and
accompanying text.
182. Id. at 1299.
183. See id. at 1299-301; see also notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
184. Id. at 1297; id.
at 1303 (Wilkinson, J.,
concurring); id. at 1318 (Russell, J., dissenting);
see also supra notes 36, 49, 55, and accompanying text.
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haps most importantly, it deemphasizes the highly speculative exercise of
determining whether an expense may eventually "enure to the benefit" of a
dissenting worker,18 5 and refocuses the inquiry on the First Amendment

concerns from which the charging issue originated.1 86
W. KEARNS DAVIS, JR.

185. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1950, 1961-62 (1991); see also supra note
104 and accompanying text.
186. Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 236-38 (1956); see also supranotes
66-68 and accompanying text.

There's Too Much Confusion Here, and I Can't Get No
Relief:1 Alcoholic Employees and the Federal
Rehabilitation Act in Little v. FBI
In 1973, Congress passed the Federal Rehabilitation Act (FRA) "to
promote and expand employment opportunities in the public and private
sectors for handicapped individuals and to place such individuals in employment."2 The Act implements affirmative action programs for the handicapped among the various federal agencies 3 and prohibits discrimination
on the basis of disability by federal employers,4 contractors,5 and recipients
of federal aid.6 Congress intended for the Act to make the federal government a leader in employment of the handicapped.7 The FRA also served as
the model for the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).8 The
two Acts incorporate many of the same ideas and were designed to work
together. 9 Interpretation of the provisions of the FRA, however, has been
clouded by imprecise congressional drafting and inconsistent treatment by
the federal judiciary. 10
A recent Fourth Circuit case, Little v. FBI,' is the latest installment in
a line of judicial interpretations of the FRA focusing on the needs of em1. BoB DYLA,, All Along the Watchtower, on JoHN WBsLEY HARDING (Columbia Records
1971).
2. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 2(8), 87 Stat. 355, 357 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 701-797 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
7. 124 CONG. REc. 30,347 (1978) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
8. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (Supp. I1 1991)).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 12,201(a) (Supp. ifi 1991). The ADA also expressly calls for coordination
of effort between agencies that are called upon to enforce both acts in order to ensure uniformity
of treatment and avoid duplication of effort. 42 U.S.C. § 12,117(b) (Supp. III 1991).
10. One commentator has noted:
The inconsistent application of section 504 to employment disputes.... is more properly regarded as the product of an unresolved conflict... about the meaning of discrimination and the measures we as a society, will undertake to alleviate it. The critical
falling of section 504 is not that it reflects ambivalence about fundamental value
choices, but rather that it represents a wholesale refusal to confront those choices. The
provision's indeterminate language devolves responsibility for policy choice on courts
and administrative agencies and leaves them to make ad hoc selections from among
competing conceptions of discrimination. These tribunals, therefore, make the actual
decisions about what constitutes discrimination against the handicapped. As a result of
this congressional default, handicapped persons and their actual or potential employers
remain without meaningful legal guidelines for interaction.
Note, Employment DiscriminationAgainst the HandicappedandSection 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act: An Essay on Legal Evasiveness, 97 HARv.L. REv. 997, 999 (1984) (citations omitted).
11. 1 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1993).
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ployers and narrowing the Act's protection for individuals with disabilities.12 The FRA's protection of alcoholic employees, as construed in Little,
has been particularly narrow. This Note examines the reasoning of the Lit-4
tle court 13 and explores alternate readings of the FRA by other courts.'
The Note then contrasts the two main interpretations of the FRA that have
emerged and examines the legitimacy of each.1 5 Finally, the Note proposes

clarifications to the FRA designed to aid courts in reaching more uniform
16
results.
Charles E. Little, Jr. was fired on January 14, 1991, after seven years
as a special agent with the FBI.17 Little was likely suffering from alcoholism during his entire period of employment with the FBI. 8 Although his
superiors knew of his alcohol problem, they consistently rated Little's performance as at least "fully satisfactory."' 19 Little was involved in several
alcohol-related incidents prior to December 1989, but all of these occurred
while he was off duty.2" In December 1989 Little was charged with driving

while intoxicated, off duty, which prompted him to request help from his
supervisor in getting professional treatment for his alcoholism.2" Although
the FBI operated an Employee Assistance Program (EAP) to help employees with disabilities, including alcoholism, Little's superiors referred him to
a private physician.22 This physician directed Little to an outpatient alcohol
rehabilitation program, which he completed in March 1990.23
Little began drinking again after he returned to active duty, and on
May 16, 1990 he had to be escorted home by fellow agents after he became
12. See, e.g., Butler v. Thornburgh, 900 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.) (discussed infra notes 79-83),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990); Copeland v. Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989) (discussed infra notes 90-96); see also Crewe v. United
States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1987) (denying a former federal
employee reemployment because of a history of alcoholism that seriously impacted his job performance); Shields v. City of Shreveport, 579 So. 2d 961 (La. 1991) (holding that FRA did not
prohibit termination of officers with alcohol problems because they were not "individuals with
handicaps" and were not dismissed "solely by reason of" their disability).
13. See infra notes 17-45 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 60-104 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 105-168 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 169-76 and accompanying text.
17. Little, I F.3d at 256.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Little was involved in three alcohol-related incidents prior to December 1989. Id. The
third such incident occurred in July 1988, and resulted in Little's conviction for driving while
intoxicated. Id. Little was placed on 18 months probation as a result of this conviction, and tried
unsuccessfully on his own to stop drinking. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. While he was undergoing treatment, Little's superiors placed him on "limited duty
status," but did not inform him of the terms and conditions of limited duty. Id. He was returned
to full active status on May 4, 1990. Id.
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intoxicated.24 Realizing the seriousness of his condition, Little enrolled in
and completed an inpatient alcohol treatment program.2 The day after Lit-

tle completed the rehabilitation program, his superiors asked him to resign
from the FBI.26 Little refused to resign, and his superiors told him that he
would be treated like a clerk rather than a full-fledged agent.27 On January
14, 1991, Little received a "Notification of Personnel Action," giving him
formal notice of his termination.28 The notification stated that he was being
removed because of his "inability to conform to the FBI's established standards that special agents must remain mentally and physically fit for duty at

all times."'29 Little responded to his removal by filing suit against his former employer, alleging claims under the FRA, the Privacy Act, and Bivens.30 The FBI moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted the motion.3 '
On appeal Little argued only that he had stated a claim under sections
501 and 504 of the FRA.3 2 Section 501 imposes affirmative action standards on Federal employers to ensure the presence of the handicapped in
the workplace,3 3 and section 504 protects handicapped employees from
discrimination on the basis of their handicap.34
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Little was given exclusively clerical duties from this point until his eventual termination.

Id.
28. Id. at 256-57.
29. Id. at 257.
30. Id. A Bivens action is a suit brought against a governmental agency by a private party
seeking compensatory damages for a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See generally
Perry M. Rosen, The Bivens ConstitutionalTort: An Unfulfilled Promise, 67 N.C. L. REv. 337,
337-38 (1989)(discussing nature and history of Bivens action).
31. Little v. FBI, 793 F. Supp. 652, 653 (D. Md. 1992) affd, I F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 1993). The
District Court relied heavily on the decision in Butler v. Thomburgh, 900 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990). See infra notes 79-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Butler. The district court found that "an FBI Special Agent who is an alcoholic and who
manifests such conduct on duty is not within the protection of the Rehabilitation Act, because he
is not 'otherwise qualified.'" Little v. FBI, 793 F. Supp. at 654.
32. Little, 1 F.3d at 257.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 791 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Section 501 provides in pertinent part:
Each department, agency and instrumentality in the executive branch shall submit to the
Commission an affirmative action program plan for the hiring, placement, and advancement of individuals with disabilities in such department, agency, or instrumentality.
Such plan shall include a description of the extent to which and methods whereby the
special needs of employees who are individuals with disabilities are being met.
29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
34. Section 504 is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) and provides in
pertinent part:
No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(8) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
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District Judge Michael, writing for a unanimous panel of the Fourth

Circuit Court of Appeals, identified the reason for Little's termination as
the "heart of the appeal. '35 He wrote that "inour view, the case turns on
whether Little was terminated because of his alcoholism or because of his
misconduct. '3 6 Little alleged that he was fired because of his alcoholism,
and the FBI argued that it fired Little because he was intoxicated while on
duty.

37

The court of appeals noted that to warrant protection under section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act a handicapped person must be "otherwise qualified" for the position.38 The court also examined the federal regulations
implementing the FRA to determine the correct application of the Act in the
context of misconduct. Noting that the Attorney General regarded an alcoholic or drug addict as a "handicapped individual" under the Act, the court
of appeals determined that alcoholics are handicapped under the terms of
the Act, but are not protected from the "consequences of their misconduct."' 39 Finally, the court stated that the FBI regulations governing the
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.
Due to its broader nature and its applicability to a wider variety of employers, § 504 is more often
relied on by handicapped persons. See Roger M. Sullivan, Jr., Comment, Balancing the Rights of
the Alcoholic Employee with the Legitimate Concernsof the Employer: Reasonable Accommodation v. Undue Hardship, 46 MONT. L. Rav. 401, 403 (1985); see also infra notes 48-51 and
accompanying text.
35. Little, I F.3d at 257. Judge Michael, of the Western District of Virginia, was sitting by
designation. Id. at 255.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The court of appeals then referred to two
Supreme Court decisions that defined that phrase. In Southeastern Community College v. Davis,
442 U.S. 397, 406 (1979), the Supreme Court characterized an "otherwise qualified" individual as
one "who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap." The court also
cited School Board v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n.17 (1987), for the proposition that "an otherwise qualified person is one who can perform the 'essential functions' of the job in question, or
one who would be able to do so if 'reasonable accommodation' were provided by the employer."
1 F.3d at 257.
39. Id. at 258. The court of appeals noted that "the Attorney General stated that the Act does
not 'prevent the application to persons suffering from alcoholism or drug addiction of reasonable
rules of conduct, such as prohibitions against the possession or use of alcohol or drugs' at the
location of the employment or the federally assisted project." Id. (citing 43 Op. Att'y Gen. No.
12, 1977 WL 17,999, at *1). The court wrote that the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
had cited the Attorney General's opinion in a discussion of regulations implementing §§ 501 and
504. Id. The Secretary had stated that an employer "may hold a drug addict or alcoholic to the
same standard of performance and behavior to which it holds others, even if any unsatisfactory
performance or behavior is related to the person's drug addiction or alcoholism." 42 Fed. Reg.
22,686 (1977). Another discussion stated that an alcoholic employee could be fired "if there is a
nexus between such [alcohol or drug] abuse or use and the nature of the employment or if the
symptoms resulting from the use of these substances may be so severe that such use, in and of
itself, will be sufficient to justify an adverse suitability determination." 43 Fed. Reg. 12,294
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treatment of alcoholic employees provide that the existence of programs for
the rehabilitation of alcoholic agents "should not be construed as a relaxation of FBI standards of conduct. FBI policy continues to require that employees
''40 should never cause themselves to be mentally or physically unfitfor
duty.

The court of appeals cited several cases from other districts to support
its distinction between termination of an employee for misconduct and dismissal based upon the employee's alcoholism. 4 The court inferred from
the weight of authority and "common sense" that it was "clear that an employer subject to the Rehabilitation Act must be permitted to terminate its
employee on account of egregious misconduct, irrespective of whether the
employee is handicapped."'42 Based upon the facts on the record, the court

found that Little's termination was a result of his misconduct, not his
alcoholism.43
The court of appeals then upheld the district court's dismissal of the
case on not one, but two grounds. First, the court found that Little was not
otherwise qualified for his work and therefore was not under the protection
(1978). The court of appeals recognized that these statements were not binding, but accorded
them "considerable deference." Little, 1 F.3d at 258 (citation omitted).
40. Little, 1 F.3d at 258 (citing the FBI's Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedures (MAOP) § 15.-3.3(2)). The court of appeals also remarked that "while it is generally required that 'rehabilitative efforts be made before disciplinary action for unsatisfactory job
performance can be taken,' those efforts 'do not preclude agency action if... other actions or
activities are present and constitute employee misconduct.'" I F.3d at 258 (citing MAOP § 153.3(3)). An exhaustive list of what constitutes misconduct is difficult to formulate and probably
unnecessary, but as one commentator has written:
Employers discharge or discipline employees for many reasons, among them absenteeism, tardiness, loafing, early quitting, sleeping on the job, assault and fighting among
employees, insubordination, threat or assault of a management representative, abusive
language to supervisors, dishonesty, theft, negligence, damage to or loss of machinery
or materials, incompetence or low productivity, refusal to work overtime, abusive behavior toward clients, and other misconduct. In the case of an alcoholic employee, discharge for any of these reasons may also be related to alcoholism.
Wendy K. Voss, Note, Employing the Alcoholic Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct of
1990, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 895, 941 (1992).
41. Little, 1 F.3d at 258 (citing Taub v. Frank, 957 F.2d 8, 11 (lst Cir. 1992) (upholding the
discharge of an alcoholic postal worker because of criminal conduct); Copeland v. Philadelphia
Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1149 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding a police officer not "otherwise qualified" because of his illegal drug use), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989); and Richardson v.
United States Postal Serv., 613 F. Supp. 1213, 1215 (D.D.C. 1985) (holding that an alcoholic
postal worker "was discharged for his criminal conduct, not because of alcoholism or poor job
performance due to alcohol")).
42. Id. at 259.
43. The court reasoned that since Little's superiors had known of his condition for some
time, the fact that he was terminated only after he was intoxicated on duty strongly indicated that
his misconduct was the reason for his termination. Id.

1758

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

of the Rehabilitation Act.' Second, the court held that because the FRA
applies only when the handicapped person is terminated or discriminated
against "solely by reason of his handicap," the finding that Little's termination stemmed from his misconduct, rather than his disability, precluded him
from stating a claim under the Act.4 5 The Fourth Circuit thus distinguished
situations in which employee misconduct was the reason for termination
from those in which alcohol-related disability was the cause of discharge
and held that the protection of section 504 did not extend to the former
scenario.
Congress passed the Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to allow handicapped persons the opportunity to participate in the workforce. 46 Section
501 of the Act mandates an "affirmative action" plan in the hiring practices
of the federal government's executive agencies. 47 Section 503 directs employers under contract with the federal government to take "affirmative action to employ and advance in employment qualified handicapped
individuals. 48 Section 504 prohibits the recipients of federal aid from discriminating on the basis of an employee's disability. 49 The relevant portion
of the section provides:
No otherwise qualified [handicapped person] in the United States
...shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance or any program or activity conducted
by any executive agency or by the United States Postal Service.5
Congress intended section 504 to reach "the tragically overdue goal of full
integration of the handicapped into normal community living, working and
service patterns,"'" and to "firmly establish the right of these [handicapped] Americans to dignity and self-respect as equal and contributing
44. Id. The court of appeals did not elaborate on how it reached the determination that Little
was not otherwise qualified, perhaps because it reasoned that the facts of the case rendered the
determination self-evident. The district court reached this conclusion on the grounds that the
special responsibilities of Little's job prevented an alcoholic from being qualified. Id.
45. Id. The court of appeals reasoned that since Little was outside the protection of the Rehabilitation Act, he could not claim the benefits of the Fourth Circuit's procedure for federal agencies in dealing with alcoholic employees, articulated in Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253, 259
(4th Cir. 1989). For a full discussion of the Rodgers decision, see infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
46. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 2(8), 87 Stat. 355 (codified at 29
U.S.C. § 701-797 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
47. Id. § 501 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (Supp. IV 1992)).
48. Id. § 503 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. IV 1992)).
49. Id. § 504 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
50. Id.
51. 118 CoNG. Rc. 3320 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams).
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members of society, and to end the virtual isolation of millions of children
and adults from society." 2
To state a claim under the FRA, a plaintiff "must establish: (1) that he
suffers from a handicapping condition; (2) that he is qualified for the position in spite of his handicap; 3 and (3) that he was terminated from the
position because of his handicap."5 4 The threshold question is whether an
alcoholic suffers from a handicapping condition. Although nothing in the
original text of the Rehabilitation Act evidenced an intent to include alcoholics and drug addicts within the definition of "individuals with handicaps," the Attorney General's interpretation of the Act so included them.5
In 1978, Congress passed a group of amendments designed to clarify the
Rehabilitation Act.5 6 The 1978 amendments exclude from the definition of
handicapped individuals current drug and alcohol abusers whose use of
drugs or alcohol either prevents them from performing their jobs or would
render them a threat to the safety or property of others if they remained
employees. 7 The legislative history of the amendments suggests that they
were passed to reassure employers that employees who either could not
function as employees or were a danger were not protected by the Act.5 8
According to the 1978 amendments, a non-federal employee who is an alcoholic or drug addict must be either rehabilitated or currently in rehabilitation in order to receive the protections of section 504.59
The Supreme Court first addressed the second element of an FRA
claim-that the plaintiff be "otherwise qualified" for the position in spite of
his handicap-in Southeastern Community College v. Davis.60 The plaintiff in Davis was barred from enrolling in a nursing program because of her
52. Id. at 32,310 (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
53. Gallagher v. Catto, 778 F. Supp. 570, 577 (D.D.C. 1991) (footnotes omitted); see also
Sullivan, supra note 34, at 406 (defining elements of a § 504 claim).
54. Gallagher,778 F. Supp. at 577; see also infra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 39.
56. Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services, and Developmental Disabilities Amendments of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 706 (1988)).
57. The amendments added to the original definition of "handicapped individuals":
For purposes of sections 503 and 504 as such sections relate to employment, such term
does not include any individual who is an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of
alcohol or drugs prevents such individual from performing the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would
constitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others.
Id. sec. 122 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 706(6) (1976).
58. Reese J. Henderson, Jr., Note, Addiction as Disability: The Protection ofAlcoholics and
Drug Addicts Under the Americans with DisabilitiesAct of 1990, 44 VAND. L. Rv. 713, 728
(1991).
59. Sally Gross-Farina, Fitfor Duty? Cops, Choirpractice,andAnother Chancefor Healing,
47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1079, 1120 (1993).
60. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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hearing problems.6 1 Davis brought suit against the college and alleged vio62
lations of section 504 and a denial of equal protection and due process.
The Supreme Court overturned the judgment of the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which had held that the college violated section 504 by taking

Davis' handicap into account when considering her application. 63 The
Court held that "an 'otherwise qualified' person is one who is able to meet
all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap."' The Court also
considered what type of "reasonable accommodation" the college was required to make for Davis. 65 Noting that "situations may arise where a refusal to modify an existing program might become unreasonable and
discriminatory," the Court nevertheless found that the college's unwilling-

ness to make "major adjustments" in its program was not discrimination.66
Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous Court, stated that section 504 did

not impose any requirement "upon an educational institution to lower or
effect substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped
person."'67
Six years later, the Supreme Court clarified the Davis holding in Alexander v. Choate,68 a case brought by Tennessee Medicaid recipients charging that a proposed limitation on inpatient coverage discriminated against
the disabled. 69 The decision interpreted Davis as striking a balance be61. Id. at 401. Davis hoped to gain admission to the associate degree nursing program at
Southeastern Community College in North Carolina. Id. at 400. In the course of an admission
interview, it became apparent to a member of the nursing faculty that Davis was having problems
hearing. Id. After a visit to an audiologist, Davis was told that a new hearing aid would improve
her hearing, but would not enable her to discern spoken words unless she was looking "directly at
the talker." Id. at 401. Upon a determination that it would be unsafe for Davis to practice as a
nurse, Southeastern denied her admission to the program. Id. at 401-02.
62. Id. at 402-03.
63. Id. at 406. Concerning the court of appeals' interpretation of § 504, the Supreme Court
said:
The court below.., believed that the "otherwise qualified" persons protected by § 504
include those who would be able to meet the requirements of a particular program in
every respect except as to limitations imposed by their handicap. Taken literally, this
holding would prevent an institution from taking into account any limitation resulting
from the handicap, however disabling.
Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 407-12.
66. Id. at 412-13.
67. Id. at 413.
68. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
69. Id. at 289. To reduce costs, the directors of the Tennessee Medicaid program reduced the
number of inpatient hospital days covered by the program from 20 to 14. Id. at 289. The plaintiffs in Alexander brought a class action for declaratory and injunctive relief. Id. They argued that
the change from 20 to 14 days of coverage would have a disproportionate impact on the disabled
and was thus discriminatory. Id. at 290. The claimants demanded a repeal of any annual limitation on the number of covered inpatient days and suggested that the program revert to a "per-stay"
basis providing more flexibility for the number of days covered. Id. at 290-91.
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tween the rights granted to the handicapped and the interests of federal employers. 70 Although recipients of federal funds would not be required to
make "fundamental" or "substantial" changes in order to accommodate the
disabled, the court held that they could be required to make "reasonable"
modifications. 7 1 Applying this interpretation of section 504 to the situation
in Alexander, the Court found that the coverage changes did not deny the
plaintiffs "meaningful access" to the benefits offered by the Medicaid
program.

72

Davis and Alexander established that employers must make reasonable
accommodations for the disabled if those changes would allow the handicapped individual to qualify for employment.73 The determination of

whether a handicapped individual is "otherwise qualified" under section
504 therefore includes consideration of the changes the employer is required to make, as well as the ability of the prospective employee to perform in the workplace.
The Supreme Court recently addressed the reasonable accommodation
requirements that section 504 places on employers in School Board v. Arline.7 4 The plaintiff in Arline was a schoolteacher with tuberculosis, dismissed because of the contagiousness of her disease. 75 After determining
that a person with a contagious disease qualified as a handicapped individual under the FRA, the Court considered whether the plaintiff was "other70. Id. at 300.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 302. In the course of interpreting Davis, the Court stated:
The balance struck in Davis requires that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual
must be provided with meaningful access to the benefit that the grantee offers. The
benefit itself, of course, cannot be defined in a way that effectively denies otherwise
qualified handicapped individuals the meaningful access to which they are entitled: to
assure meaningful access, reasonable accommodations in the grantee's program or benefit may have to be made.
Id. at 301. The Court determined that the requirement of "meaningful access" to federal benefits
did not require Tennessee to alter its program to the extent that it would favor the illnesses of the
disabled above those suffered by other citizens, and therefore it held that the proposed limitations
on coverage did not discriminate against the handicapped. Id. at 302-04.
73. See Evelynn M. Gentemann, Comment, After School Board of Nassau County v. Arline:
Employees with AIDS and the Concerns of the "Worried Well," 37 AM. U. L. REv. 867, 888
(1988) (recognizing Davis and Alexander as establishing a duty of "reasonable accommodation").
74. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
75. Id. at 276-77. Ms. Arline taught school in Nassau County, Florida from 1966 to 1979
and was dismissed after she suffered three lapses of tuberculosis within two years. Id. at 276. She
brought suit under § 504 alleging that the school board had dismissed her "solely on the basis of
her illness." Id. The district court held that Arline was not "handicapped" for the purposes of the
FRA because there was no evidence that Congress had intended persons with contagious diseases
to fall under the protection of the Act. Id. at 277. The Supreme Court disagreed. Id. at 286
("[T]he fact that a person with a ... physical impairment is also contagious does not suffice to
remove that person from coverage under § 504.").
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wise qualified. '76 The Court decided that in most cases a district court
should make an "individualized inquiry" into the relevant facts of each par-

ticular case to answer this question. Only after such an inquiry would a
court be able to make a decision on the "otherwise qualified" component of
section 504.77 Thus, the Court remanded the case for such a factual
78
finding.
The district court's dismissal of Little rested on Butler v. Thornburgh.79 Butler was factually apposite to Little, as it involved another alcoholic FBI Agent suffering from alcoholism who brought suit under the
Federal Rehabilitation Act after he was fired.8" Applying the language of
section 501 to the case, the court found that Butler was unable to "perform
the essential functions of the position in question without endangering the
health and safety of the individual or others."8" The Court stated that the
extreme sensitivity and danger inherent in a special agent's job were particularly inappropriate for alcoholics. 8 2 Although the result in Butler appears
reasonable given the nature of the plaintiff's job, the court's reasoning provided little guidance in interpreting the FRA. s3
Little argued unsuccessfully on appeal that the district court had erred
in following Butler and finding that he was not entitled to the "reasonable
accommodation" provided by Rodgers v. Lehman, 4 an earlier Fourth Cir76. Id. at 287-89.
77. Id. The Court stated:
Such an inquiry is essential if § 504 is to achieve its goal of protecting handicapped
individuals from deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while
giving appropriate weight to such legitimate concerns of grantees as avoiding exposing
others to significant health and safety risks.
Id.
78. Id. at 288-89. The Court held that after that inquiry, "[t]he next step in the 'otherwise
qualified' inquiry is for the court to evaluate... whether the employer could reasonably accommodate the employee under the established standards for that inquiry." Id. at 288. The Court also
further interpreted "otherwise qualified" to mean that such a person could perform "all the essential functions" of the job in question. Id. at 287 n.17 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k) (1985)).
79. Butler v. Thornburgh, 900 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990).
80. Id. at 872. Appellant Butler was an alcoholic employed by the FBI as a special agent for
14 years. Id. Butler's problem did not affect his work until he had been a special agent for five
years, when he received several reprimands for his behavior and sought treatment several times.
Id. In February 1987, Butler became intoxicated and was unable to remember where he left his
Bureau vehicle. Id. Butler then checked into an inpatient program for the first time and received
an excellent prognosis for recovery upon discharge. Id. Despite his progress after the incident,
and although he had abstained from drinking since the incident, Butler was dismissed from FBI
service in November 1987. Id. at 873. Butler brought suit alleging violations of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, FBI regulations, and § 501 of the FRA. Id. at 873. See supra
note 33 for the text of § 501.
81. Butler, 900 F.2d at 876 (internal quotations omitted).
82. Id. at 876.
83. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
84. Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1989).
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cuit case. In Rodgers, two plaintiffs consolidated complaints against the
Army and Navy for termination due to alcohol-related incidents. 85 Both
men had attended outpatient rehabilitation programs at the request of their
supervisors, but were eventually dismissed because of their inability to perform as employees.8 6 The plaintiffs alleged that their former employers had
failed to make reasonable accommodations for them under section 504.87
At the urging of the government, the Rodgers court articulated a standard for determining the requirements of the "reasonable accommodation"
element of section 504.88 Drawing upon directives issued by the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM), the three judge panel stated that when dealing with alcoholic employees, an employer subject to the FRA must follow
a five-step procedure: 1) the employee must be informed of available counseling services as soon as a problem is recognized; 2) if unsatisfactory performance continues, the agency must then present the employee with a
"finn choice" between treatment and discipline; 3) unless it is apparent that
inpatient treatment is immediately required, an opportunity to participate in
outpatient treatment must be given, although progressive discipline may be
administered to an employee who continues to drink; 4) if the outpatient
treatment is unsuccessful, and the employee continues to drink and is guilty
of job-related misconduct, an opportunity to participate in inpatient treatment must be offered before a decision to terminate may be made; 5) if
inpatient treatment is unsuccessful, an employer may reasonably terminate
the employee.8 9 The Rodgers court found that because the plaintiffs were
not offered an opportunity to participate in inpatient treatment, they had
successfully stated a claim under the FRA and were entitled to compensation." The court justified its holding as striking a balance between the
needs of employers and society's interest in treating alcoholics effectively. 9 1 Rodgers therefore seemed to represent a strong commitment by
85. Id. at 254-56. The first complaint in Rodgers was brought by John A. Rodgers, a civilian
employee of the Navy. Id. at 254. Although Rodgers was never drunk on the job, his alcoholrelated absenteeism resulted in his dismissal in 1984. Id. at 255-56. William Burchell, a boiler
plant operator who also was repeatedly absent and was drunk at work at least once, brought the
second complaint against the Department of the Army. Id. at 256-57.
86. Id. at 255-56, 257-58.
87. Id. at 254.
88. Id. at 259.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 260. Although the court recognized that both workers had been treated with "extreme tolerance and patience," it found that they had been denied the chance to obtain inpatient
treatment despite the apparent likelihood that providing it would cause no appreciable hardship to
their employers. Id. It wrote that "[i]n neither case does the record disclose any sound reason for
the denial of this opportunity, and the government has suggested none on appeal." Id.
91. Id. at 259. The court analyzed the competing interests in dicta:
On the one hand, the nature of the disease of alcoholism requires that there be a continuum of treatment and that the alcoholic be permitted some opportunity for failure in
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the Fourth Circuit to providing alcoholic employees with significant opportunities for rehabilitation before a decision to terminate is made.
The Little court cited several cases in support of its determination that
the plaintiff's misconduct was "distinct from his status as an alcoholic." 92
Of these cases, Copeland v. PhiladelphiaPolice Department93 is perhaps
most instructive as to the scope of the "reasonable accommodation" required by the FRA. In Copeland, a police officer brought a section 504
claim against his employer after he was fired for illegal drug use.94 He
alleged that the department discriminated against him on the basis of his
drug use, since alcoholic officers were usually sent to a rehabilitation program rather than dismissed.95 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that
Copeland was not "otherwise qualified" for his work, since the nature of a
96
police officer's job required that the officer not engage in illegal conduct.
The court held that the police department had no duty to accommodate
Copeland, because including a drug user in the ranks of the police would be
a "substantial modification" of the character of the department and would
cast doubt upon its integrity in the eyes of the public. 97 The opinion did
not, however, go as far as the holding in Little, which found that the discharged employee was not protected by the FRA because he had not been
discharged "solely by reason of his handicap." 98 Copeland's exclusion
from the benefits of section 504 rested only on the findings that he was not
"otherwise qualified" and that allowing him to continue to be employed
would exceed "reasonable accommodation." 99
Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. 1° illustrates the contours of
the requirement that a claimant be terminated "solely by reason of" her
handicap. The plaintiff in Teahan was frequently absent from work beorder to come to the acceptance of his disease which is the critical element of his cure.
On the other hand, both effective treatment and the needs of the workplace require that
an alcoholic employee be firmly confronted with the consequences of his drinking. Excessive sensitivity is no more conducive to a cure than is undue rigor, and in the final
analysis "reasonable accommodation" is the establishment of a process which embodies
a proper balance between the two.
Id. at 259.
92. Little, 1 F.3d at 258.
93. 840 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004 (1989).
94. Id. at 1148.
95. Id. at 1148-49. Copeland argued that since alcoholic officers were offered rehabilitation
by the Department, reasonable accommodation of his similar handicap was also possible. Id.
96. Id. at 1149.
97. Id.
98. Little, I F.3d at 259; see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
99. Copeland, 840 F.2d at 1149.
100. 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991). The claimant in Teahan was an alcoholic employed by the
defendant as a telephone and telegraph maintainer from 1983 to 1988. Id. at 513. Teahan was
disciplined a number of times for absenteeism. I. After his discharge, Teahan sued his employer, a recipient of federal funds, under § 504. Id. at 514.
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cause of his alcoholism, and the court stated that the "initial question" in the
case was whether he was fired "solely by reason of" his handicap. 10 1 The
court did not summarily dismiss the issue even though it was uncontested
that the claimant had been chronically absent from work:
[I]t does not inevitably follow that termination for conduct resulting from a handicap is not termination "solely by reason of" that
handicap. By equating the employer's motivation for firing with
the employee's conduct, the relevant section 504 inquiry collapses; that is to say, absenteeism resulting from alcoholism is a
factor that bears on whether an employee is "otherwise qualified"
for the position, but absenteeism is irrelevant to whether he was
terminated in the first place "solely by reason of" his handicap. °2
This analysis directs the inquiry to the motivation of the employer rather
than to the behavior of the employee. The Teahan court placed the burden
on the employer to show that any consideration of the handicap in the decision to terminate was related to the employee's qualifications for the job. °3
This approach to the "solely by reason of" element prevents employers
from justifying dismissal by citing any misconduct related to a type of disability and thereby "avoid[ing] the burden of proving that the handicap is
relevant" to the requirements of the job."°
The decision in Little is squarely in accord with a line of cases focusing on the rights of the federal employer or grantee rather than on the needs
of alcoholic employees. 0 5 This interpretation of the Federal Rehabilitation
Act stems, in part, from the 1978 Amendments, which were intended to
reassure employers subject to the Act that alcoholics and drug users whose
problems impeded their ability to function on the job were not protected by
101. Id. at 515.
102. Id. at 515-16.
103. Id. at 516. The Teahan court ruled that the district court erred in holding that because the
employer disclaimed any reliance on Teahan's disability in making the decision to terminate and
could point to a non-discriminatory reason for dismissal (absenteeism), the burden shifted to
Teahan to prove whether he had been fired "solely by reason of" his disability. Id. at 514. The
Second Circuit noted that the lower court's decision did not give the claimant an opportunity to
show that he was a "handicapped individual" or that he was "otherwise qualified" for his position.
Id.
104. Id. at 517. The court offered the following example to illustrate the faulty reasoning of
the lower court: If an employee had a handicap that caused him to limp, and the limp caused him
to make a thumping noise when he walked, an employer could fire the employee on the basis of
the thump and successfully maintain that dismissal was not "solely by reason of" the handicap
(the limp). Id. at 516-17. Logically, an employer could, under this test, fire the employee on the
basis of the thump as long as it could show that the two were not causally related. The Teahan
court cited the decision in Rodgers as support "at least implicitly" for the proposition that conduct
that is a manifestation of the disability is relevant in determining whether the claimant is otherwise
qualified, but not in discerning the reason for the termination. Id. at 517.
105. See supra note 12.
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the Act.1" 6 Although no mention is made of handicapped employees undergoing rehabilitation, the legislative history of the Act reveals that Congress
intended to include "rehabilitated" and "rehabilitating" alcoholics, but not
those who need rehabilitation.10 7 The decisions in Little and Butler construed the protection of section 504 as inapplicable to employees who had
exhibited unacceptable conduct, even if they later had undergone successful
treatments for their disabilities.108 These decisions avoided any analysis of
whether "reasonable accommodation" of the employee was possible by determining that the employee was not otherwise qualified and therefore not
protected by the Act.10 9 The alternate construction of the FRA, as evidenced in the cases similar to Rodgers,' ° incorporates a broader vision of
the responsibilities of employers to employees, making the issue of "reasonable accommodation" relevant to whether a claimant falls under the protection of the Act. I '
Case law supports the Little court's stance on the scope of the FRA's
protection.' 2 Also, the commentary of the various federal agencies cited in
Little states that an alcoholic employee is not protected from the conse13
quences of his misconduct, even if it is related to his alcoholism.'
Although the FRA clearly does not require employers to endure ineffective
and potentially dangerous employees regardless of the failure of treatment,
dismissing an employee for a single incident of misconduct without provid106. Sullivan, supra note 34, at 404.
107. See Anna P. Engh, Note, The RehabilitationAct of 1973: Focusing the Definition of a
HandicappedIndividual, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 149, 167 n.126 (1988) (citing H.R. Rep. No.
1149, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7312, 7333-34).
108. See Little, 1 F.3d at 256-57; Butler v. Thornburgh, 900 F.2d 871, 872 (5th Cir. 1990).
109. Little, 1 F.3d at 259; Butler, 900 F.2d at 876.
110. A partial list of the cases following the reasoning in Rodgers includes: Teahan v. MetroNorth Commuter R.R., 951 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1991) (imposing the burden on the employer to
relate misconduct to the qualifications for the job and to afford an employee another chance at
employment after successful completion of treatment before firing him); Fuller v. Frank, 916 F.2d
558, 562 (9th Cir. 1990) (adopting the five-step procedure in Rodgers for dealing with alcoholic
employees); Gallagher v. Catto, 778 F. Supp. 570, 577-82 (D.D.C. 1991) (applying a "reasonable
accommodation" analysis in a case involving drunken misconduct); Whitlock v. Donovan, 598
F.Supp. 126, 134 (D.D.C. 1984) (holding that an employer must present an alcoholic employee
with a "firm choice" between discipline and termination before dismissal), aff'd sub non. 790
F.2d 964 (D.C Cir. 1986).
111. The Little court deemed Rodgers inapplicable because Little fell outside the protection of
the FRA. Little, I F.3d at 259.
112. For example, both Butler and Copeland held that employees who were arguably on the
road to recovery were not "otherwise qualified" individuals. Butler, 900 F.2d at 876; Copeland v.
Philadelphia Police Dep't, 840 F.2d 1139, 1149 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1004
(1989); see also Shields v. City of Shreveport, 579 So. 2d 961, 965-66 (La. 1991) (holding that
since two policemen were not "individuals with handicaps" because they were recovering alcoholics and had not been terminated "solely by reason of their handicaps," they were not protected by § 504).
113. Little, 1 F.3d 255, 258 (4th Cir. 1993); see also supra notes 39-40.
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ing an opportunity for treatment may undermine the purpose of the FRA: to
help disabled individuals participate in the workplace. Alcoholics are considered "handicapped individuals" under the FRA and are therefore entitled
to its protection. 1 4 The practice of some courts in finding that "misconduct" obviates the need for a "reasonable accommodation" analysis denies
an employee whose addiction causes misbehavior on the job the protection
of the Act, even though he may be a far more likely candidate for successful
rehabilitation than a more discreet drinker. Such a result reflects societal
notions of the blameworthiness of alcoholics, as many people believe that
people who arrive at work drunk deserve to be fired. This result seems
incongruous, however, when placed in the context of the expansive goals of
the FRA, because it denies help to those who may need it most."' In other
words, the practice of allowing outright dismissal whenever alcoholism results in misconduct at the workplace excuses employers from their FRA
duty to provide reasonable accommodation to their employees, simply because the employee's handicap manifests itself at work." 6 If the primary
interest to be protected is that of the employer, then this may be the correct
result. If, however, one adopts the view that the FRA was intended to create a greater level of tolerance for alcoholic employees in order to encourage rehabilitation before dismissal becomes the only available option,
then the result of the Little line of cases becomes disturbing.
The disparity between the results of the Rodgers and Little cases stems
at least in part from inconsistent interpretation of the elements of a claim
under the FRA." 7 After the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, the
employer must show that it reasonably accommodated the plaintiff or, alternatively, that to do so would impose an "undue hardship."" 8 The courts'
different interpretations of the elements of an FRA claim correspond to
their differing views of the purpose of the Act. As discussed above, the
Second Circuit in Teahan v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. determined that
conduct caused by an employee's disability is not relevant to a determination of the reason for the employee's dismissal." 9 Similarly, the Little
court first determined that the primary issue was the reason behind the termination.' 2 0 The Little court then proceeded, however, to establish that
114. See supra notes 39 and 55 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
116. Rodgers held that the FRA imposed a duty on employers to provide reasonable accommodation despite the presence of misconduct in the workplace. Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 259; see also
supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text; infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text.
117. For a discussion of the prima facie case for an FRA claim, see supra notes 53-54 accompanying text.
118. Gallagher v. Catto, 778 F. Supp. 570, 578 (D.D.C. 1991).
119. See supra notes 101-05.
120. Little, 1 F.3d at 257.
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misconduct was per se distinct from disability: "[A]n employer subject to
the Rehabilitation Act must be permitted to terminate its employee on account of egregious misconduct, irrespective of whether the employee is
handicapped."'' Thus, although the circumstances in Little arguably justi-

fied the claimant's dismissal, the court neglected to impose the full burden
of the Act on the employer by not requiring any showing that the disability
was relevant to the employee's qualifications for the position. Although the
court found that Little's alcoholism rendered him unqualified for his duties
as a special agent, 1 22 its holding did not clearly articulate the necessary
causal link between his misconduct and the qualifications of the job.
Teahan also illustrates another element of a claim under the FRA that

was virtually ignored in the Little decision. The claimant in each of these
cases successfully completed rehabilitative treatment prior to the date of his
termination. 123 The Teahan court interpreted the term "current" substance
user, as contained in the 1978 amendments, as referring to one using drugs
at the time of termination. 24 The opinion noted that "it would defeat the

goal of section 504 to allow an employer to justify discharging an employee
based on past substance abuse problems that an employee has presently

overcome."' 1 5 The purpose of section 504 is particularly frustrated when
the decision to fire an alcoholic employee is made after the successful completion of treatment, as in Little.1 26 The Teahan court correctly determined
that the relevant concern is the employer's desire to avoid changing its

work environment or lowering its performance standards, neither of which
is required by section 504. 127 The Teahan court held that the burden imposed on the defendant reasonably to accommodate an employee who had
121. Id.
122. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. It seems likely that the claimant in Little
would have lost under the reasoning of Teahan as well, since the consequences of Little's disability rendered him unqualified for his work. See Teahan, 951 F.2d at 516 ("If the consequences of
the handicap are such that the employee is not qualified for the position then a firing because of
that handicap is not discriminatory, even though the firing is 'solely by reason of' the handicap.").
123. Little completed an inpatient program between the time of the incident that led to his
dismissal and his eventual termination, and he had not drunk since the incident. Little, I F.3d at
256. The claimant in Teahan completed a rehabilitation program with similar success before he
was actually fired, but not before the decision to fire him was made. Teahan, 951 F.2d at 518.
Apparently, Little completed his treatment before a decision to fire him was made, since upon his
return to work he was only notified that his failure to resign would result in an assignment to
clerical duties. Little, 1 F.3d at 256.
124. Teahan, 951 F.2d at 518.
125. Id. The court elaborated that "[t]his view best comports with the legislative purpose of
ensuring that rehabilitated or rehabilitating individuals are not discriminated against on the basis
of past substance abuse." Id.
126. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
127. Teahan, 951 F.2d at 518-19 (citing Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S.
397, 413 (1979) (holding that § 504 does not require "substantial" modifications to accommodate
the handicapped)).
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successfully completed treatment (and was therefore not excluded as a "current" alcohol abuser under the 1978 amendments) did not outweigh the
FRA's intent to provide substance abusers an opportunity to "overcome
their handicap[s]. ' ' 128
The definition of "current" substance abusers used in Teahan may be
criticized for creating a refuge for substance abusers who experience a period of delay between the behavior responsible for their termination and
their actual termination. Given the reluctance of employers to expose themselves needlessly to suit, most alcoholic employees will not be terminated
until a number of administrative procedures are completed, allowing them
time to participate in treatment. The criticism becomes more persuasive if
the employee has participated previously in treatment programs with no effect. 12 9 In the context of the Little case, however, such objections lose their
force. Although Little had participated in outpatient treatment before, he
had never been involved with inpatient treatment, which apparently is more
successful.' 30 The standard advocated in Teahan therefore should be responsive to the individual history of each claimant's prior rehabilitative history if the interests of the employee and employer are to be adequately
balanced.
The Little court's holding on the issue of "misconduct" also becomes
problematic when compared with earlier Fourth Circuit cases. Its reliance
on decisions from outside the Fourth Circuit' 3' suggests an effort to depart
from the law of its own circuit as announced in Rodgers v. Lehman.' 32 The
Little court's treatment of the "misconduct" issue seems to contradict directly the duty of employers to provide the "opportunities for failure" mandated by Rodgers.'3 3 By holding that employers must give employees
"opportunities for failure" in the form of access to treatment, the Rodgers
court recognized that employers have a duty to tolerate a limited amount of
poor performance on the part of the alcoholic employee.' 34 The Rodgers
128. Id. at 519.
129. Labor arbitrators have recognized patterns in the behavior of alcoholic employees suggesting that lending too much credence to subsequent treatment might only allow the employee to
avoid responsibility for his condition. Often, the alcoholic employee will, "while waiting for an
arbitration hearing.... seem[ ] to pull himself together. He cooperates with those treating him,
allows himself to be hospitalized, and may join Alcoholics Anonymous. By the time of the hearing his Union can point to his progress toward recovery. Authorities testify optimistically as to his
prognosis." Voss, supra note 40, at 933 (quoting Pacific Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 66 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 965, 972 (1976) (Harter, Arb.)).
130. Little, I F.3d at 256.
131. Id. at 258-59; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text.
132. Rodgers v. Lehman, 869 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1989).
133. Id. at 259; see also supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text (discussing Rodgers).
134. Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 259.
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court also refused to distinguish between "misconduct" and disability when
it held as part of its five-step procedure that
if the employee ceases to participate in the outpatient treatment, is
discharged for non-cooperation or continues to drink after completion of that treatment and is guilty of job related misconduct,
the agency must, before discharging him, afford him an opportunity to participate in an inpatient program, using accrued or unpaid leave, unless the agency can establish that it would suffer an
undue hardship from the employee's absence.' 3 '
Thus, the fact that an employee exhibits inappropriate behavior at work
does not by itself constitute a sufficient reason for dismissal under the Rodgers analysis. Indeed, at least one of the plaintiffs in Rodgers was136
guilty of
more egregious misbehavior than that of the FBI agent in Little.
The Little holding apparently carves out an exception to the duty imposed by the Rodgers decision whenever "misconduct" is involved. The
decision indicates that a failure to meet any of the elements of the prima
facie case relieves the employer of any duty to show that reasonable accommodation was made. 13 7 The Little court found that the plaintiff was terminated because of his misconduct, and therefore he failed the third elementthat he be discharged "solely by reason of" his handicap. The reasoning of
the Rodgers line of cases, however, incorporates a broader reading of what
"reasonable accommodation" entails for employers, so that a plaintiff's
failure to show all the elements of the prima facie case does not necessarily
end in dismissal.' 3 8 For example, both of the plaintiffs in Rodgers failed to
satisfy the third element of the prima facie case, because they arguably were
not terminated solely on the basis of their disabilities. 3 9 There was ample
evidence in each scenario that the dismissal stemmed from "misconduct,"
(i.e. unruly behavior, chronic absenteeism), yet the employer's failure to
establish that the procedure for "reasonable accommodation" had been followed led to a holding for the employees. 40 The broader duty of "reasonable accommodation" envisioned by the Rodgers court therefore tolerates at
least some of the "misconduct" that allowed the dismissal of Little's claims.
135. Id. (emphasis added).

136. The second plaintiff in Rodgers, William Burchell, arrived drunk for work one day and
refused to leave until a co-worker threatened to call the military police. Id. at 257. He was also
guilty of repeated absenteeism, and once called his supervisor at 2:30 in the morning and cursed
him about a disciplinary suspension. Id. In contrast, Little became intoxicated only to the extent
that he had to be escorted home and temporarily lost track of his FBI vehicle. Little, 1 F.3d at
256.
137. Id. at 259. For a description of the elements of the prima facie case for a claimant under
the FRA, see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
138. Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 259. For a list of the Rodgers line of cases, see supra note I 11.
139. Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 254-58.
140. Id.
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The scope of the duties under section 50114 of the FRA is another
area in which the two groups of case law differ. Section 501 applies only to
federal entities employing disabled individuals, not to recipients of federal
funds or federal contractors. 42 The section's requirement that federal employers provide "affirmative action" toward handicapped employees suggests that the Act intended federal entities to do more than practice
nondiscrimination. 4 3 Such an intent accords with the Act's stated goal of
turning the Federal government into a model employer of the handicapped.'" The language of section 501 partially reveals the scope of the
duty it imposes. The section requires that each agency's affirmative action
plan include "a description of the extent to which and methods whereby the
special needs of employees who are individuals with disabilities are being
met" and "sufficient assurances, procedures, and commitments to provide
adequate hiring, placement, and advancement opportunities for individuals
with disabilities."' 45 In contrast, section 504 only prohibits discrimination
against "otherwise qualified" handicapped employees that is "solely by reason of his or her disability."' 14 6 Section 501 makes no mention of the qualifications of the employee, and yet the requirement that there be "sufficient
procedures" to enable handicapped individuals to enter the workplace gives
rise to an implied duty of nondiscrimination similar to that in section 504,
which applies to Federal employers as well.' 4 7 The Little line of cases,
however, consistently has refused to recognize or has misapplied section
501's higher standard, and instead has focused only on the employer's duty
to make reasonable accommodations when section 501 has applied.' 48
141. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.

142. § 501 (codified at 29 U.S.C. 791(b) (Supp. IV 1992)).
143. Kathryn W. Tate, The Federal Employer's Duties Under the Rehabilitation Act: Does
Reasonable Accommodation or Affirmative Action Include Reassignment?, 67 Tax. L. REv.781,

788-89 (1989). Affirmative action usually refers to action seeking to remedy past discrimination,
and may include the modification of hiring practices or admission criteria. See id. at 788-89 n.30.
144. See supra note 7.

145. 29 U.S.C. § 791(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
146. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
147. Tate, supra note 144, at 792. Professor Tate keenly observes:
Although it may seem unlikely that Congress intended for federal agencies to hire and
advance unqualified persons, these phrasing distinctions, coupled with the congressional

intent that federal agencies become model employers, suggests at minimum that the
duties of federal employers under the Act are broader than those imposed on others.
Furthermore, these statutory differences indicate that limited accommodation by a federal employer before terminating an employee is insufficient to avoid discrimination
charges.

Id. at 792-93.
148. Id. at 788-89. Professor Tate discusses the federal judiciary's difficulty in recognizing
§ 501's higher standard and notes that "[t]his omission can harm the employee-plaintiff, because
if a court does not require a federal employer to provide the affirmative action mandated by the

Rehabilitation Act and views nondiscrimination as the employer's sole duty, the employer may
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An example of the reluctance to grant section 501's provisions substantial weight is found in Butler v. Thornburgh.1 49 The Butler court declined to extend the exclusions of the 1978 amendments of sections 503 and

504 to section 501,150 but it did not analyze any of the duties section 501
placed upon the employer. The Butler court confined its analysis to the
issue of whether the plaintiff could have performed his duties without endangering others. 15 1 The court therefore denied the plaintiff the full protection of section 501 by failing to address the standards imposed on
employers to accommodate the handicapped. Arguably the plaintiff in Butler was not protected under section 504 either, because the court did not
directly address the level of "reasonable accommodation" that the employer
was required to provide.'
Cases interpreting the FRA more expansively also place a burden on
the employer to identify employees in need of "reasonable accommodation." The decision in Rodgers v. Lehman15 3 illustrates this trend. The
Fourth Circuit stated that, "[w]hen the agency suspects that an employee's
poor job performance results from alcoholism, it should inform the employee of available counseling services."' 5 4 Thus, the federal employer is
responsible for identification of handicaps, which can be difficult when the

disability is alcoholism. Under the more restrictive interpretation of the
FRA, no such duty exists.' 55 An employer may dismiss an alcoholic employee regardless of the employer's lack of knowledge of the disability, as
long as the employee is not otherwise qualified or his discharge is not solely
on account of his disability. Under the Rodgers perspective, a discharged
deny employees their full rights." Id. at 789. Another recent study of the treatment of the FRA by
the federal courts has also found that the duty to provide affirmative action or impose any type of
heightened standard on federal employers has not been enforced. See Bonnie P. Tucker, Section
504 of the RehabilitationAct After Ten Years of Enforcement: The Past and the Future, 1989 U.
I.L. L. REv. 845, 848 (1989).
149. 900 F.2d 871 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 998 (1990).
150. Id. at 875. The 1978 amendments excluded current users of alcohol and drugs whose
current use prevents them from effectively performing theirjobs. See supranote 57 and accompanying text.
151. Butler, 900 F.2d at 875-76 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1613.702(f)); see also supra notes 79-83
and accompanying text.
152. See Gross-Farina, supra note 59, at 1135. (criticizing the reasoning in Butler for being
imprecise).
153. 869 F.2d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1989); see also Voss, supra note 40, at 931 (analyzing Rodgers as placing the responsibility on the employer to identify alcohol problems of an employee
and provide the employee a "firm choice" between discipline and treatment).
154. Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 259 (emphasis added).
155. In Crewe v. United States Office of Personnel Management, 834 F.2d 140, 143 (8th Cir.
1987), for example, the court held that the "[pilaintiff bears the initial burden of proof to make a
facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible."
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alcoholic could easily allege that an employer did not take the appropriate
steps to learn of his disability and present him with a "fi'rm choice."' 5 6
The Rodgers decision places on employers an impracticable and unnecessary burden to identify needed accommodation. Holding employers
responsible for the accommodation of disabilities of which they are not
aware is unfair, and will lead to unnecessary litigation because employees
57
presumably always can allege that the employer should have done more.'
If employers are responsible for identifying the needs of the employees,
then employers would also be responsible for any unsuccessful accommodations proposed by them.1'5 Placing the burden upon the employee to notify the employer of his disability allows more efficient responses to
handicaps, because an employer has the necessary information to determine
the scope of the needed accommodation or whether such accommodation
would constitute an "undue hardship."' 5 9
The most telling difference between the two interpretive trends lies in
the degree of emphasis on the employer's duty of reasonable accommodation when determining if a claimant is "otherwise qualified." This requires
an employer to consider whether the individual could perform the "essential
functions" of the job "with or without reasonable accommodation."' 6 The
line of judicial thought represented by Little focuses almost exclusively on
the ability of the employee to perform the essential functions of the job,
with only a cursory analysis of the availability of reasonable accommodation. In contrast, the more expansive interpretation has imposed several
duties on employers that move the issue of "reasonable accommodation" to
the forefront of the discussion.
Whitlock v. Donovan illustrates the rationale of the more expansive
conception of the FRA's emphasis on the employer's duty reasonably to
accommodate the alcoholic employee.' 6' The Whitlock court held that a
Federal employer had not fulfilled sufficiently its duty to accommodate an
alcoholic employee when it determined that the employee was medically
unfit for duty, without first deciding that the employee's poor performance
156. Rodgers, 869 F.2d at 259.
157. Voss, supra note 40, at 931.
158. Id at 932.
159. Id.
160. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text; Tate, supra note 144, at 797 ("This definitional circularity has led to variances in judicial outcome depending on whether a court focuses
primarily on a handicapped individual's ability to perform the position's essential functions or on
the availability of reasonable accommodation to assist the individual's performance.").
161. 598 F. Supp 126 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Whitlock v. Brock, 790 F.2d 964 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); see supra note 111-12 and accompanying text. The claimant in Whitlock was employed by the Department of Labor. Id. at 128. He was an alcoholic and was repeatedly counseled and disciplined for his excessive absenteeism. Id. at 134-35. He was eventually terminated
and filed suit after exhausting his administrative appeals. Id. at 128, 136.
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was due to alcoholism. 62 Thus, the agency failed to initiate procedures
designed to "reasonably accommodate" the employee. 163 These procedures
would have offered the claimant a chance to seek inpatient treatment while
on an extended leave without pay. 164 The court noted that although an
agency is not always required to offer leave without pay to an employee
who has been unsuccessful in earlier treatment, if evidence exists that such
a leave would be beneficial, the agency is required to evaluate whether the
leave would constitute an "undue hardship."165 Finding that the claimant
had made a showing of possible accommodation, the court held that the
employer violated its duty to the employee when it failed to provide the
66
accommodation or prove that doing so would create undue hardship.'
Thus, once the employee establishes the possibility of reasonable accommodation, Whitlock shifts the burden to the employer to show that no reasonable accommodation is possible before the dismissal of an employee for
alcohol-related reasons is permissible.
A comparison of Whitlock and Little illustrates the shift in analysis
from the employer's duty to accommodate the employee to the employee's
obligation to perform all of the "essential functions" of the job. The Little
court did not engage in any of the "reasonable accommodation" analysis
performed by the Whitlock court, and instead distinguished misconduct
from disability status.1 67 Arguably, Little could have presented a credible
claim that accommodation was possible, because he had successfully completed an inpatient treatment program after the incident that led to his dismissal. 6 8 The Fourth Circuit's emphasis on the employee's ability to
perform all the essential functions of the job allowed the court to sidestep
the duties identified in Whitlock. Although the court may have reached the
correct result, its reasoning contributed to the uncertainty of how to resolve
future FRA claims involving alcoholics.
The confused state of the law concerning the application of the FRA to
alcoholics reflects both poor statutory drafting and excessive judicial discretion in interpreting the provisions of the Act. The two primary judicial conceptions of the Act each have strengths and weaknesses, yet the inability of
the courts to settle on one or the other has robbed the law of any of its
162. Id. at 137. The court noted that the medical evaluation the claimant received was "seriously mishandled." Id. The agency "had every reason-to believe that he was an alcoholic and was
continuing to drink heavily." Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. The court stated that "[o]nce an employee has shown evidence that his handicap can be
reasonably accommodated, the burden of persuasion is on the agency to show that it cannot accommodate the employee." Id.
167. Little, I F.3d at 258-59.
168. Id. at 256-57.
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predictive value. Employees are alternately encouraged to bring suit or denied the full protection of the Act. Employers sometimes are allowed to
avoid fully discharging their responsibilities towards their employees, but
are left without the ability to be certain that they are in compliance with the
requirements of the Act. The courts have identified correctly the relevant
interests in the context of the FRA, but a uniform framework specifying the
relative weight to be accorded to those interests is sorely needed.
Because the confusion regarding the FRA stems from the breadth of
discretion left to the courts to interpret the Act, it is possible that a series of
amendments designed to clarify the elements of an FRA claim might produce more uniform rulings. Any legislative solution to this confusion
should strive to balance the rights granted to alcoholic employees by the
FRA against the legitimate interests of federal employers. First, the "solely
by reason of his disability" element of the claimant's prima facie case
should not be allowed to be disproved merely by a showing that the employee was dismissed because of misconduct. Courts must evaluate the
misconduct in the context of whether the employee was "otherwise qualified" for the position. 16 9 If the misconduct prevents the employee from
fulfilling the requirements of the job, then dismissal may be appropriate
even if the misconduct was related to a disability. This approach allows the
employee to show that he was "otherwise qualified" for his position before
the claim may be dismissed. Forcing the employer to prove that the employee is not "otherwise qualified" also promotes early investigation into
whether "reasonable accommodation" is possible. Prompt exploration of
the available alternatives will allow employers to make cost-effective
choices regarding dismissal, and will perhaps ensure that more employees
are successfully rehabilitated. If an alcoholic worker is quickly confronted
with a firm choice between treatment and dismissal, it is less likely that the
workplace will facilitate the disability and more likely that the employee
will seek treatment.
Second, the term "current substance abuser" should be interpreted to
force greater tolerance of employees who complete treatment before a decision to fire them is made. 70 The interests of federal employers can be
adequately safeguarded if such tolerance is tempered by consideration of
the prior rehabilitative history of the individual.
Third, courts must recognize that section 501 of the FRA imposes a
17
heightened standard of accommodation on certain federal employers.
Because the federal government was intended to be a model employer of
169. See supra notes 117-22 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
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the disabled, 172 mere analysis of reasonable accommodation may deny a
claimant her full rights under the section.
The scope of the employer's burden to accommodate alcoholic employees also needs clarification, as does the weight assigned to the employer's duty in determining if an employee is "otherwise qualified."
Congress should make absolutely clear that employees bear the responsibility of notifying their employers of handicaps. Placing this burden on the
employee helps to protect employers and may encourage employees to seek
early treatment. 173 Employers would also benefit from a clearer articulation
of what constitutes reasonable accommodation, beyond the assurance that
no "fundamental" or "substantial" changes are required by the FRA.1 74 The
ADA has identified certain factors that render an accommodation an "undue
hardship" on the employer, and it seems that these same factors should apply to the FRA.' 7 5 Finally, courts should incorporate the finding of whether
"reasonable accommodation" was possible into the determination of
whether the employee was "otherwise qualified." To do otherwise ignores
and instead
the responsibility of the federal employer to the employee,
176
employee.
the
of
obligations
the
on
focuses
merely
Although these proposed clarifications of the FRA are not exhaustive,
it is hoped that they are sufficient to help federal courts reach consistent
results. It is not desirable to narrow extensively the courts' freedom of
action on FRA claims because of the myriad of diverse situations that may
arise. A clarification of the Act's intent therefore should seek to indicate
how interests are to be balanced in certain contexts and should take care not
to rob the courts of discretion.
ERIC

HARBROOK COTrRELL

172. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
174. Alexander v. Choate, 496 U.S. 287, 300 (1985).
175. The factors identified by the ADA include:
(i) the nature and cost of the accommodation needed under this chapter;
(ii) the overall financial resources of the facility or facilities involved in the provision of
the reasonable accommodation; the number of persons employed at such facility; the
effect on expenses and resources, or the impact otherwise of such accommodation upon
the operation of the facility;
(iii) the overall financial resources of the covered entity; the overall size of the business
of a covered entity with respect to the number of its employees; the number, type, and
location of its facilities; and
(iv) the type of operation or operations of the covered entity, including the composition,
structure, and functions of the work force of such entity; the geographic separateness,
administrative, or fiscal relationship of the facility or facilities in question to the covered
entity.

1991).
42 U.S.C. § 12,111(10)(B) (Supp. m1
176. See supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text.

Evidence-Rape Shield Statute-Witnesses-State v. Guthrie,
110 N.C. App. 91, 428 S.E.2d 853 (1993)
"It never happened, and whats [sic] more they deserve it."'

Before the advent of rape shield laws, the moral character of victims of
rape and sexual assault was often an issue at the trials of their attackers.2
When a case turned on "his word against hers," evidence that the woman
was unchaste frequently was used to undermine her testimony.3 In response
to this problem; prosecutors in the 1970s urged legislators to enact rape
shield laws making a victim's past sexual behavior irrelevant to the defense
of one accused of rape.4 Defendants then challenged the newly enacted
rape shield laws as infringing on their Sixth Amendment right to confront
and cross-examine their accusers on all relevant issues.5 A balance of the
competing interests was struck by careful drafting of rape shield laws to
permit inquiry into a victim's past sexual behavior only under certain exceptional circumstances.6
1. RAPE VIcrimOLOGY XV (Leroy G. Schultz ed., 1975) (quoting slogan popular in 1971).
2. See 1 KENNm S. BROLJN, BR1ADIS & BROuN ON N.C. EvmNca, § 104 (1993); see also
State v. Davis, 291 N.C. 1, 14-15, 229 S.E.2d 285, 294-95 (1976) (recognizing, in a rape case
before the 1977 passage of rape shield legislation, evidence that the complainant's reputation was
"bad" was admissible on the issue of her credibility); Abraham P. Ordover, Admissibility of Patterns of SimilarSexual Conduct: The Unlamented Death of Characterfor Chastity, 63 ComRNEL
L. REv.90, 95-110 (1977) (criticizing use of character and reputation evidence of victims in rape
prosecutions); Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Modern Status of Admissibility, in Forcible
Rape Prosecution, of Complainant's General Reputation for Unchastity, 95 A.L.R. 3D 1181,
1188-89 (1979) (noting that as late as 1979 the general weight of authority held that evidence of
complainant's general reputation for chastity was admissible in rape trials).
3. See, e.g., Barbara Fromm, Comment, Sexual Battery: Mixed-Signal Legislation Reveals
Need for FurtherReform, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. Rv. 579, 588-93 (1991) (noting that statutory consideration of a victim's dress "reinfore[es] the myth that the victim somehow caused the attack");
Barbara Kantrowitz, Naming Names, NEwswEEK, Apr. 29, 1991, at 26, 31 (citing poll indicating
57% of Americans think negatively about rape victims).
4. See generally Vivian Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's Tribulation: Rape Cases in the
Courtroom, 77 CoLUM. L. Rnv. 1, 39-84 (1977) (comparing the rights of victims and defendants
under the common law and new rape shield legislation); Ordover, supra note 2, at 120-26 (suggesting reform of the common law practice of admitting evidence as to chastity); Lara English
Simmons, Note, Michigan v. Lucas: Failingto Define the State Interest in Rape Shield Legislation, 70 N.C. L. RPv. 1592, 1601-05 (1992) (discussing the history of rape shield legislation).
5. The Sixth Amendment states in pertinent part, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
"U.S. CONST.
shall enjoy the right.., to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....
amend. VI. See generally David Haxton, Comment. Rape Shield Statutes: ConstitutionalDespite
Unconstitutional Exclusions of Evidence, 1985 Wis. L. Rlv. 1219, 1255-65 (discussing Sixth
Amendment criticisms of rape shield legislation); Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Constitutionality of
"Rape Shield" Statute Restricting Use of Evidence of Victim's Sexual Experiences, 1 A.L.R. 4TH
283, 287-91 (1980) (noting numerous state court challenges to newly enacted rape shield legislation on due process grounds).
6. See, e.g., 1 BRouN, supra note 2, § 104 (offering examples of typical exceptions to rape
shield laws); DONAL E.J. MAcNAMARA & EDwARD SAGARIN, SEX, CRIum, AND Tm LAW 95
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In State v. Guthrie,7 the North Carolina Court of Appeals was asked to
decide whether testimony about a victim's letter to a classmate indicating
her desire to have sex with the classmate should be admitted to show that
she was likely to have written similar letters voluntarily to the defendant.
The defendant, fifty-three-year-old Manley Jarvis Guthrie, was charged

with second-degree sexual offense and taking indecent liberties with his
thirteen-year-old step-granddaughter, Lisa.' He was married to Lisa's
grandmother, with whom Lisa lived after the death of her mother.9 At trial
Lisa testified that the defendant had sexually abused her since she was
eleven. 10 In February of 1991, Lisa, who had become suicidal," first told
her grandmother of the alleged abuse.' 2 Lisa later repeated the allegations
to a school counselor who, in turn, contacted the local Department of Social
Services to investigate.
When a detective first interviewed the defendant, he produced three
"promise" letters that Lisa had written to him. 4 In the letters, Lisa offered
the defendant sexual favors in exchange for his taking her to school and
giving her lunch money." 5 Lisa admitted writing the letters, but she
claimed that the defendant had forced her to write them whenever she asked
(1977) (noting that "in rape cases, social policy may require prosecution and measures to reduce
the difficulties for the victim while at the same time demanding that the constitutional rights of the
accused not be abrogated"); J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield
Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544, 578-89 (1980) (giving examples of
situations in which prior sexual history might be relevant); Haxton, supra note 5, at 1271-72,
(concluding that despite Sixth Amendment challenges, most rape shield legislation is
constitutional).
7. 110 N.C. App. 91, 428 S.E.2d 853, disc. rev. denied, 333 N.C. 793, 431 S.E.2d 28
(1993).
8. Id. at 92, 428 S.E.2d at 853.
9. Brief for the State at 1-2, State v. Guthrie, 110 N.C. App. 91,428 S.E.2d 853 (1993) (No.
9210SC214).
10. Id. at 3.
11. The fact that Lisa became suicidal is consistent with some commentators' observations
about the effects of incest and child abuse on emotional development. See, e.g., DAVID
FINKELHOR, SEXUALLY VICTIMIZED CHILDREN 31 (1979); Seymour L. Halleck, Emotional Effects
of Victimization, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND rim LAW 677-79 (Ralph Slovenko ed., 1965); RAPE
VIC1mOLOGY, supra note 1, at 260-65.
12. Brief for the State at 2-3, Guthrie (No. 9210SC214).
13. Id.at 3.
14. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 4-5, Guthrie (No. 9210SC214).
15. Brief for the State at app. 5-6, 12, Guthrie (No. 9210SC214). The letters read: "Jarvis,
take me to school and give me [five] dollars, and I will do something tonight." Id.at app. 9, 29.
Another read, "I will do something tonight if you take me to school and give me a little money."
Id. And perhaps the most overtly sexual stated: "Jarvis, I want you to do something to me very
bad." All were signed "Lisa." Id. The State's attorney pointed out, in his brief to the appellate
court, that "Defendant's testimony that he was angry because Lisa wrote the notes and told her
that it was wrong to write the notes condemns him because the content of the notes themselves do
[sic] not require a prurient interpretation." Id. at 9.
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him for money or for a ride to school.1 6 The trial judge admitted the three
"promise" letters over the defendant's objection.1 7
The admissibility of testimony about two other letters became a central
issue in the trial and subsequent appeal. Lisa wrote a letter to a boy in her
class at school in which she asked him to have sex with her. 8 The boy
replied in a return letter that Lisa found on her desk at school and put in her
bookbag. 19 The defendant produced the reply letter at trial, 20 but after
heated debate, the trial judge refused to admit it.2 ' He also refused to allow
cross-examination about the reply letter or the initial letter written by
Lisa, 22 reasoning that it was precluded by North Carolina's rape shield statute.23 The statute deems irrelevant all evidence about the prior sexual be24
havior of a complainant in a sexual offense case.
The North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling
and ordered a new trial.' The court gave two reasons for its decision.
First, it held that Rule 412 did not apply because a written letter, including a
16. Id. at 4.
17. Id. at app. 9-10. The defendant's attorney did not state the basis for his objection to the
admissibility of these three letters in the portion of the transcript set out in the appellate record.
Id. Apparently, he had stated it on the record at an earlier point, but the admission of the three
"promise" letters from Lisa to the defendant was not an issue on appeal. Id.
18. Id. at app. 7a-8. Lisa testified that the letter was written to the boy as a "joke." Id. at
app. 8.
19. Id. The reply letter, which was produced at trial said, "Also, all you have wrote to me,
will you fuck me? Personally, I think you are too fat to fuck." Defendant-Appellant's Brief at
app. 15, Guthrie (No. 9210SC214). While not particularly legally significant to this case, the
language and content of the note demonstrate how this type of evidence could be embarrassing
and hurtful to a complainant. That these hurtful words were read out loud at trial by police
investigators and repeated in the appellate record exemplifies the point made by one commentator
that "[v]ictims frequently report that their encounters with the police, district attorneys, and courtroom personnel were more traumatic than the rape incident itself." Carol Bohmer, JudicialAttitudes Toward Rape Victims, 57 JUDICATURE 303 (1974).
20. Lisa testified that she did not know how the defendant had gotten the note. Brief for the
State at app. 8, Guthrie (No. 9210SC214).
21. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at app. 5-17, Guthrie (No. 9210SC214).
22. Guthrie, 110 N.C. at 94, 428 S.E.2d at 854; see also Defendant-Appellant's Brief at app.
5-17, Guthrie (No. 9210SC214) (setting out the attorneys' debate over the judge's ruling).
23. N.C. R. Evno. 412.
24. Guthrie, 110 N.C. App. at 94, 428 S.E.2d at 854. North Carolina's rape shield statute
reads in relevant part:
(a) As used in this rule, the term "sexual behavior" means sexual activity of the complainant other than the sexual act which is at issue in the indictment on trial.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the sexual behavior of the complainant
is irrelevant to any issue in the prosecution ....
N.C. R. Evm. 412. The defendant did not assert that the letter fell within any of the exceptions to
the rape shield statute or any other provision of law. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief, Guthrie
(No. 9210SC214). The North Carolina Supreme Court approved the constitutionality of Rule 412
in State v. Fortney, 301 N.C. 31, 34, 269 S.E.2d 110, 112 (1980).
25. Guthrie, 110 N.C. App. at 94, 428 S.E.2d at 854.
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26
solicitation for sex, is not "sexual behavior" as contemplated by the Rule.

Second, analyzing the evidence under the general rules of admissibility, 27 it
found the evidence relevant under Rule 401,28 and determined under Rule
30
40329 that its probative value was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The court ruled, therefore, that evidence of the letters should have been
admitted by the trial court. "Showing that the victim voluntarily wrote at
least one letter to another person which is similar to the ones written to the
defendant," the court found, "bears directly on the victim's credibility. It

[indicates] that the victim wrote the letters to defendant voluntarily, contra31
dicting her earlier testimony."
There are two distinct tensions in State v. Guthrie. First, the statutory
definition of "sexual behavior" and the purpose of the rape shield statute
appear to conflict. Both the plain language of the statute32 and North Carolina case law narrowly define "sexual behavior." This definition does not

include letter writing, even if a letter is a sexual solicitation. 33 This narrow
26. Id. at 93, 428 S.E.2d at 854; see also supra note 24.
27. Guthrie, 110 N.C.App. at 94, 428 S.E.2d at 854.
28. N.C. R. EviD. 401. North Carolina defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Id.
29. Guthrie, 110 N.C. App. at 94, 428 S.E.2d at 854. North Carolina's Rule 403 states that
even if evidence is relevant, it may not be admissible if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury ....
N.C. R. EviD. 403.
30. Guthrie, 110 N.C. App. at 94,428 S.E.2d at 854. Defendant maintained that impeaching
Lisa's credibility was the reason for introducing the evidence regarding the letter. He said this
was a case solely about credibility, not a case involving a consent defense, as he denied making
any sexual advances. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 7, Guthrie (No. 9210SC214).
31. Guthrie, 110 N.C. App. at 94, 428 S.E.2d at 854, The court determined that the defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser about her letter writing. The Sixth
Amendment right to confront one's accusers is central to an effective defense and a fair trial.
However, the Sixth Amendment right of cross-examination is not absolute, and in some instances
may be outweighed by other legitimate interests. See State v. Durham, 74 N.C. App. 159, 163,
327 S.E.2d 920, 923 (1985) (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972)). One legitimate
limitation on cross-examination may be a situation in which the prejudicial effect of the evidence
outweighs its probative value. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. The rape shield statute
expressly limits cross-examination in sexual offense cases. See infra note 41. It prevents a defendant from inquiring into a complainant's sexual history for any reason not addressed in the
exceptions to Rule 412. See State v. Alverson, 91 N.C. App. 577, 579, 372 S.E.2d 729, 730
(1988) (holding that when the defendant speculated that the prosecuting witness was pregnant by a
boyfriend, and this motivated her to accuse the defendant of raping her, the trial court properly
denied the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the victim about her sexual behavior); 1
BRout, supra note 2, § 104 (1993).
32. See supra note 24 for text of statute.
33. "Sexual behavior" means a "sex act" and not mere words or conversation. State v.
Baron, 58 N.C. App. 150, 153, 292 S.E.2d 741, 743 (1982) (citing State v. Smith, 45 N.C. App.
501, 263 S.E.2d 371, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 104, 273 S.E.2d 460 (1980)). In Baron, the
defendant sought to cross-examine the victim about allegations of sexual abuse she made against
other family members. Id. at 152, 292 S.E.2d at 742. The court of appeals held that those accusa-
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definition may often be at odds with the statute's purpose-preventing unnecessary embarrassment to the victim and keeping out irrelevant
evidence.3 4
Prior North Carolina cases have construed "sexual behavior" narrowly,
but these cases can be distinguished from Guthrie. In State v. Smith,35 the
court of appeals defined "sexual history" narrowly in order to prevent the

admission of a conversation between the defendant and the victim. 36 Subsection (b)(1) allows admission of evidence of behavior "between the complainant and the defendant."3 7 Presumably, the court's intent was to protect
the complainant from embarrassment, an intent consistent with the purpose
of the statute.38 In Guthrie, by contrast, the narrow definition was used to
admit evidence that might be embarrassing. 9
In State v. Baron,n° the court of appeals deemed admissible evidence
of false allegations of sex abuse previously made by the complainant
against the defendant. 4 ' The court ruled that the accusations were not "sexual behavior" within the meaning of the statute.4 2 Like Smith, Baron can be
distinguished; to apply the statute in Baron would not have furthered the
statute's purpose. The policy of protecting a victim from embarrassment
does not support protecting a false accuser from the consequences of her
own lies. Nor does that policy justify the exclusion of evidence that is
directly probative of a complainant's lack of credibility.4 3
tions were merely words and not sexual behavior. Id at 153, 292 S.E.2d at 743. Therefore, the
court reasoned, the subject matter did not fall into the category of inquiry that the legislature
intended to protect. The court noted: "We believe that the Legislature intended to exclude the
actual sexual history of the complainant .. " Id. (emphasis added). The Baroncourt cited State
v. Smith, 45 N.C. App. 501, 263 S.E.2d 371, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 104, 273 S.E.2d 460
(1980), as standing for the proposition that conversation does not constitute sexual behavior.
Baron, 58 N.C. App. at 153, 292 S.E.2d at 743. In Smith, the defendant wanted to admit evidence
that the victim talked with him about her sexual problems in an inviting way. Smith, 45 N.C. App.
at 502, 263 S.E.2d at 372. Since prior sexual activity between the defendant and the victim is
relevant under an exception to Rule 412, the defendant sought to have the evidence admitted
because it was relevant to the issue of consent. Id. at 503, 263 S.E.2d at 372. The Smith court
held that conversation does not constitute activity, so it does not come in under the exception to
Rule 412. Id.
34. State v. Fortney, 301 N.C. 31,43-44, 269 S.E.2d 110, 117 (1980); see also infra note 41
and accompanying text.
35. 45 N.C. App. 501, 263 S.E.2d 371, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 104, 273 S.E.2d 460
(1980); see also supra note 33.
36. Id. at 503, 263 S.E.2d at 372.
37. N.C. R. Evm. 412(b)(1) (1992).
38. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
39. Guthrie, 110 N.C. App. at 94, 428 S.E.2d at 854.
40. 58 N.C. App. 150, 292 S.E.2d 741 (1982); see supra note 32.
41. Baron, 58 N.C. App. at 154, 292 S.E.2d at 743.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 154, 292 S.E.2d at 743-44.
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To exclude letters from the meaning of "sexual behavior" is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, because written or oral communication
about sexual matters can be just as embarrassing and irrelevant as prior
sexual acts." Yet because existing case law interprets Rule 412 to apply
only to actual "sex acts," and does not bar the defendant from cross-examining the victim about prior letters, the victim is protected only by the standards of relevancy and admissibility provided in Rules 401 and 403.45
The second tension in Guthrie, a tension that is independent of the
statute, is in determining whether a sexual letter is sufficiently probative on
the issue of the victim's credibility to outweigh its prejudicial effect on the
issue of her sexual history. The argument for admission is that the letter
introduces a question of the victim's credibility that outweighs any prejudicial effect of revealing her sexual history. 46 Balancing the probative value
against the prejudicial effect of the evidence,4 7 the defendant is entitled to
cross-examine the victim about the letter if it indicates that she is lying.48
In its brief to the court of appeals, the State addressed this issue:
Defendant argues that Lisa's testimony that she voluntarily wrote
a note to a classmate named Michael, asking him if he would
have sexual intercourse with her, tends to prove that Lisa voluntarily wrote [similar notes] to defendant. It is denied that the proffered evidence tends to prove that if a 13 year old voluntarily
writes vulgar notes to a classmate, it is more likely that she would
write a similar note to her 53 year old step grandfather, particularly if the usual relationship, attested to by defendant, existed.
Such an inference is beyond
the limits of relevancy prescribed by
4
1
401.
Rule
8C-1,
N.C.G.S.

44. The purpose of the rape shield statute is to prevent harassing, humiliating, and irrelevant
inquiries into the past sexual behavior of victims, as well as to prevent the introduction of collateral issues that may confuse the jury. See State v. Fortney, 301 N.C. 31, 42, 269 S.E.2d 110, 116
(1980) (concluding that North Carolina's rape shield rule narrows the traditional relevancy test to
a balancing of the defendant's right to cross-examination and the victim's right to privacy and
right to avoid further trauma during the investigation and trial process). The Fortney court noted
that evidence of sexual history diverts the jury's attention to collateral issues. Id. at 39, 269
S.E.2d at 114. It also noted policy reasons, aside from questions of relevance, for excluding
sexual history. Noting that rape is an under-reported crime, the court stated that inquiry into
embarrassing sexual history would cause harm by discouraging victims from reporting and prosecuting the crime. Id. at 42-43, 269 S.E.2d at 116.
45. Guthrie, 110 N.C. App. at 94, 428 S.E.2d at 854,
46. See id.
47. See N.C. R. EvID. 403; see also supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
48. N.C. R. Evw. 403.
49. Brief for the State at 7, Guthrie (No. 9210SC214).
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The State further argued that even if the evidence were relevant, the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and waste of time outweighed
the letter's probative value.5"
The court should go beyond the wording of the statute to its purpose.
The letter soliciting sex, while not considered a sexual act, is potentially
just as embarrassing and prejudicial to the victim as if she had engaged in
sex with her classmate. If the policy behind the rape shield statute5 ' is
compelling with respect to sexual acts, then it should be equally valid in
this case. Moreover, evidence of the complainant's sexual knowledge, if
considered relevant at all, surely is more prejudicial than probative on the
issue of her credibility.5 2 The purpose of rape shield laws is to keep out
this type of evidence.
Past sexual talk is relevant to chastity, not credibility. By enacting the
rape shield statute, the legislature has made it clear that a victim's chastity
is not to be an issue at a rape trial.
ALISON RAY BUNCH

50. Id.
51. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
52. This seems particularly true given societal attitudes towards rape victims. See supra note
3 and accompanying text.

Kuder v. Schroeder: The North Carolina Court of Appeals
Holds That a Professional Education Is Not Within the
Spousal Duty of Support
Graduate and professional education is a costly undertaking. Tuition,
fees, books, room, board, and the opportunity costs of voluntary unemployment can impose a significant financial burden on students and their families. Unmarried students may look to a combination of parental assistance,
prior earnings, and student loans to offset these expenses. Married students
often have access to an additional source of funds-the income and savings
of their spouses.
When one spouse undertakes to finance another's advanced degree, the
supporting spouse consents to a present reduction in standard of living in
anticipation of a future increase in earning capacity. If the degree is attained and the marriage continues, the supporting spouse recoups the financial contribution to the other's education in the form of increased marital
income. But if the marriage dissolves shortly after the program is completed and marital property is limited, the contribution of the supporting
spouse is never repaid. In the latter case, the investment of both spouses is
realized by one alone.
This Note examines Kuder v. Schroeder,' a recent North Carolina
Court of Appeals case in which a supporting spouse's attempt to recoup
expenditures for her husband's professional education failed. The Note explores remedies available to separating spouses under North Carolina law,2
analyzes the court's decision in light of those remedies,3 and considers the
possibility of importing solutions from other jurisdictions. 4
In Kuder, the court of appeals considered a wife's divorce-related
claims against her husband for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.'
Cynthia Kuder alleged that she and Thomas Schroeder, married in 1978,
entered into an agreement whereby she would provide support for the family and pay her husband's educational expenses in exchange for his subsequent support of the family and the opportunity for her to become a fulltime wife and mother.6
1. 110 N.C. App. 355, 430 S.E.2d 271 (1993). The plaintiff has not petitioned the North
Carolina Supreme Court for discretionary review under N.C. GEr. STAT. § 7A-31 (1981).
2. See infra notes 23-83 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 96-120 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 84-95, 121-34 and accompanying text.
5. Kuder, 110 N.C. App. at 356, 430 S.E.2d at 272. Unjust enrichment is an equitable
doctrine compensating the benefactor when it would be unfair for the recipient of services to
retain their benefit. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text.
6. Kuder, 110 N.C. App. at 356-57, 430 S.E.2d at 272-73.
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Mr. Schroeder was unemployed for eleven years, throughout which he
pursued undergraduate, Master's, and law degrees.7 During this period,
Ms. Kuder remained the family's sole income earner, paying both the direct
and indirect expenses of her husband's education allegedly in accord with
the couple's agreement.' Three months after becoming an associate in a
law firm-his first employment earning a salary sufficient to provide complete support for the family-Mr. Schroeder requested a separation. 9 At
that time, the marital estate consisted of little property and Mr. Schroeder
had established no goodwill as an attorney.'
The trial court dismissed Ms. Kuder's alimony claim because she was
unable to demonstrate the threshold requirement of financial dependence on
her spouse." Her contract claim, premised on the alleged agreement between the spouses, and her quasi-contract claim, premised on Mr. Schroeder's unjust retention of an increased earning capacity derived from Ms.
Kuder's services, were both dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.' 2 Ms. Kuder appealed the dismissal of the
contract and quasi-contract claims.' 3
Judge Wells, writing for the court of appeals, affirmed.' 4 The majority
held that (1) a personal duty of each spouse to support the other arises out
of the marital relationship and (2) the duty cannot be abrogated or modified
by an agreement between the parties.'
7. Id. at 358-59, 430 S.E.2d at 273-74 (Greene, J., dissenting). Upon receiving his law
degree, Mr. Schroeder first founded a legal research business. Amended Complaint at 2-3, Kuder
v. Schroeder, 110 N.C. App. 355, 430 S.E.2d 271 (No. 9220DC425) (1993). He earned approximately $5,000 in the first year of business and $20,000 in the second year. Id. The venture
subsequently failed. Id.
8. Kuder, 110 N.C. App. at 358, 430 S.E.2d at 273 (Greene, J., dissenting). Ms. Kuder was
a veterinarian employed as a teacher at a community college. Id. (Greene, J., dissenting). She
earned $36,000 per year. Complaint at 3, Kuder v. Schroeder, 110 N.C. App. 355, 430 S.E.2d 271
(No. 9220DC425) (1993).
For the purposes of this Note, "direct expenses" are tuition, fees, and books; "indirect expenses" include room, board, transportation, and opportunity costs.
9. Kuder, 110 N.C. App. at 359, 430 S.E.2d at 274 (Greene, J., dissenting). Mr. Schroeder
informed Ms. Kuder that he would earn at least $33,000 in each of his first two years as an
attorney and $100,000 annually thereafter. Amended Complaint at 3, Kuder v. Schroeder, 110
N.C. App. 355, 430 S.E.2d 271 (No. 9220DC425) (1993).
10. Kuder, 110 N.C. App. at 365, 430 S.E.2d at 277 (Wynn, J., concurring); see also infra
notes 41-43 and accompanying text (discussing the distribution of goodwill).
11. Kuder, 110 N.C. App. at 356, 430 S.E.2d at 272; see also infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (citing N.C. Gm. STAT. § 50-16.1(3) (1987)).
12. Kuder, 110 N.C. App. at 356, 430 S.E.2d at 272.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 357-58, 430 S.E.2d at 273.
15. Id. at 357, 430 S.E.2d at 273 (citing North Carolina Baptist Hosps. v. Harris, 319 N.C.
347, 354 S.E.2d 471 (1987); Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945)).
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Judge Greene, concurring in the dismissal of Ms. Kuder's contract
claim, found a lack of specificity in the alleged contract between the
spouses. 6 He disagreed, however, with the majority's position that a supporting spouse's contract-based action to recoup educational expenditures
should always go unrecognized.1 7 Regarding Ms. Kuder's unjust enrichment claim, Judge Greene dissented in both analysis and result. 8 He urged
that the agreement between the spouses sufficiently demonstrated Ms. Kuder's nongratuitous intent to provide her husband with educational support. 9 He further argued that, even between spouses, such a demonstration
warrants equitable intervention.20
Judge Wynn concurred with the majority and responded directly to
Judge Greene's dissent regarding the viability of Ms. Kuder's unjust enrichment claim. He maintained that the equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment
"is inapplicable when the benefit is bestowed gratuitously or is in discharge
of some obligation."21 He agreed with the majority that the provision of
educational benefits is in discharge of each spouse's obligation to support
22
the other.
In North Carolina, each spouse undertakes a common-law obligation
upon marriage to provide the other with the necessaries of life.23 Rather
than attempt to enumerate these necessaries, North Carolina courts have
preferred to expound the duty more broadly: "Under the law of this State,
there is a personal duty of each spouse to support the other, a duty arising
from the marital relationship, and carrying with it the corollary right to support from the other spouse.""4 The relevant case law predictably examines
the minimum duty, but the obligation is often described as one of "reasonable support" according to the provider's means, ability, and station in
life. In discussing the scope of the duty of support owed a child, for
16. Id. at 360, 430 S.E.2d at 274 (Greene, J., dissenting) (citing Matthews v. Matthews, 2
N.C. App. 143, 147, 162 S.E.2d 697, 699 (1968)).
17. Id. at 359-60, 430 S.E.2d at 274 (Greene, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 361-63, 430 S.E.2d at 275-76 (Greene, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 362-63, 430 S.E.2d at 275-76 (Greene, J., dissenting),
20. Id. at 363, 430 S.E.2d at 276 (Greene, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 364, 430 S.E.2d at 277 (Wynn, J., concurring) (citing Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
State Highway Comm'n, 268 N.C. 92, 96, 150 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1966)).
22. Id. at 364, 430 S.E.2d at 277 (Wynn, J., concurring).
23. Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 453, 35 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1945); 41 AM. JUR. 2D Husband and Wife §§ 329-330 (1968). See generally 73 AM. JUR. 2D Support of Persons § 11 (1974)
(discussing support obligations generally); 41 Am. JuR. 2D Husbandand Wife §§ 365 (1968) (discussing what services constitute necessaries).
24. Kuder, 110 N.C. App. at 357, 430 S.E.2d at 273 (citing North Carolina Baptist Hosps. v.
Harris, 319 N.C. 347, 354 S.E.2d 471 (1987) (extending liability arising from the doctrine of
necessaries to female spouses)).
25. See Schloss v. Schloss, 273 N.C. 266, 271-72, 160 S.E.2d 5, 10-11 (1968); Mercer v.
Mercer, 253 N.C. 164, 169, 116 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1960); Bowling v. Bowling, 252 N.C. 527, 532,
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instance, the supreme court has held that the reasonable amount "is to be
determined with reference to the special circumstances of the particular parties." 6 Thus, what may be a reasonable support obligation for one family
may be beyond reasonability for another.

In North Carolina, as between the spouses themselves and in the absence of a valid antenuptial or separation agreement,27 economic disparities
arising out of separation or divorce may be resolved by an alimony award,28
a property distribution under the Equitable Distribution Act,2 9 or a combination of the two remedies.3 0 The remedies may be indistinguishable, as
North Carolina allows alimony in "lump sum"' 1 and distributive awards
"over a period of time in fixed amounts" when physical distribution would
be impractical.3 2
To support a claim for alimony, section 50-16.1(3) of the North Carolina General Statutes demands a threshold showing of economic dependency on the part of the support-seeking spouse. 3 Alimony claims by
spouses with a demonstrated ability to provide for themselves and their
families are dismissed for failure to satisfy the dependency requirement. 4
If substantial dependency is shown, the support-seeking spouse must then
allege and demonstrate one of ten grounds for alimony.35 In North Caro114 S.E.2d 228, 232 (1960). As the standard of living improves, the tendency among courts is to
broaden the scope of what constitutes necessaries. ROBERT E. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY
LAW § 132, at 129 (4th ed. 1980).
26. Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 57, 134 S.E.2d 227, 234 (1964). Williams contains
one of the court's most complete discussions of the duty of support as manifested in the closely
related doctrine of necessaries.
27. See infra note 53.
28. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (1987).
29. Id. § 50-20 (Supp. 1993).
30. LEE, supra note 25, § 135.1, at 145. The remedies are initially determined independently, subject to the court's revisitation of the alimony award. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(f)
(Supp. 1993). The statute states:
The court shall provide for an equitable distribution without regard to alimony for either
party or support of the children of both parties. After the determination of an equitable
distribution, the court, upon request of either party, shall consider whether an order for
alimony or child support should be modified or vacated pursuant to G.S. 50-16.9 or 5013.7.
Id.
31. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 50-16.1(1) (1987).
32. Id. § 50-20(b)(3) (Supp. 1993). See generally LEE, supra note 25, § 135.1, at 145-46
(discussing spousal remedies).
33. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 50-16.1(3) (1987).
34. Williams v. Williams, 299 N.C. 174, 182-86, 261 S.E.2d 849, 855-58 (1980). The Williams court held that, even in the absence of actual dependence, a spouse could still demonstrate a
"need for financial contribution from the other spouse in order to maintain the standard of living
of the spouse seeking alimony in the manner to which that spouse became accustomed." Id. at
183, 261 S.E.2d at 856. However, in a situation in which the alimony-seeking spouse provided
virtually all family resources throughout the marriage, such a demonstration is impossible.
35. See N.C. GEM. STAT. § 50-16.2 (1987) for a list of these grounds.

1788

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

lina, all grounds for alimony constitute marital misconduct or "fault" on the
part of the supporting spouse.3 6
The Equitable Distribution Act,37 enacted in 1981, represents an attempt by the state legislature "to alleviate many of the problems that had

existed in property divisions of divorced couples."3 The first step in the
distribution process is to identify marital property. 9 In North Carolina,
professional licenses and degrees, even if acquired during a marriage, are
not considered marital property for the purposes of distribution under the

Act.'

Goodwill associated with a professional practice, however, is dis-

tributable as marital property. 4 Goodwill can only be accumulated by pro-

fessionals with an ownership interest in their practice, not by salaried
professionals, 42 and the accumulation is limited by the length of time the
practice has been in operation.4 3
Although strongly favoring an equal distribution of marital property,
upon classification the Act affords the parties an opportunity to demonstrate
that an equal division of property would be inequitable under the circumstances. 4 Factors warranting an unequal distribution involve the relative
36. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (1987); Williams, 299 N.C. at 187-88, 261 S.E.2d at 85859.
37. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (Supp. 1993).
38. Hagler v. Hagler, 319 N.C. 287, 289, 354 S.E.2d 228, 231 (1987) (citing Sally B. Sharp,
Equitable Distributionof Property in North Carolina: A PreliminaryAnalysis, 61 N.C. L. REv.
247 (1983)).
39. Smith v. Smith, 111 N.C. App. 460, 472, 433 S.E.2d 196, 204 (1993).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Supp. 1993); Haywood v. Haywood, 106 N.C. App. 91,
99, 415 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1992); Geer v. Geer, 84 N.C. App. 471, 478, 353 S.E.2d 427, 431
(1987).
41. Poore v. Poore, 75 N.C. App. 414, 420-21, 331 S.E.2d 266, 271, disc. rev. denied, 314
N.C. 543, 335 S.E.2d 316 (1985). Marital property is defined as "all real and personal property
acquired by either spouse or both spouses during the course of the marriage and before the date of
the separation of the parties." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1) (Supp. 1993). In Poore,the court
ruled that goodwill associated with a dental practice and accumulated during the marriage was
within the scope of this definition. Poore, 75 N.C. App. at 420-21, 331 S.E.2d at 271.
42. Sonek v. Sonek, 105 N.C. App. 247, 250, 412 S.E.2d 917, 919, disc. rev. denied, 331
N.C. 287,417 S.E.2d 255 (1992). Although the alleged goodwill interest in Sonek was denied, the
court remanded the issue for an increase in the plaintiff's distributional percentage because one
spouse's enhancement of the other spouse's earning capacity is a factor weighing in favor of an
unequal distribution under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(7) (1991). Id. at 251, 412 S.E.2d at 920.
Judge Greene concurred in Sonek's result, arguing that, although the license should itself remain
separate property, any increase in the value of the license due to marital contribution should be
regarded as actual marital property rather than as a mere distributional factor. Id. at 255-58, 412
S.E.2d at 923-24 (Greene, J., concurring). At least in cases in which goodwill is at issue, such a
classification would avoid inequity when little marital property has been accumulated, presumably
by warranting a distributive award to be paid over time under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(e) (Supp.
1991).
43. Poore,75 N.C. App. at 421, 331 S.E.2d at 271.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (Supp. 1993). In White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 324 S.E.2d
829 (1985), the court stated:
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needs, expectations, and contributions of each party, including "[a]ny direct or indirect contribution made by one spouse to help educate or develop
the career potential of the other spouse."'4 5 Because an educational or career development contribution merely suggests an unequal distribution of
assets already classified as marital property, the Act benefits the contributing spouse only in the event that significant marital property exists at the
time of dissolution. In addition to alimony and equitable property distribution-statutory rights derived from the marital relationship itself-spouses
may upon dissolution allege additional rights founded on specific acts or
agreements between them.4 6 Contract and unjust enrichment claims fall
within this category.
Contracts between North Carolina spouses are generally valid unless
inconsistent with public policy.47 In Ritchie v. White,a" the supreme court
considered a widow's contract and unjust enrichment claims against her
deceased husband's estate.4 9 In the alleged agreement between the spouses,
Mr. Ritchie promised to devise his family's "home place" to his wife in
exchange for her provision of domestic services, lodging, and utilities until
his death.5" The husband failed to devise the property as agreed. 5 ' Regarding the contract claim, the court held that marital contracts that transfer the
spousal duty of support from one party to another or relieve one party of the
duty altogether are void.52 Such an agreement fails both because it offers a
preexisting duty as consideration and because a modification or release of
either party's obligations under the duty of support during the marriage violates public policy encouraging spousal support.5 3
The clear intent of the legislature was that a party desiring an unequal division of marital
property bear the burden of producing evidence concerning one or more of the twelve
factors in the statute and the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
an equal division would not be equitable.
Id. at 776, 324 S.E.2d at 832.
45. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(7) (Supp. 1993).
46. See supra notes 28-30.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-10(a) (1991).
48. 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945).
49. Id. at 452, 35 S.E.2d at 415.
50. Id.

51. Id.
52. Id. at 454, 35 S.E.2d at 416.

53. Id. at 452, 35 S.E.2d at 416. The duty of support may nevertheless be contractually
altered before or after marriage by premarital agreement, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52B-4(4) (1987), or
separation agreement, Archbell v. Archbell, 158 N.C. 409, 414,74 S.E. 327, 329 (1912) (holding
that separation agreements are permissible "where the separation has already taken place or immediately follows"). During the marriage, services beyond the scope of the support duty may be the
subject of a contract between the spouses. Dorsett v. Dorsett, 183 N.C. 354, 358, 111 S.E. 541,

543 (1922).
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Actions for unjust enrichment, like contract actions, are available to
both husband and wife.5 4 The general rule regarding unjust enrichment is
that "if one performs services for another which are knowingly and voluntarily accepted, nothing else appearing, the law implies a promise on the part
of the recipient to pay the reasonable value of the services."5 5 The principle
has never been applicable, however, "[i]f the services were rendered as a
pure gratuity or in discharge of a moral obligation."56
In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. State Highway Commission,57
the supreme court narrowed the applicability of the doctrine to exclude
58
compensation for services performed in discharge of a legal obligation.
In Atlantic Coast, the plaintiff railroad made necessary improvements to a
crossing it operated when the defendant State Highway Commission widened the underlying road.5 9 The railroad sued to recover its expenses on the
theory that the State had been unjustly enriched by the railroad's modifications. 60 The court, pointing to a statute requiring such repairs by rail carriers, held that the principle of unjust enrichment is inapplicable "when6 1the
services are rendered gratuitously or in discharge of some obligation."
Although these limitations complicate claims between spouses, there is
no doubt that an unjust enrichment claim can succeed when a spouse seeks
recovery for non-domestic services. Most commonly, such claims involve
services rendered in furtherance of the benefited spouse's business. In Dorsett v. Dorsett,62 the supreme court denied a wife's unjust enrichment claim
based on her services in her former husband's repair shop because no agreement regarding compensation existed.63 In dicta, however, the court noted
that a wife would have a valid claim if her services did not arise from the
marital relation and there was an express agreement between the parties
54. Most recently, in Biesecker v. Biesecker, 62 N.C. App. 282, 302 S.E.2d 826 (1983), the
court remanded for further consideration a defendant-wife's counterclaim for unjust enrichment.
Id. at 286, 288, 302 S.E.2d at 829-30. In Wright v. Wright, 47 N.C. App. 367, 267 S.E.2d 61
(1980), the court remanded a plaintiff-husband's unjust enrichment claim when the trial court
incorrectly instructed the jury to determine whether a contract between the parties existed. Id. at
369-70, 267 S.E.2d at 62.
55. See Johnson v. Sanders, 260 N.C. 291, 293, 132 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1963); Young v. Herman, 97 N.C. 280, 281-82, 1 S.E. 792, 793 (1887).
56. Twiford v. Waterfield, 240 N.C. 582, 585, 83 S.E.2d 548, 551 (1954) (citing Young, 97
N.C. at 281-82, 1 S.E. at 793).
57. 268 N.C. 92, 150 S.E.2d 70 (1966).
58. d. at 96, 150 S.E.2d at 73.
59. Id at 93-94, 150 S.E.2d at 71-72.
60. Id

61. Id. at 96, 150 S.E.2d at 73 (emphasis added) (citing Johnson v. Sanders, 260 N.C. 291,
132 S.E.2d 582 (1963); Allen v. Seay, 248 N.C. 321, 103 S.E.2d 332 (1958); Twiford v.
Waterfield, 240 N.C. 582, 83 S.E.2d 548 (1954)).

62. 183 N.C. 354, 111 S.E. 541 (1922).
63. Id. at 356-58, 111 S.E. at 542-43.
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regarding compensation.' In Leatherman v. Leatherman,6" the court reiterated that unjust enrichment claims based on non-domestic services are
available to spouses and noted that, although even business-related services
between spouses are presumptively gratuitous, this presumption can be re66
butted by evidence of an express or implied agreement to the contrary.
The applicability of unjust enrichment to domestic services is most
67
In Francis, the plaintiff sought
clearly discussed in Francis v. Francis.
recovery for domestic services she provided to her father-in-law in the years
preceding his death.68 Because no express contract to pay existed, the
plaintiff's theory of recovery was limited to unjust enrichment.6 9 The court
noted that when valuable services are rendered between parties in "certain
family relationships," a presumption of gratuity and moral obligation
arises. 70 The court acknowledged, however, that "this is a presumption
which may be overcome or rebutted by proof of an agreement to pay, or of
facts and circumstances permitting the inference that payment was intended
on the one hand and expected on the other. ' ' The court held that, as between family members as distant as father and daughter-in-law, no presumption of gratuity arises. 72 Alternatively, and for good measure, the
services were, at the time,
court found evidence showing "that plaintiff's
73
intended to be paid for by the decedent."
In addition to the problems of gratuity and discharge of obligation,
spouses seeking recovery for domestic services based on unjust enrichment
face yet another hurdle. In Ritchie, in which the court denied the plaintiffwife's contract claim for domestic services on grounds that the contract
lacked adequate consideration and violated public policy, the court further
64. Id. at 358, 111 S.E. at 543.
65. 297 N.C. 618, 256 S.E.2d 793 (1979).
66. Id. at 622, 256 S.E.2d at 796. For other cases considering unjust enrichment claims for
services in furtherance of spouse's business, see Sprinkle v. Ponder, 233 N.C. 312, 64 S.E.2d 171
(1951); Eggleston v. Eggleston, 228 N.C. 668, 47 S.E.2d 243 (1948).
67. 223 N.C. 401, 26 S.E.2d 907 (1943).
68. Id. at 402, 26 S.E.2d at 907.
69. Id., 26 S.E.2d at 908.
70. Id; see also Allen v. Seay, 248 N.C. 321, 323, 103 S.E.2d 332, 333 (1958) (discussing
the presumption); Twiford v. Waterfield, 240 N.C. 582, 585, 83 S.E.2d 548, 551 (1954) (same).
71. Francis,223 N.C. at 402, 26 S.E.2d at 908 (quoting Nesbitt v. Donoho, 198 N.C. 147,
147, 150 S.E. 875, 875 (1929)).
72. Id. at 402-03, 26 S.E.2d at 908. Cases turning on whether the presumption of gratuity
applies to domestic services rendered within a particular relationship have involved family members other than spouses. See, e.g., Johnson v. Sanders, 260 N.C. 291, 292, 132 S.E.2d 582, 583
(1963) (adult daughter); Allen, 248 N.C. at 323, 103 S.E.2d at 333 (first cousin once removed);
Twiford, 240 N.C. at 583, 83 S.E.2d at 549 (adult foster son); Francis,223 N.C. at 402, 26 S.E.2d
at 908 (adult daughter-in-law).
73. Francis,223 N.C. at 403, 26 S.E.2d at 908. It should be noted that although Francis
involved domestic services, the distant relation between the parties removed the services from the
scope of the duty of support.
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held that Ms. Ritchie's unjust enrichment claim failed because "[the law
74
will not imply assumpsit where the parties may not effectually agree."
Although she alleged express and implied agreements evidencing the nongratuitous nature of her labor and rebutting the presumption of gratuity arising between spouses, Ms. Ritchie could not claim unjust enrichment when
she could not contract for the same transaction. 75
The case of Suggs v. Norris76 further illustrates the point that recovery
in equity is unavailable when recovery at law would be impossible. In
Suggs, a partner to an unmarried but cohabiting relationship brought an unjust enrichment claim to recover the value of services provided to her cohabitant's produce business. 77 The court noted that "no recovery can be
had under either a contract or restitutionary (quantum meruit) theory arising
out of a contract or circumstances which violate public policy."'78 But because the relationship was between unmarried partners and involved business services "not of the character usually found to be performed
gratuitously," no violation of public policy had occurred and recovery was
allowed. 9
Although the Suggs court cited the celebrated California case of Marvin v. Marvin80 as authority for the proposition that express contract and
quasi-contract claims should be made available to unmarried cohabitants,
the Suggs court did not adopt Marvin's holding that relief for unmarried
cohabitants should extend to claims for domestic services as well.81 In
Marvin, the California Supreme Court approved relief based on the plaintiff's services "as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook." 2
The Suggs trial court, however, "refused to submit to the jury any issues
74. Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450,455,35 S.E.2d 414,417 (1945); see also supra notes 4853 and accompanying text.
75. Ritchie, 225 N.C. at 455, 35 S.E.2d at 417. In Pierce v. Cobb, 161 N.C. 300, 77 S.E. 350
(1913), the supreme court fully expounded the principle that unjust enrichment is unavailable
when an underlying contract for the same services would violate public policy. The court stated:
The rule rests upon the broad ground that no court will allow itself to be used when its
judgment will consummate an act forbidden by law.... When parties ... have united in
an unlawful transaction to injure another or others or the public... or when the contract
is against public policy, or contra bonos mores, the courts will not enforce it in favor of
either party.
Id. at 302, 77 S.E.2d at 350-51 (citations omitted).
76. 88 N.C. App. 539, 364 S.E.2d 159 (1988).
77. Id. at 540, 364 S.E.2d at 160-61.
78. Id. at 541, 364 S.E.2d at 161 (citing Pierce, 161 N.C. 300, 77 S.E. 350 (1913)).
79. Id. at 542-43, 545, 364 S.E.2d at 162-63.
80. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
81. Suggs, 88 N.C. App. at 545, 364 S.E.2d at 163.
82. Marvin, 557 P.2d at 110, 122-23.
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83
concerning plaintiff's recovery for housecleaning and domestic services.
The court of appeals did not remand on this issue.
Courts in other jurisdictions have fashioned various remedies for the
situation in which a spouse providing educational benefits remains uncompensated at dissolution by a distribution of limited marital property. Perhaps the most radical alternative is to classify professional degrees and
licenses as marital property for equitable distribution purposes. The vast
majority of states considering the issue, including North Carolina, have held
that neither an educational degree nor a professional license is marital property.84 Few courts or legislatures have felt compelled to wrestle with the
practical problems of valuation, an inherent lack of transferability, and the
danger of speculation as to future value of the degree or license. 85 A revisitation of this rule by North Carolina courts appears unlikely.
Alternatively, some courts have applied remedies such as "reimbursement alimony" or "equitable reimbursement" in similar situations. In reimbursement alimony, the education-providing spouse receives regular
maintenance payments equal in total value to her contribution to the direct
and indirect expenses of her spouse's education.86 States applying this remedy, however, may rely on alimony statutes that consider the alimony-seeking spouse's potential for self-support as a mere factor in the determination

83. Suggs, 88 N.C. App. at 540, 364 S.E.2d at 161.
84. North Carolina's position is clearly stated in Haywood v. Haywood, 106 N.C. App. 91,
99, 415 S.E.2d 565, 570 (1992). For a list of twenty-four courts refusing. to consider a degree or
license marital property, see Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1078 n.1 (Md. 1985). For decisions holding that degrees or licenses are marital property see Postema v. Postema, 471 N.W.2d
912,918 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712,713 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985);
Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 288 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
85. See Leonard L. Loeb & Mary K. McCann, Dilemma v. Paradox: Valuation of an Advanced Degree Upon Dissolutionof a Marriage,66 MARQ. L. Rayv. 495, 519-21 (1983) (attempting a valuation approach when advanced degrees are considered distributable marital property and
cautioning that property settlements are non-modifiable as a result of changed circumstances and
are dischargeable in bankruptcy); see also Linda S. Mullenix, The Valuation of an Educational
Degree at Divorce, 16 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 227, 283 (1983) (concluding that "the most equitable
method of valuing a degree is in terms of the labor time utilized by the student spouse to achieve
the degree" and recommending the supporting spouse receive one-half the value of this asset).
86. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 534 (N.J. 1982). According to Mahoney, reimbursement alimony includes "all financial contributions to the former spouse's education including household expenses, educational costs, school travel expenses and any other contributions
used by the supported spouse in obtaining his or her degree or license." Id. For another application of reimbursement alimony, see Bold v. Bold, 574 A.2d 552 (Pa. 1990). See also Joan M.
Krauskopf, Recompensefor FinancingSpouse's Education: Legal Protectionfor the MaritalInvestor in Human Capital,28 KAN. L. Rav. 379, 417 (1980) (advocating a nonmodifiable, in gross
maintenance award based on both actual expenditure and expected return in proportion to the
amount invested by the supporting spouse).
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of an award and are not exclusively "fault-based. 8 7 North Carolina's ali-

mony statute plainly prevents such an award on both grounds. 8
Equitable reimbursement also awards the supporting spouse the value
of direct and indirect contributions to the education, but it does so outside

the statutory dissolution framework of support maintenance and property
distribution. 9 The award, although not the result of a property settlement,
consists of cash payments similar in form to distributive awards under

North Carolina's Equitable Distribution Act. The amount represents restitution of financial support provided by either spouse toward the education
of the other-in essence, a limited but explicitly authorized unjust enrichment claim. 9° In some jurisdictions, the action requires proof of an agree-

ment evidencing non-gratuity. 9 In other jurisdictions, even absent such an
agreement, the action prescribes post-separation recovery of any spousal
expenditures in excess of a minimum legally obligated support amount.9"
The availability of the award, however, clearly depends on a restricted view
of what services fall within the duty of support.
A more creative remedy considers any increase to future earning capacity acquired during the term of marriage, including the acquisition of an
advanced degree, as a marital asset relevant not only to an equitable property distribution, but also to whether a continuing alimony award is justi-

fied.93 As a final alternative, at least one court has fashioned a remedy by
87. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 3701(a), (b)
(1988).
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.2 (1987); see also supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
89. DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755,757-58 (Minn. 1981). For a proposal codifying the equitable reimbursement remedy, see Nancy S. Erickson, Spousal Support Toward the
Realization of EducationalGoals: How the Law Can Ensure Reciprocity, 1978 Wis. L. REv.947,
971-74 (1978) (recommending amending the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act to mandate repayment of direct and indirect educational expenditures in the absence of a written waiver).
90. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d at 757-58.
91. Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196, 203 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). The Pyeatte court held:
"[W]e do not need to decide what limits or standards would apply in the absence of an agreement." Id. at 207.
92. Bold v. Bold, 574 A.2d 552, 556 (Pa. 1990); see also Katherine Hein, Note, Pennsylvania Recognizes the Reality of the ProfessionalDegree/DivorceDecree Couple, 64 TaMP. L.
REv. 281, 295-97 (1991) (applauding the Bold court's award of actual expenses beyond the duty
of support but criticizing the court's failure to allow recovery for lost opportunity costs and other
intangibles).
93. In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885, 891 (Iowa 1978); see also Randall Caldwell, Note, ProfessionalEducation as a Divisible Asset in Marriage Dissolutions, 64 IowA L.
REv. 705, 716-21 (1979) (analogizing the Horstmann award to an award at dissolution for pension
benefits, business goodwill, and traditional investment); see also Deborah A. Batts, Remedy
Refocus: In Search of Equity in "EnhancedSpouse/Other Spouse" Divorces, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rav.
751, 781-86 (1988) (recommending that enhanced earning capacity be considered a marital asset
distributable upon divorce, but advising that only "cost of acquisition" of the enhanced capacity
and not projected future earnings resulting therefrom should be distributed); Susan Klebanoff,
Comment, To Love and Obey 'Til GraduationDay-The Professional Degree in Light of the
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liberally construing its state's statutory "threshold of need" requirement that
the spouse seeking alimony must be incapable of self-support through appropriate employment.94 Recommending a maintenance award when a
marriage that had accumulated little property dissolved shortly after a fully
supported spouse obtained his degree, the court held: "[The determination
of what constitutes 'appropriate employment' . . . requires that the party's
. . .reasonable expectations established during the marriage be considered." 95 The defendant-husband was essentially estopped from asserting
that his spouse had demonstrated her self-maintenance capabilities.
The reasoning of the court of appeals in Kuder v. Schroeder presumes
that the direct and indirect expenses of a graduate education are within the
scope of the duty of support.9 6 As Judge Greene pointed out, however, this
conclusion is questionable. 97 Because the extent of the duty is generally
based on reasonability under the circumstances,9 8 the court should have examined whether Ms. Kuder's ability to provide support-although sufficient to cover the cost of food, shelter, and medical care-was sufficient
under the circumstances to create an obligation to provide educational expenses as well. 99 Although this point was not raised by the court, the existence of an agreement between Ms. Kuder and Mr. Schroeder arguably
suggests that the couple's financial status was inadequate to support such an
obligation.
Assuming, however, that the services in question are within the scope
of the support duty, the majority's brief analysis of Ms. Kuder's contract
claim is unassailable under current North Carolina law. An agreement entered into during the marriage that attempts to modify the duty of support
between the spouses is void as a matter of law and public policy. 10 0 The
entire panel agreed on this point. 10 '
But Judge Greene argued that if the court refused to limit the scope of
the support duty, it should nevertheless expand spousal contract rights to
allow modifications of the obligation during marriage. 102 In support of this
Uniform Marital Property Act, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 839, 873 (1985) (asserting that the current

Uniform Marital Property Act encompasses contributions to earning capacity because under its
provisions, "if one spouse substantially contributes to the appreciation of the individual or separate property of the other spouse, the appreciation constitutes marital property").
94. In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 681-82 (Colo. 1987).
95. Id. at 681. A finding of fault is not required under Colorado's alimony statute. See
CoLo. REv. STAT. § 14-10-114 (1987).
96. See 110 N.C. App. at 357, 430 S.E.2d at 273.
97. See id. at 359, 430 S.E.2d at 274 (Greene, J., dissenting).
98. See supra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 8.
100. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
101. Kuder, 110 N.C. App. at 357, 359, 430 S.E.2d at 273, 274.
dissenting).
102. Id. at 359-60, 430 S.E.2d at 274 (Greene, J.,
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prescription, Judge Greene first alluded to the legislative trend toward con-

sideration of marriage as a modifiable contract. 10 3 Then, citing the holding
by the court of appeals in Suggs v. Norris that express or implied agreements between unmarried cohabitants are enforceable, Judge Greene observed that "our Courts recognize the validity of an agreement of the type at
issue provided that the parties to such an agreement are unmarried cohabiting partners."' 1 He found the differing treatment of spouses and unmarried cohabitants in like situations "incongruous" and questioned the public
policy behind such a result.' 0 5 Judge Wynn responded to Judge Greene's

arguments by bluntly observing: "Quite simply, the rules are different for
married couples." 10 6 In Judge Wynn's opinion, the special protections be-

stowed by the state on the marital relationship far outweigh the minor deprivation to which Judge Greene alluded.'

7

Although Judge Wynn defended current law on the ground that any
deprivation imposed by the marital status is de minimis, it is not clear, contrary to Judge Greene's observation, that the contract rights of unmarried
couples actually do exceed those of spouses. Recall that Suggs, unlike the
California case of Marvin v. Marvin, never approved agreements regarding
domestic services or services within the duty of support.'0 8 Rather, by destroying the presumption that the plaintiff's services in the defendant's
business were rendered in exchange for illicit sexual services, Suggs
granted unmarried cohabitants the same rights as spouses to recover for
services clearly beyond the scope of the support duty. x°9 Had Ms. Kuder
been unmarried and the court persisted in its classification of educational
expenditures as within the scope of the duty of support, her claim, under the
requirements set forth in Suggs, would likely have failed. Whether Judge
103. Id. (citing N.C. Gm. STAT. §§ 52B-1 to 52B-4(a)(4) (1987) (extending spousal right to
modify the duty of support by agreement before marriage); N.C. Gm. STAT. § 52-10.1 (1991)
(extending spousal right to modify the duty of support by agreement upon separation); N.C. GeN.
STAT. § 50-20(d) (Supp. 1992) (extending spousal right to distribute marital property by agreement before, during, and after marriage)).
104. Kuder, 110 N.C. App. at 360, 430 S.E.2d at 274 (Greene, J., dissenting); see also supra
notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
105. Kuder, 110 N.C. App. at 360, 430 S.E.2d at 274 (Greene, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 364, 430 S.E.2d at 276-77 (Wynn, J., concurring) (citing Ritchie v. White, 225
N.C. 450, 453, 35 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1945) (holding that certain rights spring into being the moment the marriage relation comes into existence)).
107. Judge Wynn listed the following special protections: the right to hold property in tenancy by the entirety, the right to claim an elective share of a deceased spouse's estate, and the
right to a year's allowance upon the death of a spouse. Id. at 363, 430 S.E.2d at 276 (Wynn, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted). Additionally, from the viewpoint of public policy, it is not likely
that the public interest intervenes to protect the support rights and expectations of unmarried
cohabitants.
108. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text.
109. Suggs v. Norris, 88 N.C. App. 539, 542-43, 364 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1988); see also supra
notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
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Greene properly recommended that contract rights between married couples
should be expanded, North Carolina's treatment of similarly situated
spouses and unmarried partners does not provide legitimate support for his
position.
Given only the terse statement that the "duty of support may not be
abrogated or modified by the agreement of the parties to a marriage,"' 10 the
majority's consideration of Ms. Kuder's unjust enrichment claim is more
difficult to reconstruct. Judge Wynn's concurrence provides the only insight into the court's reasoning. Citing the principle from Atlantic Coast
that unjust enrichment is unavailable "when the benefit is bestowed gratuitously or in discharge of some obligation," Judge Wynn continued: "Each
spouse has a duty to support the other during the course of the marriage,
and, therefore, the wife in the instant case cannot now seek to be reimbursed for such support under a theory of unjust enrichment.""' Significantly, Judge Wynn identified the stumbling block of Ms. Kuder's unjust
enrichment claim not as gratuity but rather as the existence of a legal obligation-in particular the duty of support. 12
Judge Greene's dissent, however, focused solely on the limitation that
the benefit not be conferred gratuitously." 3 Judge Greene appropriately
cited Francis for the proposition that although a presumption of gratuity
arises between spouses, the presumption can be overcome by proof of
agreement or circumstances to the contrary," 4 but he ignored the further5
limitation-disharge of legal obligation-that Atlantic Coast imposed.1
The Atlantic Coast model is particularly hostile to unjust enrichment recovery because, unlike the limitation based on gratuity or moral obligation
alone, the plaintiff has no opportunity to rebut evidence of legal obligation.
A legal obligation simply exists or it does not. Understandably, Judge
Greene relied on the more easily satisfied Francis paradigm because Francis has historically provided the standard for evaluating unjust enrichment
claims to recover the value of domestic services. 1 6 The more expansive
Atlantic Coast limitation, on the other hand, arose to prevent a rail carrier's7
recovery against the State and is founded on no discernible precedent."
110. Kuder, 110 N.C. App. at 357, 430 S.E.2d at 273.
111. Id. at 364, 430 S.E.2d at 277 (Wynn, J., concurring) (citing Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
State Highway Comm'n, 268 N.C. 92, 96, 150 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1966)).
112. Whereas in Atlantic Coast a statutory duty was at issue, Judge Wynn applied the same
rule to the common-aw duty between the spouses in Kuder. Id. (Wynn, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 361, 430 S.E.2d at 275 (Greene, J., dissenting).
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
117. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. State Highway Comm'n, 268 N.C. 92, 96, 150 S.E.2d 70,73
(1966) (citing Johnson v. Sanders, 260 N.C. 291, 132 S.E.2d 582 (1963); Allen v. Seay, 248 N.C.
321, 103 S.E.2d 332 (1958); Twiford v. Waterfield, 240 N.C. 582, 83 S.E.2d 548 (1954)). The
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But even assuming that the Atlantic Coast standard can be dismissed as an
anomaly, could Ms. Kuder recover under the Francisstandard limiting unjust enrichment only in cases of gratuity or moral obligation? In Francis,
recovery was allowed because the parties were not spouses and the presumption of gratuity did not arise." 8 In Ms. Kuder's case, however, the
presumption would arise and Ms. Kuder would offer her agreement with
Mr. Schroeder as evidence that payment was intended or expected. 119 But
at this point, the additional limitation on unjust enrichment claims imposed
by Ritchie v. White could easily be invoked to prevent recovery.120 Ms.
Kuder's inability to enter into a legally enforceable contract transferring the
duty of support would give a reluctant court cause to deny relief in equity.
Could any of the alternative remedies available in other jurisdictions
be incorporated into existing North Carolina law? Importing an alimonybased solution would be the most disruptive to the state's current divorce
framework. To authorize either reimbursement alimony1 21 or conventional
alimony based solely on one spouse's contribution to the other's increased
earning capacity 22 would require either a departure from North Carolina's
exclusively fault-based alimony statute1 23 or an overly broad interpretation
of its threshold dependency requirement.1 24
Under the present scope of the marital duty of support, contract remedies are problematic because a public policy violation arises from a modification of the duty of support and the preexisting support duty results in
invalid consideration. 2 5 Contract-based solutions are also invalidated, as
Judge Greene pointed out in Kuder, because the terms of an agreement
be1 26
tween spouses will often be too uncertain to warrant enforcement.
The alternative remedy of equitable reimbursement, 7 although not
prohibited statutorily, fails in North Carolina for the same reason that unjust
enrichment claims fail under current law. Given the Kuder court's inclusion of direct and indirect educational expenses within the duty of support,
authorities cited in Atlantic Coastcontain no mention of a limitation based on legal obligationonly gratuity and moral obligation; see Johnson at 293, 132 S.E.2d at 584 ("gratuitous"); Allen at
323, 103 S.E.2d at 333 ("moral obligation"); Twiford at 585, 83 S.E.2d at 551 ("pure gratuity or in
discharge of a moral obligation") (citing Francis v. Francis, 223 N.C. 401, 26 S.E.2d 907 (1943)).
118. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. But cf supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (expansively interpreting Colorado's "threshold of need" requirement).
125. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text.
126. See Kuder, 110 N.C. App. at 360-61, 430 S.E.2d at 274-75 (Greene, J., dissenting).
127. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
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any unjust enrichment claim between spouses concerning the provision of
educational benefits must, in order to rebut the presumption of gratuity arising between parties of close family relationship, be founded on an agreeare currently
ment to modify or abrogate that duty. Since such agreements
12 8
deemed contrary to public policy, these claims will fail.
In short, no alternative remedy is easily transplanted in the absence of
a significant change of course by the legislature or a limitation of the scope
of the duty of support by the judiciary. The court of appeals in Kuder recognized the "apparent dilemma" of the uncompensated education-providing
spouse.' 29 At the same time, however, the court may have feared that by
limiting the scope of the support duty, it risked opening a Pandora's box of
contract and unjust enrichment claims between separating spouses and fostering a wholesale erosion of the marital duty of support. 13 0
Although any judicial remedy must involve a limitation on the scope
of the support duty, the solution that best limits these risks appears to be a
restricted form of equitable remibursement. If the court were to classify
provision of educational expenses as a service in furtherance of the benefited spouse's business, the equitable reimbursement doctrine could be
grafted onto existing North Carolina law with little disturbance. In Dorsett
and Leatherman, the supreme court recognized that a spouse's services
outside the support duty and in benefit of the other spouse's business can be
the subject of an unjust enrichment claim. 3 ' The presumption of gratuity
attaching to all services rendered between spouses can be rebutted by evidence of agreement to the contrary, 132 and because spouses may enter into a
business contract, 1 33 unjust enrichment would not be foreclosed on the
grounds that the parties could not contract for the same services.' 34 In order
to limit the use of equitable reimbursement, the court should allow the remedy only when marital property is insufficient to otherwise compensate the
supporting spouse, proof of an agreement between the spouses exists, and
dissolution occurs soon after the advanced degree is attained. The court
could further limit recovery to the direct expenses of the education since
128. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.

129. 110 N.C. App. at 357, 430 S.E.2d at 273.
130. The court appears to fear a surge in litigation to determine spousal rights under private

agreements or to account for benefits conferred non-gratuitously: "[R]eaching the result that the
dissenting opinion urges . . . would result in unwarranted litigation in those situations where a
supporting spouse claims recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment in an amount in excess of
the value of the marital property." Id at 365, 430 S.E.2d at 277 (Wynn, J., concurring). The court
has also expressed a fear of "reduc[ing] the institution of marriage, or the obligations of family
life, to a commercial basis." Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 452, 35 S.E.2d 414, 415 (1945).
131. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
133. Leatherman v. Leathennan,297 N.C. 618, 622, 256 S.E.2d 793, 796 (1979).
134. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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these expenses are the most easily quantified. Such a holding would remove professional education from the scope of the duty of support, but only
in the most compelling circumstances.
STEvEN

A. KiNG

Family Law-Equitable Distribution-Brown v. Brown, 112
N.C. App. 15, 434 S.E.2d 873 (1993).
Equitable distribution, a remedy used in divorce cases, attempts to give
both spouses an equitable share of the marital property in order to allow
them to maintain the same standard of living to which they were accustomed during marriage.1 In the words of one commentator, equitable distribution "seeks to effect upon divorce those sharing principles that motivate
most couples during marriage."'2 During the pendency of an equitable distribution action, however, there are no assurances that both parties will control enough assets to live at the level at which they lived prior to divorce.
The problem is particularly acute when one of the significant marital assets
is an income-producing asset, such as a partnership or a family owned business.3 While the spouse who owns the business has access to income derived from it, the other spouse may have little or no income until the final
equitable distribution judgment is rendered.
In 1991, the North Carolina General Assembly amended the equitable
distribution statute.4 The amendment, codified at North Carolina General
Statutes section 50-20(il), allows a judicially enforced interim transfer of
assets before the final equitable distribution judgment.5 In the recent case
of Brown v. Brown6 the North Carolina Court of Appeals interpreted section
50-20(il) for the first time. Brown addressed the question of whether a trial
judge has the authority under the statute to order an interim cash transfer
1. Cf. Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 54, 286 S.E.2d 779, 788 (1982) (stating that the equitable distribution statute is intended to divide property "equitably, based upon the relative positions
of the parties at the time of divorce"). For a discussion of the background of equitable distribution
in North Carolina, see Sally B. Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North Carolina:A
PreliminaryAnalysis, 61 N.C. L. Rev. 247, 247 (1983).
2. See Sharp, supra note 1, at 247.
3. Cf. Gary N. Skoloff & Cary G. Cheifetz, Equitable DistributionDelayed: Justice Denied,
124 N.J. L.J. 1360 (1989) (stating that allowing one spouse to control an investment portfolio
pending the outcome of the equitable distribution action is unfair to the non-controlling spouse).
4. An Act for Equitable Distribution of Marital Property, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws
1184 (1981) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-20 to -21 (Supp. 1993)).
5. N.C. GEM. STAT. § 50-20(il). The statute provides:
After an action for equitable distribution has been filed the Court may, for just cause,
order the spouse in control of marital assets to transfer the use and possession of some
or all of those assets to the other spouse provided that any and all assets so transferred
shall be subject to a full accounting when the property is ultimately allocated in an
equitable distribution judgment. Any property transfer made pursuant to this subsection
shall be made without prejudice to the rights of either spouse to claim a contrary classification, value, or distribution in the final equitable distribution trial.
Id.
6. 112 N.C. App. 15, 434 S.E.2d 873 (1993).
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asset.
between the parties of cash that is not itself an identifiable marital
7
The court held that the trial judge does not have such authority.
JoAnn Brown and D.T. Brown, Jr. separated on July 26, 1981 after
more than thirty-one years of marriage.' On January 13, 1982, JoAnn filed
an action seeking, among other things, equitable distribution of the marital
property. 9 During the legal battle over the marital assets, JoAnn's standard
of living was significantly lower than the standard she had enjoyed during
her marriage. 10 Meanwhile, D.T. had access to the vast majority of the
marital assets." On October 22, 1991, JoAnn filed a motion pursuant to

section 50-20(il), seeking an interim distribution of marital assets.' 2 Even
though the marital property did not include significant cash, 13 the court ordered D.T. to pay JoAnn $400,000.14 The court further provided that if
D.T. failed to make the payment, Brown Brothers Construction Co. would
be forced to pay. 5 The court of appeals held that section 50-20(1) authorizes only in-kind transfers of assets and that the trial court had erred in
ordering the transfer of liquid assets that were not part of the marital
estate.16
7. Id. at 17, 434 S.E.2d at 876.
8. Id. at 15, 434 S.E.2d at 875.
9. Id. JoAnn later amended her complaint, adding Paul Brown, D.T.'s brother and coowner with him of Brown Brothers Construction Company, as an additional defendant. Id. at 16,
434 S.E.2d at 875. The trial court dismissed many of the claims against Paul's property, but
allowed claims against property titled in the names of both brothers or in the name of Brown
Brothers Construction Co., which was the most significant marital asset. Id. On December 12,
1988, the trial court appointed a referee to determine the identity and value of the marital property
and to suggest an equitable distribution. Id. The referee concluded that the marital estate consisted
of $2.4 million in titled property. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 5, Brown (No. 9224DC669).
JoAnn also sought alimony and possession of the marital estate. The parties entered into a
Consent Judgment on February 25, 1982, which set alimony at $1,200 per month and gave JoAnn
possession of the marital home. Brown, 112 N.C. App. at 15, 434 S.E.2d at 875.
dissenting). To supplement her monthly alimony
10. Id. at 23, 434 S.E.2d at 880 (Greene, J.,
dissenting). Because of her meapayments, JoAnn worked minimum wage jobs. Id. (Greene, J.,
ger income, had no money to pay her enormous legal fees, had been without a vehicle for five
dissenting).
years, and periodically lived without heat in her house. Id. (Greene, J.,
11. Id. at 23-24, 434 S.E.2d at 880 (Greene, J., dissenting). Of the $2.4 million in "titled"
marital assets found by the referee, D.T. controlled approximately $2.2 million. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 5, Brown (No. 9224DC669).
12. Brown, 112 N.C. App. at 16, 434 S.E.2d at 875.
13. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 6, Brown (No. 9224DC669). The marital property included only $200,714 in liquid assets. Id. These were in the form of cash, stocks, and the cash
value of life insurance policies. Id.
14. Brown, 112 N.C. App. at 16, 434 S.E.2d at 875.
15. Id. at 16-17, 434 S.E.2d at 875-76.
16. Id. at 17-18, 434 S.E.2d at 876. Under North Carolina law, JoAnn was entitled to an
appeal as of right to the North Carolina Supreme Court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (1989). The
parties, however, reached a settlement that precluded the need for such an appeal. Interview with
Judge Edward Greene, North Carolina Court of Appeals, in Chapel Hill, N.C. (Feb. 22, 1994).
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Writing for a divided court, Judge Wynn began his discussion by noting that the legislature enacted section 50-20(il) to achieve equity between
the parties during the pendency of the equitable distribution action.17 The
court then examined the plain language of the amendment."8 It noted that
the amendment referred to the transfer of the "use and possession" of assets.19 The court interpreted this to mean that a transferee can use a transferred asset only "as it was meant to be used." 20 Such a reading makes the
cash transfer of the value of an asset, instead of the asset itself, inconsistent
with the statutory language.2 1 Further, the court noted that the amendment
provides for a "full accounting" at the final equitable distribution2 2 and that
the transfer could not adversely affect "the rights of either spouse to claim a
contrary classification, value, or distribution in the final equitable distribution trial."2 3 To force the liquidation of an asset to pay a lump-sum award,
it reasoned, would frustrate the intent of the legislature to ensure that
neither party is permanently disadvantaged by an interim award.24
The court then looked at how the amendment fits within the larger
framework of the equitable distribution statute. It noted that under the equitable distribution statute, there is a presumption that any distribution of assets be in kind.' The provision allowing for liquid distributive awards, 26
the court stated, is a "secondary remedy."'27 It requires a judge to find that a
17. Brown, 112 N.C. App. at 17-18, 434 S.E.2d at 876. For a fuller discussion of the goals of
section 50-20(ii), see infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
18. Brown, 112 N.C. App. at 17, 434 S.E.2d at 876.
19. Id. at 18, 434 S.E.2d at 876.
20. Id. at 18, 434 S.E.2d at 877. The court cited the transfer of the marital home, rental
property that would allow the transferee to collect rental income, and a bank account as examples
of the type of asset transfers contemplated under § 50-20(1). Id.
21. Id. at 18-19, 434 S.E.2d at 877.
22. Id. at 18, 434 S.E.2d at 877.
23. Id. at 18-19, 434 S.E.2d at 877.
24. Id. at 19, S.E.2d at 877. Presumably, if the recipient of the cash award spent all the
money before the final distribution, the transferring spouse would have no recourse even if the
interim valuation was incorrect. See id. at 20, 434 S.E.2d at 878.
25. Id. at 19, 434 S.E.2d. at 877.
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(e) (Supp. 1993) provides that the court may make distributive
awards. The section states:
In any action in which the court determines that an equitable distribution of all or portions of the marital property in kind would be impractical, the court in lieu of such
distribution shall provide for a distributive award in order to achieve equity between the
parties. The court may provide for a distributive award to facilitate, effectuate or supplement a distribution of marital property. The court may provide that any distributive
award payable over a period of time be secured by a lien on specific property.
Id.
A distributive award is an award of the monetary value of an asset given in lieu of the asset
itself. See Smith v. Smith, 111 N.C. App. 460, 514-17, 433 S.E.2d 196, 229-30 (1993). For a
discussion of the distributive award provision of the equitable distribution statute, see infra notes
56-58 and accompanying text.
27. Brown, 112 N.C. App. at 19, 434 S.E.2d at 877.
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distribution in kind either would be impractical or would "facilitate, effectuate or supplement" the distribution.2 8 Because these findings are a prerequisite to a distributive award, the court determined, the remedy is
particularly unsuitable for an interim award, which "is useful to the party
without assets precisely because it can be awarded quickly." 29 The majority stated that one goal of the equitable distribution statute-keeping the
marital estate as intact as possible until a final distribution-is consistent
with a requirement of an in-kind interim distribution.30
To reach this conclusion, the majority employed basic tenets of statutory construction. First, it noted that an amendment statute is not presumed
to change a statute except as is explicitly stated in the amendment. 31 Because section 50-20(1) specifically provides for asset transfers and does not
mention a lump-sum payment or distributive award, the court refused to
infer authorization for such an award.32 Second, it noted that the language
of section 50-20(e), which does allow the court to order payment of liquid
assets, contains the phrase "distributive award." 33 That the legislature
opted not to use that language in the context of interim awards, but instead
chose the phrase "transfer the use and possession, ' 34 is "presumptive evidence that it intended that the provision" not include the option of awarding
cash that was not an identifiable marital asset.35
The majority noted that a provision should not be read to render another part of the statute meaningless. 36 The court reasoned that if the trial
judge was allowed to divide and distribute the marital assets at the interim
stage, there would be no need for the final equitable distribution trial.37 The
majority concluded that the proper relief in this case would be an in-kind
transfer of existing marital assets. 38 The court remanded the case and recomimended that the trial judge order D.T. to transfer at least a part of his
interest in Brown Brothers Construction Co. to JoAnn, so that she would
realize a share of the profits until the final equitable distribution. 9
Judge Greene argued in his dissenting opinion that nothing in section
50-20(il) precludes a trial judge from making an interim distributive
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 20, 434 S.E.2d at 877.
Id. at 20, 434 S.E.2d at 878.

32. Id.
33. Id.

34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(1) (Supp. 1993).
35. Id. at 20, 434 S.E.2d at 878.
36. Id. at 21, 434 S.E.2d at 878; accord State v. Tew, 326 N.C. 732, 739, 392 S.E.2d 603,
607 (1990).
37. Brown, 112 N.C. App. at 21, 434 S.E.2d at 878.

38. Id.
39. Id. at 21-22, 434 S.E.2d at 878-79.
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award.4" Judge Greene examined the amendment in the context of the statute as a whole.4 ' He focused on section 50-20(e), which allows a judge to
make a distributive award if distribution in kind would be impractical, and
concluded that "there is no language in the section that would prohibit its
use in the context of interim awards."'42 He noted also that the policy behind distributive awards, to achieve "equity between the parties," would be
well served by allowing interim distributive awards.4 3
The majority's disposition of Brown is consistent with the language of
the amendment, but its interpretation does not further the goals of the statute when applied to an asset such as a partnership or closely held corporation.' The majority is correct that the phrase "transfer the use and
possession" suggests that the legislature contemplated a transfer of the asset
itself, not its value.45 That the legislature did not refer to "distributive
awards" or provide for an alternative remedy when an in-kind transfer is
"impractical" is further support for this conclusion.46 However, although
the legislature did not specifically provide for the possibility of interim distributive awards, to allow such awards would help further the goals of the
amendment. Section 50-20(il) was intended to address two major
problems.4 7 First, without the statute, the spouse not controlling the assets
could not continue to live at the financial level she enjoyed during the marriage, while the controlling spouse could continue to live at the level to
which he was accustomed.48 Second, the controlling spouse would have
"an incentive to delay the equitable distribution proceedings." 49
40. Id. at 23, 434 S.E.2d at 879 (Greene, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (Greene, J., dissenting).
42. Id. (Greene, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 23, 434 S.E.2d at 879-80 (Greene, J., dissenting). Judge Greene would require that
two facts be found before an interim distribution could be awarded: (1) "just cause" for the interim
award and (2) that an in kind transfer is impractical. Id. (Greene, J., dissenting). On the facts at
issue, Judge Greene agreed with the trial court that JoAnn's financial difficulties, especially in
light of D.T.'s control of the income-producing marital assets, constituted just cause. Id. at 23-24,
434 S.E.2d at 880. Further, he argued that a transfer of assets in kind would be impractical in this
case. Transfer of a portion of the partnership would "have disrupted the operation of the construction company.' Id. at 24, 434 S.E.2d at 880 (Greene, J., dissenting). In addition, JoAnn would
have had a difficult time converting the partnership to cash. Id.
44. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
45. Brown, 112 N.C. App. at 20, 434 S.E.2d at 878.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 17-18, 434 S.E.2d at 876. But cf.Skoloff & Cheifetz, supra note 3, at 8 (suggesting
other policy reasons for interim property distribution).
48. Brown, 112 N.C. App. at 17-18, 434 S.E.2d at 876.
49. Id. at 18, 434 S.E.2d at 876. Brown presented this problem in stark form. The case had
been at the trial court level for 10 years, at the time the oldest pending case at that level in North
Carolina. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 5, Brown (No. 9224DC669).
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As recognized by the majority in Brown,50 these problems often arise
because one spouse runs a business in which the other spouse is not in-

volved. An in-kind transfer of such an asset may be impractical and unwise. 5 ' First, it may be difficult for the spouse not participating in the

business to reap much benefit from it. Second, such a transfer may damage
the business, an outcome contrary to the policy of keeping marital assets

intact until the final distribution.

2

Finally, to force the parties to interact

together as business partners, or one spouse to interact with the family
members of the other, 3 would be unwise. Courts in other jurisdictions
have recognized the inherent problems in dividing businesses in kind in the

context of final equitable distributions, 54 and the policy justifications for
avoiding such a division are the same as those for interim awards."
Clearly, forced sale of a family business to pay a lump-sum

interim award is an undesirable outcome. An alternative that may
avoid this outcome while accomplishing the goals of the amendment
is the payment of an interim distributive award5 6 on a periodic
50. Brown, 112 N.C. App. at 17-18, 434 S.E.2d at 876.
51. Courts are often hesitant to divide property in kind when the result will be to force "ongoing financial interaction between the parties." LAWRENCE J. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DIsTRtriUnoN
oF PROPERTY 248 (1983). Judges take this approach because they recognize that "[s]pouses frequently cannot interact well after divorce." THOMAS J. OLDHAM, DIVORCE, SEPARATION, AND TlE
DiSTRIuroN OF PROPERTY § 13.03(8) (1987). The issue often arises when the asset in question
is a closely held business or partnership. Id. § 13.03(7).
52. The majority in Brown specifically recognized this policy. See supra notes 22-24 and
accompanying text.
53. That would have been the result in Brown, had there been an in-kind transfer. See
Brown, 112 N.C. App. at 24, 434 S.E.2d at 880 (Greene, J., dissenting).
54. E.g., Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408 (Utah App. 1989). In Weston, the trial court
awarded the wife the cash value of half the stock owned by the husband in a closely held, family
owned business., Id. at 409. On appeal, the husband argued that the trial court erred by not
allowing him to transfer the shares themselves instead of the share value. Id. at 410. The Appeals
Court upheld the award of money. Id. at 412. It noted first that there was no assurance that the
wife would receive any income, because the "[husband] and his family own the majority interest
and have exclusive control of business operations." Id. Furthermore, the court noted that giving
the wife an ownership interest would force the former spouses to interact, providing "a breeding
ground for future conflicts . . thus interfering with their abilities to proceed with their separate
lives." Id.; see also Josephson v. Josephson, 772 P.2d 1236, 1243 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (awarding the wife cash value of shares in closely held corporation in order to "leav[e] the parties free of
tangled interests"); Borodinsky v. Borodinsky, 393 A.2d 583, 589 (N.J. Super. 1978) (finding trial
judge erred in awarding 50% of stock in closely held corporation to wife).
55. See Brown, 112 N.C. App. at 24, 434 S.E.2d at 881 (Greene, J., dissenting); supra note
44 and accompanying text.
56. Section 50-20(e) of the equitable distribution statute provides that the trial judge has the
power to make a distributive award. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-20(e) (Supp. 1993). A distributive
award is used when the court determines that marital property should not be sold or divided.
GOLDEN, supra note 51, at 246. In Sonek v. Sonek, 105 N.C. App. 247,412 S.E.2d 917 (1992),
the court of appeals held that a trial judge has discretion to make a distributive award in two
circumstances. Id. at 252, 412 S.E.2d at 920. First, she may make such an award when division
in kind is impractical. Id. Alternatively, she may make a distributive award "to facilitate, effectu-
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In Brown, periodic payments would have allowed JoAnn to main-

tain her predivorce standard of living.5 8 Also, such an arrangement would
have curtailed the incentive for D.T. to prolong the equitable distribution
proceedings.59 D.T. could have funded such payments out of his existing
income from the construction business, thus eliminating the possibility that
marital assets would have to be sold. Finally, the payments easily could
have been subjected to a "full accounting" at the end of the proceedings
when the final distribution of assets took place.6 0

Section 50-20(il) should be amended to require a more moderate approach. The amendment should state clearly that interim distributive
awards are permitted, but subject to strict conditions: (1) payments must be
periodic, and (2) under no circumstances can such awards cause the forced
sale of marital assets. For example, the legislature might add the following
after the first sentence: "If in the discretion of the trial court a distributive
award is warranted, the award shall be payable in periodic amounts. The
court shall consider the ability of the transferor to make such payments
without selling the asset that is the basis of the award." Amended in this
manner, section 50-20(il) would continue to aid the party that does not
control the income-producing asset by countering any delaying tactics on
the part of the controlling spouse. It would do so, however, without forcing
ate, or supplement a distribution of marital property." Id. (quoting Harris v. Harris, 84 N.C. App.
353, 362, 352 S.E.2d 869, 875 (1987)). The main advantage of the distributive award is that it
gives the judge an alternative to either forcing a sale of a business or granting the nonowning
spouse an interest in the business. GOLDEN, supra note 51, at 246.
57. In deciding on the proper structure of a distributive award the trial judge has wide discretion. Sonek, 105 N.C. App. at 252, 412 S.E.2d at 920 (noting that the only apparent limit on the
judge's discretion relates to the taxation consequences of distributive awards). For example, in
Smith v. Smith, 111 N.C. App. 460, 433 S.E.2d 196 (1993), the trial judge ordered the husband in
an equitable distribution action to make periodic payments to his former wife in the amount of $15
million over a ten-year period. Id. at 514-15, 433 S.E.2d at 229. The court of appeals noted that
the trial judge had considered the husband's lack of then-existing liquid assets, and therefore had
structured the payment over a ten-year period. Id. at 516, 433 S.E.2d at 229. Furthermore, the
trial court had found that, given the husband's ownership of substantial business interests, he had
considerable borrowing capacity that would enable him to meet the periodic payment requirements. Id. at 516-17, 433 S.E.2d 229-30. The court approved the plan, stating that the distributive award "reflects a careful balancing of the respective interests of the parties." Id. at 517, 433
S.E.2d at 230.
58. Allowing the parties to live at predivorce levels is the goal of the equitable distribution
statute. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
59. See Brown, 112 N.C. App. at 18, 434 S.E.2d at 876 (noting that before the enactment of
§ 50-20(il), the spouse in control of assets had "an incentive to delay the equitable distribution
proceedings").
60. Section 50-20(1) requires that "any and all assets... transferred shall be subject to a full
accounting" at the final equitable distribution. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(il) (Supp. 1993). Because periodic payments would not total anywhere near the noncontrolling spouse's equitable
share of the income-producing asset, the effects of an improperly calculated interim distributive
award could be rectified at the final equitable distribution.
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the parties to interact. 61 Most importantly, the prohibition on forced sale
would prevent the interim remedy from causing a permanent detrimental
effect on both parties-the sale of the income-producing asset.
WiLmAm E. ScHwARTZ

61. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.

Baxley v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company: A Key
Loophole in the Financial Responsibility Act of 1953
Comes to Light
American tort law provides a mechanism to shift the costs of wrongful
actions from the injured party to the wrongdoer.' Its goal is to "make the
victim whole" by awarding damages sufficient to place the victim in the
same position she would have enjoyed had the injury not occurred.2 For
centuries, however, a simple rule of economics prevented the accomplishment of this goal: "[B]ecause of the delay between the date of the plaintiff's injury and the court's judgment, a plaintiff loses the 'use of money'
he would have had absent the defendant's negligence . . . [and conse-

quently] is not fully compensated."3
To remedy this gap in tort compensation, the North Carolina General
Assembly amended section 24-5 of the North Carolina General Statutes in
1981. 4 Section 24-5(b) now provides that "[i]n an action other than contract, the portion of money judgment designated by the fact finder as com1. See 1 STUART M. SPEISER Er AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 1:3, at 12 (1983)
(" 'The primary purpose of tort law is that of compensating plaintiffs for the injury they have
suffered wrongfully at the hands of others.' ") (quoting Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 11 (NJ.
1979)).
2. Shaver v. Monroe Constr. Co., 63 N.C. App. 605, 615, 306 S.E.2d 519, 526 (1983);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 901(a) (1979); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 26 (1988).
3. Jeffrey R. Sandier, Note, PrejudgmentInterest in PersonalInjury Claims: A Proposal
for the Illinois General Assembly, 25 J. MARSHALL L. Rav. 595, 596-97 (1992).
4. Prior to 1981, section 24-5 provided for prejudgment interest only in actions based on
contract. The 1981 amendment added the following language:
The portion of all money judgments designated by the fact-finder as compensatory damages in actions other than contract shall bear interest from the time the action is instituted until the judgment is paid and satisfied, and the judgment and decree of the court
shall be rendered accordingly. The preceding sentence shall apply only to claims covered by liability insurance. The portion of all money judgments designated by the factfinder as compensatory damages in actions other than contract which are not coveredby
liability insurance shall bear interest from the time of the verdict until the judgment is
paid and satisfied.
Act of May 5, 1981, ch. 327, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 369 (current version codified at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 24-5(b) (1991)). In 1985, the General Assembly again amended the statute, resulting
in its current formulation:
(a) Contracts. - In an action for breach of contract, except an action on a penal
bond, the amount awarded on the contract bears interest from the date of breach. The
fact finder in an action for breach of contract shall distinguish the principle from the
interest in the award, and the judgment shall provide that the principal amount bears
interest until the judgment is satisfied. If the parties have agreed in the contract that the
contract rate shall apply after judgment then interest on an award in a contract action
shall be at the contract rate after judgment, otherwise it shall be at the legal rate provided, however, that on awards in action on contracts pursuant to which credit was
extended for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes, interest shall be at
the legal rate, provided, however, such rate shall not exceed the contract rate.
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pensatory damages bears interest from the date the action is instituted until
the judgment is satisfied."5 Despite the apparently far-reaching language of
the amended statute, the effort to compensate plaintiffs for the use-value of

their money could not yet claim success. Disagreements erupted between
automobile insurance companies and their insureds not over the propriety of
prejudgment interest awards,
but over who would bear ultimate responsibil6
ity for their payment.
Under the Financial Responsibility Act of 1953, 7 automobile insurers
8
are required to provide three types of coverage: basic liability coverage,
uninsured motorist (UM) coverage, 9 and underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage.10 In general, once coverage is properly established for a liability or
(b) Other Actions. - In an action other than contract, the portion of money judgment designated by the fact finder as compensatory damages bears interest from the date
the action is instituted until the judgment is satisfied. Interest on an award in an action
other than contract shall be at the legal rate.
Act of May 21, 1985, ch. 214, § 1, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 181 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 245(b) (1991)).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-5(b) (1991).
6. See infra notes 74-102 and accompanying text.
7. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279 (1993).

8. See N.C. GEm. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(2) (1993). This statute mandates liability insurance
for every owner or operator of a motor vehicle registered in North Carolina. Specifically, the
statute requires every policy of insurance issued in the state of North Carolina to
insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured ... against loss from
the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or
use of such motor vehicle or motor vehicles ... subject to limits exclusive of interest
and costs, with respect to each motor vehicle, as follows: twenty-five thousand dollars
($25,000) because of bodily injury or death of one person in any one accident and,
subject to said limit for one person, fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) because of bodily
injury to or death of two or more persons in any one accident, and fifteen thousand
dollars ($15,000) because of injury to or destruction of property of others in any one
accident.
Id.
9. See N.C. GEM. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (1993). This section provides for UIM coverage.
Specifically, it requires that, unless the insured rejects such coverage, no policy of automobile
liability insurance shall be issued
unless coverage is provided ... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are
legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles .... The provisions shall include coverage for the
protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages
from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of injury to or destruction
of the property of such insured, with a limit in the aggregate for all insureds in any one
accident of up to the limits of the... policy.
Id.
10. See N.C. GEM. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1993). Under this section, UIM coverage is
deemed to apply when the limit of liability in the tortfeasor's liability policy is less than that of the
insured under his own policy. Under the provisions of that section:
The provisions of subdivision (3) of this section shall apply to the coverage required by
this subdivision. Underinsured motorist coverage is deemed to apply when, by reason of
payment of judgment or settlement, all liability bonds or insurance policies providing
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UM/UIM claim, the insurer is obligated to pay all bodily injury and property damages awarded to the claimant up to its limit of liability." Insurers
contend that they are responsible only for damnages that are the direct result
of bodily injuries and property damage. In the absence of an agreement to
the contrary, they eschew responsibility for purely economic injuries incidental to the process of claim adjudication.' 2 In response, tort plaintiffs
argue that prejudgment interest is simply an additional element of damages
that arises as a result of the accident and, pursuant to the statutory provisions of section 24-5(b), is therefore the obligation of the insurers." The
ultimate question for the courts has thus become to what extent section 245(b) prejudgment interest awards are included within the "damages" that
insurers are required to cover under the Financial Responsibility Act of
1953.14

Although the North Carolina Supreme Court took a significant step
toward answering this question in Baxley v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance

it failed to resolve the issue decisively.' 6 In Baxley, the court held
that under a UIM policy that obligated the insurer to pay all "damages" that
the insured is "legally entitled to recover" from the tortfeasor, the insurer
had assumed, up to its policy limits, responsibility for prejudgment interest.' 7 The court reasoned that prejudgment interest, as compensation for
economic injuries, is included within the term "damages" as that term was
used in the contract.'" However, the court failed to address whether, in the
7o.,

5

coverage for bodily injury caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of the underinsured highway vehicle have been exhausted.... In any event, the limit of underinsured
motorist coverage applicable to any claim is determined to be the difference between the
amount paid to the claimant under the exhausted liability policy or policies and the limit
of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to the motor vehicle involved in the
accident.
Id.
11. See supra notes 8-10.
12. See infra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Baxley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 334 N.C. 1, 6, 430 S.E.2d 895, 898 (1993)
(addressing whether a UIM carrier is obligated to pay prejudgment interest within its policy limits); Sproles v. Greene, 329 N.C. 603, 611, 407 S.E.2d 497, 501 (1991) (addressing whether
prejudgment interest is a "defense cost" within the meaning of the policy); Lowe v. Tarble, 313
N.C. 460, 463, 329 S.E.2d 648, 650 (1985) (addressing whether prejudgment interest is a "cost[ I
taxed against the insured" within the meaning of the policy language); Ensley v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 80 N.C. App. 512,514,342 S.E.2d 567,569, cert. denied,318 N.C. 414,349 S.E.2d 594
(1986) (addressing whether a claim filed under a UM provision is "an action other than contract").
15. 334 N.C. 1, 430 S.E.2d 895 (1993).
16. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
17. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 6, 430 S.E.2d at 899 (citation omitted).
18. Id. at 8, 430 S.E.2d at 900.
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absence of such a contractual provision, the Financial Responsibility Act of
1953 mandates payment of prejudgment interest."

This Note surveys the historical debate surrounding prejudgment interest and examines how North Carolina courts have framed the relationship

between section 24-5 and the Financial Responsibility Act of 1953.20 Next,
this Note analyzes the result reached in Baxley and determines that,
although the decision has a strong public policy justification, it rests somewhat precariously on the applicable statutory language.2" Finally, this Note
points out that Baxley exposes a critical loophole in the Financial Responsibility Act: by failing to address explicitly the appropriate treatment of pre-

judgment interest, the Act allows insurers to limit their own liability to a
greater degree than sound public policy otherwise might dictate.22 The
Note concludes that this result may unavoidably subvert the purpose of section 24-5(b).2 3 Hence, Baxley presents the General Assembly with the opportunity, and arguably the obligation, to reevaluate the arguments

concerning prejudgment interest and to resolve the conflict between the
right of insurers to contractually limit their liability and the right of tort
plaintiffs to be made whole.24
The Baxley case involved a personal injury action brought by Ms.

Della Baxley against Ms. Anita Brown for damages arising out of an automobile accident. On January 7, 1987, Ms. Brown collided with a vehicle in
which Ms. Baxley was a passenger.' At the time of the accident, Allstate

Insurance Company provided liability insurance for Ms. Brown in the
amount of $25,000.26 In addition, Ms. Baxley's own automobile insurance
policy with Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company provided for $100,000
in UIM coverage.27 On August 22, 1987, Ms. Baxley filed a negligence
19. Id. at 6, 430 S.E.2d at 898-99.
20. See infra notes 65-126 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 127-40 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 141-57 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 141-54 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
25. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 3, 430 S.E.2d at 897 (1993).
26. Id. It is interesting to note that the liability portion of Ms. Brown's policy contained a socalled "supplemental" payment provision:
In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay on behalf of a covered person... (3)
Interest accruing after any suit we defend is instituted. Our duty to pay interest ends
when we pay our part of the verdict which does not exceed our limit of liability for this
coverage.
Record at 48, Baxley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 334 N.C. 1, 430 S.E.2d 895 (1993) (No.
538PA91) (emphasis added). Before appealing to the North Carolina Supreme Court, Ms. Baxley
released Allstate from further liability. Consequently, whether this supplemental clause should
have obligated Allstate to pay at least a portion of the total prejudgment interest in this case was
not an issue on appeal. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 6, 430 S.E.2d at 898.
27. The UM/UIM portion of Ms. Baxley's policy stated: "We will pay damages which a
covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured [or
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action against Ms. Brown seeking $100,000 in damages for personal injuries she suffered in the accident.2 8 Soon after the complaint was filed, Allstate tendered $25,000, representing the limit of its liability policy covering
Ms. Brown, to the clerk of court and motioned for release from further
obligation to defend Ms. Brown. 29 In response to that motion and to preserve its right of subrogation against Ms. Brown,3 0 Nationwide then deposited its own $25,000 with the clerk of court.3 On August 15, 1988, the trial
court entered an order granting Allstate's motion for release, and Nationwide immediately hired counsel and assumed full responsibility for the defense of Ms. Brown.3" The case was tried before a jury, and on September
14, 1988 the court entered a judgment in favor of Ms. Baxley for compensatory damages of $100,000 plus costs and prejudgment interest from the date
the complaint was filed, excluding interest on the $25,000 Nationwide had
already tendered.33 Following the court's entry of judgment, Nationwide
underinsured] motor vehicle because of (1) [b]odily injury sustained by a covered person and
caused by an accident; and (2) [plroperty damage caused by an accident' Record at 36, Baxley
(No. 538PA91).
28. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 3, 430 S.E.2d at 897.
29. Id. This motion was made pursuant to N.C. GFN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1993), which
states:
[P]rovided that application is made to and approved by a presiding superior court judge,
in any suit, any insurer providing primary liability insurance on the underinsured highway vehicle may upon payment of all of its applicable limits of liability be released
from further liability or obligation to participate in the defense of such proceeding.
30. N.C. GEN.STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1993) allows insurers to perfect a right of subrogation against the tortfeasor. The statute provides that
an underinsured motorist insurer, following the approval of the [liability insurer's]
[i]f
application [for release], pays in settlement or partial or total satisfaction of judgment
moneys to the claimant, the insurer shall be subrogated to or entitled to an assignment of
the claimant's rights against the owner, operator, or maintainer of the underinsured
highway vehicle and, provided that adequate notice of right of independent representation was given to the owner, operator, or maintainer, a finding of liability or the award
of damages shall be res judicata between the underinsured motorist insurer and the
owner, operator, or maintainer of the underinsured highway vehicle.
Id.
31. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 3-4, 430 S.E.2d at 897. On September 11, 1987, Nationwide also
dispersed $10,000 to Ms. Baxley under a separate medical payments provision of her insurance
policy. Id. Part C of Ms. Baxley's insurance policy with Nationwide entitled "Medical Payments
Coverage" reads: "We will pay reasonable expenses incurred for necessary medical and funeral
services because of bodily injury: 1. Caused by accident; and 2. Sustained by a covered person.
We will pay only those expenses incurred within one year from the date of the accident" Record
at 34, Baxley (No. 538PA91).
32. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 4, 430 S.E.2d at 897.
33. Id. at 4, 430 S.E.2d at 897. Under the prejudgment interest doctrine as it now exists in
North Carolina, a party may stop the accrual of interest in either of two ways: by settling the
claim out of court or by posting with the clerk of court an amount sufficient to satisfy the final
judgment. Id. at 9, 430 S.E.2d at 900. In this case, by tendering $25,000 to the clerk of court to
secure its right of subrogation, Nationwide halted the accrual of interest on that amount.
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paid Ms. Baxley an additional $65,00034 and, pursuant to its right of subroreceived the $25,000 that Allstate had deposited with the clerk of
gation,35
6
3

CoUrt.

Upon Nationwide's refusal to tender payment for the prejudgment interest award, Ms. Baxley filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to
determine whether Nationwide, as her UIM carrier, was liable for prejudgment interest up to the policy limit. 37 The Superior Court judge ruled that
the obligation for costs and prejudgment interest rested on the primary carrier, in this case Allstate, and on the original defendant, in this case Ms.
Brown, rather than on Nationwide.38
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed the trial
39
court's holding. Relying on Ensley v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,
the court ruled that "[t]he defendant assumed up to its policy limits the

liability of the uninsured motorist for damages which the plaintiff is legally
entitled to recover from the uninsured motorist."4 Based on this holding,
the court remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to apply the
provisions of section 24-5(b)4" to the $65,000 paid to Ms. Baxley by Nationwide on December 13, 1988.42
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted Nationwide's petition for
discretionary review.43 Writing for the majority,' Justice Frye carefully
reiterated the court's prior holding that because section 24-5(b) is not in-

cluded in the Financial Responsibility Act, the terms of the individual insurance policy govern the insurer's liability for interest above its policy
limits.4 5 However, because at least a portion of the interest in this case
34. Id at 4, 430 S.E.2d at 897. In addition to disclaiming liability for the prejudgment interest award, Nationwide claimed that the $10,000 it paid pursuant to Ms. Baxley's medical payments coverage should be credited against its UIM liability. Id. If such a credit were allowed, the
$25,000 previously paid and this payment of $65,000 would represent full satisfaction of the
$100,000 UIM policy. If this credit were not allowed, Nationwide would be deemed to have paid
only $90,000 towards its UIM liability. For a discussion of the court's resolution of the medical
payments credit issue, see infra note 54.
35. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
36. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 4, 430 S.E.2d at 897.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 5, 430 S.E.2d at 897-98.
39. 80 N.C. App. 512, 515, 342 S.E.2d 567, 569, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 414, 349 S.E.2d 594
(1986). See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text.
40. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 5, 430 S.E.2d. at 898.
41. See supra note 4.
42. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 5, 430 S.E.2d at 898.
43. Id. at 6, 430 SE.2d at 898.
44. Id. at 3, 430 S.E.2d at 896. Justice Meyer filed a dissenting opinion. Id. at 14, 430
S.E.2d at 903 (Meyer, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. Justice
Parker did not participate in the resolution of this case. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 14, 420 S.E.2d at 903.
45. Id. at 6, 430 S.E.2d at 898 (citing Sproles v. Greene, 329 N.C. 603, 613, 407 S.E.2d 497,
503 (1991)).
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would fall within the limits of the UIM policy,4 6 this case could not be
wholly disposed of by reference to those precedents. 47 Instead, the court
was required to determine whether the language of the policy itself obligated Nationwide to pay prejudgment interest48 or whether the Financial
Responsibility Act requires such coverage despite the policy language.4 9
The applicable contractual language stated that Nationwide promised
to pay, up to its UIM policy limit, "damages which a covered person is

legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor
vehicle because of: (1) [b]odily injury sustained by a covered person and
50
caused by an accident; and (2) [p]roperty damage caused by an accident."
Adopting a broad interpretation of "damages, 5 1 the court held that "the
insured is legally entitled to recover the total amount of money that the
46. In her argument on appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, Ms. Baxley contended
that "[t]he court of appeals correctly found that defendant, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company, is obligated to pay prejudgment interest on the judgment in the underlying tort action up to
its policy limits." Plaintiff-Appellee's New Brief at 4, Baxley (No. 538PA91). The notion that the
interest at issue in this case fell within the $100,000 UIM limit was based on an argument that,
even if allowed to claim the medical payments credit, Nationwide would be out of pocket only
$75,000 ($65,000 paid pursuant to the trial court judgment plus $10,000 medical payments) since
it recouped from Allstate the $25,000 it had earlier paid to Ms. Baxley to preserve its right of
subrogation. Although apparently unquestioned by the North Carolina Supreme Court, this position appears to be in direct conflict with the language of the Financial Responsibility Act. Section
20-279.21(b) (4) governs UIM coverage and states: "IT]he
limit of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to any claim is determined to be the difference between the amount paid to the
claimant under the exhausted liability policy or policies and the limit of underinsured motorist
coverage applicable to the motor vehicle involved in the accident." N.C. Gm. STAT. § 20279.21(b)(4) (1993). Under this formulation, Nationwide's limit of liability on its UIM policy
should have been the difference between the amount paid to Ms. Baxley by Allstate under Ms.
Brown's liability policy ($25,000) and the limit of liability under Ms. Baxley's UIM policy
($100,000), or $75,000. Viewed in this light, the court incorrectly limited the scope of its analysis
to liability within the policy limits. Had the court properly characterized Baxley as a case involving liability in excess of policy limits, it is likely that Nationwide would have prevailed based on
the rules of Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. 460, 329 S.E.2d 648 (1985) and Sproles v. Greene, 329
N.C. 603, 407 S.E.2d 497 (1991). See infra notes 108-11, 118-26 and accompanying text.
47. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 6, 430 S.E.2d at 989 ("This case is different in that the question
raised by the parties is whether the UIM carrier, Nationwide, is obligated to pay prejudgment
interest up to its policy limits.").
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Record at 36, Baxley (No. 538PA91).
51. AMEwaNcx JURISPRUDENcn defines "damages" as "the sum of money which the law
awards or imposes as a pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury done or
a wrong sustained as a consequence of either a breach of a contractual obligation or a tortious
act." 22 AM. JUR. 2D.Damages § 1 (1988). As a subset of this overall classification, "compensatory damages" may be defined as
damages in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They compensate a plaintiff for actual injury or loss resulting, for instance, from bodily or property
damage. The term covers all loss recoverable as a matter of right and includes all damages (beyond nominal damages) other than punitive or exemplary damages.
Id § 23.
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judgment says she is entitled to recover from the tortfeasor."5 2 Consequently, because "Nationwide ha[d] promised to pay the insured all the
'damages' awarded to her, up to its policy limit'"53 and prejudgment interest
was within the amount to which she was entitled under the terms of the
judgment,54 Ms. Baxley was entitled to payment of prejudgment interest
under the terms of her UIM policy with Nationwide.5 5 In dicta, the court
also noted that
[riequiring the UIM carrier to pay prejudgment interest up to its
policy limit is not a harsh result since the UIM carrier has had the
opportunity to invest the money during the pendency of the suit.
In addition, it is within the UIM carrier's power to stop the accrual 5of
prejudgment interest by offering (or posting) its policy
limit. 6
Consequently, because Nationwide, as Ms. Baxley's UIM carrier, had assumed primary responsibility for the defense of Ms. Brown, the court held
it accountable for "the amount of damage it caused plaintiff by delaying the
57
payment due under its UIM coverage."
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Meyer argued that the majority misinterpreted the language of Nationwide's policy. Rather than hold Nationwide liable for all "damages" the insured was legally entitled to recover, he
would read the policy language literally and would hold that the UIM carrier was liable only for "damages suffered by reason of bodily injury and
property damage."5 8 He argued that purely economic injuries caused by factors unrelated to the accident itself should not be compensable under the
UIM portion of Ms. Baxley's policy.5 9 Justice Meyer also recognized that
liability contracts, including the one at issue in this case, commonly include
"supplemental payment provisions" that spell out other types of obligations,
such as defense costs and interest, that the insurer will assume.6 Because
the contract at issue in Baxley contained such a provision in the liability
52. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 7, 430 S.E.2d at 899.
53. Id.
54. Id. The majority reversed the court of appeals with respect to the medical payments
credit issue and held that Nationwide was not entitled to a credit. Id. at 12, 430 S.E.2d at 902.
Because Ms. Baxley had paid separate premiums for the two types of coverage, and no provision
in the contract gave Nationwide a right of subrogation or credit, the court rejected Nationwide's
argument that recovery under both provisions unjustly enriched Ms. Baxley. Id. at 13-14, 430
S.E.2d at 902-03.
55. Id. at 9, 430 S.E.2d at 900.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 15, 430 S.E.2d at 904 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting) (stating that "[i]nterest cannot be said to arise from bodily
injury or property damage").
60. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). As an example of a supplemental payments provision, the
liability portion of Ms. Baxley's policy with Nationwide included the following language:
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portion of the policy, but not in the UM/UIM portion, he concluded that the
contract obviously was not intended to cover such payments.6 Finally, he
agreed with the trial court's ruling that the obligation for prejudgment interest should properly fall upon the original defendant and liability carrier.62
In his view, the defendant contracted for and paid premiums for liability
coverage, defense costs, court costs, and interest on the judgment.63 To
hold that the plaintiff's UIM carrier must pay a portion of these costs would
deprive the defendant of the benefit of her bargain with her liability

carrier.64
The importance of the Baxley decision is best understood in light of
the debate surrounding prejudgment interest and its role in tort remediation.
Prejudgment interest is interest on the amount of the judgment from the
time the plaintiff files the action 65 until the court enters judgment.66 As
such, it is a remedial device intended "to indemnify a claimant for the loss
of the use of the money which presumably could have been earned had
payment of damages not been delayed."'67
In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay on behalf of a covered person:...
Interest accruing after any suit we defend is instituted. Our duty to pay interest ends
when we pay our part of the judgment which does not exceed our limit of liability for
this coverage.
Record at 22, Baxley (No. 538PA91) (emphasis added).
61. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 16, 430 S.E.2d at 904 (Meyer, I., dissenting).
62. Id. at 17, 430 S.E.2d at 905 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
63. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
64. Id. (Meyer, I., dissenting). Justice Meyer also disagreed with the majority's resolution of
the medical payments credit issue. Quoting the UM/UIM portion of the Nationwide policy, he
argued that the medical payments paid by Nationwide fell within the following limit of liability:
"Any amount otherwise payable for damages under this [UM/UIM] coverage shall be reduced by
all sums: 1. Paid or payable because of the bodily injury . . . by or on behalf of persons or
organizations who may be legally responsible' Baxley, 334 N.C. at 18, 430 S.E.2d at 905 (Meyer,
J., dissenting) (quoting Part D of the Nationwide policy, Record at 37, Baxley (No. 538PA91)).
Consequently, he would allow the $10,000 medical payments credit claimed by Nationwide. Id.
(Meyer, J., dissenting).
65. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-5(b) (1991). It should be noted that this is not a universal formulation. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-5(a) (1991) (providing that, in an action on a contract, the
"amount awarded... bears interest from the date of breach"); ALAsKA STAT. § 09.30.070 (Supp.
1993) (stating that interest shall accrue from the date of injury); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21101 (West 1987) (same); Omo REv. CODE- ANN. § 1343.03(c) (1993) (same).
66. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-5 (1991). Prejudgment interest should be distinguished from postjudgment interest, which accrues from the date the court enters judgment until the judgment is
satisfied. See id.
67. David J. Pierce, Note, Insurer'sLiabilityfor PrejudgmentInterest: A Modem Approach,
17 U. RiCH. L. Ra,. 617, 617 (1983); see also Deans v. Layton, 89 N.C. App. 358, 370, 366
S.E.2d 560, 568, disc. rev. denied, 322 N.C. 834, 371 S.E.2d 276 (1988) ("In general, interest is
the compensation allowed by law or fixed by the parties for the use, forbearance, or detention of
money.'); Thomas F. Londrigan, The Case for Prejudgment Interest,72 IiL. BJ. 62, 64 (1983)
("[I]t is meant to place an injured party in the same position as if he had been compensated
immediately after his injury for his loss.').
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Prejudgment interest as a remedy for lost "use" of money is a modem
phenomenon. At common law, interest in any form was viewed as usury
and considered an abhorrence to the law, and was generally unacceptable as
an element of damages.6" Consequently, "most courts, in the absence of a
statute to the contrary, would not award interest on unliquidated pecuniary
claims, the amount of which could not be ascertained or computed, even in
theory, without a trial."' 69 In the early part of this century, however, legal
scholars began to recognize the need to compensate plaintiffs for the usevalue of their money. Judge Learned Hand represented the growing trend

when he proclaimed:
Whatever may have been our archaic notions about interest, in
modem financial communities a dollar today is worth more than a
dollar next year, and to ignore the interval is to contradict wellsettled beliefs about value. The present use of my money is itself
a thing of value, and, if I get no compensation for its loss, my
remedy does not altogether right my wrong.7 0
As jurists and politicians gradually accepted this economic reality, judicial decisions and statutes began to relax the common law rule disfavoring prejudgment interest. Under a new corollary, "[i]nterest would be
awarded on claims which, though not liquidated in an exact amount, were
based on a formula by which the amount due could be ascertained."7 How68. Laycock v. Parker, 79 N.W. 327, 332 (Wis. 1899) (discussing historical views regarding
interest payments).
69. DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 165 (1973). The belief underly-

ing this rule was that defendants should be liable for interest only if the circumstances make it
reasonably possible to determine the amount owed so that, if the defendant chooses, he may
satisfy the claim and halt the accrual of interest. Id.; see also Harris & Harris Const. Co. v. Crain
& Denbo, Inc., 256 N.C. 110, 126, 123 S.E.2d 590, 602 (1962) ("It may be stated as a general
rule, that interest is not allowed on unliquidated damages or demands, for the reason that the
person liable does not know what sum he owes and therefore can be in no default for not paying.")
(quoting 15 AM. JuR. Damages § 161, 579-80 (1938)). See generally 22 Am.JUR. 2D Damages
§§ 654-55, 658-59 (1988) (discussing treatment of unliquidated damage claims in absence of a
statute granting prejudgment interest).
70. Proctor & Gamble Distrib. Co. v. Sherman, 2 F.2d 165, 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); see also
Londrigan, supra note 67, at 62 ("To this date the quality of our justice has not been exchanged
for a speedy result; however, the legal profession must recognize the economic axiom: Justice
delayed is justice denied.").
71. Proctor & Gamble, 2 F.2d at 165; see also General Metals, Inc. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 259
N.C. 709, 713, 131 S.E.2d 360, 363 (1963) ("When the amount of damages in a breach of contract
action is ascertained from the contract itself, or from relevant evidence, or from both, interest
should be allowed from the date of the breach."); Harris & Harris Constr. Co. v. Crain & Denbo,
Inc., 256 N.C. 110, 126-27, 123 S.E.2d 590, 602-03 (1962); Harper v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
Co., 161 N.C. 451, 452, 77 S.E. 415, 416 (1913). In Harper,the court held that
damages recovered for a tort do not as a matter of law bear interest until after judgment,
but when the tort consists solely in the destruction of property, and not in personal
injuries, this Court has held that the jury may in their discretion give interest on the
value of the property destroyed from the date of its destruction, in addition to the actual
value of the property.
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ever, even with this liberalization, awards of prejudgment interest remained
limited to contract actions.7 2
Recognizing the need for a similar remedy in tort actions, the North
Carolina General Assembly amended section 24-5 in 1981 to allow for prejudgment interest in an "action other than contract." 73 The application of
the statute in cases in which the claim is covered by liability insurance,
however, has generated much debate.7 4 Because many tortfeasors have liability insurance, the apportionment of liability for prejudgment interest has
become a divisive issue between insurance companies and their insureds.75
Three schools of thought can be clearly delineated regarding this issue.
The first of these is the "total compensation" theory, which holds that insurers should be held liable for prejudgment interest even in excess of their
policy limits. 76 Under that theory, proponents argue that the economic justifications for awarding prejudgment interest 77 and the ability to limit the
adverse effects of such liability by statute78 outweigh the insurers' interests
ld.; see also Lazenby v. Godwin, 60 N.C. App. 504, 509, 299 S.E.2d 288, 291 (1983) (denying
prejudgment interest in a tort action in which the judgment was not covered by liability insurance
on the ground that although "[p]rejudgment interest has ... been granted under certain limited
circumstances where the amount of a claim is obvious or easily ascertainable from the contract or
insurance policy[,] ... as a general rule, North Carolina courts do not recognize the granting of
prejudgment interest on unliquidated damages") (citations omitted).
72. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-5 (1980); see also Joel A. Williams, PrejudgmentInterest: An Element of Damages Not to be Overlooked, 8 CUMB. L. REv. 521, 521-25 (1977) (discussing the liquidated/unliquidated and ascertainability theories of prejudgment interest).
73. Act of May 5, 1981, ch. 327, § 1, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 369 (current version codified at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-5(b) (1991)); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 108-26 and accompanying text.
75. A majority of states have enacted statutes that, in varying degrees, allow awards of prejudgment interest in tort actions. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.30.070 (Supp. 1993); CAL. CrV. CODE
§ 3291 (West Supp. 1994); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 13-21-101 (West 1987); CONN.GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-192a (West Supp. 1994); D.C. CoDE ANN. § 109 (1981); HAw. REv. STAT. § 636-16
(1985); IDAHO CODE § 28-22-104 (Supp. 1993); IND. CODE Am. § 34-4-37 (Burns Supp. 1993);
IOWA CODE § 535.3 (Supp. 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4203 (West 1991); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, §1602 (West Supp. 1993); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-301 (1989);
MAss. GEM. L. ch. 231, § 6B (1986); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 600.6013 (Callaghan Supp. 1993);
Mim .STAT. ANN. § 549.09 (West Supp. 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-17-7 (1972); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 408.040(2) (Vernon 1990); MONT.CODE ANN. § 27-1-210 (1993); NEv. REV.STAT. § 45103.02 (1988); N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 524:1-b (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 56-8-4(B) (Michie
1986); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.3 (McKinney Supp. 1994) (allowing prejudgment
interest from the date of decedent's death in wrongful death actions); N.C. GEM. STAT. § 24-5(b)
(1991); OHIo Rev. CODE ANN. § 1343.03(c) (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12,
§ 727(A) (2) (West 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9.21-10 (Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-14123 (1988); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-44 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-382 (Michie 1992); W.
VA. CODE § 56-5-31 (Supp. 1993); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 807.01 (West Supp. 1993).
76. See Pierce, supra note 67, at 624.
77. See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
78. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
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in contractual certainty.7 9 After all, supporters claim, "[i]t hardly seems
fair to allow the insurance company to litigate the entire case in an effort to
save its policy coverage and then force the insured to pay the prejudgment
interest on the excess verdict when he exercised no control over the litigation process." 80
The most basic argument in favor of total compensation is that it is the
only mechanism by which tort plaintiffs can be fully compensated for their
injuries. 8 ' As one commentator stated: "Although the award for delay of
time may be in the nature of interest, in reality, it is merely an extension of
the compensatory damages necessary to make the plaintiff whole."8 2
Along those same lines, proponents of prejudgment interest argue that
because the insurer is in control of the litigation and can cease the accrual
of interest at any time by settling the claim or posting its policy limit, it is
unfair to allow the insurers to escape liability for the resulting economic
harm.83 Thus, permitting insurers to delay payment of claims while not
paying for the use of the plaintiff's money during that time "overrides the
espoused purpose of insurance, namely to prompt evaluation and payment
of claims."8 4
In addition, it is argued that, without prejudgment interest requirements, insurers are able to reap large profits by investing those amounts.
During the prejudgment process, while tort plaintiffs wait eagerly for their
money, insurance companies set aside large reserve accounts that they may
later use to satisfy a resulting judgment. 85 While the insurers are realizing
substantial profits from the investment of these accounts, plaintiffs who
must pay for medical expenses or repair property damage are forced to
"borrow at commercial rates the same amount of money, which is being
79. ALAN I. WIDISs, UNINSURED & UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 20.7, at 192 (2d
ed. 1992). Widiss notes that
[o]nce it is established that a claimant is entitled to compensation provided by an uninsured motorist insurance coverage, there is little, if any, reason to allow an insurer to
derive economic benefit from forcing the insured to seek an adjudication of the claim.
To allow insurers the benefit of the time value of an amount of insurance'benefitswhich an insured is subsequently determined to have been entitled to receive-to the
date of payment following adjudication of a disputed claim is to encourage insurers to
delay payments .... [Ilt follows that the insurer should be liable for such interest even
when the award or judgment itself is equal to the company's maximum coverage limits.
Id.
80. Pierce, supra note 67, at 627. For a brief critique of this theory, see ALLAN D. WINDT,
INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DISPTrS: REPRESENTATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES AND INSUREDS,

§ 6.15,
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

320 (2d ed. 1988).
See Sandier, supra note 3, at 598.
Londrigan, supra note 67, at 65.
See Sandier, supra note 3, at 596-97.
Londrigan, supra note 67, at 64.
See Sandler, supra note 3, at 598-99.
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used by [their] creditors at no cost."'8 6 Theoretically, the insurers' investment income will be exactly equal to the prejudgment interest they are
forced to pay to the injured parties,87 and the net effect of prejudgment
interest awards will be simply to level the playing field. 8 In support of this
result, one commentator noted: "Justice requires that one ought not be able
to use someone else's money for a considerable period of time without paying anything for its use. This is the very basis of the theory of
restitution." 9
Perhaps the most persuasive argument in favor of prejudgment interest
is that forcing insurers to pay prejudgment interest will encourage early
settlement of meritorious claims.9" The desire to avoid prejudgment interest charges encourages insurers who might otherwise delay the trial to extract a more desirable settlement or earn investment profits during the
interim to settle the case early. 91 Hence, prejudgment interest awards not
only ensure full compensation for plaintiffs, but also lessen the congestion
of court dockets.
The second school of thought reaches a conclusion opposite to that of
the "total compensation" school. Under what might be called the "voluntary contract" school, insurers argue that prejudgment interest is not included within "damages" as that term appears in the Financial
Responsibility Act, and consequently their liability for it should be governed solely by the language of their contracts. 92 Although the goal of tort
law may be to make plaintiffs whole, insurers contend that they are not
responsible for the accomplishment of that task. Instead, their only obligation to the injured party should be to pay the policy limit for which the
insured contracted. 93
86. Londrigan, supra note 67, at 64.
87. Id. at 65 (quoting Kent W. Seifried, Note, Recovery of PrejudgmentIntereston an Unliquidated State Claim Arising in the Sixth Circuit, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 151, 164 n.15 (1977)).
88. See WIDISS, supra note 79, § 20.7 at 192; Londrigan, supra note 67, at 66.
89. Londrigan, supra note 67, at 64.
90. See Sandier, supra note 3, at 599.
91. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 710 F. Supp. 164,
167-68 (E.D.N.C. 1989). The Harford court held that
N.C. [Gen. Stat.] § 24-5, under which the prejudgment interest was awarded, was
designed to provide an incentive for an insurance carrier to resolve claims quickly rather
than delay resolution in order to maximize return of investment on lost reserves....
[Tihe policy behind N.C. [Gen. Stat.] § 24-5 is to prevent dilatory tactics in the settlement of viable claims....
Id.; see also Harwood v. Harrelson Ford, Inc., 78 N.C. App. 445, 450, 337 S.E.2d 158, 161 (1985)
("The legislature's purpose in amending [N.C. GEM. STAT. § 1 24-5 was to provide an incentive
for insurance companies to expeditiously litigate actions they are involved in.").
92. See, e.g., Defendant-Appellant's New Brief at 8, Baxley (No. 538PA91).
93. Defendant-Appellant's Reply Brief at 8-9, Baxley (No. 538PA91).
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One argument advanced by insurers to support their position is that
they are-not responsible for the delays of the judicial system. They argue

that, under the circumstances, forced liability for prejudgment interest is an
unfair penalty on insurers who do not contract for such a risk. 94
Insurers also challenge the notion that adoption of a total compensa-

tion regime will lead to increased settlements. Rather than eliminating insurers' incentives to delay and encouraging early settlement, they argue that
forcing insurers to bear the costs of prejudgment interest will merely shift
the delay incentive to the plaintiff.95 Secure in the knowledge that any delay will be compensated by later recovery of prejudgment interest, plaintiffs
94. See Londrigan, supra note 67, at 66. Proponents of total compensation contend otherwise. Taking a closer look at the nature of tort claims and the result of prejudgment interest
requirements, they contend that this argument is unfounded, noting that
[w]hile only the defendant profits by delay, it does not follow that it is an unfair penalty
to have defendant account for that profit. With prejudgment interest, neither the plaintiff
nor defendant profits by delay; however, both are equally penalized by the continued
cost of litigation if the case is not settled.
Id. Finding that something is a penalty presumes the premise that the payor was otherwise entitled
to that amount. Compare BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1133 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "penalty" as
"a sum of money which the law exacts payment of by way of punishment for doing some act
which is prohibited or for not doing some act which is required to be done") with Londrigan,
supra note 67, at 403 (defining "debt" as "[a] specified sum of money owing to one person from
another, including not only obligation of debtor to pay but right of creditor to receive and enforce
payment"). In the case of tort compensation and insurance, the plaintiff is deemed, however artificially, to have been entitled to payment of the claim on the date the complaint was filed. See, e.g.,
Pierce, supra note 67, at 617 ("Once a cause of action accrues, the injured party becomes entitled
to be made whole."). Thus, it is the plaintiff, not the insurer, who is entitled to equitable ownership of the judgment principle during the process of adjudication, and it is she who should be
entitled to the interest income on that amount. To take that income from the insurer and pass it on
to the insured cannot properly be viewed as a penalty that deprives the insurer of its rightful
property. See Londrigan, supra note 67, at 66.
95. Lawrence R. Smith, The Case Against PrejudgmentInterest, 72 ILL. B.J. 63, 73 (1983);
Londrigan, supra note 67, at 66; see also Pierce, supra note 67, at 623, noting that
[h]olding the insurer liable for prejudgment interest in excess of the policy limits will
put unfair pressure on the insurer to settle early. It is argued that such excess liability
could force an insurance company to acquiesce to a plaintiff's demands at an early stage
of the proceeding, regardless of any meritorious defenses it may have. It would do so
rather than run the risk of paying a large amount of interest caused by court delays,
should the plaintiff eventually recover.
Id Commentators argue that prejudgment interest is unfair to insurers because, since both the
claim and the amount of damages are in dispute, they cannot reasonably be expected to calculate
the amount on which prejudgment interest will be accruing and therefore cannot make an appropriate decision concerning whether to settle the claim or proceed to trial. See Londrigan, supra
note 67, at 65; Sandier, supra note 3, at 599. As one commentator replied, however:
[the d]efendant's apparent dilemma-whether to pay the claim and avoid prejudgment
interest, or to litigate the claim with the possibility of an interest award-is illusory. If
defendant is found liable, he has not suffered the uncertain loss of interest damages.
Theoretically, the money controlled by him, and found owing as damages, has produced
during the period of litigation the exact amount due as prejudgment interest.
Londrigan, supra note 67, at 65.
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would have the incentive to reject reasonable offers of settlement in hopes
of obtaining a larger judgment at trial.
Although this argument is valid in theory, the insurers' position is
weakened by the fact that simple statutory provisions can effectively alleviate this concern. For example, by providing that a plaintiff forfeits the right
to receive prejudgment interest if he rejects a "reasonable" offer of settlement,9 6 a plaintiff would face an all-or-nothing risk with respect to the interest value of his money during the pretrial process.
Finally, insurers maintain that the potential liability for prejudgment
interest would increase the level of risk and instability in the industry.9 7
When this concern is coupled with their inability to limit their liability by
contract, insurance companies would be forced to recoup their costs by raising premiums. 98
The public policy underlying the Financial Responsibility Act supports
this argument. The goal of the Financial Responsibilty Act is to mandate
that every owner or operator of a motor vehicle be insured for at least some
minimum amount so that parties injured by judgment-proof defendants will
be able to recoup at least a portion of their losses. 99 To accomplish this
goal, the state necessarily must concern itself with setting statutory minimums on coverage and premium caps low enough that even low-income
citizens can afford insurance. Hence, if a total or even partial compensation
scheme would force insurers to raise their rates above that amount in order
to remain profitable, the ability of the state to protect its citizens from injury
and loss due to accidents with uninsured and underinsured motorists would
be seriously compromised.
The third school of thought, which a majority of courts addressing the
Compromising
issue have adopted, 100 is the "limited liability" school.'
96. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 600.6013 (Callaghan Supp. 1993). That statute provides:
(7) If a bona fide, reasonable written offer of settlement in a civil action based on tort is
made by the party against whom the judgment is subsequently rendered, the court shall
order that interest shall not be allowed beyond the date the written offer of settlement
which is made and rejected by the plaintiff, and is filed with the court....
(11) As used in this section:
(a) "Bona fide, reasonable written offer of settlement means:
(i) With respect to an offer of settlement made by a defendant against whom
judgment is subsequently rendered, an offer of settlement that is not less than 90% of
the amount actually received by the plaintiff in the action through judgment.
Id.
97. See Pierce, supra note 67, at 623.
98. See Smith, supra note 95, at 73.
99. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Houselog v. Milwaukee Guardian Ins., 473 N.W.2d 52, 55 (Iowa 1991); Nunez
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 412 A.2d 1383, 1383 (Me. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Starke, 797
P.2d 14, 19 (Colo. 1990); Guin v. Ha, 591 P.2d 1281, 1285 (Alaska 1979); Brinkman v. Aid Ins.
Co., 766 P.2d 1227, 1235 (Idaho 1988); Factory Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cooper, 262 A.2d 370, 373 (R.I.
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between the insurers' rights to limit their liability contractually and the goal

of total compensation, proponents of this theory argue that insurers should
be held liable for prejudgment interest, but that their liability should not
exceed their policy limits. 10 2
In dealing with this issue, North Carolina has followed the majority
rule' 013 and moved toward limited liability. However, because of the ques-

tionable interrelationship between the Financial Responsibility Act and section 24-5(b), most of the cases in this area have turned on the court's
interpretation of the particular policy language at issue. Not until Baxley
did the North Carolina Supreme Court begin to articulate a rationale that
might resolve the issue based on statutory authority.
Although the provisions of the Financial Responsibility Act are written
into every policy of insurance and take precedence over any conflicting
policy provisions," ° it is well settled that any coverage above the statutory
minimum is voluntary and governed solely by the policy language. 105
Thus, because the statute involving prejudgment interest is entirely separate
from the code of insurance and is not a part of the Financial Responsibility
Act, the inclusion of prejudgment interest appears to be optional on the part

of insurance companies. As a result of the Financial Responsibility Act's
apparent failure to specifically address the issue of liability for prejudgment
interest' 06 -the Act refers only to "damages" awarded as a result of personal injury or property damage-North Carolina courts have relied heavily
1970); Walker v. Walker, 235 A.2d 520, 521-22 (N.H. 1967). But see Matich v. Modem Research
Corp., 420 N.W.2d 67, 73-74 (Mich. 1988) (holding insurer liable for prejudgment interest in
excess of the policy limits); Burton v. Forret, 498 So.2d 706, 712-13 (La. 1986) (same).
101. See Pierce, supra note 67, at 623-27.
102. See id., at 620, 624.
103. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
104. See, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 293 N.C. 431, 440-41, 238 S.E.2d 597,
603-04 (1977). In Chantos, the court stated:
Under the Financial Responsibility Act, all insurance policies covering loss from liability growing out of the ownership, maintenance and use of an automobile are mandatory
to the extent coverage is required by [N.C. Gen. Stat. § ] 20-279.21.... The provisions
of the Financial Responsibility Act are "written" into every automobile liability policy
as a matter of law, and, when the terms of the policy conflict with the statute, the
provisions of the statute will prevail.
Id.; accordMoore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. Group, 270 N.C. 532, 542-43, 155 S.E.2d 128, 135
(1967).
105. N.C. Gm. STAT. § 20-279.21(g) (1993) ("Any policy which grants the coverage required
for a motor vehicle liability policy may also grant any lawful coverage ... and such excess or
additional coverage shall not be subject to the provisions of this article."); Paul D. Coates, Settling
with the Tort-feasorand Preservingthe UIM Action: A Defense Perspective,in isuiiANcE LAw
12 (N.C. Academy of Trial Lawyers continuing legal education presentation) (1993) ("In general,
the obligation for interest under a liability policy will be governed by the terms of the policy.").
106. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b) (2-4) (1993). See supra notes 8-10.
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on broad interpretations of insurance policy language to accomplish the
goals of section 24-5(b).' 7
The first case to have a major impact in this area was Lowe v. Tarble.'0 8 Lowe addressed the extent to which the insurance company would
be liable for prejudgment interest beyond its policy limits.'" In addition to
its limit of liability, the policy provided that the company would
(2) Pay all expenses incurred by the company, all costs taxed
against the insured in any such suit and all interest accruing after
entry of judgment until the company has paid, tendered or deposited in court such part of such judgment as does not exceed the
limit of the company's liability thereon.1 1 °
The court held that prejudgment interest was a "cost taxed against the insured" and was therefore the obligation of the insurer under the terms of the
contract. II
Next, the North Carolina Court of Appeals addressed a fact situation
1 2
almost identical to Baxley in Ensley v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
In Ensley, the plaintiff had been struck by a hit-and-run driver and brought
suit to recover damages for personal injuries under her UM policy. 1 3 The
trial court awarded the plaintiff $16,500 in damages plus prejudgment interest and court costs." 4 On appeal, the defendant insurance company argued
that the language of the contract, which did not provide coverage for costs
or prejudgment interest, should control its liability to the plaintiff for prejudgment interest under the provisions for contract actions set forth in section 24-5(a).'1 1 The court rejected this argument and held that the
[pllaintiff s right to recover against his... insurer under the uninsured motorist endorsement is derivative and conditional. Unless he is 'legally entitled to recover damages' . . . from the
uninsured motorist[,] the contract upon which he sues precludes
him from recovering against the defendant ....
[Thus,] despite
the contractual relation between plaintiff insured and defendant
107. See infra notes 108-26 and accompanying text.
108. 313 N.C. 460, 329 S.E.2d 648 (1985).
109. On May 4, 1981, the defendant, Mr. Samuel Tarble, caused an automobile accident in
which the plaintiff, Mr. Bobby Lowe, was injured. Following a jury trial, the trial court entered
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $85,000 plus $1000 damages for Mrs. Lowe's loss of consortium and prejudgment interest. Lowe v. Tarble, 312 N.C. 467, 468, 323 S.E.2d 19, 20 (1984) aff'd
on reh'g, 313 N.C. 460, 328 S.E.2d 648 (1985).
110. Lowe, 313 N.C. at 463, 329 S.E.2d at 651.
111. Id. at 464, 329 S.E.2d at 651.
112. 80 N.C. App. 512, 342 S.E.2d 567, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 414, 349 S.E.2d 594 (1986).
113. Id. at 513, 342 S.E. 2d at 568.
114. Id.
115. Ensley, 80 N.C. App. at 513-514, 342 S.E.2d at 568. For the text of § 24-5(a), see stupra
note 4 and accompanying text.
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insurer, this action is actually one for the tort allegedly committed
by the uninsured motorist." 6
In 1991, the North Carolina Supreme Court again addressed the Lowe
18
issue" 7 of insurer liability beyond policy limits. In Sproles v. Greene,'
two insurance policies provided coverage for the plaintiffs injuries, resulting in a total liability limit of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident,
and UIM coverage of $100,000.119 The total judgment in the case was
$950,000 plus prejudgment interest on $750,000.12o On July 30, 1987, the
defendant's liability carrier paid the clerk of court the $25,000 limit of its
policy as well as $2312.36 in interest.' 2 ' The liability insurer then challenged the finding that it was liable for prejudgment interest on the entire
judgment.' 2 2 Under the terms of the policy, the liability insurer agreed to
pay, in addition to its limit of liability, "all defense costs we incur."' 23 Distinguishing Lowe, the court stated that
[t]he promise to pay "all defense costs" in the Integon policy is
quite different from the promise to pay "all costs taxed against the
insured." . . . "Defense costs" refer to costs associated with the
process of defending a claim such as attorney fees, deposition expenses, and24court costs including such items as subpoena and witness fees.'
Most importantly, the court held that it could find no provision in the Financial Responsibility Act that would require a liability insurer to pay prejudgment interest in excess of its policy limits despite the fact that such interest
may properly be taxed against the insured, 1 25 and concluded that the liability insurer was not liable for prejudgment interest beyond its policy
limits.' 26
116. Ensley, 80 N.C. App. at 515, 342 S.E.2d at 569.
117. 313 N.C. 460, 329 S.E.2d 648 (1985). See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
118. 329 N.C. 603, 407 S.E.2d 497 (1991).
119. Id. at 606,407 S.E.2d at 499. In Sproles, the defendant collided with the rear of a van in
which Mrs. Sproles and two other passengers were riding. The collision caused the van to run off
the highway and overturn several times. Ms. Sproles was totally and permanently disabled as a
result of the accident. Id.
120. Id. The judgment against Mr. Greene represented $750,000 for the injuries Mrs. Sproles
sustained and $200,000 in damages for the loss of consortium suffered by Mr. Sproles. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. It is interesting to note that the liability insurer voluntarily paid prejudgment interest
beyond its policy limits on the portion of the judgment attributable to its limit of liability. The
interest it refused to pay represented that attributable to the remaining portion of the verdict which
was equal to thirty times the insurer's liability limit. Id. at 607, 407 S.E.2d at 499.
123. Id. at 611, 407 S.E.2d at 501.
124. Id. at 611, 407 S.E.2d at 502.
125. Id. at 612, 407 S.E.2d at 503.
126. Id.
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This decision provided the context for the Baxley dispute. Baxley differed from the North Carolina Supreme Court's previous decisions because
the issue presented was not whether the insurer was obligated to pay prejudgment interest above its policy limits, but whether it was liable for the
12 7
portion of interest that fell within its policy limits.
On one hand, categorizing prejudgment interest as damages appears to
be inconsistent with the court's prior holding in Lowe that prejudgment interest is part of the "costs taxed against the insured."' 28 Yet Baxley is entirely consistent with the court's apparent willingness to adopt broad and
flexible readings of 29policy language to attain the goal of total compensation
wherever possible.

1

In his dissent, Justice Meyer appeared to accept the majority's conclusion that prejudgment interest may properly be categorized as an element of
compensatory damages in tort actions.' 3 ' Rather than challenging this
holding, he argued that even if prejudgment interest is an element of damages, it was not covered by Ms. Baxley's policy with Nationwide.' 31 Justice Meyer's argument clearly comports with a literal reading of the
statutory and policy language. Both the Financial Responsibility Act and
the Nationwide policy provide coverage for "damages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover ... because of: (1) Bodily injury . ..
132
caused by an accident; and (2) Property damage caused by an accident."'
According to Justice Meyer, prejudgment interest damages-which are
designed to remedy economic injuries that arise not out of the accident and
injury itself, but out of the inefficiency of the adjudicative process-"cannot be said to arise from bodily injury and property damage" as required by
33
the statute.1
The majority was unwilling to confine itself to this narrow approach.
Instead, the majority asserted that the "damages" the insured is " 'legally
entitled to recover' from the tortfeasor as a result of bodily injury" include
the total amount of money that the judgment says she is entitled to recover.' 34 Although this approach best effectuates the combined purposes of
127. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 6, 430 S.E.2d at 898.
128. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 108-26 and accompanying text.
130. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 17, 430 S.E.2d at 904 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
131. Id.at 15, 430 S.E.2d at 903-4 (Meyer, J., dissenting) ("The majority concludes that Nationwide's obligation under its UIM coverage to pay 'damages' . . . includes prejudgment interest.
I disagree.... Under the plain language of the UIM coverage provisions, Nationwide's obligation
is limited to paying damages suffered by reason of bodily injury and property damage.").
132. Id. at 15, 430 S.E.2d at 904 (Meyer, J., dissenting); see also supra note 27.
133. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 15, 430 S.E.2d at 904 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 7, 430 S.E.2d at 899.
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section 24-5(b) and the Financial Responsibility Act, 13 5 even the most ardent supporters of prejudgment interest must concede the infirmity of its
statutory foundation.
In the line of cases leading up to Baxley, the court has shown a marked
tendency to interpret broadly the language of insurance contracts to arrive at
its desired outcome. 136 As a result, however, the court has created inconsistent precedents: It has held that prejudgment interest can properly be considered as both a "cost" 137 (although not a "cost of defense"138 ), and as an
element of "damages." 1 39 The court in Baxley attempted to dispel this inconsistency by stating that "'the facts and issues in the present case are
different from the facts in Lowe to a sufficient degree as to justify a contrary holding.' "140 However, the court failed to discuss any significant factual differences to justify the distinction. In the absence of such an
explanation, one is led to the conclusion that, in the years since Lowe, the
court has agreed to view prejudgment interest as damages, properly
awarded as compensation for tortious injuries. However, the court, possibly
in an effort to preserve flexibility and limit the ability of insurers to avoid
liability by artful drafting, has also refused to expressly overrule the Lowe
holding.
In addition to confusing the costs/damages issue, the court's decision
in Baxley left open a key question: While Sproles allows insurers to limit
their liability for prejudgment interest above their policy limits,141 does the
Financial Responsibility Act mandate such coverage within the policy limits so that insurers cannot contract out of such liability? Or, alternatively,
142
can insurers avoid this liability by carefully drafting contracts?
Should the court continue on its current path, a number of factors indicate that the Financial Responsibility Act will be found to mandate prejudgment interest coverage within the policy limits. First, this result is
consistent with the legislative intent underlying section 24-5(b) and the Financial Responsibility Act. As originally applied to tort claims, prejudg135. WIDDIS, supra note 79, § 31.1, at 3 ("The motor vehicle financial responsibility laws
enacted by the states are designed to provide a prescribed level of minimum protection for those
who may be injured in highway accidents as a consequence of the negligent operation of an
insured vehicle").
136. See supra notes 108-26 and accompanying text.
137. Lowe v. Tarble, 313 N.C. 460, 464, 329 S.E.2d 648, 651 (1985); see also supra notes
108-11 and accompanying text.
138. Sproles v. Greene, 329 N.C. 603, 611,407 S.E.2d 497, 501 (1991); see supra notes 11826 and accompanying text.
139. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 7, 430 S.E.2d at 899; see supranotes 51-57 and accompanying text.
140. Id. at 11 n.1, 430 S.E.2d at 901 n.1 (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. U.S. Fire
Ins. Co., 710 F. Supp. 164, 167 (E.D.N.C. 1989), aff'd, 918 F.2d 955 (4th Cir. 1990)).
141. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
142. Baxley, 334 N.C. at 6, 430 S.E.2d at 899.

1994]

TORT LAW

1829

ment interest was allowed only when the claim was covered by liability
insurance. 1 43 Moreover, its purpose was clearly to provide a more adequate
level of compensation for injured plaintiffs. 44 To hold that the legislature
did not intend recovery of prejudgment interest damages to fall within the
statutory obligation of insurers would defeat the purposes of both
mandatory liability insurance145 and section 24-5(b),146 because plaintiffs
would continue to suffer economic losses occasioned by "judgment-proof"
defendants. For example, if a tortfeasor was covered by a $25,000 liability
policy and caused $10,000 in damages but was insolvent, the injured party
could recover no more than the $10,000 he would have obtained without
section 24-5(b). 47 Given that the purpose of mandatory liability insurance
148
is to protect injured parties from financially irresponsible tortfeasors,
placing prejudgment interest outside the reach of plaintiffs rather than making it subject to the liability limit in the same manner as other damages
would significantly hamper the effectiveness of the Financial Responsibility
Act.
Second, one of the primary arguments in favor of awarding prejudgment interest to plaintiffs is that, because insurers control the litigation process, it is fair to impose the resulting costs upon them. 1 49 If insurers could
contract around this liability, they would have a significant incentive to delay the judicial process.' 5 0 By contrast, holding that insurers are liable for
prejudgment interest within their policy limits would force insurers to
weigh the comparative costs of settlement and trial and encourage early
settlement of meritorious claims.' 5 ' Dictum in Baxley provides explicit
support for such a result. There the court reasoned that, in addition to the
language of section 24-5(b) and the Nationwide policy,
[r]equiring the UIM carrier to pay prejudgment interest up to its
policy limit is not a harsh result since the UIM carrier has had the
opportunity to invest the money during the pendency of the suit.
143. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. The 1985 amendment that resulted in the current formulation of § 24-5 was explicitly aimed at making prejudgment interest available to plaintiffs regardless of the financial position of the defendant. Act of May 21, 1985, ch. 214, § 1, 1985
N.C. Sess. Laws 181 (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-5(b) (1991)) ("An Act to clarify interest
relating to judgments and provide for interest on noncontract judgments regardless of insurance
coverage.").
144. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
147. Presumably, a party who was injured by a solvent defendant would be able to recover the
$10,000 from the tortfeasor's insurer in addition to recovering any prejudgment interest from the
tortfeasor herself.
148. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
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In addition, it is within the UIM carrier's power to stop the accrual 1of
prejudgment interest by offering (or posting) its policy
limit. 52
Third, by equating prejudgment interest and damages in Baxley, 153 the
North Carolina Supreme Court implied that, because the Financial Responsibility Act requires insurers to pay for all damages the insured is legally
entitled to recover and prejudgment interest is an element of damages that
the insured is legally entitled to recover, the insurer is liable for prejudgment interest.
Taking Baxley to its logical conclusion in this manner exposes a key
loophole in the Financial Responsibility Act with respect to prejudgment
interest. Even if it mandates coverage for prejudgment interest within insurance policy limits, because the Act does not mandate payment of prejudgment interest above policy limits, insurers who face claims at or above
their policy limits will face none of the economic pressures that otherwise
would be attributable to prejudgment interest.154 Hence, the goals of early
settlement-relieving crowded court dockets and insuring complete compensation for tort plaintiffs-would be lost in many cases.
Fourth, the insurers' argument that holding them liable for prejudgment interest will force them to raise rates is not, in itself, compelling.
First, insurers would be encouraged to settle more claims at an early date
rather than go to trial, thereby avoiding prejudgment interest on those
claims as well as attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses.155 Thus, an
insurer should be able to estimate the average risk of its policies and calculate its premiums accordingly. Second, if it is the plaintiff rather than the
defendant who forces the trial, insurers could avoid prejudgment interest
costs by making a reasonable offer of settlement.' 56 Finally, to the extent
the loss of profits attributable to prejudgment interest presently being withheld from insureds necessitates an increase in rates, that increase would
merely be a correction for past manipulation of the risk pool and would
result in a more efficient insurance market. To illustrate, assume that both
the rate of return on investments and the legal interest rate are identical at
ten percent and the risk of loss per policy per year is $200 (1/500 chance of
a $100,000 payout). Insurance Company "A" writes policies in a state that
does not require payment of prejudgment interest. As a result, it can invest
the risk component of its premiums during the year and keep any investment return. To achieve the $200 receipts necessary to cover its risk, it
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Baxley, 334 N.C. at 9, 430 S.E.2d at 900.
Id. at 8, 430 S.E.2d at 900.
See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 92-93.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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must charge its insured a total premium of $182 ($182 premium + $18
return on investment = $200 total risk). By contrast, Insurance Company
"B" writes policies in a state that requires payment of prejudgment interest.
In this situation, the insurer must pay any investment return to the claimant
and cannot discount the risk of loss to its present value in arriving at a
sufficient premium. Hence, to achieve the $200 gross income necessary to
cover its risk, the insurance company must charge premiums of $200. In
summary, to the extent that prejudgment interest results in a rate increase, it
does so only because the present system subsidizes the actual risk with income from claimants' money. Under this analysis, insurers should be neutral from a profit perspective toward prejudgment interest.157
The decision in Baxley is thus important for two reasons. First, by
holding that prejudgment interest is an element of compensatory damages,
the decision places such interest well within the language of most insurance
policies and, arguably, within the mandate of the Financial Responsibility
Act. By doing so, Baxley opens the door for tort plaintiffs to receive a
higher level of compensation for their injuries. More importantly, however,
this decision illuminates the failure of the Financial Responsibility Act to
deal adequately with the issue of prejudgment interest. Because of the
loophole created by the coextensive application of the Financial Responsibility Act and section 24-5(b), Baxley should serve as a call for the General
Assembly to reexamine the policy debate surrounding prejudgment interest.
The Assembly should weigh the competing interests of total compensation,
contractual certainty, and affordability and make clear the rules to be applied in automobile insurance cases. Without such a clarification, the law
in this area is likely to continue as an ad hoe series of cases interpreting
minor variations in contract language. As a result, insurance companies,
cognizant of current holdings, will almost certainly decide the issue for
themselves by drafting the language of their policies to exclude additional
coverage for prejudgment interest. Consequently, tort plaintiffs unfortunate
enough to be injured by financially distressed tortfeasors will continue to be
inadequately compensated for their losses.
SHERI

SNELSON HARING

157. On the other hand, it is crucial to remain mindful of the significant interest of insurers in
controlling their liability contractually and the interest of the state in making sure that mandatory
liability insurance remains widely affordable. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.

